General Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 23, 1968

173 N.L.R.B. 253 (N.L.R.B. 1968)

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
General Electric Company and International Union of
Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO.
Case 2-CA- 10991
October 23, 1968
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 6, 1967, Trial Examiner David London
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recom-
mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached
Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent
and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.' The
General Counsel submitted to the Board the memo-
randum he had previously submitted to the Trial
Examiner. The Respondent and the Charging Party
also filed answering briefs
The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed
the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing
and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has
considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the excep-
tions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and
hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the additions
set forth below.
This case arises out of the 1965-66 negotiations
between General Electric Company, hereinafter re-
ferred to as Respondent or GE, and International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union or
IUE.
Through the years, Respondent has negotiated
collective agreements with more than 80 unions.
Although it has conducted most of these negotiations
at the local level, it has also negotiated national
agreements with several unions, including the IUE.
The IUE has conducted its national negotiations with
GE through its IUE-GE Conference Board, consisting
of delegates from its local unions representing GE
employees. The Conference Board in turn has elected
a Negotiating Committee which actually conducted
the negotiations.
In 1965, a number of different international unions
that have bargaining relationships with Respondent
joined together to form the Committee on Collective
Bargaining (CCB), which, in turn, established a
Steering Committee with responsibility for imple-
menting the initial policy determinations of the CCB.
The avowed purpose of the CCB was to formulate a
1 Respondent 's request for oral argument is denied as the record,
including the exceptions and briefs , adequately presents the issues and
the positions of the parties.
2 On August 18, Judge Marvin Frankel granted the Regional
173 NLRB No. 46
253
set of common goals and to seek to achieve these
objectives through a "coordinated approach" to
bargain with Respondent. Beginning in November
1965, the Steering Committee offered to meet with
Respondent on several occasions, but Respondent
rejected the offers, asserting that the Steering Com-
mittee was an instrument through which the partici-
pating unions hoped to engage in coalition bargaining.
In a letter dated April 13, 1966, the chairman of
the IUE-GE Conference Board informed Respondent
that the Union was abandoning its request for joint
discussions. Respondent then agreed to meet with the
IUE on May 4, 1966.
In preparation for that meeting, the Union added
to its Negotiating Committee as nonvoting members,
one representative from each of the other seven
international unions which, with the IUE, had com-
prised the Committee on Collective Bargaining. As the
Trial Examiner found, the presence of representatives
of other unions on the Negotiating Committee
would supply adequate interunion communication
as a means of avoiding the "whipsawing" Respon-
dent was thought to have accomplished in the past.
It was not intended, by adding these members, to
bargain for any unions other than IUE. Nor did the
additions reflect any understanding that a pro-
posed agreement between IUE and Respondent
would be subject to approval, disapproval, or
adoption by any other union.
Respondent did not learn about the addition of the
nonvoting members until the IUE Negotiating Com-
mittee arrived at the conference room on the morning
of May 4. After discovering the presence of the seven
"outsiders," Respondent's representatives refused to
engage in any discussions with the Committee and left
the room. Until August 18, Respondent remained
steadfast in its position that it would negotiate only
with a committee that consisted exclusively of IUE
members. On that date, pursuant to court order,2
Respondent agreed to meet with the Negotiating
Committee as constituted by the IUE.
The collective-bargaining contract which was then
in effect had been executed by the parties in 1963
and contained an October 2, 1966, terminal date. It
provided that if either party wished to modify or
terminate the contract, that party had to give
appropriate written notices to the other not more
than 60 and not less than 30 days prior to the
October 2 expiration date. It also provided that
negotiations for a new contract would begin within
15 days from the date the notice was received. On
August 2, in accordance with these provisions, John
Callahan, chairman of the IUE-GE Conference Board,
wrote to Philip Moore, GE's chief negotiator, to
Director's motion for a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section
10(1) of the Act. McLeod v. General Electric Co .,, 257 F.Supp. 690
(D.C.N.Y.), reversed 366 F.2d 847 (C A. 2), reversed and remanded 385
U S 533.
254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"serve notice" that IUE intended to terminate the
pending collective-bargaining contract. Callahan also
requested a meeting of the parties on August 15, 16,
or 17 to consider several IUE proposals which were
enclosed with the August 2 letter. In his reply of
August 9, Moore agreed to meet with IUE "provided
there will be no representatives of other unions
present." As noted above, Respondent did not alter
this stand until August 18, when Judge Frankel's
opinion was filed. On that day, Respondent, being
advised of the opinion, agreed to meet immediately,
but made clear that it intended to appeal Judge
Frankel's order and, therefore, that it was meeting
"under protest." Meetings began on August 23 and
continued until October 14, when an agreement was
reached to expire in 1969. On September 20, how-
ever, Judge Frankel's order was vacated by the court
of appeals. On that date, Moore informed the Union's
Negotiating Committee that if the "outside represen-
tatives" remained at the negotiating sessions, their
presence would be ignored. Respondent did, in fact,
ignore the "outsiders" until the following afternoon,
when it learned that Mr. Justice Harlan had reinstated
the order of the district court.
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by refusing to meet
with the Union both before and after bargaining was
required by the collective-bargaining contract of the
parties. Respondent contends that: (1) at all times, it
was justified in refusing to meet with the IUE
Negotiating Committee because of the presence on
that committee of seven nonvoting members who
normally represent unions other than the IUE; and
(2) in any case, even if the presence of these
representatives did not privilege a refusal to bargain,
Respondent cannot be found to have violated Section
8(a)(5) prior to August 18, because, under the terms
of its collective-bargaining contract with the IUE it
was not obligated to bargain at all before that date.
A. The Composition of the Negotiating Committee
The issue presented by Respondent's first conten-
tion is a narrow one. Crucial to our analysis of this
question is the fact that Respondent left the nego-
tiating table before negotiations began, and, there-
fore, before it had any opportunity to determine
whether the IUE Committee had, as it professed,
come to negotiate an agreement only for the IUE. As
noted above, the Union, in its letter of April 13,
specifically disclaimed any intent to engage in coali-
tion bargaining. Under these circumstances, as Judge
Frankel pointed out,
What the IUE was bent upon could only be
determined with respondent's professed certainty
by doing what respondent chose not to do-by
staying and bargaining and seeing whether the IUE
had lied when it said it had come to negotiate only
for its own agreement.'
For this reason, we need not decide whether Respon-
dent's refusal to bargain might have been justified if,
in fact, the participating unions had been "locked in"
to a conspiratorial understanding. By walking out of
the May 4 meeting, Respondent precluded our consid-
eration of this issue. Nor need we decide whether
Respondent could lawfully have suspended negotia-
tions if, during the course of the discussions, it
became apparent that the non-IUE representatives
were seeking to bargain for their own unions, rather
than for the IUE. These situations raise questions
which are not presented by the instant case. In this
case, we are only called upon to decide whether the
mere presence on the IUE Negotiating Committee of
representatives from unions other than the IUE
justified Respondent's refusal to bargain, there being
no evidence that these representatives bargained in
bad faith or for employees other than those repre-
sented by the IUE. Our dissenting colleague would
hold that the mere presence of these "outsiders" did
privilege a refusal to bargain, even absent a specific
finding of bad faith, because their presence was
inherently disruptive of the bargaining process. We
disagree.
Our starting point is Section 7 of the Act. That
section provides that "employees shall have the right
to ... bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing."4 Included in the right to select
representatives is the derivative right of the duly
elected bargaining agent to select the bargaining team
which will represent it at the negotiating table.5 It is
true that these rights, like most, are not absolute6 and
have been held subject to limitation in unusual
situations where the chosen representative is so
tainted with conflict or so patently obnoxious7 as to
negate the possibility of good-faith bargaining. Such a
case is Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,8 where the Board
held that an employer could refuse to bargain with a
union which had established a competing enterprise in
the same locality. The Board's decision in that case
rested explicitly on the fact that the union stood in
the position of a business competitor, which, unlike
the employees it represented, stood to benefit if the
3 257 F.Supp at 706.
4 See , N.L.R.B v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33.
5 American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp ., 155 NLRB 736,
enforcement denied on other grounds 381 F.2d 632 (C.A . 6), Standard
Oil Co., 137 NLRB 690, 710 (and cases cited), enfd. 322 F.2d 40
(C. A. 6).
6 N.L.R .B. v International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, 274
F 2d 376, 378 (C.A. 3).
7N.L.R.B. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 182 F.2d 810, 813 (C.A. 6).
8 108 NLRB 1555.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 255
employer could be forced out of business after being
compelled to yield to mordmate demands.9 Kenne-
cott Copper Corporations 0 and Douglas Aircraft
Co,'' both cited by our dissenting colleague, are
similar to Bausch & Lomb In these decisions, the
Board held that supervisors may not represent em-
ployees for purposes of collective bargaining, notwith-
standing the preference of the employees. All of these
cases, however, involved situations which were funda-
mentally different from the one presented here
because in each of the cited cases, the Board
concluded that the allegiance of the representatives
involved was so seriously compromised as to make
good-faith bargaining "inherently impossible "' 2 We
do not believe that such a conclusion is warranted
here
There is no precedent for the position taken by
Respondent. In fact, the precedents are the other
way In Standard Oil Co v. N L R.B,' 3 the Respon-
dent Company objected to the presence of temporary
International representatives as part of the Union's
negotiating team because it believed that the appoint-
ment of such representatives and their participation in
bargaining was part of a subtle plot to bring about
companywide bargaining. The court rejected the
company's contention that it could refuse to meet
with the Union's negotiating committee because of
the presence of outsiders thereon and held that
"absent any finding of bad faith or ulterior motive on
the part of unions, we conclude that it was the duty
of the Company to negotiate with the bargaining
committees of the Unions ... even though the tempo-
rary representatives were present."' 4 Recently the
same court reiterated that "a union has the right to
select outsiders to sit and assist a local bargaining
committee."' S
It is true that some representatives might, under
certain circumstances, attempt to misuse their posi-
tion on another union's negotiating committee As
Member Jenkins points out, such representatives
could attempt to bargain for their own unions while
serving on the negotiating committee of another, or
they might claim to be bargaining for one union
9Id. at 1560-61.
