Georgia Rug Mill

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 27, 1961

131 N.L.R.B. 1304 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

1304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
expedition" as the placement of many of these employees was specifi-
cally litigated in the hearing preceding execution of the Stipulation.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and
Brown].
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board finds :
On March 9, 1960, IUE stipulated to a unit which did not contain
the categories of employees it seeks by its present request although
it was fully aware of their existence, and indeed had argued for their
inclusion prior to executing the stipulation. Moreover, IUE ex-
pressly waived its rights to urge the eligibility of the employees in
these categories "for the purposes of this election." Accordingly, a
motion to clarify is not the proper method for adding the employees
in these categories to the existing unit. IUE should rather have filed
a representation petition seeking an election among the employees
in these categories to determine whether they desire to be added to
the present unit of production and maintenance employees.' We shall
therefore deny IUE's request for clarification of the certification.
[The Board' denied the request for clarification of certification.]
3 General Electric Company, 127 NLRB 724; United Aircraft Corporation, 124 NLRB
392; General Electric Company, 119 NLRB 1233.
Georgia Rug Mill and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO. Cases Nos. 10-CA-4430 and 10-CA-4457. June 07, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 8, 1961, Trial Examiner David London issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Interme-
diate Report attached hereto. He also recommended that certain other
allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respond-
ent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Re-
port and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and
Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
131 NLRB No. 160.
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1305
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme-
diate Report, the exceptions and the entire record in the case, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner, with the following additions and modifications.
1. THE VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 8 (a) (1)
The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a) (1) of the Act (1) through interrogation of employees about
their union activities, by Supervisors Brooks and Gregg and Person-
nel Manager Dunson; (2) threats of reprisal for union activities by
Brooks and Gregg; and (3) promises of benefit for refraining from
union activities, also by Brooks and Gregg.
These findings were based on conflicting testimony, with one excep-
tion.' The Trial Examiner resolved the credibility issues in favor of
the General Counsel's witness. The Respondent excepts to these find-
ings but suggests no reason why we should set aside the Trial Exam-
iner's resolutions of credibility and we perceive none? Accordingly,
we adopt the foregoing findings.
II. THE VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 8 (a) (3)
Gaines: The Trial Examiner found that Gaines had been unlaw-
fully discharged because of his union activities and not, as Respondent
now contends, because of his intemperate remarks and threat to gen-
eral foreman, Gregg, when the latter taxed him with overstaying his
leave.
We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion, but rely only on
the following considerations :
Prior to his discharge in the last week of February 1960, Gaines had
worked for Respondent for 6 years as the operator of a hyster (a
forklift truck). At the time of his discharge he was assigned to the
third shift, midnight to 8 a.m. About February 15, 1960, Gaines told
Reynolds, who operated a hyster on the second shift, that Gaines in-
tended to apply for leave during the week of February 21. The testi-
mony is in conflict as to whether, as Reynolds testified, Gaines said he
was going to take 2 days' leave or, as Gaines testified, he announced
an intention to take 3 days' or a few days' leave. For reasons stated
below, we do not deem it necessary to resolve this conflict. Reynolds
agreed, in any event, to replace Gaines on the third shift during the
period of his absence, which meant that Reynolds would have to work
both the second and third shift, or 16 hours a day, during Gaines'
absence. On February 19, Gaines applied to Foreman Tucker for
i Powell's testimony concerning interrogation by Brooks was not denied.
2 A factor not stressed by the Trial Examiner, but which tends to support his credibility
determinations , is that all the witnesses credited by him with regard to the violations of
Section 8(a) (1) testified adversely to the Respondent notwithstanding that they were still
in its employ.
1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
leave, and Tucker referred him to Gregg. Gaines repeated his request
to Gregg, who granted it. (Here again there is conflict between
Gaines, on the one hand, who insisted that his request was for 3 days'
leave, and Gregg and Tucker, who testified that it was only for 2 days'
leave.) The leave of absence began at midnight of Sunday, Febru-
ary 21, and Gaines did not report for work again until the following
Wednesday, a few minutes before midnight. He found his timecard
missing from the rack and was told by Tucker that Gregg had his card
and wanted to see him the next morning. Gaines accordingly did not
work that shift, and reported to Gregg the next morning. Gregg asked
Gaines why he had not returned to work Tuesday midnight, and a dis-
cussion ensued as to whether Gaines had asked leave for 2 days or
3 days. When Gaines insisted it was for 3 days, Gregg asked, "Are
you trying to call me a damn liar?" Gaines answered, "No, but if that's
the way you want to put it, you ain't nothing but a damn liar." Gregg
retorted, "Well, you was fired yesterday when you didn't come in then."
The exchange becoming even more heated, Gregg ordered Gaines off
the premises, whereupon Gaines threatened to "whip" Gregg if he
caught him outside the mill. At some point in this exchange, Gregg
told Gaines that he had heard he was "working for the union." 3
The reason given on Gaines' termination notice for his discharge,
which notice was prepared by Personnel Manager Dunson, was that
Gaines had overstayed his leave. However, at the hearing Gregg testi-
fied that he at no time intended to discharge Gaines for that reason,
but the sole purpose of the interview of February 25 was to ascertain
why Gaines had overstayed his leave, and that the decision to dis-
charge Gaines was provoked by his abusive language 4 However, the
Trial Examiner credited Gaines as against Gregg with regard to the
substance of the foregoing interview, including Gaines' crucial testi-
mony that Gregg told him he had already been discharged the day
before for overstaying his leave.' Insufficient reason appears for re-
jecting the Trial Examiner's resolution of credibility. We find there-
fore that Gregg notified Gaines in effect that the decision to discharge
him had been made the previous day, and that Gregg attributed the
decision to Gaines' failure to report for work. This is consistent with
s The foregoing findings as to the altercation between Gregg and Gaines are based on
Gaines ' version, which was credited by the Trial Examiner. Gregg 's version corroborated
Gaines only as to the subject of the argument ( the duration of Gaines' leave of absence),
and the threat by Gaines to whip Gregg , after an exchange of heated words. Gregg
denied making any reference to Gaines ' union activity or that he told Gaines he -had already
been discharged when he failed to report on Tuesday midnight According to Gregg, he
discharged Gaines only after the latter resorted to abusive language.
4 See footnote 3.
5 The Trial Examiner paraphrased this testimony as follows :
During the course of the harangue , Gregg told him that he was discharged for not
reporting the day before . . . .
It would have been more accurate to find , as we do in the text above, that Gregg told
Gaines that he had been discharged the day before.
