General Tire & Rubber Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 30, 1971

190 N.L.R.B. 227 (N.L.R.B. 1971)

GENERAL TIRE & RUBBER CO. 227
General Tire & Rubber Company and Bernice Hill.
Case 25-CA-3883
April 30, 1971
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND KENNEDY
On January 27, 1971, Trial Examiner Joseph I.
Nachman issued his Decision in the above -entitled pro-
ceeding , finding that Respondent had engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices and recommending that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action , as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision . Thereafter, the General Counsel and Re-
spondent filed exceptions to the Decision and support-
ing briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers
in connection with this case to a three -member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Ex-
aminer made at the hearing and finds that no prejudi-
cial error was committed . The rulings are hereby
affirmed . The Board has considered the Trial Ex-
aminer 's Decision , the exceptions and briefs , and the
entire record in the case , and hereby adopts the
findings, conclusions , and recommendations of the
Trial Examiner.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent
General Tire & Rubber Company, Marion, Indiana, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended
Order, as modified herein.2
' Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner prejudiced its case by
allegedly erroneously excluding certain evidence and acting as an advocate
for the Charging Party We have carefully examined the record and are
satisfied that the Trial Examiner was concerned only with his duty under
Section 102 35 of the Board's Rules and Regulations "to inquire fully into
the facts to regulate the course of the hearing to call, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses and to introduce into the record documentary or
other evidence " We see nothing in this record to prove that his conduct
of the hearing was based upon a bias and prejudice in favor of the Charging
Party and against Respondent Moreover, we note that the Trial Examiner
in his decision reversed his ruling excluding Respondent's evidence and duly
considered the evidence in reaching his decision We therefore find that his
initial exclusionary ruling was nonprejudicial
Respondent also excepts to certain of the Trial Examiner's credibility
resolutions. It is the Board's established policy, however, not to overrule a
Trial Examiner's credibility findings unless, as is not the case here, the
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect Standard Dry Wall Products, inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 362
(CA 3)
3 In view of our adoption of the Trial Examiner's Decision, we find it
190 NLRB No. 44
unnecessary to pass upon the question as to whether the Trial Examiner at
the hearing erroneously precluded General Counsel from proving that there
was no economic justification for Hill's discharge and erred after the hearing
in receiving Respondent's rejected evidence without affording General
Counsel an opportunity to attack such evidence and to introduce coun-
teracting evidence.
In addition, no backpay shall be computed for the period during the strike,
or any portion thereof, when Respondent did not require Hill's full-time
services exclusively as an office clerical employee.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOSEPH I. NACHMAN, Trial Examiner: This proceeding
tried before me at Marion, Indiana, on November 23,' with
the General Counsel and Respondent represented by counsel,
involves a complaint2 pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act)
which alleges that by interrogation of employees regarding
their union sympathies and desires, and by threats of dis-
charge if the employees did not cease their assistance to and
support of a union, General Tire & Rubber Company (herein
Respondent) interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights protected by Section 7
of the Act, and by the August 3 discharge of Bernice Hill, a
clerical employee who was not a member of the production
and maintenance unit, because she refused to perform pro-
duction duties while the employees in the production and
maintenance unit were on strike, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. For reasons hereafter stated I find
and conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by discharging Bernice Hill, but that the General Coun-
sel failed to prove the remaining allegations of the complaint
by a preponderance of the evidence.
At the hearing all parties were afforded an opportunity to
introduce relevant and material evidence, to examine and
cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally on the record.
Respondent's oral argument is incorporated in the transcript
of evidence. Briefs submitted by the General Counsel and
Respondent, respectively, have been duly considered. Upon
the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor
of the witnesses while testifying, I make the following:
I FINDINGS OF FACTS
A. Background
For some years Respondent has recognized Local 466,
United Rubber Workers (herein the Union), as the collective-
bargaining representative of a unit composed of employees at
its Marion, Indiana, plant with certain exclusions, specifically
plant and office clericals.' About mid-June, Respondent and
the Union commenced bargaining for a contract to replace
the one scheduled to expire on July 31, but no agreement was
reached, and immediately following July 31 the unit em-
ployees struck and picketed the Marion plant.' During these
negotiations, recognizing the possibility of a strike at the end
This and all dates hereafter mentioned are 1970
= Issued September 23 on a charge filed August 3
No issue of commerce or labor organization is presented The complaint
alleges and the answer admits facts which establish these jurisdictional
elements I find these facts to be as pleaded
In the contract effective from August 1, 1967, to July 31, 1970, Re-
spondent recognized the Union as the representative of all employees at its
Marion, Indiana, plant, excluding "all foreman, supervisors, timekeepers,
plant protection employees, trainees, confidential employees, laboratory
employees, office and plant clericals, salaried employees and process inspec-
tors "
The strike lasted until about September 18, when a new contract was
agreed upon, and by September 21 all striking employees had returned to
work
228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of July, Respondent concluded that if a strike did occur, it
would endeavor to maintain production at the plant by utiliz-
ing for that purpose, to the fullest possible extent, clerical and
other nonunit personnel. All such personnel were advised of
that decision some time in June, and were directed not to
make vacation commitments that would conflict with Re-
spondent's purpose.'