10 98 NLRB 75
11 53 NLRB 486
12 Bausch & Lomb Optical Co , supra, in . 9 at 1562.
13 322 F 2d 40 (C.A. 6).
14 Id at 44
15 American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. N L.R .B., 381
F.2d 632, 634 (C.A. 6), reversing on other grounds American Radiator
Corp., 155 NLRB 736 . See also N.L R.B. v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d
645, 651 (C.A. 6), cert. denied 345 U.S. 906 (holding that the Act does
not require that the bargaining representative be employed by the Com-
pany with which the Union is bargaining ), McLeod v. General Electric
Co , supra , in. 2 at 703-706.
16 See N. L R.B v. Truitt, 351 U.S 149 , 153-154, American
National Insurance Co, 343 U.S 395 , 401, where the Supreme Court
cautioned against reliance on such per se assumptions and admonished
the Board to resolve controversies involving refusals to bargain, not by
invoking mechanical rules, but rather by closely analyzing the facts
presented by each case
t7 N L R B v Atkins, & Co., 331 U.S. 398, 405.
when, in fact, they were locked into an understanding
that no union would sign an agreement unless all
unions did. But to recognize the possibility of abuse is
quite different from concluding, as does our dis-
senting colleague, that abuse is inherent in any
attempt at coordinated bargaining.' 6 We do not
believe that the mere possibility of such abuse,
without substantial evidence of ulterior motive or bad
faith, justifies qualification of a union's right to select
the persons who will represent it at the negotiating
table.' 7
Our dissenting colleague's assumption that the
inclusion of non-IUE representatives would "by ne-
cessity encumber and disrupt the bargaining process"
seems particularly unjustifiable when applied to the
facts of this case. First, there is no evidence that the
presence of the "outsiders" actually disrupted negoti-
ations once they began in August. Respondent does
not even make such a contention. It is difficult to
reconcile this fact with the assertion that the presence
of outside representatives would "by necessity" en-
cumber the negotiating process. Moreover, although,
as noted above, Respondent bargains with more than
RO unions, the offers made to many of these unions
are substantially identical. Since most of the contracts
negotiated by Respondent have common expiration
dates, the majority of unions receive these offers at
the same time. Uniformity in the past has extended
not merely to the offers made but also to the
substantive terms of the agreements actually exe-
cuted. In this case, it is highly significant that the
Unions which have joined together to form the CCB
have traditionally received similar offers and, addi-
tionally, have executed similar agreements with Re-
spondent. This history suggests common objectives
rather than conflicts of interest between representa-
tives of unions which are bargaining for many of the
same contractual benefits from an employer which
has traditionally refused to treat one union more
favorably than another.' 8 In any event, we find no
justification for the presumption of our dissenting
colleague that conflicts must invariably arise between
the representatives of unions which are so situated.'
18 General Electric Co., 150 NLRB 192, 209-2 10.
19 Member Jenkins also states that "during collective-bargaining
negotiations for a multiunit company, such as the Respondent herein, a
company may be willing during the give and take of collective
bargaining to surrender certain rights or accord greater benefits to a
particular unit containing what the company considered its key
employees in hopes of recapturing a few benefits or giving less to what
it considered a unit of less importance " He concludes that such a
practice would be impossible if several unions are represented at the
negotiations because "the unit to be deprived of benefits would
certainly object " We do not believe, however, that the possibility of
such an objection being interposed is a valid reason for proscribing the
kind of bargaining which is here involved. First, this kind of objection is
not likely to occur where an employer , like Respondent herein, extends
the same basic offer to all employees and usually tries not to trade
benefits between units . Moreover , the significant, and we believe the
determinative fact is that there is no evidence in this case that
Respondent actually attempted to engage in such a practice and,
therefore , there is no evidence of the kind of objection to which
Member Jenkins alludes
256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Moreover, a holding that the mere presence of
"outsiders" is so inherently disruptive of the bargain-
ing process as to privilege an employer's refusal to
bargain would substantially limit the opportunity for
collaboration and cooperation between unions. It
would, for example, prevent an expert employed by
one union from assisting another union at the
negotiating table, even though the negotiating union
might be seeking nothing more than technical advice
from the "outside" representative. We do not believe
that this kind of collaboration is inconsistent with the
statutory objectives. We find no basis, therefore, for a
rule of law which would impose a blanket prohibition
on this kind of interunion cooperation, regardless of
whether such collaboration can actually be shown to
have obstructed negotiations to any substantial
degree. Such a restriction on the right of a union to
determine the composition of its own bargaining
committee would be lacking both in precedent and
justification.' °
B. Refusal To Bargain Prior to August 18
The Trial Examiner found that Respondent had
unlawfully refused to bargain not only on and after
August 18, but also on May 4, and for the same
reason-Respondent's refusal to meet with the
Union's negotiating team because of the presence
thereon of "outsiders." Respondent contends that,
whatever the legality of its asserted reason for
refusing to meet with IUE representatives, no refusal
to bargain can be found on May 4, because Respond-
ent could not be required to bargain with the IUE on
that date in view of contract provisions for modifica-
tion or termination2 1 and Section 8(d)12 of the Act.
We agree, of course, that under the statute Re-
spondent could not be required to bargain before the
Union had served notice of contract termination and
had requested agreement on a date for bargaining But
Section 8(d) exists for the benefit of the contracting
parties; there is nothing to prevent them from
mutually agreeing to reopen the contract in whole or
in part to permit the start of negotiations for a new
contract prior to the permissible contract date. If
they do agree on an early reopening, they are
subject to the same standards of good-faith bargaining
as if the contract expressly provided for such opening
As set forth more fully in the Trial Examiner's
Decision, correspondence exploring the possibility of
an early meeting between the parties began in
November 1965. On November 24, Philip Moore,
manager of Respondent's Employee Relations Ser-
vice, wrote a letter to John Callahan, chairman of the
IUE-GE Conference Board, confirming an earlier
proposal by GE for the establishment of subcommit-
tees to deal with such subjects as grievance procedure,
contract language, etc. On December 21, Callahan,
replying to Moore's letter, agreed to the use of three
subcommittees.2 3
After several other communications between
Callahan and Moore, the Committee on Collective
Bargaining wrote to Moore It noted in this letter that
the eight unions had "joined together in preparation
for these meetings" and suggested that
Since our eight unions have a jointly developed
approach on how to create the most successful
type of meetings and since your management has a
national policy on this matter, the simplest and
most effective solution is a conference between us
The request for a joint meeting was repeated in a
letter from the Steering Committee to Moore on
February 15. On February 24, Moore wrote three
letters. In a letter to Joseph Swire, IUE's pension and
benefit consultant, Moore stated
It would be most inappropriate for us to respond
to the Steering Committee as they requested in
their recent letter since this would only serve to
create an illusion that national negotiations on
benefits are now in process. . .
In his other letters, Moore outlined his objections to
coalition bargaining and stated that Respondent
would not recognize the Committee on Collective
Bargaining as a "merged negotiating body."
Following several other communications, Callahan,
on April 13, 1966, announced a significant change
in the Union's position. After noting that Respondent
was unwilling to hold a joint meeting, Callahan
stated that the IUE-GE Conference Board "will
not pursue that matter any further and will abandon
any suggestions for any such joint meeting or for
20 Obviously, the same right to determine the composition of its
own bargaining committee exists for employers as well . A company's
choice of negotiators , including experts from other companies, would
be subject only to the kind of limitation already placed on unions. See,
e.g., Bausch & Lomb, supra , Kennecott Copper, supra
21 Article XXX of the 1963 collective -bargaining contract between
Respondent and the Union provides,
Either the Company or the Union may terminate this National
Agreement by written notice to the other not more than sixty days
and not less than thirty days prior to October 2, 1966, or prior to
October 2 of any subsequent year. Not more than 15 days following
receipt of such notice , collective bargaining negotiations shall
commence between the parties for the purpose of considering the
terms of a new agreement , and a proposal for a revision of wages
which may be submitted by either the Company or the Union.
On August 3, 1966, the Union served notice of its intention to
terminate the National Agreement on its terminal date and proposed a
meeting between the parties for either August 15, 16, or 17 to consider
its contract proposals.
22 Section 8(d) of the Act provides that the duty to bargain "shall
not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any
modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a
fixed period , if such modification is to become effective before such
terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the
contract."