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1307
the terms of Respondent's separation notice 6 and with the fact that
Gaines' card had already been removed from the rack Wednesday mid-
night and he was not allowed to work that night, admittedly pursuant
to Gregg's instructions.'
If further proof were needed that the discharge of Gaines was not
prompted by the events of February 25, but had been decided upon the
day before, there is the testimony of employee Glen Hughes that in
the morning of Wednesday, February 24, Supervisor Brooks offered e
Gaines' job to Hughes, explaining that Gaines was about to be dis-
charged that very morning for "talking too much."
Accordingly, we find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that
Gaines was not discharged for his intemperate remarks or threat to
Gregg, and that the only reason for his discharge assigned to him by
Gregg was his alleged overstaying of his leave.
However, there is no need to consider whether Gaines in fact over-
stayed his leave or whether that was the true reason for his discharge,
since Respondent, itself, now disclaims that reason.
We turn now to the reason for Gaines' discharge advanced by the
General Counsel namely, that Gaines was discharged for his activity
on behalf of the Union.
As found by the Trial Examiner late in 1959, the Union had
launched a campaign to organize the Respondent's employees. There
is no contradiction in the record of Gaines' testimony that he had
solicited other employees to join the Union, some of them a few weeks
before his discharge, and we have, like the Trial Examiner, credited
Gaines' testimony that at his final interview with Gregg on February
25, the latter stated that he had heard that Gaines was "working for
the Union." We have also, like the Trial Examiner, credited the testi-
mony of Glen Hughes that Brooks told him on February 24 that
Gaines was being discharged for "talking too much."
8 At the hearing, Gregg testified that Dunson had prepared the separation notice before
Gregg had a chance to advise him of the "true " reason for Gaines' discharge, namely,
his insubordinate remarks However , even if we gave no weight to the separation notice,
we would still find, on the basis of Gaines ' credited testimony and the other evidence
recited in the text, that he was told by Gregg on February 25 that he had been discharged
for overstaying his leave.
7 In its brief , Respondent attributes this action to "the fact that Gaines had not re-
ported the previous night; that the man on his job had worked three double shifts; that
the Respondent was faced with the necessity of having someone who would be certain to
run the job." While not clearly stated , the implication of this argument seems to be that
Reynolds , who had substituted for Gaines on the 3 previous days, could no longer be
expected to do so, and it was necessary for Respondent to make arrangements to replace
Gaines with another employee , which arrangements could not have been canceled at the
last moment when Gaines reported for work . However, Reynolds testified , without con-
tradiction , and we find , that he substituted for Gaines on the shift beginning Wednesday
midnight. No explanation is offered by the Respondent as to why, if he did not intend to
discharge Gaines, Gregg chose to let Reynolds work a fourth consecutive 16-hour day, at
overtime rates, rather than excuse Reynolds and let Gaines take over when he reported
for work. This is particularly difficult to square with Gregg 's testimony that he was con-
cerned over Reynolds ' ability to withstand the strain of even 2 days of double-shift work.
8 At one point in the Intermediate Report the Trial Examiner inadvertently attributed
this offer to Gregg Instead of Brooks.
1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Moreover, as already noted, we have adopted the Trial Examiner's
findings that during the first 4 months of 1960, the Respondent,
through various supervisors, including Gregg, violated Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act by such conduct as interrogation of employees
about their union activities, promises of benefit for refraining from
such activity, and threats of reprisal therefor. Of these findings,
those relating to a conversation between employee SentellI and
Brooks have special reference to Gaines. This conversation, we find,
occurred on April 15, 1960. In the course thereof, Brooks told Sentell
that if he were discharged for union activity he "couldn't expect to
get a job in that county." When Sentell asked Brooks whether it
"wasn't against the law to fire people on account of the Union,"
Brooks answered, "yes, but you don't have to put that on the paper."'
Brooks then added, "Look what happened to Walt Hughes, Chester
Bridges, and George Gaines . . . the law hasn't helped them any so
far. . . all they can do is file unfair labor charges." 10
It is clear from the foregoing that Brooks cited the case of Gaines
as an instance of a discharge for union activity for which a different
reason had been assigned by the Respondent. Brooks denied at the
hearing that there had been such a conversation. However, the Trial
Examiner did not credit this denial and the Respondent has suggested
no reason for disagreeing with the Trial Examiner in this respect, and
we perceive none.
There emerges from the foregoing the following outline of the
salient events relating to Gaines' discharge :
On the morning of February 24, the Respondent, being under the
impression, rightly or wrongly, that Gaines had overstayed his leave
by 1 day, decided to utilize this as a pretext for discharging him, the
real reason for his discharge being his union activity. The next day,
Gregg notified Gaines that he had been discharged for overstaying
his leave, whereupon Gaines became belligerent and threatened Gregg.
Thereafter, Gregg, for reasons best known to him, decided to attribute
Gaines' discharge to his flareup on February 25 rather than to his
overstaying of his leave, and took that position at the hearing.
Upon consideration of all the foregoing matters, we find, like the
Trial Examiner, that the General Counsel has established by the
preponderance of the evidence that Gaines was discharged on Febru-
ary 24, 1960,11 for union activity and that the Respondent thereby
violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
9 Sentell was still in Respondent 's employ at the time of the hearing
10 In the interest of clarity , it should be noted that none of the employees named by
Brooks had as yet filed charges. Accordingly , Brooks was necessarily referring to what
the employees might do and not to what they had done
"The Trial Examiner at one point in his Intermediate Report referred to the discharge
as occurring on February 25, but in the section of the report entitled "The Remedy," he
adopted the February 24 date. The latter date is more accurate , as we have found that
the discharge was effective as of that date, although Gaines was not advised thereof until
the next day.