About mid-July, Sales Manager Pugh informed Hill that
her job was being abolished with a portion of her duties
transferred to Charlotte Ellis, who served as secretary to
company Vice president Schmeiser, stationed at the Marion
plant. Pugh also told Hill that there was a job available for
her in the accounting department, if she would accept it.
After some discussion, Hill agreed to accept the accounting
department job, and was told that Comptroller Dierkes
would talk to her further about it. Pugh additionally asked
that Hill explain fully to Ellis the duties that the latter would
be taking over from her, and that Hill act as Vice-president
Schmeiser's secretary the last week in July, when Ellis would
be on vacation. Hill agreed to do this, and served as substitute
secretary to Schmeiser from July 27 through July 31.'
Shortly following the last mentioned conversation between
Pugh and Hill, the latter was visited by Comptroller Dierkes,
who offered Hill a job as accounts payable clerk. Hill told
Dierkes that it was her understanding from Pugh that her
new job was to be as his secretary,' but Dierkes told her this
would not be possible. After some discussion Hill accepted
his job offer and was told to report to the accounting depart-
ment on August 3, in the meantime taking her own vacation
during the first 3 weeks in July and serving as the replacement
for Ellis during the last week of July. Dierkes and Hill dis-
cussed the matter again during the last week of July and
confirmed that Hill would start her new duties on August 3.'
Having completed her assignment as substitute secretary to
Vice-President Schmeiser on Friday, July 31, Hill, on August
3,10 reported to the accounting department for duty. As she
approached the company parking lot, Hill observed the pick-
ets across the entrance to the lot, but parked her car in the
lot and entered the plant for the purpose of performing the
clerical duties of her new job." Hill went directly to Dierkes'
6 Hill testified that Sales Manager Pugh, whom she served at that time
as secretary, informed her of Respondent's decision to operate the plant
with office and managerial personnel about mid-June. According to Hill, she
told Pugh at that time that her husband (not employed by Respondent), was
very active in union affairs and had strong union principles, and if Respond-
ent's production employees went on strike she would have to support their
cause by refusing to do production work, but that she would continue to
perform any and all clerical duties that Respondent might require of her.
Pugh denied that Hill made such a statement to him. I find it unnecessary
to resolve the conflict because in my view decision of this case turns on
events of August 3, hereafter detailed.
' Hill testified that in this conversation Pugh again told her of the decision
to operate the plant with nonunit employees in the event of a strike, and that
she told Pugh she would not act as strikebreaker by working in the plant,
but would perform her clerical assignments . Pugh denied that Hill made
such a statement to him. Again, I deem it unnecessary to resolve the conflict.
' Pugh denied that he had made such a promise to Hill, but I find it
unnecessary to resolve the conflict.
0 Based on the testimony of Hill and Dierkes, which to the extent set
forth is not in conflict. With respect to this last conversation, Hill calimed
that Dierkes stated that if there was a strike she would be required to do
production work, and that she told Pugh she would not do so because she
did not believe in being a strikebreaker by doing a unionman's job while he
was on strike, but that she would do any clerical work that might be assigned
her. Dierkes denied that any such conversation occurred. Again, I find it
unnecessary to resolve the conflict.
10 The two intervening days being Saturday and Sunday, respectively,
were nonwork days for Hill.
11 Hill admitted that it was her intention to cross the picket line each day
thereafter that the strike was in progress had she not been discharged.
office, but not finding him in waited for his arrival and, when
he arrived, went to his office. There Dierkes informed Hill
that the Union was on strike, and that he had to assign 30
people from his department to do production work in the
plant and that she was one of those so assigned. Hill told
Dierkes that because of loyalty to her husband, who was a
strong unionman, and sympathy for the Union and its cause,
she could not perform unit work in the plant. Dierkes stated
that he had no clerical work for Hill to perform," and that
he had assigned her work and expected her to do it. Hill
replied that she would not work in the plant, but would
perform any clerical work. At this point Dierkes stated that
Hill's conduct would result in disciplinary action against her.