23 It thus appears that at an early date , the parties had agreed that
subcommittees should be established The failure to meet prior to
August 23 , therefore , resulted not from disagreement as to whether
subcommittees should be convened , but, rather , from IUE's plan to
include "outside" representatives on its Negotiating Committee.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
joint discussions." Callahan then requested a meeting
between the IUE-GE Negotiating Committee and
Respondent to discuss "all of the problems I have
mentioned including the agenda of subject matters
for, the number of, and the scheduling of, the
proposed subcommittee meetings.." Moore replied
on April 20, proposing that a meeting be held
on May 4 when GE would "be prepared to move
ahead on establishing any necessary ground rules,
subject matter and schedules." Callahan responded by
telegram on April 25, agreeing to meet as proposed by
Moore. 2 4
As we analyze the facts of this case, we conclude
that the parties agreed upon a limited modification of
the reopener clause. It is not necessary to decide
whether, as the Trial Examiner found, the parties
agreed to abrogate the reopener provision in its
entirety and commence negotiations for a new con-
tract on May 4. It is sufficient that they did agree to
modification to the extent of permitting considera-
tion of certain preliminary matters relating to the
execution of a new agreement. Having voluntarily
agreed to early modification of the contract for these
purposes, Respondent was obligated to conform with
the good-faith bargaining requirements of Section
8(d) . 25
It is true that the early meetings were agreed upon
to establish the ground work for the more formal
negotiations which would follow after the official
reopening date of the entire contract, and that the
parties agreed that no contractual commitments
would be made. But such preliminary matters are just
as much part of the process of collective bargaining as
the negotiation over wages, hours, etc. In many
2 4 The convening of such a meeting was fully in keeping with the
usual practice of the parties Respondent itself concedes that by mutual
agreement , the parties , in 1955, 1960, and 1963 agreed to meet for
certain limited purposes prior to the mandatory bargaining date. In
1960, for example , the parties began to bargain on July 19 , even though
the contract did not require that bargaining begin until August 17. In
1963, subcommittees similar to those contemplated here, were meeting
throughout May and June although the earliest mandatoiy bargaining
date was August 15
25 Our dissenting colleague would hold that , even if such an
agreement were reached , one of the conditions of the agreement was
that the Union would bargain through its traditional negotiating
committee We do not believe that such a condition can be read into the
understanding of the parties It is clear that Respondent refused to meet
with the Union for several months because it believed that the Union
was attempting to engage in coalition bargaining . Callahan's letter of
April 13, however , proposing an early meeting , clearly states that the
Union was abandoning its request for such discussions . There is nothing
in Moore's acceptance letter of April 20 which can be read as imposing a
condition on Respondent 's acceptance Although Moore refers to the
Union's change of position , several paragraphs before his formal
acceptance , we do not believe that such a casual reference is sufficient
to convert an otherwise unambiguous acceptance into a conditional one.
Moreover , even if we assume , arguendo, that Respondent 's agreement to
meet on May 4 was conditional, we do not believe that it was
conditioned on the Union 's being represented by its traditional
committee . Respondent 's concern at that time was not with the
composition of the union committee but solely with the Union's
attempt to engage in coalition bargaining . Thus, if Respondent's
agreement to meet on May 4 was conditional , as our dissenting
colleague suggests , the preliminary correspondence between the parties
257
industries, it has become the general practice of
negotiators to meet for "preliminary" discussions well
before bargaining is required by the contract. As
stated by one commentator,
Although the bargain itself may continue to be the
product of a deadline (this may be unavoidable)
there is far greater acceptance of the notion that
there is no good reason why the bargaining need be
limited to the sixty days prior to contract
termination.' 6
In complicated, multiunit negotiations, such as are
here involved, "preliminary" discussions have proven
particularly valuable. Such discussions provide a
forum in which tentative proposals can be exchanged,
procedural ground rules established, and routine
issues resolved. Through the informal give-and-take of
such discussions, the parties may be able to isolate
and define the pivotal issues, identify areas of
agreement, and narrow areas of disagreement.2 7
Respondent itself has recognized that preliminary
meetings "served a very useful purpose in bringing
about a sound and peaceful settlement in 1963," and
it anticipated similar usefulness for the 1966 meet-
ing.2 8 In a report to its employees on August 6,
1963, Respondent described the function of the
subcommittee as "this years important way of imple-
menting the company's basic year-round `fact finding'
approach to bargaining." In a letter to the Union
dated November 25, 1965, Respondent proposed that
the subcommittees be convened immediately in order
to "avoid crisis bargaining next fall." These communi-
cations indicate rather clearly that Respondent itself
recognized the importance of preliminary discussions
and regarded such discussions as an intrinsic phase in
the negotiating process.2 9
would indicate that the agreement was conditioned on the Union's
willingness to forego coalition bargaining , rather than on its being
represented by its traditional committee
26 Friedin , New Collective Bargaining, 50 Va L. Rev. 1034, 1046
(1964) See also Kelly, The Application of "Pre-Activity" in the
Guidance of Crisis Bargaining, 18 Lab L.J 47 (1947)
27 Indeed , if, as the Trial Examiner pointed out , bargaining had
begun after the full scale reopening of the contract and the parties
undertook initially to establish subcommittee and prescribe ground
rules for their operation , it could hardly have been argued that during
such preliminary discussions the parties were not engaged in the process
of collective bargaining.
28 In a letter to Callahan dated January 20, 1966, Moore wrote
Surely you must remember the many enthusiastic comments on the
work of the 1963 subcommittees-statements not only from
members of the management negotiating team but from members of
your own negotiating team as well . In fact , one of your international
representatives recalled the success of the 1963 subcommittees
during our informal meeting with your people in August. While you
may now suggest that they were not 'an unqualified success' I
continue to feel that they served a very useful purpose in bringing
about a sound and peaceful settlement in 1963 and I would hope
that we can look forward to using a similar avenue to again reach a
sound and peaceful settlement this year
29 The significance of these preliminary meetings is further indi-
cated by the fact that the full negotiating committees of both parties
were present at the May 4 meeting It is also significant that when the
parties first met on August 23, one of their first acts was to establish the
same subcommittees which were to have been the subject of discussion
on May 4.
258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Accordingly, we find that by walking out of the
scheduled May 4 meeting because of the presence of
"outsiders" on the Union's negotiating Committee,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act;3 ° and that this violation continued until August
23, the date when Respondent first began bargaining
with the Union, and recurred briefly on September 20
and 21 when Respondent, while continuing to bar-
gain, refused to recognize or deal with the non-IUE
representatives. 3 1
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, and hereby
orders that the Respondent, General Electric Co.,
New York, New York, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial
Examiner's Recommended Order.
MEMBER ZAGORIA, concurring and dissenting in part
In all the circumstances of this case, I am not
persuaded that Respondent General Electric violated
the Act on May 4, 1966, because in my view the
preliminary discussions did not involve substantive
collective bargaining, but were merely exploratory
and ground-rule setting meetings conducted on a
wholly voluntary basis. However, it is plain that
Respondent's refusal to meet with the I.U.E.'s desig-
nated committee on May 4 continued to be Respon-
dent's position when true bargaining began, for on
September 13, the Company reiterated its position
that a "mixed committee" was not appropriate, "that
its earlier meetings with such a committee had been
held under protest against the mixture and subject to
appeal," and on September 20 and 21, the Company
completely ignored the "outsiders," until it received
word that the Supreme Court had stayed the action
of the Court of Appeals in vacating the District Court
injunction. I therefore concur with my colleagues'
conclusion that Respondent General Electric violated
Section 8(a)(5), and would date the violation from
August 18, 1966, the date bargaining pursuant to the
contractual commitment began.
30 We do not believe that this holding will, as argued by Respon-
dent , and also in the dissent , discourage parties from the desirable
practice of starting collective-bargaining contract negotiations before
the formal contract reopening date . Our holding is a narrow one It is
merely that if the parties agree to the early start of negotiations, they
must conform to the same standards of good -faith bargaining required
of parties after the formal contract reopening date Just as GE on
August 18, could not exercise a veto power on the Union 's selection of
a bargaining committee , so our present holding is only that GE could
not exercise such a veto power during the agreed upon early preliminary
bargaining negotiations . We are not holding that GE must consent to
contract negotiations before the contract reopening date, nor are we
deciding that GE must agree to put into effect immediately any
agreements reached during these preliminary negotiations.
MEMBER JENKINS , dissenting:
In adopting the Trial Examiner's Decision in toto,
my colleagues have found that the Respondent was
under a duty to bargain with the Union on May 4,
1966, several months prior to the reopening date
contained in the then existing contract. I disagree.3 2
The majority decision also concludes that the
Charging Union had the right to choose, as its
representatives for purposes of collective bargaining,
representatives of other unions with whom Respon-
dent had statutory obligations to bargain in other
units. I disagree.
Prior to the 1947 amendments to the Act, the
Board construed Section 8(a)(5) of the Act as
requiring either party, notwithstanding the existence
of a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement, to
consider and bargain in good faith upon the proposals
of the other. In 1947, Congress, recognizing that the
aforementioned policy of the Board was not condu-
cive to industrial peace and harmony, amended the
Act to include Section 8(d) which specifically pro-
vides that the bargaining obligations imposed by the
Act "shall not be construed as requiring either party
to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms
and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed
period, if such modification is to become effective
before such terms and conditions can be reopened
under the provisions of the contract". Thus, unless
the Respondent's offer to meet with the Union
constituted an early reopener of the existing agree-
ment, the Respondent's actions on May 4, 1966, can
not be the basis of an unfair labor practice charge. I
do not think that the facts justify such a finding.