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1309
Walter Hughes: The General Counsel excepts to the Trial Ex-
aminer's failure to find that Hughes was discharged for union activity
and that the Respondent discriminated against Hughes with respect
to the assignment of overtime work.13
Hughes was employed by the Respondent for about 5 years prior to
his discharge on April 8, 1960. He attended a union meeting in Janu-
ary 1960. Glen Hughes i3 testified that in January 1960 he was inter=
rogated about this meeting by Supervisor Brooks and that Brooks
commented that he knew who attended the meeting. The Trial Ex-
aminer made no reference to this comment, which was denied by
Brooks. However, the Trial Examiner refused to credit Brooks'_
denial of other statements attributed to him by Glen Hughes on'the
same occasion, including the foregoing interrogation about the Janu-
ary meeting. As we have adopted the Trial Examiner's credibility
rulings with regard to the rest of this conversation, we credit Glen
Hughes' imputation to Brooks of an admission that he knew who
attended the January meeting. Walter Hughes testified, without
contradiction, that a few months before his discharge he complained to
Supervisor Pettit that he was not receiving his fair share of overtime
work, and that Pettit, while denying any discrimination against
Hughes, remarked that he was "working against the company." When
asked by Hughes to explain this statement, Pettit replied, "You're
working with these union boys," and Pettit admonished him to be
"careful" or his situation could be "a lot worse than what it is." 14
However, like the Trial Examiner, we do not believe that the evi-
dence preponderates in favor of a finding that there was any discrimi-
nation against Hughes with respect to overtime. Hughes testified that
he believed that during the last 2 or 3 months of his employment he
received less overtime work than the other employees, but, on cross-
examination , he admitted that he did not know whether he in fact
received less overtime work than the other employees or whether there
were occasions when he worked overtime and the other employees did
not. He also admitted that since January 1960 there had been a gen-
eral decline in overtime work. While we have credited his account
of his conversation with Pettit about his complaint concerning cur-
tailment of overtime, Pettit at the outset of that conversation as noted
above, denied that there had been any discrimination in that regard.
It is true that Pettit taxed Hughes with "working with these union
boys,"' and concluded the conversation with the admonition that unless
12 The overtime issue is not treated in the Intermediate Report. However , at the hear-
ing the Trial Examiner granted the Respondent 's motion to strike the pertinent paragraph
of the complaint.
"There was no evidence of any family relationship between Glen Hughes and Walter
Hughes.
14 Although Pettit testified at the hearing, he was not questioned about these remarks
The Intermediate Report makes no references to this conversation . We credit Hughes'
version thereof , in the absence of any denial by Pettit.
1310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hughes was careful he would find himself in a much worse position.
The General Counsel contends that this should be construed as an
admission that Hughes was in fact being deprived of overtime be-
cause of his union activity. However, in view of the vagueness of
Hughes' own testimony as to the extent of his loss of overtime, and
the ambiguity of Pettit's remarks insofar as they dealt with the sub-
ject matter of Hughes' complaint, we do not believe that the record
warrants a finding that Hughes in fact received less than his fair share
of overtime work during the period in question. Accordingly, as an
essential element of a finding of unlawful discrimination in that re-
gard is lacking, we shall dismiss this allegation of the complaint.
However, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Hughes'
discharge on April 8 was for union activity. Hughes' wages were
garnished twice within a space of 3 months, and Personnel Manager
Dunson testified, without contradiction, and we find, that on the occa-
sion of the first garnishment, late in January 1960, he warned Hughes
that it was the Respondent's policy that two garnishments of an em-
ployee's wages within 3 months would result in "automatic discharge."
The second garnishment of Hughes' wages was received on April 7
and Hughes was discharged the next day, by order of Roberts, the
plant production manager, after consultation with Dunson. Dunson
testified, without contradiction, and we find, that three other em-
ployees had been discharged for excessive garnishments during' his
3-year tenure as personnel manager. However, he admitted on cross-
examination that one of these three employees might have been sub-
jected to above five garnishments, and, as to another, he was unable
to recall whether or not the employee in question had received as many
as six garnishments. In any event, there was no evidence that any
other employee had been discharged, as was true in the case of Hughes,
for only two garnishments.ib Moreover, Dunson admitted that the
Respondent's alleged policy of discharging for- two garnishments
within 3 months was not an inflexible one but that other factors, such
as the employee's financial circumstances, were considered, and that
Dunson had not questioned Hughes about the reasons for his plight.
It is clear therefore that, according to Dunson's own testimony,
Respondent had no firm and inflexible policy of discharging for two
garnishments within 3 months, but that other factors were weighed.
Considered against this background, certain testimony by employee
Sentell relating to a conversation with Supervisor Brooks about
Hughes' discharge takes on special significance. It has already been
found that on April 15, 1960, about a week after Hughes' discharge,
Brooks cited to Sentell the discharge of Hughes, among others, as an
instance of a discharge for union activity. When Sentell asked Brooks
15 There was no denial of Hughes ' testimony that these were the only garnishments he
Thad received during his 5 years with the Respondent.
GEORGIA RUG MILL I - 1311
if Hughes had not been discharged because of garnishments, Brooks
agreed, but when Sentell inquired further whether other employees
had not been garnished, Brooks answered that they had but that the
Respondent "tried to take care of people that wanted to do right and
were on the right side." 16 Adding to this the credited testimony of
Glen Hughes as to Brooks' admission that he knew who attended the
union meeting in January 1960,11 and Pettit's taxing of Walter Hughes
with "working against the Company" and for the Union, coupled with
Pettit's warning to Hughes that if he were not careful his situation
"could be a lot worse" than it was, we believe that the evidence war-
rants a finding that Hughes' union activity 18 was the true reason for
his discharge, and that by such discharge the Respondent violated
Section 8 ( a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
Chester Bridges: Bridges was employed by the Respondent as a
machine operator from December 1956 to his discharge on April 12,
1960. Bridges testified, without contradiction, and we find, that he
attended union meetings in 1960, including one on April 9, and that
he talked to some employees about the Union, in aid of the Union's
organizational campaign.
As already related, on April 15, 3 days after Bridges' discharge,
Brooks cited the case of Bridges to Sentell as an instance of a dis-
charge for union activity. Bridges testified, without contradiction,
and we find, that on April 1, while at his machine, he was asked by
two other employees about the eligibility of employees to vote in a
pending Board election, in which the Union was one of the choices
on the ballot, that at the same time Supervisor Tucker approached the
group, that Bridges told the other employees he didn't know who
could vote in the election but that they could find out by attending
union meetings , that at this point the employees became aware of
Tucker's presence and the other two employees addressed to him their
question about eligibility, and that Bridges then volunteered the in-
formation that all except office employees were eligible to vote. We
find, therefore, .that Bridges, within Tucker's presence, conveyed to
the other employees information about voting eligibility, which infor-
mation Bridges had just told them, as Tucker approached, was obtain-
able at union meetings. ,
16 While crediting, notwithstanding Brooks' denial , Sentell's testimony regarding the
rest of his conversation with Brooks on April 15 , the Trial Examiner made no reference
to the portion of that conversation summarized in the last sentence of the text. As we
perceive nothing in this portion of the conversation that would render it less credible
than the remainder of the conversation as reported by Sentell , we reject Brooks' denial and
find that he made the statements so attributed to him.
17 As already noted , Walter Hughes was present at that meeting
11 While such activity was not pronounced , consisting only of attendance at one union
meeting, the statements of Pettit to Hughes and of Brooks to Sentell indicate either that
the Respondent regarded even such minimal union activity as ground for discharge or
believed that Hughes ' activity was more extensive than it in fact was . In either case, the
discharge would be unlawful.