Hill asked what form the discipline might take. Dierkes re-
plied that Respondent had only one form of discipline and
that was to show her the door. Hill asked if she had any rights
in the matter, and when Dierkes replied that he didn't know,
Hill stated that she intended to find out. To this Dierkes
replied, " ... fine, I hope you do." Hill then asked if there was
anything further, and Dierkes replied "thats it." Hill then left
Dierkes' office, and after gathering her personal belongings,
left the plant. On the same day she filed the charge on which
the instant complaint is based."
On August 5, Hill telephoned Personnel Director Wright
and asked for her termination notice. Wright replied that it
was his understanding that Hill had quit. Hill told Wright
that he was incorrectly informed, that Dierkes had fired her
because she refused to do production work, and that she
needed the notice to collect unemployment compensation.
Wright then stated that Hill was not entitled to compensation
if she had quit. Hill then told Wright that she had filed an
unfair labor practice charge against Respondent. Wright re-
plied that he was aware of that fact, having received a copy
of the charge, and would have to call her back. Not having
heard from Wright for several days, Hill called him again and
asked for the notice. Wright replied that it had been mailed,
and subsequently Hill received the notice dated August 5,
which in material part reads: "No work available in em-
ployee's department. Refused to take work outside depart-
ment. Released with termination pay."1°
The evidence also shows that in response to a request by
the Regional Office that Respondent submit "a complete
written account of the facts and a statement of [its] position
in respect to the allegations set forth in the charge" filed by
Hill, Respondent's Counsel, on September 2, wrote the Re-
gional Office:
" In this connection it may be noted that Vice-President Schmeiser
admitted that all of the clerical work normally performed at the plant re-
mained to be performed during the strike, but that he decided to defer the
performance of that work to the fullest possible extent in order to free
clericals for production work.
" Based on the credited testimony of Hill. Dierkes admitted that Hill told
him that she could not work in the plant because of her strong union views,
and that he told her that was the only work he had available. He testified
that Hill was the one that raised the question of possible discipline, and that
he merely stated that he assumed there would be, but that the form of the
discipline was not mentioned by either of them. He admitted that Hill left
his office, but claimed he was unaware that Hill had not reported to produc-
tion as he directed until his discussion with Personnel Director Wright on
August 5, a conversation hereafter set forth in greater detail . Dierkes admit-
ted, however, that in the interval various plant supervisors mentioned to him
that he had not assigned to them the number of clericals he had promised.
To the extent that Dierkes' testimony is in conflict with that of Hill, I credit
the latter.
" A copy of this notice, which also states that Respondent gave Hill 2
months termination pay, was sent to the State agency handling unemploy-
ment compensation claims . That agency subsequently awarded Hill com-
pensation to commence with the expiration of the period for which Re-
spondent gave her termination pay.
GENERAL TIRE & RUBBER CO. 229
You requested a statement with respect to our discharge
of a Mrs. Hill. This is to advise you as follows:
1. Mrs. Hill was a clerical employee.
2. She came to our offices at Marion , Indiana and
was advised that we had no clerical work available
since our plant was being picketed by members of
the United Rubber Workers.
3. She was assigned to other work as were her fellow
clericals. They accepted the work . She refused.
4. For this reason she was discharged and given two
months severance pay. (Emphasis added).
Contentions and Conclusions
The first question to be considered is whether Hill was
discharged on August 3, as the General Counsel contends, or
whether she voluntarily quit her employment , as Respondent
contends . Resolution of this question is to be determined, I
believe , from the conversation between Hill and Dierkes the
morning of August 3.15 Upon consideration of the entire
record , I find and conclude that Dierkes' statements to Hill
on August 3 constituted a discharge of the latter , and that
Hill left the plant on that date as a dischargee and not as a
voluntary quit . I reach this conclusion for the following rea-
sons:
1. As heretofore stated , I have credited Hill with respect
to her conversation with Dierkes on August 3, at which time
the latter stated that Hill's refusal to do production work
would result in discipline against her, and that with Respond-
ent the only form of discipline was to show her the door.