Pursuant to a successful past experience, the
Respondent on November 24, 1965, proposed the
establishment of three subcommittees for purposes of
informally delineating and defining the subject matter
to be considered at a subsequent appropriate time by
the full negotiating committees of the respective
parties. Both parties made it clear that while the
subcommittees were free to analyze their respective
subject areas, exchange ideas, and discuss alternate
courses of action, they were to have no power to
commit their respective principals for whom they
were merely exploring areas of possible agreement or
31 Respondent acknowledges that it was obligated to bargain on and
after August 18. Its only defense to the charge that it refused to bargain
after that date is based on the presence of "outsiders " on the Union's
Negotiating Committee Since we have rejected this defense, we would
find that Respondent violated the Act on and after August 18, even if
we were to hold that it had no duty to bargain prior to that date.
32I am also in disagreement with the position of concurring
Member Zagoria who would date the violation from August 18, 1966,
the date on which bargaining was required to begin under the contract,
for the reason that there is no evidence to indicate that subsequent to
August 18 the Respondent failed to bargain with the Union in any
manner other than the alleged breach found by the majority to have
occurred on May 4, 1966.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
disagreement in hopes of preventing what the parties
later characterized as "crisis bargaining" by their
respective negotiating committees. In subsequent cor-
respondence, the Union expressed a willingness to
participate in the proposed informal conferences
between duly appointed subcommittees, but pro-
posed various changes in the ground rules and the
establishment of two new subcommittees. Addition-
ally, the IUE, whose International officers had recent-
ly become affiliated with the Committee on Collec-
tive Bargaining, requested the inclusion of such group
in the proposed exploratory subcommittee meetings.
The Respondent vigorously objected to meeting with
the merged group constituting the Committee on
Collective Bargaining and made it clear that it had no
intention of engaging in group bargaining or meeting
with the IUE (or any of the seven other unions with
whom it had compulsory bargaining obligations) on
other than an individual basis as it had done in the
past. Thereafter, following further exchanges between
the parties and after the IUE had communicated its
intention to abandon its request for a joint meeting,
the parties agreed to hold their first meeting relative
to the subcommittees on May 4, 1966. When the IUE
subsequently appeared at the May 4, meeting accom-
panied by personnel from other unions which were
contractual representatives for other GE bargaining
units, the Respondent refused to proceed with the
meeting and left the room.
Based upon the foregoing facts my colleagues
would find an 8(a)(5) violation. In so doing they
overlook the exploratory nature of the proposed
subcommittees and the proscription contained in
Section 8(d)
Contrary to my colleagues, I can find no language
in the Respondent's proposals and subsequent com-
munications with the Union indicating even an intent
to modify Section XXX of the existing contract with
regard to reopening same for immediate negotiation
of a contract to succeed the one then in effect. In the
absence of such language, Section 8(d) makes it clear
that the Respondent was under no obligation to
commence negotiations. Inasmuch as it was under no
obligation, I can not see how its refusal, in all the
circumstances herein, to continue meeting with the
Union could constitute an act in derogation of the
bargaining obligations imposed by Section 8(a)(5).
Moreover, even assuming, as found by the majority,
that a voluntary agreement had been reached to
commence negotiations for a new contract, it is clear
that one of the conditions underlying such voluntary
agreement was that the IUE was to be represented by
its traditional committee. Accordingly, when the IUE
appeared at the meeting with representatives of other
units it vitiated the voluntary agreement and the
Respondent was then free to discontinue the negotia-
tions. To reach a different conclusion would have the
effect of ignoring Section 8(d) and would dissuade
259
any party to a contract from entering into early
exploratory discussions or talks relative to successor
contracts since they aught well run the risk of having
the statutory obligations contained in Section 8(a)(5)
and 8(d) of the Act imposed upon them.
In any event, as noted above, it is my opinion that
the Union had no right to insist upon the inclusion on
its bargaining committee of representatives from
other unions having contractual commitments in
other independent units of the Respondent. The
Board has, of course, recognized that the right of
employees to bargain collectively through "represen-
tatives of their own choosing" includes the derivative
right of the duly elected bargaining agent to in turn
select the individuals who will act in its behalf in
negotiations with the employer free from control by
the latter. However, the Board has on occasion seen
fit to temper or restrict such right where it appeared
that the unfettered exercise of such right could
possibly be detrimental to the employer and the
collective-bargaining process. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co, 108 NLRB 1555. On the other hand the Board
has refused to qualify the use of the right when the
objections thereto were predicated solely on animosi-
ty and distrust. Ladies Garment Workers Union, 122
NLRB 1390; Kentucky Utilities Co, 76 NLRB 845. 1
feel that the inclusion of representatives of other
units herein shall fall in the former category. Aside
from any multiunion or multiunit considerations, the
inclusion of representatives from other unions, having
separate contracts or certifications with the Respon-
dent in other units, in negotiations for employees of a
different and independent bargaining unit must by
necessity encumber and disrupt the bargaining pro-
cess. While, as contended herein, those who represent
other units may claim and honestly intend to devote
their particular skills solely to bargaining in behalf of
the employees currently under consideration, it is
virtually impossible for them to separate their own
ultimate goals and problems from those of the unit
for which they are currently bargaining. Additionally,
experience has revealed that during collective bargain-
ing negotiations for a multiunit company, such as the
Respondent herein, a company may be willing during
the give and take of collective bargaining to surrender
certain rights or accord greater benefits to a particular
unit containing what the company considers its key
employees in hopes of recapturing a few benefits or
giving less to what it considers a unit of lesser impor-
tance. With representatives present from all units at
the negotiations, it would be virtually impossible for
the company to achieve its aims and possibly amicably
settle one phase of its negotiations and obtain a cer-
tain measure of industrial peace since the unit to be
deprived of benefits would certainly object and most
likely prolong the instant negotiations. It is simply a
matter of allegiance. In fact the Board in the past has
recognized the dangers inherent in conflicts of
260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
allegiance and the possible disruptive effect they could
have on truly good-faith bargaining negotiations.
Thus, on this ground the Board has refused to allow a
supervisor to represent employees for purposes of
collective bargaining regardless of the employees'
wishes to the contrary and despite the rights accorded
the employees in Section 7 to bargain collectively
through the representatives of their own choosing.
Kennecott Copper Corporation, 98 NLRB 75; Doug-
las Aircraft Co., Inc., 53 NLRB 486.
Ultimately, to allow representatives of other units
to attend and participate in negotiations for a unit
which they do not represent may have the effect of
broadening or narrowing, at the pleasure of the
unions concerned, the numbers, types and locations
of the employees covered or affected by the bargain-
ing. This in turn would conflict with the responsibili-
ty of the Board to determine the scope of the
appropriate unit under Section 9 of the Act, and
would curtail the Board's power to enforce the
good-faith bargaining requirement of Sections 8(a)(5)
and 8(b)(3). We do not now permit such alterations
of the reach of bargaining except by mutual consent,
cf Evening News Association, 154 NLRB 1494, enfd.
372 F.2d 569 (C.A. 6), or through the medium of a
UC petition which is particularly designed for this
purpose and enables the Board to discharge its
responsibilities as to determination of units and
enforcement of the bargaining obligations.
Accordingly, inasmuch as the 8(a)(5) violations
herein were predicated solely upon the Respondent's
refusal to bargain with the Union while those repre-
senting other units were on its committee, and since I
would find that such conduct by the Respondent was
not under the circumstances here, violative of the Act
I would dismiss the complaint
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID LONDON, Trial Examiner: Upon a charge filed May
9, 1966, by International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter called IUE or the
Union, the General Counsel of the Board, on July 13, 1966,
issued a complaint against General Electric Company, herein-
after referred to as Respondent, the Company, or GE , alleging
that Respondent had engaged in conduct violative of Section
8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The complaint, as
thereafter amended,' alleges, in substance, that on and since
May 4, 1966, during which time Respondent and the Union,
including certain of the latter's constituent locals, were parties
to a collective-bargaining agreement expiring on October 2,
1966, Respondent refused to meet and confer with the Union
"for the purpose of discussing and negotiating various [proce-
dural] issues pertinent to, and in aid of, collective bargaining
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement to
i An amended charge was filed and served on August 17, 1966.
succeed the [expiring] agreement" because, among the persons
designated by the Union to represent it at such negotiations
were persons who also represented other labor organizations
which engaged in collective bargaining with Respondent The
amended complaint also alleges that on and after August 9,
1966, Respondent refused to meet or confer with the Union
for the purpose of negotiating the substantive terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement to succeed the expiring con-
tract and that Respondent refused to do so for the same reason
alleged immediately above for Respondent's refusal to meet
and confer with the Union on the previous May 4.