1312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The next day Bridges was suspended for 1 week. The reason as-
signed was that he had run wrinkles in the backing of a rug, which
resulted in a defective product. The Trial Examiner found that the
wrinkles extended for about 9 feet and were more extensive than any
produced by other operators. He found further that Production
Manager Roberts, after investigating the matter, concluded that the
wrinkles were caused by carelessness on the part of Bridges and that
Respondent's management thereafter decided to discipline Bridges by
laying him off for 1 week.
The General Counsel excepts to the Trial Examiner's failure to find
any violation of the Act in Bridges' layoff, contending that the motiva-
tion for the layoff was not any defective work by Bridges but rather
his "expression of union sympathies in the presence" of his foreman,
Tucker, the day before his layoff. However, there is insufficient
evidence that Tucker was actually close enough to hear any part of
the employees' conversation on that occasion other than Bridges' re-
mark that all except office employees were eligible to vote. As there
was no evidence that such information was known only to union ad-
herents, we are unwilling to infer that Tucker suspected from this
remark that Bridges was a union adherent.19 The General Counsel,
in his brief, seeks, moreover, to minimize Bridges' responsibility for the
wrinkles, suggesting that Bridges' foreman or his machine may have
been at fault. However, we find insufficient basis in the record for
exonerating Bridges of responsibility for the wrinkling of the carpet.
Upon consideration of all the circumstances, we find that Bridges'
suspension has not been shown to be discriminatory.
On April 9, during his layoff, Bridges attended a union meeting
which was held in a restaurant. To prove Respondent's knowledge of
that meeting, the General Counsel adduced testimony by employee
Miller that on April 12,, Supervisor Brooks asked him, " How was the
supper the other night.?" Brooks denied making this statement.
Even if we credit Miller's testimony,2° we do not believe that it war-
rants the inference that Brooks knew that Bridges had attended the
meeting.
When Bridges returned on April 11 from his layoff, he was'assigned
to the same machine as before, and, as a result of the malfunctioning
of the machine, a hole about 8 feet long was torn in the carpet on the
machine. The Trial Examiner found that this was the most exten-
sive hole ever torn in a carpet in Respondent's plant, and he also found
in effect that Bridges should have stopped his machine before the hole
10 The General Counsel does not, in his brief, rely on any other aspect of Bridges' union
activity as motivating his suspension while Bridges testified that he attended union
meetings in 1960, the only one he identified by date was the meeting on April 9, about a
week after his suspension . He did not give the dates or places of his solicitation of other
employees . Brooks' statement to Sentell of April 15 appears to have related only to
Bridges' subsequent discharge on April 12, and not to his suspension on April 2.
20 The Trial Examiner makes no reference to this testimony.
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1313
developed.21 In view of the seriousness of the "tear" incident, and
its proximity to the "wrinkle" incident, the Trial Examiner found that
the Respondent "reasonably concluded that it could no longer tolerate
[Bridges'] incompetence and that he should for that reason be
discharged."
The General Counsel, in his brief, cites the testimony of one of Re-
spondent's menders, Powell, that he once repaired a tear in a carpet
about 6 feet long, which was produced on a machine operated by Tudor
and that Tudor had not been disciplined therefor. However, Tudor
testified that the largest hole he had ever torn was only a foot and a
half long. The Trial Examiner did not refer to this testimony of
Powell or Tudor. However, even if we credit Powell on this point, the
fact would still remain that, so far as the record shows, the 8-foot
tear produced on Bridges' machine was the largest in Respondent's
experience.
It would seem therefore that Respondent had ground to discharge
Bridges. The question remains, however, whether he was in fact dis-
charged because of the "tear" incident or for union activity. The
only probative evidence that Respondent regarded Bridges as a union
adherent or that his discharge was for union activity is Sentell's
credited testimony that Brooks, on April 15, cited Bridges' case as an
example of a discharge for union activity. While this statement, as,
in the case of Gaines and Hughes, gives rise to a strong inference that
Bridges was in fact discharged for union activity, that inference we
believe is adequately rebutted here by the cogency of the Respondent's
defense. As pointed out by the Trial Examiner, the fact that on the
very first day after his return from a nondiscriminatory suspension
for defective work Bridges caused such extensive and unprecedented.
damage to its product could reasonably be expected to shake the Re-
spondent's confidence in his competence. The decision to discharge
him seems to have been a logical one under the circumstances, and one
that might well have been deemed necessary to prevent further damage
to Respondent's product from Bridges' incompetence 22 Accordingly,
we find, like the Trial Examiner, that the General Counsel has not,
proved that Bridges' discharge was for union activity.
THE REMEDY
The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner's recommendation.
that Gaines be reinstated with backpay, contending that, even if his,
n The Trial Examiner found that the carpet material on the machine "puckers" when a
hole is about to develop and that Bridges should have seen this pucker and stopped the
machine at once.
^ The General Counsel contends that the damage caused by Bridges occurred at the end
of a roll of carpet backing, which would have had to be scrapped in any event However,
the record is not clear on this point. In any event, the question is not how much monetary
loss Respondent had actually suffered, but the potential loss that might be caused by an _
employee who was as unreliable as Bridges had demonstrated himself to be
599198-62-vol. 131 84
1314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
discharge was unlawful, he disqualified himself for reinstatement by
his insulting and insubordinate remarks to Gregg on February 25,
including his threat to "whip" him. The Trial Examiner rejected
this contention on the ground that Gaines' conduct was not so serious
as to warrant denial of the usual remedy, and in this connection the
Trial Examiner stressed the fact that Gregg was no longer in the
Respondent's employ. It follows that the strained relation between
Gregg and Gaines is no longer a factor militating against his rein-
statement . We agree with the Trial Examiner , for the reasons cited
by him, that Gaines' conduct does not bar his reinstatement 2'
As we have found, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the dis-
charge of Walter Hughes on April 8, 1960, was for union activity, we
shall grant him the usual remedy. However, in accord with our usual
practice, backpay as to him will be tolled from the date of issuance of
the Intermediate Report to the date of this Decision and Order.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Georgia Rug Mill, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of its employees, by
discharging or refusing to reinstate any of its employees or by dis-
criminating in any other manner in regard to their employment.
(b) Threatening employees with loss of employment or other re-
prisals because of membership in, or assistance to, the Union named
above, or any other labor, organization.
(c) Interrogating employees concerning their membership in, or
activities on behalf of, the Union or any other labor organization, in
a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation
of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
(d) Creating or fostering the impression among its employees that
it is engaged in surveillance of their union activities.