Although Dierkes in talking with Hill did not use the term
"discharge," I nonetheless conclude that in the circumstances
Hill had every reason to so construe the statement Dierkes
did make , that she would be discharged for her refusal to
perform production work , (a result which Respondent's
counsel admitted was correct)," and that it was not incum-
bent upon her to stay on the job and await the actual fall of
the axe . She was entitled to consider Dierkes' statement to be
an actual discharge , as she in fact did.
2. The termination slip which Hill requested , and which
Personnel Director Wright sent her and the State Employ-
ment Service on August 5, states on its face that Hill was
terminated by Respondent . It is true that Wright , in his tele-
phone conversation earlier that day, stated that his informa-
tion was that she had quit , but when Hill told him that
Dierkes had discharged her, and that she had filed a charge
with the Board concerning the matter (a fact which Wri ter
stated he was aware of), he said he would have to call her
back . Dierkes admitted that Wright told him that Hill had
called requesting a termination notice, and it is not unreason-
able to infer that Wright must have mentioned to Dierkes
that it was Hill's claim that he had discharged her. Notwith-
standing these facts , and his knowledge that Hill had filed a
charge with the Board alleging that she had been dis-
criminatorily discharged by Respondent , Wright sent the ter-
mination notice referred to with full knowledge of the fact
that Hill intended to use that notice to collect unemployment
" It is for this reason that I find it unnecessary to resolve the conflicts
between Hill and Pugh and Hill and Dierkes as to whether Hill informed
either of them in prior conversation that in the event of a strike by the
production employees she would not perform production work Even as-
suming that she did not so inform Pugh or Dierkes in the prior conversa-
tions, Dierkes was admittedly so informed , with the reasons for Hill's posi-
tion, in their conversation on August 3
" In oral argument before me, counsel for Rc.pondent stated "Now I
have to say to you, Mr . Trial Examiner , that if she had stayed on the job
and continued to refuse to do anything but clerical work, undoubtedly we
would have discharged her
compensation ; benefits to which he knew she would not be
entitled were she in fact a voluntary quit."
3. The letter written by Respondent 's counsel to the Board
on September 2 states flatly and unequivocally , not once but
twice , that Hill was discharged, and gives Respondent's rea-
sons therefor.18
4. When the considerations set forth in 2 and 3 above are
viewed in conjunction with those referred to in 1 above, the
contention that Hill voluntarily quit has every indication of
being a mere afterthought.
Accordingly , I find and conclude that Hill was discharged
and turn to consider whether the discharge was unlawful
under the Act. On this issue, I find the Board 's holding in the
Cooper Thermometer Company, 154 NLRB 502, controlling.
In Cooper Thermometer, supra, as here, a nonunit clerical
employee was discharged because she refused to cross a
picket line of striking production workers to perform produc-
tion work , assigning as reasons for such refusal fear of cross-
ing the picket line and that for her to do production work
would under the circumstances be taking jobs away from the
strikers, but she offered to perform her regular clerical duties.
The Board concluded ( 1) that the employee's refusal to per-
form the production duties assigned her was protected con-
certed activity; and (2) that the discharge violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
As to whether the conduct of the employee in Cooper Ther-
mometer was concerted within the meaning of Section 7 of
the Act , the Board pointed out that "the focal point of in-
quiry" on this issue must "be the nature of the activity itself
rather than the employee 's motives for engaging in the ac-
tivity" (154 NLRB at 504). Here Hill's activity by its very
nature had the effect of assisting or making common cause
with the striking production workers in their dispute with
Respondent . As Judge Learned Hand said in writing for the
Second Circuit in N.L. R.B. v. Peter Cailler Swiss Chocolate
Co., 130 F . 2d 503, 505:
Certainly nothing elsewhere in the act limits the scope
of the language to "activities " designed to benefit other
"employees ;" and its rationale forbids such a limitation.