With respect to the alleged refusal to meet on May 4, 1966,
Respondent's amended answer denied that it refused to
negotiate with the Union for the reasons alleged in the
complaint and affirmatively pleaded, in substance, that (a) this
demand was not made during the period for bargaining
prescribed by the then current collective-bargaining agreement,
and (b) the subject of prenegotiation procedural matters was
not a mandatory subject for collective bargaining With respect
to the allegations of the amended complaint that Respondent
refused on and after August 9, 1966, to meet or confer with
the Union for the purpose of negotiating a collective-
bargaining agreement to succeed the current contract,
Respondent affirmatively pleaded that commencing in the
latter part of 1965, and continuing thereafter, the Union,
together with seven other International unions with whom, or
their locals, Respondent maintained collective-bargaining
agreements covenng employees other than those represented
by the Union herein, had proclaimed themselves as a coalition
"pledged to confront the Company with uniform demands in
collective bargaining, pledged to maintain a unanimous and
uniform front with respect to said demands throughout
negotiations, and pledged that no one of them would
consummate a contract covenng any bargaining unit with
Respondent until all should do so." As a further defense, the
amended answer pleads that the instant proceeding is now
moot and should be dismissed because the Union and
Respondent, on October 28, 1966, executed a collective-
bargaining agreement effective until October 26, 1969.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before me at
New York, New York, and Washington, D.C., on various dates
beginning October 31, 1966, and concluding on December 20,
1966 At that hearing, both parties hereto and the General
Counsel were represented by counsel, were afforded full
opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, intro-
duce relevant evidence, to argue orally, and to file briefs. After
several extensions of time in which to file such briefs,
extensions which were granted by agreement or consent of all
parties to the proceeding, the General Counsel, Respondent,
and the Union, on or about April 3, 1967, filed briefs which
have been fully considered.
At the hearing before me, the parties stipulated, in
substance, that the record of testimony given, exhibits
received, admissions, stipulations and concessions of fact made
during the course of a hearing conducted July 25-29, 1966,
before the Honorable Marvin E. Frankel, a judge of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
a proceeding by the Board's Regional Director seeking tempo-
rary injunctive relief against Respondent pursuant to Section
10(1) of the Act and arising out of the Company's failure to
bargain with the Union on May 4, 1966, shall be considered by
me as though originally given, received, or made in the instant
proceeding.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 261
Upon the entire record, and my observation of the
witnesses who appeared before me, I make the following
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, a
corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the
laws of the State of New York. At all times material herein,
Respondent has maintained its principal office at 570 Lexing-
ton Avenue, New York, New York, and various other plants
and places of business in the State of New York and other
States of the United States of America, where it is, and has
been at all times material herein, engaged in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of electrical equipment and related
products During the year 1965, which period is representative
of its annual operations generally, Respondent, in the course
and conduct of its business operations, manufactured, sold and
distributed at its various plants and places of business,
products valued in excess of $10,000,000, of which products
valued in excess of $5,000,000 were shipped directly from its
various plants and places of business to points outside the
States in which the respective plants and places of business are
located. Respondent admits, and I find, that at all times
material herein it was an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
It THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union and its constituent locals listed in appendix A to
the complaint, as amended by appendix I of Respondent's
amended Answer, are, and have been at all times material
herein, labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Relationship Between the Parties
Respondent is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and
servicing of a variety of products including basic electrical and
electronic equipment, jet engines , chemicals and plastics. It
employs approximately 290,000 employees engaged in over 60
plants in 30 States and over 400 other locations such as service
shops, appliance repair shops, warehouses, etc., located in all
50 States of the United States About half of these employees
are represented by more than 80 unions, and are members of
approximately 150 bargaining units. About 80,000 employees
in approximately 90 of these units are represented for
purposes of collective bargaining by the Union and/or its
constituent locals
IUE is an international labor union having 600 affiliated
local unions with a dues-paying membership of about 314,000
It is the certified bargaining representative for some of the 90
units described above and various of its locals are individually
certified as the representatives for the remaining units.
Notwithstanding the individual unit certifications and the
varying designations of the Union or its locals as their certified
representative, Respondent and the Union, through the years,
have customarily bargained on a national basis for a national
contract covering basic terms and conditions of employment
of all the units, such as general wage increases, employee
benefits, arbitrations, etc. This national agreement is supple-
mented by local agreements which cover other terms and
2 See also General Electric Company , 150 NLRB 192 , 210, 213.
conditions of employment such as local working conditions,
layoff procedures, individual job rates, etc., not covered in the
national agreement. These local agreements are additions to,
not variations of, the national agreement Thus, the preamble
and article XXX of the national agreement which expired on
October 2, 1966, provide, in substance, that the agreement is
between Respondent and the IUE acting on its own behalf and
on behalf of its various named locals.
B. The Mandatory Bargaining Period,
the Prematurity Issue
In 1955, 1960, and 1963, Respondent and the Union
entered into collective-bargaining agreements covering the
employees in the units described above. All three of these
contracts, the last having a terminable date of October 2,
1966, contained a provision continuing each of said contracts
from year to year after the fixed terminal date therein unless
either party gave written notice to the other not more than 60
days and not less than 30 days, prior to the expiration date
thereof, and that not more than 15 days following the receipt
of such notice "collective-bargaining negotiations shall com-
mence between the parties for the purpose of considering the
terms of a new agreement, and a proposal for a revision of
wages which may be submitted by either the Company or the
Union." The threshold issue in the proceeding is whether
Respondent was required to bargain with the Union on May 4,
1966, when it admittedly refused to do so.
In 1955, 1960, and 1963, notwithstanding the contractual
provisions just referred to, the parties met on numerous
occasions during a period several months prior to the dates
fixed by the expiring agreement in order to give consideration
to a successor contract.2 The practice was summarized in
Respondent's "Employee Relations News, Special Report For
All Employees," dated August 6, 1963, as follows-
In 1955, for example, the Company met in advance of
negotiations with the full union committee to discuss
medical insurance. In 1960, General Electric began formal
negotiations a month early to fully explore the employment
security issue. (Emphasis supplied )
In 1955, with a contract terminating September 15, the parties
met on June 22 to discuss medical insurance , and commenced
full negotiations on July 19, all well in advance of the
mandatory date.
In 1960, as noted in the Employee Relations News
described above, the parties met a month before the manda-
tory bargaining date because, as stated by GE's chief negotia-
tor, Philip D. Moore, when testifying in General Electric
Company, supra, "we wanted to negotiate on the subject of
employment security and reach an agreement on it so that it
wouldn't spill out over into our other matters of negotiation."
The parties stipulated that in 1963 they commenced their
formal negotiations on August 5, approximately 10 days in
advance of the earliest mandatory date. Prior to these sessions,
and commencing early in May 1963, the parties held numerous
meetings of three joint subcommittee, respectively set up to
discuss the subjects of arbitration, contract language, and
employee benefits. These three subcommittees held a total of
over 25 meetings before August 5, 1963. The function of the
1963 subcommittees as defined by Moore in a letter dated
April 29, 1963, to IUE negotiator John Callahan, was to
engage in "joint studies and discussion of the pertinent
subjects, in an effort to identify general areas of agreement or
262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
disagreement in preparation for formal negotiations " The
accomplishment of the 1963 subcommittees was described in
GE's Employee Relations News of August 6, 1963, as follows
General Electric believes the subcommittees made a signifi-
cant contribution in advance of this year's formal negotia-
tions by providing a sort of listening-post for both the
Company and the unions to express serious concerns,
discuss them and more clearly understand them. The
defining of areas of agreement and disagreement on both
sides cannot help but clear aside a mass of detail that might
otherwise have unnecessarily bogged down the actual
negotiations.
On November 24, 1965, Moore, Respondent's manager,
Employee Relations Service, wrote to Callahan, chairman of
the Union's Conference Board, confirming Respondent's pro-
posal made at a meeting on the preceding November 16 "to
consider certain matters that will be open for negotiation in
August 1966." The letter suggested the immediate appoint-
ment of three committees, one on grievance procedure to
convene in December 1965, one on contract language to
convene in February or March 1966, and the third on
employment security to convene in March or April 1966. The
letter concluded with an observation by Moore "that the
subcommittees, in 1963, served an extremely useful purpose
and [Respondent was] looking forward to similarly construc-
tive results this time." On December 21, 1965, Callahan
replied agreeing to the use of the three committees
Following a further exchange of correspondence between
the two men in which Moore emphasized "the benefit of this
early and constructive ground work," Moore, on April 20,
1966, wrote Callahan expressing "complete agreement" with
the latter's request for an "early meeting" and suggesting May
4 as an appropriate time for that meeting. Respondent's
Employee Relations News of July 20, 1966, prepared for
circulation among "General Electric Management," proclaims
that "seven times since last November-11 months before the
expiration of our union contracts-the company has invited
the [Union] to come forward to join with the company in
prenegotiating meetings to pave the way for a sound, construc-
tive result in the 1966 bargaining sessions." The letter
attributes the failure of the parties to negotiate during that
8-month period to the alleged purpose of the Union and seven
other unions to bargain collectively with Respondent, only "as
a coalition," the principal issue involved in this proceeding as
will hereafter appear
At the hearing before me, Respondent, in accordance with
its Answer, contended that by reason of the limitation clause
of the 1963 contract heretofore summarized, May 4, 1966,
when Respondent admittedly refused to bargain with the
Union, or indeed any time before August 18 of that year, was
not "a period of mandatory bargaining" and that Respondent
could not therefore be found guilty of a refusal to bargain at
any time prior to August 18, 1966. I do not agree and
accordingly reject this contention as a defense to the amended
complaint herein. Instead, on the entire record I find that long
before May 4, 1966, in accordance with the prior practice of
the parties as heretofore found, Respondent proposed and the
Union agreed to commence negotiations on May 4, 1966, for a
contract to become effective October 3, 1966.3
Although Respondent contends that meetings designed to
discuss ground rules, subject matter and procedure are not part
of, but preliminary to, actual bargaining concerning wages,
terms and conditions of employment, I conclude that discus-
sions designed to prescribe a modus operandi for bargaining
sessions, and to narrow the areas of disagreement, are as much
a part of the collective bargaining required by the Act, as the
give and take on a particular subject of the desired ultimate
agreement Had the parties awaited the contractual reopening
date, and had the Company at the first session suggested that
this first session, and as many others as were necessary, be
devoted to ground rules, subject matter and procedure, the
Company would not, and certainly could not, take the
position that it was not then bargaining concerning a manda-
tory subject of bargaining.