(e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
35 See J. P Stevens & Cc , Inc., 125 NLRB 1354 , 1355, 1379. There the Board adopted
the Trial Examiner 's recommendation that an employee found to have been discrimina-
torily discharged , and to have threatened his supervisor with physical violence after the
discharge , be reinstated to a job at a plant of the respondent other than the one in which
his supervisor worked.
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1315
other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such
activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer George W. Gaines and Walter Hughes immediate and
full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make them whole, in the manner set forth in the sections of the
Intermediate Report and of this Decision and Order entitled "The
Remedy," for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of
the Respondent's discrimination.
(b) Upon request, make available to the Board, or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records,'social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due.
(c) Post at its plant in Summerville, Georgia, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix." 24 Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after
being duly signed by Respondent, be posted by Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter in conspicuous places including all places where
notices are customarily posted. Reasonable, steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it
alleges violations other than those found above.
a+ In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Textile Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of our
employees, or in any other manner discriminate in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of their
employment.
1316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL offer to George W. Gaines and Walter Hughes im-
mediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions without prejudice to any seniority or other
rights previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of
pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against them.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with economic reprisals or loss
of employment because of their union affiliations and activities or
assistance to the union named above.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their mem-
bership in, or activities on behalf of, the above-designated Union,
or any other labor organization, in a manner constituting inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of
the above-named Act.
WE WILL NOT create or foster the impression among our em-
ployees that we are engaged in surveillance of their union
activities.
IVE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the
above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to
engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any
or all such activities.
GEORGIA RUG MILL,
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed by Textile Workers Union of America„ AFL-CIO, herein
called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by
the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, issued .his consolidated complaint against
Georgia Rug Mill , herein called Respondent . With respect to the unfair labor
practices, the complaint alleges, in substance , that Respondent (1) discharged three-
named employees on specified dates, and otherwise discriminated against two of
them, because of their union or concerted activities ; ( 2) engaged in specified acts
of interference, restraint , and coercion ; and (3) has thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1)
and (3), and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as.
amended. By its duly filed Answer, Respondent denied the commission of any un-
fair labor practices.
At the hearing held before me at Rome , Georgia, on August 2 and 3, 1960, all
parties were represented by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to examine and cross -examine witnesses, to present oral argument , and to file briefs
Since the close of the hearing, briefs have been received from the General Counsel'
and Respondent and have been duly considered.
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1317
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent, during all times material herein, was a Georgia corporation with an
office and place of business at Summerville, Georgia, where it is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of carpets and related products. During the 12 months pre-
ceding the issuance of the complaint, Respondent sold and shipped products valued
in excess of $50,000 from its Summerville plant directly to customers located outside
the State of Georgia. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is, and has been at all
times material herein, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and I find, that Textile Workers Union
of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
In October or November 1959, the Union revived a campaign, initiated in 1958,
to organize Respondent's plant of approximately 300 employees. As a part of that
drive, the Union held a meeting in nearby Broomtown, Alabama, in the latter part
of January 1960, and held other meetings thereafter. It also distributed circulars
at entrances to the plant.
A substantial part of the testimony offered by the General Counsel and received
at the hearing concerned itself with alleged specific conduct constituting interference,
restraint, and coercion of Respondent's employees by its supervisors in violation of
Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. In answer thereto, the accused supervisors denied the
allegedly illegal conduct and statements attributed to them by the General Counsel's
witnesses. Disposition of this phase of the case, therefore, presents for the most
part, if not entirely, a pure credibility problem A summary of the testimony per-
taining to that alleged violative conduct by Respondent's supervisors follows im-
mediately below.
Charles Brooks
Employee Glen H. Hughes testified that toward the end of January 1960 Foreman
Brooks asked him whether he had attended the union meeting at the Broomtown
Community Center. When Hughes replied that he did not attend that meeting be-
cause he did not know about it, Brooks told him that he thought that Hughes "had
better sense than to get mixed up in that thing [and that he] had a bright future
with the Company if [he'd] leave the Union alone and stay along on their side of
the fence."
Employee W. A. Sentell testified that on April 15, 1960, Foreman Brooks came
to where he was working and told him he wanted to talk to him about the
Union because he had heard that Sentell was "a union man." When Sentell ad-
mitted that he was, Brooks asked how the Union could help him and told him that
the Company was paying all it could afford to pay and that as soon as it was able,
it would pay more. Brooks then stated that if Sentell "was fired on account of the
Union, [he] couldn't expect to get a job in that county." Sentell further testified
that when he asked Brooks whether it "wasn't against the law to fire people on
account of the Union" Brooks answered, "Yes, but you don't have to put that on
the paper." According to Sentell, Brooks then said, "Look what happened to Walt
Hughes, Chester Bridges, and George Gaines (the three alleged discriminatees here-
in) the law hasn't helped them any so far . . . all they can do is file unfair labor
charges."
Employee James D. Powell testified that during a day immediately following a
union meeting in March or April 1960, Brooks told him that he had heard that
Powell had attended union meetings and that he knew that employees Fred Kelly
and Grady Rowlls also were "union men." During the course of the conversation,
Brooks reminded Powell that he was "hungry when [he] came to work" for Re-
spondent.
Lorenz Gregg
Glen Hughes testified that about a week after Brooks questioned him about his
attendance at the union meeting, Lorenz Gregg, general foreman of the needling
department, asked him what he thought about the Union, and told him that he had
1318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a bright future with the Company and "was qualified for a crew leader if [he]
wouldn't get mixed up in the Union."
Employee Grady Rowlls testified that in about mid-February 1960, Gregg told
him that he had heard that Rowils was asking other employees to join the Union.
Gregg added that while it was Rowlls' privilege to do so, if he heard of it any more,
he would fire him.
S. A. Dunson
Employees Powell and Bryan testified that in March or April, and on April 22,
1960, Dunson, Respondent's personnel manager, asked each of them, individually,
what he thought about the Union.
Supervisors Brooks, Gregg, and Dunson appeared as witnesses for Respondent
and denied making the inquiries or threats attributed to them by the employees
named above.