When all the other workmen in a shop make common
cause with a fellow workman over his separate griev-
ance, and go out on strike in his support , they engage in
a "concerted activity" for "mutual aid or protection,"
although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them
who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest
knows that by their action each one of them assures
himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the
one whom they are all then helping ; and the solidarity
" Respondent makes much of the fact that the Decision of the State
Employment Security Office, finding Hill entitled to unemployment com-
pensation beginning with the end of the period for which Respondent paid
her termination pay, states that Hill declined transfer to the plant because
she had never done factory work and felt it would be injurious to her health
As Hill denied that she made any statements to the State Office of the nature
mentioned, and her testimony in that regard is uncontradicted, I am unable
to find as Respondent urges, that this piece of evidence tends to support its
contention that Hill voluntarily quit, or that her reason for refusing to work
in the plant as Dierkes requested was based on reasons other than those
Dierkes admits she gave him , as heretofore found
11 Counsel for Respondent contended at the trial that this letter should
not be received in evidence because it was allegedly written before he
completed his investigation of the case This objection however, goes only
to weight and not to admissibility It may be noted that no testimony was
offered to show that the letter , written more than 4 weeks after the events
of August 3, and a copy of which was sent to Vice president Schmeiser, was
in fact written before counsel was advised of the facts , nor is there any
showing that after he completed his investigation counsel made any effort
to notify the Regional Office that the statements set forth in his letter were
inaccurate in any respect.
230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
so established is "mutual aid" in the most literal sense,
as nobody doubts."
Accordingly, I must and do find and conclude that by
refusing to perform production work which but for the strike
would have been performed by the strikers, Hill engaged in
concerted activity within the meaning of Section 7 of the
Act.20
Whether under the circumstances here involved Respond-
ent could lawfully discharge Hill turns, as the Board held in
Cooper Thermometer, on whether the discharge "was jus-
tified by legitimate business considerations of an overriding
nature ." 21 To bring itself within this rule Respondent estab-
lished by the exhibits referred to that the Marion plant is a
major supplier , and in some instances the exclusive supplier
to the automobile industry; that Respondent feels not only a
moral obligation to maintain deliveries , but that its failure to
do so will cause the automobile builders to cease using Re-
spondent as a supplier , thus eliminating or marterially reduc-
ing the number of jobs available not only for striking em-
ployees , but for the clericals as well. Assuming , arguendo,
that the evidence which Respondent relies upon establishes
"legitimate business considerations of an overriding nature"
for the decision to use every means to keep its plant operating
during the strike, it does not show the need to discharge Hill
as a clerical employee, to enable it to maintain production. As
the Board said in Cooper Thermometer, supra at p. 506, "its
need was to replace the production employees who were on
strike." While Respondent could have laid Hill off if the
strike temporarily eliminated the need for her clerical ser-
vices," or treat her as a striker when she refused to perform
production work, "it could not ... punish her for exercising
her statutory rights by permanently severing her employ-
ment" (Cooper Thermometer, supra, at p. 506-507). If it
" The fact that Hill alone was lending assistance to a large group of
strikers , rather than a large group taking action to assist her, obviously does
not affect the principle involved . See N.L.R.B. v. Union Carbide Corpora-
tion, 440 F . 2d 54 (C.A. 4). In that case, when the production and mainte-
nance employees engaged in an economic strike against and picketed its
plant, Respondent discharged several nonunit construction workers because
they had absented themselves from work because of the presence of the
pickets . Addressing itself to the contention that the discharged construction
workers had not engaged in concerted or protected activity, the Court said:
It cannot be denied that respect for the integrity of the picket line may
well be the source of strength of whole collective -bargaining process in
which every union member has a legitimate protected economic inter-
est. And any assistance by a union member to a labor organization in
the collective-bargaining process is for mutual aid or protection of the
nonstriking unionist even though he has no immediate stake in the labor
dispute.
And N.L.R.B. v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299 (C.A.5), makes
it clear that lack of union membership is no impediment to the application
of this principle. Id at 1300. To the same effect see N.L.R.B. v. Difco
Laboratories, Inc., 427 F.2d 170 (C.A. 6), cert. denied 400 U.S. 831 enfg.
172 NLRB No. 235.
30 Unless Section 7 of the Act protects Hill in her refusal to do struck
work, that Section is indeed, to paraphrase the language of Mr. Justice
Jackson, "'only a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing
illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." (Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 172)
" At the trial , Respondent sought to introduce documentary evidence to
establish that Hill's discharge and its decision to operate the plant during
the strike with administrative and clerical personnel was based upon legiti-
mate business considerations of an overriding nature. On objection by the
General Counsel these exhibits were rejected but were made a part of the
rejected exhibit file. In view of the Board's language in Cooper Thermometer.
supra, as to "legitimate business considerations of an overriding nature," I
conclude that this ruling was error . Accordingly , I now reverse my ruling
and receive Resp . Exhs . 2, 3, and 4 into evidence and consider their eviden-
tiary weight.