It is abundantly established by the record herein that
Respondent's usual practice was to hold meetings with the
Union for a successor contract well in advance of the
bargaining dates prescribed by their agreements. The value of
that practice in furthering the basic purposes of the collective-
bargaining process was acknowledged by Moore in his letter to
Callahan on January 20, 1966, in which he characterized the
early subcommittee meetings in 1963 as serving "a very useful
purpose in bringing about a sound and peaceful settlement in
1963." And, on May 9, 1966, after the Company had refused
to meet with the committee designated by the Union, Moore
nevertheless acknowledged that it was desirable and important
to immediately "get to subcommittee work to develop ideas
that will be responsive to the concerns of IUE members and
thus avoid crisis bargaining next fall " (Emphasis supplied.)
The parties stipulated that between August 23 and October
2, 1966, when they were engaged in bargaining pursuant to
district court order, there were five subcommittees selected by
the Company and the Union to negotiate the following five
subject matters. (1) Grievances and Arbitration Procedures, (2)
Contract Language, (3) Employee Security Benefits, (4)
Service Shops, (5) Committee on Ways and Means. Of critical
significance is that the bargaining use of the subcommittees
between August 23 and October 2 is in part the very same
work contemplated by the discussions which were scheduled
to commence May 4, 1966. The bargaining that occurred
between August 23 and October 2 which eventually produced
the agreement between the parties was therefore contemplated
by the subcommittees which were scheduled to begin working
May 4, were it not for Respondent's objection to the
composition of the Union's bargaining committee
There is no merit to Respondent's contention that the
"language of Section 8(d) [of the Act] and the clear import of
the contractual language adopted by the parties for the
purpose of providing stability during the term of the agree-
ment made manifest that the Company, prior to August 18,
1966, was not required to meet with the IUE." Section 8(d) of
the Act imposes upon both parties the duty "to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising
thereunder ...... While the section further provides that the
duty so imposed " . shall not be construed as requiring either
3 By agreement of the parties of the district court hearing, this
so-called prematurity issue was not litigated in that proceeding
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 263
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the term and
conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such
modification is to become effective before some terms and
conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the
contract ...... the proviso has no application to the issue
under consideration . Here, there is no contention, not even a
suggestion , that the parties were seeking a modification of the
substantive terms and conditions of employment contained in
the then current contract "to become effective before such
terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of
the contract." Here, the parties were manifestly seeking to
negotiate a new contract , to become effective only upon the
expiration of the current agreement 4
Though Respondent now pleads its "prematurity " defense
that there was no duty to bargain on May 4, 1966, or indeed at
any time prior to August 18, 1966, the testimony is
undisputed that on May 4, when the parties met pursuant to
their agreement , Respondent 's full bargaining committee ap-
peared at that meeting , willing and apparently prepared to
commence negotiations for a successor contract . Not a word
was uttered to the union committee that the time had not yet
arrived for negotiations That fateful meeting floundered, as
will hereafter appear, only because Respondent refused to
negotiate with a IUE committee which included some who
were not members of the IUE. Respondent continued that
refusal until August 23 , 1966, when it was required, by order
of the District Court, to commence negotiations with the
designated IUE comnuttee . By reason of all the foregoing, I
reject Respondent 's defense that notwithstanding its prior
agreement to do so, it was under no obligation to bargain with
the Union prior to August 18, 1966.
C. The History ofNegotiations
To conduct the negotiations with the Company, the Union
traditionally established a General Electric Locals' Conference
Board, consisting of delegates from various locals, which in
turn elects a Negotiating Committee. The function of the
Conference Board is to elect the Negotiating Committee, to
submit to it the Union's proposals for contract terms and,
when the Negotiation Committee reports back the results or
status of the bargaining, to accept or reject the contract or
particular recommendations of the Negotiation Committee. As
its name implies, however, the Negotiation Committee is the
body which actually sits and bargains with the Company.
In addition to the members of the Negotiation Committee
elected by the Conference Board, this Committee has normally
included the Union's general counsel, its research director, and
other technicians who participate in the discussions both at
and away from the bargaining table. However, although all the
members of this Committee may participate in the negotiation
discussions, only those members who are elected by the
Conference Board to be members of the Committee may vote
on whether or not to recommend acceptance or rejection, or
take any action with respect to a proposal or counterproposal.
i-
4 C. & S. Industries , Inc., 158 NLRB 454, on which Respondent
relies, is inapposite . All that the Board held in that case was that a wage
incentive system, unilaterally imposed by the employer during the term
of a collective -bargaining agreement , was violative of the Act. It was
held to be of no avail to the employer that the union had refused to
bargain with respect thereto though given an opportunity to do so.
5 In addition to the IUE, Respondent bargains on a national basis
with the United Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers (UE), and the
Pattern Makers ' League.
The nonelected members of the Committee may participate in
discussions, but they do not have the right to vote upon
contract terms or on the ultimate determination of the
Committee, including whether or not it should recommend
that the Conference Board accept or reject a contract or any of
the terms thereof. The Conference Board alone is charged with
the responsibility of ultimately and finally determining any
given questions, including whether or not to accept or reject
any proposal or ultimate contract.
The Company's practice is to centralize and coordinate all
of its national and local bargaining activities It does so by
formulating and submitting to IUE and UE a set of proposals
for a national contract. 5 At about the same time, according to
the testimony of its labor relations counsel, the Company
submits its proposals to substantially all the other unions with
which it maintains a collective-bargaining relationship, which
proposals "turn out to be substantially similar to the one that
[is] initially made to IUE." Before these proposals are
presented, the various field employee relations managers are
called to New York for a meeting at which copies of the
proposals are distributed and explained to them. There is a
constant flow of communications respecting labor relations
between Respondent's national office and its field employee
relations managers. Shortly after the national office of the
Company presents to the Union its proposals, upon "signals"
from Respondent's national office, substantially these same
proposals are presented by Respondent's various local em-
ployee relations representatives to the various other unions
with which the Company deals on a local basis as, for example,
locals of the International Associations of Machinists (IAM)
Sheet Metal Workers, and of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW). Generally also, Respondent's con-
tract proposals are announced to the employees themselves
throughout the country before the Union has advised Respon-
dent of its position thereon.
D. Events Preceding the 1966
Negotiation 6
For some years before the events giving rise to this
proceeding, the IUE and other unions representing Respond-
ent's employees were growing increasingly restive and self-
critical over the results of their separate, mutually isolated
efforts to cope with the Company's centralized bargaining
strategy. They believed that they had repeatedly been
outmaneuvered when the Company announced that one or
more unions had accepted a proposal and used this as leverage
to wrest agreement from a more obstinate representative. They
believed that the Company's technique had tended to divide
and conquer them, so that the terms and conditions of
employment for General Electric employees had fallen behind
others in comparable industries. They concluded that a
program of mutually agreed "national goals" was needed to
meet the Company's offering of identical national proposals. It
was thought moreover, that there should be a means and a
program for communication between the interested unions,
6 After a careful and painstaking review and independent analysis of
the entire record herein, I find myself in agreement with a portion of
the exhaustive factual findings contained in the excellent and scholarly
opinion of Judge Frankel , rendered after the conclusion of the district
court hearing mentioned in Statement of the Case, supra By reason
thereof, and because I find no substantial probative evidence in the
record made at the following Board hearing to cause me to deviate from
those findings , I have, to the extent found in the text, taken the liberty
and privilege of adopting a portion of those succinct factual findings.
264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mutual research assistance , coordinated publicity-in short, a
substantial measure of "unity" with respect to their bargain-
ing activities.
Acting on such views, the AFL-CIO, through George
Meany, its president, convened a meeting at Washington, D. C.,
in October 1965, of a group of presidents or other repre-
sentatives of international unions which, or locals of which,
had bargaining relationships with Respondent. Christened the
Committee on Collective Bargaining (CCB), the group at its
initial meeting contained officials of the IUE, IBEW, Inter-
national Association of Machinists (IAM), United Automobile
Workers (UAW), Allied Industrial Workers (AIW), and Ameri-
can Federation of Technical Engineers (AFTE) 7 It was
determined at the meeting that there should be a "coordinated
approach" to the forthcoming 1966 negotiations with Respon-
dent A Steering Committee, including representatives of the
six unions named above was named, with responsibility for
implementing the initial policy determinations, and the struc-
ture of some other committees was outlined. It was agreed that
there should be a cooperative program of research, education,
and publicity, and an effort to evolve a set of "national goals"
on wages and other working conditions.
Although each of the member unions of the CCB and its
Steering Committee were to cooperate and support each other
in such matters as education, research and publicity, they were
to continue to function individually "as autonomous" umons,
just as they had in the past, making their own bargaining
decisions and controlling their own destinies, the IUE, and
each of the other unions, continued to retain the right to
individually control its own bargaining and to decide for itself
what agreement it would make with the Company. Although it
was felt that in the interest common to all of the unions, and
in the interest of courtesy, the various unions should consult
with each other and exchange views, if any one of them should
decide to take less than any common goal, each of the unions
was free at any time to deviate from, or take less than, any
of the common goals, or abandon any or all of the common
goals in its bargaining with the Company.