Being fully mindful of the weight which the Board and the courts attach to the
credibility findings of the Trial Examiner and the responsibility which that precept
imposes on me, consideration of the entire record, coupled with my observation of
the demeanor of the witnesses involved, have nevertheless brought me to the conclu-
sion that the interrogation and threatening statements attributed to Supervisors
Brooks, Gregg, and Dunson, as testified to by the employees named above, were
in fact made. By that conduct Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The Discharge of Gaines
George W. Gaines had been employed by Respondent for approximately 6 years
when he was discharged on February 25, 1960, at which time he was engaged as a
hyster forklift operator on the third shift, midnight to 8 a.m . At the conclusion of
the last day that he actually worked, the morning of February 19, he went to Fore-
man Gregg and asked whether he could be off for 3 days so that he could drive his
wife to visit a sick aunt in Florida. He told Gregg that he had made arrangements
with Reynolds, the hyster operator on the preceding second shift, to double up on
Gaines' shift during the latter's absence. Gregg asked him to wait until he could
consult with Brooks and returned a few minutes later and informed Gaines that his
request was granted.
Gaines reported for work at about 11:45 p.m. Wednesday, February 24, having
missed 3 days' work, and found his timecard missing from the rack. He asked
Tucker, the night supervisor, for its whereabouts and was told that Gregg, who was
not then in the plant, had the card and wanted to talk to him. Gaines went home
and returned to the plant about 8 a .m. of the following morning for his interview
with Gregg.
At that time, Gregg asked Gaines why he did not return to work the day before.
When Gaines answered that he was not supposed to return the previous day,
Gregg stated that Gaines had only requested leave for 2 days. Gaines insisted
that his request had been for 3 days.' Gregg asked whether he was being ac-
cused of being "a damn liar." Gaines replied: "No, but if that's the way you
want to put it, you ain't nothing but a damn liar." Further angry and profane
words were exchanged between the two men at the conclusion of which, Gaines
threatened to whip him if he ever caught him outside the mill . During the course
of the harangue, Gregg told him that he was discharged for not reporting the day
before, and that he had heard that Gaines "was working for the Union."
Thereafter, Gaines received through the mail a copy of a separation notice, signed
by Dunson as personnel manager , dated February 26, 1960, giving the following
reason for his discharge:
This employee was granted a 2-day leave of absence and specifically instructed
to return to his job at the end of that period. When employee did return late
he could furnish no reason for failing to be back when instructed, and in con-
sideration of this and his past record, he was discharged.
The findings contained in the preceding paragraphs pertaining to Gaines' dis-
charge are based on the testimony of Gaines. The only substantial manner in which
that testimony varies from that offered by Gregg is that the latter testified that
Gaines asked for leave of only 2 days, his denials that he told Gaines that he was
being discharged for not reporting the day before or that he had heard that Gaines
was working for the Union. I credit Gaines' testimony and reject Gregg' s version
' I do not credit Gregg's testimony that during this conversation Gaines stated that he
had asked for a "few days' leave."
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1319
of the conversations between the two men wherein it varies from that given by
Gaines.
Gregg testified that during the same Friday morning when Gaines asked for his
leave, he prepared a written leave-of-absence notice indicating that Gaines had asked
for leave of 2 days. He further testified, however, that on the following Monday
afternoon, when Gaines had been gone only 1 workday, he asked Reynolds, with
whom Gaines had made arrangements to be his substitute -and of which Gregg had
been advised, how many days Reynolds was going to work for Gaines? I find it
incredible to believe that Gregg would have made this inquiry if he had , in fact,
made a true written memorandum of Gaines' request on the previous workday.
Further doubt is aroused concerning Gregg's testimony that he expected Gaines
back after a leave of only 2 days by Reynolds' testimony that on Tuesday night,
before the commencement of the third shift, he "was told to stay a few minutes and
see if [Gaines] did come in." This, notwithstanding the absence of any offer of
proof that Gaines was not going to report for work that night, or that he had ever,
at'any time before, overstayed a leave.
On the entire record and my observation of the witnesses who testified pertaining
to the incidents in question, I find that Gaines asked for, and was granted , leave of
absence for 3 days.
Inconsistently with the reason ascribed by Gregg at the time of Gaines' discharge
and confirmed by the separation notice aforementioned, Respondent, for the first
time, at the hearing, and in its brief , states that "Gaines was discharged by Respond-
ent as the result of his deliberate , gross insubordination and insulting language to his
supervisor when asked to explain his having overstayed a leave of absence which
had been granted him."
In refutation of that theory , however , is the testimony of Glen Hughes, which
I credit, that the day before Gaines was allegedly fired for insubordination, Foreman
Brooks asked Hughes whether he would be interested in taking the hyster job on the
third shift, explaining that the occupant of that job was going to be fired that
morning because "he'd been talking too much." Though Brooks denied telling
Hughes that he was going to fire Gaines because he had been talking too much, he
admitted that he told Hughes that he "might need two hyster operators." He made
no mention of why one of the vacancies existed, but stated that the "other" one
was brought about by the quitting, or prospective quitting, of Dan Stowe, the first
shift hyster driver. Brooks further testified that Hughes told him he would "love"
to have the hyster's job, "except on the third shift."
On the entire record I find that Gaines was discharged neither for overstaying
his leave as assigned by Gregg and asserted in the separation notice, nor because of
insubordination as urged upon me in Respondent's brief. The first is rejected on three
grounds; (1) Gregg's testimony, as summarized in Respondent's brief, "that at the
time he called Gaines in about overstaying his leave, he did not intend to discharge
him, but merely to find out why he overstayed his leave"; (2) if that were all that
Gregg then had in mind, why did he leave instructions not to allow Gaines to report
for work Wednesday night? If Gregg only wanted, as he testified, to determine
whether Gaines had a "good reason" for allegedly overstaying his leave, that could
have been determined upon his return, whenever it occurred; (3) Gregg's inquiry of
Hughes, on the day before Gaines engaged in his argument with Gregg, whether
Hughes was interested in the hyster's job on the third shift; (4) though Tucker,
Gaines' immediate supervisor , testified that he "figured [Gaines ] would be back
on the third night" and that he never knew of him to overstay a leave, why, during
Tuesday evening, before Gaines' allegedly scheduled return, was Reynolds asked
to stay and see if Gaines reported for work? Respondent's explanation for Gaines'
discharge as advanced in its brief is rejected on grounds (2) and (3) immediately
above, and the following additional considerations.
Without condoning Gaines' use of profane and threatening remarks at the time
of his discharge , his conduct on the day in question cannot be considered in isolation,
but must be appraised in light of the circumstances then existing. At that time,
he had already been unjustifiably deprived of 1 day's work. It is, therefore, not
surprising that he resentment was further aroused when, upon being accused of
"working for the Union," Gregg injected into the conversation what Gaines could
reasonably have construed as, and I find to be, a pretext fraught with further and
more drastic action against him. It is against this background that Gaines' conduct
must be assessed. It should also be noted that Gaines' profanity and threats were
2 Reynolds , who appeared as a witness for Respondent and was still in, its employment at
the time of the hearing herein, also testified that Gregg made this inquiry of him "before
[Gaines] was supposed to have been back "
1320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
uttered in privacy, and not in the presence of other employees, and that Gregg is no
longer employed by Respondent. I do not credit Gregg's testimony that he imposed
this privacy because Gaines "might have a reason for overstaying his leave that he
might not want to say in the office in the presence of others." Instead, I find that
Gregg, having already determined to fire Gaines, sought this privacy in anticipation
of a vigorous reaction to such discharge by Gaines.