" As noted supra, fn. 12, Vice President Schmeiser admitted that all
clerical work remained to be performed during the strike.
could, then by the same process of reasoning it could have
discharged the production workers because they decided to
strike; conduct clearly unlawful under the Act.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that by discharging Hill
on August 3 Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.29
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire
record in the case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2) of the Act, and is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Hill because she engaged in concerted
activities for mutual aid and protection, Respondent inter-
fered with , restrained , and coerced employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby
engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices pro-
scribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
5. Except to the extent set forth in paragraph 2 above, the
evidence fails to establish that Respondent engaged in any
unfair labor practice alleged in the complaint , and said com-
plaint should , to that extent , be dismissed.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce,
it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action found necessary and designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discharged Hill because she
engaged in concerted activities protected by Section 7 of the
Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be required to offer
her immediate , full, and unconditional reinstatement to her
former position, or, if that is not available, to a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or
other rights , privileges , or working conditions , and make her
whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of her dis-
charge, by paying to her a sum of money equal to the amount
she would have earned as wages from August 3, to the date
Respondent offers her reinstatement as aforesaid , less the
termination pay paid her by Respondent , and also less any
amounts she may have earned during said period. Backpay
shall be computed in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest at the rate of 6 percent
per annum, as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716. It will also be recommended that Respondent be
required to preserve and, upon request, make available to
" The complaint alleges that in the conversation between Hill and
Dierkes in mid-June, the latter interrogated Hill concerning her union mem-
bership and desires, and those of her fellow employees , and that in the
conversation between them on August 3, Dierkes threatened Hill and other
employees with discharge or other reprisal if they did not refrain from
assisting and supproting the Union . I find nothing in the record to support
these allegations and recommend that they be dismissed . Additionally, the
evidence fails to establish that Respondent 's discharge of Hill was in any
way motivated by antiunion considerations , and accordingly shall recom-
mend that the complaint be dismissed to the extent that it alleges a violation
of Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act. Cooper Thermometer, supra, 503. Nor have I
given any consideration to Hill's letter to Respondent , dated September 10,
asking that she be reinstated , and that Respondent did not reply to the same,
because for reasons stated in Cooper Thermometer, fn. 14, I regard those
facts as irrelevant to any issue in this case.
GENERAL TIRE & RUBBER CO.
authorized agents of the Board all records necessary or useful
in determining compliance with the Board's order, or in com-
puting the amount of backpay due.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act,
I hereby issue the following recommended:24
ORDER
Respondent, General Tire & Rubber Company, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of their right to assist labor organizations or
engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protec-
tion, by discriminating in regard to their hire, tenure, or
employment, or any term or condition of employment.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed and found
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Bernice Hill immediate, full, and unconditional
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists,
to a substantially equivallent one without prejudice to her
seniority or other rights, privileges, or working conditions,
and make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered, in the
manner set forth in the section hereof entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Notify immediately Bernice Hill, if presently serving in
the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selec-
tive Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to author-
ized agents of the Board, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records neces-
sary or useful in determining compliance with this Order, or
in computing the amount of backpay due, as herein provided.
(d) Post at its Marion, Indiana, plant copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix."25 Copies of said notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 25 of the
Board, Indianapolis, Indiana, shall, after being signed by an
authorized representative, be posted immediately upon
recepit thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the aforsaid Regional Director, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision, what
steps it has taken to comply herewith.26
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes
" In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals Enforc-
ing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
" In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
231
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be dis-
missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifi-
cally herein found.
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified by deleting
the words "receipt of this Decision," and substituting therefore the words
"this Order "
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a full trial in which all sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we, General Tire & Rubber Company, vi-
olated the National Labor Relations Act and ordered us to
post this notice. We intend to carry out the Order of the
Board, the judgment of any court, and abide by the following:
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or help unions
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all of these things.
WE WILL NOT discharge any of our employees or oth-
erwise discriminate in regard to their hire, tenure of
employment, or any term or condition of employemnt
because they have assisted any labor organization or
engaged in concerted activities for mutual aid or protec-
tion.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
As it has been found that we violated the law when we
fired Bernice Hill.
WE WILL offer old job back to her if the same exists,
and if not, a substantially equivalent job, and we will
make up the pay she lost, together with 6 percent inter-
est.
WE WILL notify Bernice Hill if presently serving in
the Armed Forces of the United States of her right to full
reinstatement upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, as amended, after discharge from
the Armed Forces.
GENERAL TIRE &
RUBBER COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 614 Tsta
Center, 150 West Market Street, Indianapolis, Indiana
46204, Telephone 317-633-8921.