Following the formation of the CCB, and mainly under the
leadership of its Steering Committee, a number of steps were
taken to implement the "coordinated approach" to bargaining
with Respondent. At the AFL-CIO convention in December
1965, a resolution was adopted reciting that the unions
represented on the CCB had "joined together to form a
collective bargaining front for the negotiations * * * in 1966"
with Respondent and Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The
group, the resolution continued, "plan to develop national
goals which they will jointly support and prevent the corpo-
rations from playing one off against the other." Reciting the
view that Respondent (and Westinghouse) had lagged behind
other major industries in granting employee benefits, the
resolution said:
The seven umons have expressed their determination,
through an insistence upon genuine collective bargaining, to
not only secure action in 1966 on pension and insurance
problems, but also to assure their membership the benefits
of the breakthroughs being made in recent labor-
management agreements on other contractual matters.
Experience has shown that in industries in which a
number of unions operate, such coordination of collective
bargaining is the only way large corporations can be made
to face up to their responsibilities.
* * * Therefore, be it
Resolved. We pledge the full support and resources of
the AFL-CIO to the efforts of the Committee on Collective
Bargaining, representing the seven unions, to secure justice
for their membership in these negotiations, and call upon all
affiliated unions to join us in this pledge.
Speaking in support of that resolution, IUE President Paul
Jennings said
As these corporations grow larger and more diversified, it
becomes more and more difficult for individual inter-
national unions to deal effectively with the corporation's
technique of attempting to settle with one union, and then
come to the others with an accomplished fact. What we
have done, therefore, is recognize the basic fact that we
have the responsibility to deal with each other as autono-
mous umons.
On March 15, 1966, the cooperating unions, now totalling
eight, published a document entitled "Program for Progress."
On its cover it bore a symbol consisting of a circle of links
connecting boxes showing the initials by which the eight
Internationals are known Within the circle appeared the
legend. "We unite for a greater measure of justice." The text
of the paper was preceded by a heading announcing "Joint
Union Collective Bargaining Demands for GE-Westinghouse
1966 Negotiations," further characterized by a subheading
that said. "National goals adopted by over 300 delegates from
the eight International unions at the Conference on National
Collective Bargaining Goals in Washington, D.C., on March 15,
1966." The document then proceeded to list, and later to
elaborate upon, a series of three "economic issues"' and six
"non-economic contract clauses"9 the unions proposed to
press in the forthcoming negotiations. The paper concluded
with a "Resolution on Unity" which said, inter alia
It is now time for us to convey the details of this
program to the membership of our local unions At the
same time we must communicate with the public in a
manner which will create sympathetic understanding of our
program and of our objectives. * * *
We have developed a sound basis for coordinated
negotiations as the result of the spirit of mutual respect and
confidence which has been developed to new levels during
recent months. ***
While we come together as representative of eight
different unions accustomed to negotiating with the GE and
Westinghouse Corporations on a union by union basis, the
companies' representatives have dealt with us and will
continue to attempt to deal with us, either locally or
nationally, under a centrally controlled program. The fact is
that even though the companies have opposed company-
wide bargaining on any issue they have, in fact, insisted
upon the implementation of company-wide policies during
contract negotiations.
By the action we have taken here today we intend to
confront company-wide policies with a union-wide program.
7 The Committee was later enlarged to include the Sheet Metal 9 (a) A full arbitration clause with no restrictions , (b) the full union
Workers (SMW) and the American Flint Glass Workers (AFGW). shop, (c) provisions dealing with automation , (d) continuity of service,
8 (a) Wages (b) holidays and vacations , (c) income and employment (e) antidiscrimination clause, (f) pensions and insurance program.
security
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 265
Our members will know and the companies will know
that all bargaining units will be directing their energies
toward the same national goals.
Of course, in addition, each union will have an oppor-
tunity to pursue additional goals necessary to meeting its
own problems.***
In the light of these simple and common-sense principles,
it is a matter of deep regret, that at least twice in recent
weeks, General Electric officials have launched bitter, yet
totally unfounded, attacks upon our efforts. They accuse us
of wanting to carry on meetings with the company "in
secrecy" and of wanting to take away the rights of
bargaining units to carry on their negotiations, the company
charges that our activities will lead to "industry-wide
bargaining" with "strikes and unsound settlements" and
"economic strangulation," which, of course, is not true.'**
Not only do we reject this obvious attempt to confuse
and divide us, but we pledge to each other our mutual
cooperation, our mutual understanding and our mutual
support.
At the meeting in which the foregoing Program and
Resolution were adopted, IUE President Jennings observed
that the cooperative effort gave the he to those who had
deemed such a thing inconceivable because of interunion
jealousies, rivalries, suspicion, and mistrust. He rejected as
misleading propaganda, the management view that the joint
effort would impair the power of individual unions to bargain
for themselves. He said: "What concerns these corporations, is
that each group as it bargains will have the confidence that all
other bargaining groups are going to be asking for the same
national goals."
Implementing the decision to publicize the joint program
and educate the memberships of the several unions, the CCB
created a publication called "Unity," the first issue of which
(dated March 1966) announced that it would "be distributed
to all GE and Westinghouse workers from time to time during
the eight-union drive." To the same end, a series of so-called
"grass roots meetings" was scheduled and held for the
companies' workers in various places around the country, with
one or another of the cooperating unions acting as "host" on
each occasion.
It is the issues of "Unity," the contents of more than 40
other leaflets, newspapers, statements, etc. received in evidence
at Respondent's request, and the statements attributed to
stewards of union locals at the "grass roots" meetings upon
which the Company places its greatest reliance to establish its
amended defense, that the IUE, and the other seven unions
who had representatives on the CCB and its negotiating
committee, had "pledged [themselves] to confront the Com-
pany with uniform demands in collective bargaining, pledged
to maintain a unanimous and uniform front with respect to
said demands throughout negotiations, and pledged that no
one of them would consummate a contract covering any
-bargaining unit with Respondent until all should do so."
Despite what is found above, on the entire record and my
observation of the witnesses that testified before me, I find
that there was never any conspiracy, agreement, express or
implied, among the cooperating unions that none would sign
with Respondent unless all signed. Instead, I find there was a
mere tacit understanding that before any of them varied or
abandoned any of the agreed "national goals," they would
inform and consult with each other. The cooperative arrange-
ments were instinct with the objective of approaching, as
nearly as possible, the kind of unitary stance Respondent
regularly took vis-a-vis the several unions. Nevertheless, each
union retained the "autonomous" status affirmed in the
AFL-CIO resolution of December 1965, so that each was free
at all times to sign with Respondent on terms it deemed
acceptable for its members.
E. The Refusal To Bargain
on May 4, 1966
On November 16, 1965, in a telegram to Moore signed by
its seven members, including David Lasser as its chairman, the
Steering Committee of the CCB invited early negotiations with
the Company concerning pension and insurance problems By
his telegraphic reply on the following day , addressed only to
Lasser as assistant to the president of IUE, after stating that
the subject of pensions and insurance " is closed to negotiations
until 1968," Moore noted that the Steering Committee's
telegram "listed the names of several representatives of other
unions." With reference thereto, Moore implied that the other
individual signatories to the Committee 's telegram would be
ignored because Respondent does "not bargain with their
unions at the national level."
On November 24, 1965, Moore, in a letter to Callahan,
confirmed a proposal Respondent had made for the creation of
subcommittees to explore preliminarily the subjects of griev-
ance procedure , contract language, and employment security,
beginning in December 1965, as groundwork for the 1966
negotiations . Answering for IUE on December 21, Callahan
objected to some of the substantive and procedural thoughts
Moore had expressed , and made some counterproposals for the
subcommittee procedure . Moore treated of these views in
another letter dated January 20 , 1966. In answer to this, on
February 7, 1966, the CCB wrote to Moore, observed that the
subcommittee problem had been "the subject of considerable
discussion" between the Company and the several unions, and
said
Since the matter is common to the eight AFL-CIO
unions which are joined together in preparation for these
negotiations , and we have given it considerable thought, we
are offering you our joint thinking.
After outlining the promised "joint thinking ," this letter said
Since our eight unions have a jointly developed approach
on how to create the most successful type of meetings, and
since your management has a national policy on this matter,
the simplest and most effective solution is a conference
between us.
On February 15, the Steering Committee wrote again to
Moore, this time on one of the pension problems mentioned
earlier herein. Among other things, the Committee wrote:
Since your offer to each of the unions is the same and
we have considered this matter jointly, we believe it would
be to the best advantage to all considered that we have a
joint meeting in order to discuss your proposals.
On February 24, Moore wrote three letters . The first, to
Joseph Swire, IUE's Pension and Benefit Consultant , referring
to claimed misconceptions in the Steering Committee's Feb-
ruary 15, letter, said:
It would be most inappropriate for us to respond to the
Steering Committee as they requested in their recent letter
since this would only serve to create an illusion that
national negotiations on benefits are now in process and
that locally negotiated contract agreements are subject to
alteration at the national level.