Having found that Gaines was not discharged for either of the reasons assigned
by Respondent, search must be made elsewhere to determine the true reason for his
discharge. Gaines had been employed by Respondent for more than 6 years, and
though his "past record" was given as one of the reasons for his termination, not
a shred of evidence of "past" misconduct or inefficiency on his part was offered by
Respondent. Indeed, Foreman Tucker, who had been working with Gaines approxi-
mately 7 years, "couldn't say anything bad" about his work record, and that he
"had a good record of dependability and punctuality in the type of work he did" for
him.
The record does establish, however, that while the union campaign was in progress,
Gaines had "been talking all over the mill about the Union," and that Gregg knew
that he "was working for the Union." No other valid reason having been estab-
lished why he was discharged, I can only conclude that Gaines was fired for his union
activities and that the belated reason assigned for his discharge was, and is, a mere
pretext. By that discharge, Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
The Discharge of Hughes
Walter Hughes, who the General Counsel contends was discharged for his union
activity, was employed by Respondent for almost 5 years when he was discharged
on April 8, 1960. In the latter part of 1958, when Foreman Brooks asked him what
he thought about the Union, Hughes replied that he was "for it 100 percent." The
only evidence of his union activity however, is that he attended the meeting in
Broomtown in January 1960.
Respondent contends that Hughes was discharged "as a result of Respondent's
normal policy that any employee who received two garnishments within a 3-month
period was automatically tobe separated."
In December 1958, Respondent received a letter from Montgomery Ward & Co.
in reference to a delinquent account of Hughes in the amount of $131 and asking
Respondent to bring this to the attention of Hughes. On September 3, 1959, another
letter was received from Montgomery Ward in reference to the same account. In
late January 1960, Respondent was served with a garnishment issued against Hughes'
wages by the Summerville Triom Ice and Coal Company. On March 8, 1960,
Respondent received another letter from Montgomery Ward still attempting to
collect the balance of $131 due from Hughes since 1958.
On April 6, 1960, Respondent received a letter from a law firm in Rome, Georgia,
regarding a debt due by Hughes to C & S Jewelers in the amount of $81.48 The
letter advised Respondent that efforts to collect this account from Hughes were un-
successful and enlisted Respondents' aid in securing payment of this debt so as to
forestall garnishment proceedings. On the next day, April 7, 1960, Respondent was
served with another garnishment against Hughes brought by the Rome Hardware
Company. "At about the same time," Respondent received a notice from the Kay
Bee Store at Rome, Georgia, advising Respondent that it was about to institute pro-
ceedings against Hughes, and that it might be necessary to have Respondent appear
to testify in garnishment proceedings.
When the first garnishment against Hughes by the Triom Ice and Coal Company
was served on Respondent in January 1960, Foreman Pettit told Hughes about the
garnishment and informed him that he must keep his financial situation straightened
out. Personnel Director Dunson also discussed the matter with Hughes and told
him that the Respondent did not discharge an employee for their first garnishment,
but "if a person gets two garnishments within a period of 3 months, then that is an
-automatic discharge."
After this interview and the letters above described, the second garnishment
against Hughes was served on Respondent. Dunson took the matter up with Rob-
erts, the plant production manager, and laid before him all the facts heretofore
found pertaining to Hughes' financial difficulties. After reviewing all the facts,
Roberts ordered his discharge and Hughes was thereupon separated from Respond-
ent's employment.
On the entire record, I find that the General Counsel has not established by a
-preponderance of the evidence that Hughes was discharged for the reasons alleged
in the complaint and will therefore recommend that those allegations be dismissed.
GEORGIA RUG MILL 1321
The Alleged Discrimination Against Chester Bridges
The complaint alleges that on or about April 2, 1960, Respondent laid off and
suspended Chester Bridges for a period of 1 week and discharged him on April 12,
1960, all because of his union activities.
Respondent , on the other band , contends Bridges "was discharged for carelessness
and inefficiency resulting in the ruining of a large amount of carpet after he had been
previously warned and disciplined for inattention to his job."
Bridges was employed by Respondent from December 12, 1956, to April 11, 1960.
At the time of his discharge, and for an undisclosed period prior thereto, Bridges
was engaged as the operator of a cut pile, tufted carpet machine approximately 15
feet in width. In the manufacture of a cut pile carpet, its backing comes up from
a large roll in the front part of the machine holding it firmly as it goes through the
needle bar, a process in view of the operator standing in front of the machine. As
the needle pulls the yarn through the backing, each loop is out automatically by
one of approximately a thousand knives. If a knife should fail to cut the yarn,
the carpet builds up on the looper and, as it continues to pull, the backing becomes
tighter causing a pucker. If a pucker develops, and the machine is not stopped
immediately, the yam looper inevitably tears or mars the carpet.
As the operator of the machine, Bridges was posted at the front thereof where it
was his duty to be "constantly patroling the machine for trouble." His machine,
like that of all the other operators, was equipped with an automatic cutoff in the
event trouble occurred which cutoffs, however, did not function perfectly on any
of the machines. Like the other operators, Bridges was therefore equipped with a
switch on an extension cord which he was to utilize to stop the machine. If the
operator does his job properly, and gives it the attention it requires, a pucker can
be stopped almost immediately after it develops.
At approximately 2 a.m. of April 2, 1960, while Bridges was operating his ma-
chine, the backing developed wrinkles over a length of approximately 3 to 4 yards
resulting in bare spots of carpet where only its backing was left exposed, without
yarn. When the mender observed the difficulty the machine was in, he went to
the office of the third shift foreman, Tucker, and told him that wrinkles had de-
veloped which he did not think he could mend. Tucker returned to the machine
and told Bridges to stop the machine because he was making "nothing but a bunch
of imperfects" which could not be mended.
Tucker testified that he had never before seen that many wrinkles in a carpet
or any so long, an appraisal with which Supervisor Gregg concurred when Tucker
called the matter to his attention. Gregg asked Bridges why he did not stop the
machine when the first bad wrinkle appeared. Bridges answered that, instead of
shutting the machine off, he "pulled on the carpet and tried to get the wrinkles
out." Gregg replied that he "should have stopped tthe machine down and gone to
[his] shift foreman and shown it to him, and let him make a decision as to whether
to stop that machine down, cut the backing fabric out, put on another roll, or what."
The matter was called to the attention of Roberts, the production manager, who,
upon examination, characterized the damaged carpet as the worst he had ever
seen. After consulting with the head machine fixer, Roberts concluded that nothing
but "pure carelessness" by Bridges was responsible for the damaged carpet. He
conferred with the plant manager and Dunson, and the three men agreed that dis-
ciplinary action, a layoff of 1 week, was required and it was immediately imposed.
During the first morning on Bridges' return to work, a hole 8 feet 2 inches long
was torn in the carpet on his machine before he stopped the machine. Bridges
attributed this mishap to broken loops, or because the "knives would quit," and that
his failure to stop the machine earlier was due to the fact that on this particular
machine he could not see a hole because of the intervening needles between him
and the developing hole. Foremen Mitchell and Pettit testified however, that if an
operator pays close attention to his job, it can be observed. Whether the hole can
be seen from the position in front of the machine or not, the record establishes that
when either of the causes assigned by Bridges for the holes occurs, the backing, in,
clear view of the operator, begins to pucker or tighten and the machine should be
stopped immediately.
As found above, the hole in the carpet under consideration was 8 feet 2 inches
long. John Tudor, another machine operator, employed by Respondent for 7ih
years, testified that the longest tear he ever had in a carpet was 18 inches. Jerry
Bridges,3 the mender on the machine in question, testified that the longest hole he
ever saw on that machine was only 6 to 8 inches long. Foreman Mitchell testified;
8 Not related to Chester Bridges
1322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that he never saw a hole ras large as the one caused by Bridges. Pettit, general
foreman, testified that the longest rip or tear that he ever saw in the backing of a
carpet was 8 to 12 inches. Though Production Manager Roberts admitted that he
had previously never disciplined any employee "for making holes in rugs," he tes-
tified that he never saw a hole in a carpet over 12 inches long.
When the torn carpet was first called to Roberts' attention, he inquired of the
head mechanic or fixer "whether anything had happened to the machine" that would
cause that large a tear and received a negative answer. He then consulted the plant
manager, and the personnel manager, and recommended that because this incident
occurred the very first night after the previous layoff "for careless work," that
Bridges be discharged. ' The other two men agreed with that recommendation and
the action was taken.
In support of the allegations in the complaint that Bridges was both laid off, and
later discharged, because of his union membership or activities, Bridges testified that
he attended "some" union meetings in 1959 and 1960. He further testtified that the
night before he received the disciplinary layoff of 1 week, two employees engaged
him in conversation concerning what groups of employees would be eligible to vote
in the coming election and directed the same inquiry to Foreman Tucker who
approached the position where the employees were standing. Tucker replied that he
did not know, while Bridges stated that anybody could vote except those who "work
in the office or push a pencil."
Assuming, arguendo, that by reason of the foregoing, and the remainder of the
record, that there is sufficient evidence to establish that Respondent had knowledge
of Bridges' union membership or activity, I nevertheless find that the General Counsel
has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discharged for
that reason. Instead, I find that he was discharged for his incompetence in connec-
tion with the two incidents described above. "The Company has a right to operate
its plant efficiently. If an employee is both inefficient and engaged in union activities,
that is a coincidence that does not destroy the just cause for his discharge." N.L.R.B.
v. Birmingham Publishing Co., 262 F. 2d 2 (C.A. 5).
Bridges tried to create the impression that it was a failure of the automatic cutoff
on his machine to function properly before the wrinkle and hole developed that
caused the damage to the carpet on both occasions under consideration. The record
is conclusive, however, that each of the other four machines was equipped with the
same automatic cutoff but, because it was recognized that these cutoffs did not
perform their function 100 percent, each machine was manned by an operator
whose principal duty was to manually cut it off when trouble occurred. And, though
it is undoubtedly true that Gaines' machine gave more trouble than the others,4
and that other operators had allowed wrinkles and holes to develop without resultant
disciplinary action, the record compels the finding that Bridges' derelictions were,
by far, the worst. This, coupled with the fact that the second serious incident
occurred on the very first work night following the imposition of discipline for his
prior neglect, leads me to find that Respondent reasonably concluded that it could
no longer tolerate his incompetence and that he should, for that reason, be discharged.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices, I recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent
discriminatorily discharged George W. Gaines on February 24, 1960, I recommend
that Respondent offer him immediate and full reinstatement without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings
that he may have suffered by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which
he normally would have earned from the aforesaid date to the date of Respondent's
offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period. The backpay provided
for herein shall be computed in accordance with the formula stated in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289. I also recommend that Respondent, upon reason-
'It was referred to as "the John Deere" machine by some of the employees because It
"sounds like a John Deere tractor."
WHITELIGHT PRODUCTS DIVISION, ETC. 1323
able request, make available to the Board and its agents, all payroll and other
records pertinent to an analysis of the amount due as backpay.
Since I have found that Respondent, by various acts, interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in the Act and
particularly because the discriminatory discharge found herein goes "to the very
heart of the Act" (N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4) ),
and indicates a purpose to defeat the self-organization of its employees, I am con-
vinced that the unfair labor practices committed are related to other unfair labor
practices proscribed and that the danger of their commission in the future is to be
anticipated from Respondent's conduct in the past. Accordingly, in order to make
,effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7 and thus effectuate the policies
of the Act, I will recommend that the Respondent cease and desist from in any
manner infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed by the Act. May Depart-
ment Stores v. N.L.R.B., 326 U.S. 376, 386-392.
During the hearing, Respondent took the position, because of Gaines' insubordina-
tion, that "under no circumstances should the company be required to put him back
to work." The circumstances under which that insubordination occurred have
already been considered. I find that the threats directed to Gregg do not exceed the
bounds of resentment which could normally be aroused in a moment "of animal
exuberance." Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 293. It should also be recalled, that Gregg is no longer in Respondent's em-
ployment. I conclude that Gaines' insubordination is not sufficient to bar his rein-
statement. Efco Manufacturing, Inc., 108 NLRB 245, 250, 261 (Charles Arnold).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce and the Union is a labor organization, all
within the meaning of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of George W. Gaines, thereby
,discouraging membership in the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Respondent did not discriminate against Walter H. Hughes, or Chester H.
Bridges, as alleged in the complaint.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Whitelight Products Division of White Metal Rolling and Stamp-
ing Corp . and United Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers
of America , Local 218. Case No. 1-CA-3266. June 27, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On January 5, 1961, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent and
the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
briefs in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
131 NLRB No. 158.