266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
You can help to clarify this matter by advising your
associates in the other unions that no arrangements have
been made between IUE and General Electric which would
require or facilitate multi-union negotiations or discussions
in that direction
Moore's second letter, to David Lasser, as assistant to the
president of IUE, protested the proposed "coalition" approach
by the unions, observing inter alia.
* * * It now appears that [there] * * * is a bid for General
Electric to recognize this group as a merged negotiating
body. Apparently this new group is seeking to take over
negotiations that historically have been earned on by the
IUE here in New York, and independently by the seven
other unions at the Company locations where they are
certified.
We realize that it is not our place to advise you and
your associates on internal union affairs and that arrange-
ments for coalitions and mergers for negotiations purposes
have been publicized before as indications of mtra-union
cooperation. We also realize that officials of the unions
involved may actually have some organizational authority
to give up their independence at the bargaining table for
tactical reasons.
We are not responding to your Steering Committee's
two recent letters because by doing so it might create the
mistaken impression that national bargaining with local
bargaining units is in effect; this is clearly not the case nor
do we believe it should be. * * *
The letter went on to portray the dangers and defects of
"industry-wide bargaining," expressed fears of "experimenting
with techniques that go in the direction of unnecessary strikes
and unsound settlements," and concluded that such evils could
"be the long-term hazard of any coalition in our industry."
Moore's third letter of February 24 was to Callahan,
congratulating him on his reelection as Chairman of the
Conference Board, urging that the parties move forward on the
subcommittee problem, and enclosing a copy of the preceding
letter to Lasser. Repeating his objections to "coalition bar-
gaining," Moore wrote in this letter "... I want to assure you
now that there is no likelihood that we will obstruct
negotiations with your union nationally or with the other
seven unions locally (where they are certified to negotiate) by
engaging in coalition bargaining." In a reply of March 10,
1967, among other points of disagreement, Callahan eluded
Moore for "choos[ing] to ignore the suggestions of the eight
unions completely and, instead, propos[ing] that [the parties]
start subcommittee meetings on [Respondent's] unilaterally
determined basis."
On March 20, 1966, the then eight-union CCB pressed its
efforts toward joint sessions in a telegram to Respondent's
president, Fred J. Borch, reiterating such points as the
following-
The contracts of our eight unions with GE on the major
issues considered by the [Union] Conference are the same
and we naturally have developed a common program to
improve our agreements. * * *
In order to canvass this whole problem [of a peaceful
settlement] facing us jointly as an attempt to lay the
groundwork for such collective bargaining, we propose an
early meeting with you and your representatives.
iO This position was arrived at upon advice of the Union 's general
counsel that it "would have to abndon the [iointl approach and go it
alone."
Such a meeting would be informal and would involve no
commitments as to future action by either group
Borch telegraphed a rejection of this proposal on March 25.
On the same day, Moore wrote again to Callahan, enclosing a
copy of the Botch wire, referring to his letter of March 22 on
the subcommittee problem, and repeating that the Company
remained "receptive to appropriate pre-negotiation discussions
with IUE, but ... [did] not intend to participate in any
eight-union coalition discussions or in any other steps in the
direction of industry-wide bargaining "
In his reply to Moore dated April 13, 1966, Callahan
unequivocally announced a significant change of position-that
the Union was abandoning any request for joint discussions.
He said that the Committee on Collective Bargaining and IUE's
membership "were truly disappointed that the officials of
General Electric did not find it possible to accept the request
of the eight union presidents for an informal meeting" to
discuss a joint approach "However," he continued,
it is clear that General Electric is not willing to hold any
such joint meeting, even though it may be informal. The
IUE did not intend by its telegram any formal request for
joint negotiations.
Speaking for the IUE-GE Conference Board, we will not
pursue that matter any further and will abandon any
suggestions for any such joint meeting or for joint
discussions. 10
Callahan went on to discuss still outstanding differences
concerning the proposed subcommittee procedure, then said
* * * We believe the only way to satisfactorily deal
with all of these problems and attempt to resolve them is by
a meeting between your representatives and our Negotiating
Committee. The IUE-GE Negotiating Committee therefore
request that your Company meet with it to discuss all ofthe
problems I have mentioned, including the agenda of subject
matters for, the number and the scheduling of the proposed
subcommittee meetings.
Replying on April 20, Moore expressed his satisfaction with
the foregoing statement of IUE's position and acknowledged
that Callahan had made it "clear that IUE was not supporting
joint negotiation...." He suggested, and it was soon agreed,
that the committee for the Company and the IUE should meet
at 10 a.m. on May 4 in the usual Conference Room at the
Company's offices.
In preparation for that meeting, as stated in an IUE
statement prepared for and delivered to Respondent on May 4,
the Union had added to its Negotiating Committee, as
nonvoting members, one representative from each of the other
seven unions that had comprised, with IUE, the Committee on
Collective Bargaining (CCB). The seven were needed, it was
stated, to give IUE the benefit of their experience in
negotiating with Respondent. Callahan testified, and I credit
his testimony, that their presence on the Committee would
supply adequate interunion communication as a means of
avoiding the "whipsawing" Respondent was thought to have
accomplished in the past. It was not intended, by adding these
members, to bargain for any unions other than IUE. Nor did
the additions reflect any understanding that a proposed
agreement between IUE and Respondent would be subject to
approval, disapproval, or adoption by any other union.
The IUE Negotiation Committee, including the seven men
from other unions, arrived at Respondent's offices at about
9:45 a.m. on May 4. A member of Respondent's staff, whose
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
duty it was to escort the Union's committee to the Conference
Room, observed that some of the seven men were wearing
lapel buttons reflecting their membership in unions other than
that of the IUE and hastened to report it to Moore in his
private office The latter made the report the subject of a
speedy discussion of strategy with his committee and, upon
advice of Thomas F. Hilbert, Jr , the Company's labor relations
counsel, concluded that the inclusion of the seven in the
group, ostensibly appearing for IUE, was a breach of faith, or,
at the least, an attempt to use and apply the Board's recent
decision in American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corpora-
tion, 155 NLRB 736, which upheld the propriety of such
additions to a union negotiating team. Advised by its counsel
that the Board'sAmencan Radiator decision should be deemed
unsound, and that it should not be followed, Respondent's
committee concluded that it would not meet with the IUE
group while it included the seven "outsiders." It was decided
that the Company's group would repair to the Conference
Room, that Moore would state the Company's position, and
that they would then depart without tarrying.
The plan was executed Moore and his colleagues went to
the Conference Room, filed around the table, and greeted the
Union's Committee. With all, or substantially all, of the
unwanted seven, there was a brief, approximately uniform
conversation. As Moore and each of them exchanged intro-
ductions, Moore, observing the button worn by the committee
member, said "I see you're from [naming a union other than
IUE] ," to which each replied that he was appearing this day as
a member of the IUE Committee.
Following the tour of the table, the Company's people took
seats on their side. Callahan said he had a statement to make
and handed copies thereof to Moore. The latter, however, said
he had a statement to make first, and proceeded to do so
Moore said he "must have come to the wrong meeting", that he
would not be a party to "coalition bargaining", that he
deemed the meeting recessed to 2 p.m. at which time those on
the other side were invited to return, "but only with the IUE
people." Callahan and Irving Abramson, IUE's general counsel,
unavailingly requested an opportunity to explain, repeating
their requests several times more shrilly as the Company's
people prepared to leave. They managed to shout that their
group was intended to be "an IUE Committee," but no more
than that before Moore and his colleagues swept from the
room. The whole episode took about 10 minutes
Later in the morning, Callahan delivered to Moore, at the
latter's office, a letter composed after the brief Conference
Room encounter. The letter said the Union was "shocked at
[Moore's] refusal to meet the IUE-Negotiating Committee
and ... [his] intemperate and arbitrary refusal to permit the
Committee to respond to [his] false enunciation of the
purpose of our Committee." It announced IUE's readiness to
resume the meeting at 2 p.m. only "on behalf of the JUE," but
insisted that the Union had a "right to choose the represen-
tatives of [its] own Committee," and rejected any suggestion
that the Company could "designate the composition" of the
committee. On May 9, Moore again informed Callahan that
Respondent would negotiate with IUE only with "an IUE
committee that consists [exclusively] of IUE people." The
it Similar protection is provided for the employer by Section8(b)
( 1)(B) of the Act which makes it unlawful for a union "to restrain or
267
parties having adhered to their respective positions, the Union,
on May 9, 1966, filed the charge which instituted this
proceeding.
The Company's contention on the ultimate issue herein,
applicable to both its May 4 refusal to bargain and that of the
following August, is that "the totality of the conduct engaged
in by the IUE and its fellow members in the CCB so imposed
on the collective-bargaining process as to privilege the
Company's refusal to meet with the IUE's expanded com-
mittee." In support thereof, it argues that (1) "the Company's
action was privileged because the unions were seeking unlaw-
fully to expand the Board's certified bargaining units" and (2)
"the `choice of negotiators rule' is not an absolute one and in
the context of the facts herein, the Company's action was
privileged because the Union's conduct constituted an un-
warranted imposition on the bargaining process."
Considering these contentions in reverse order, any discus-
sion concerning the "choice of negotiators" must begin with
obedience to Section 7 of the Act which guarantees employees
the right "to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing." That guarantee is implemented by
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act which makes it unlawful for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise" of that right.] i
To limit the scope of Section 7 merely to the right of
employees to determine whether or not they desire represen-
tation by a specified union, or indeed by any union as
Respondent contends, would make a sham of that entire
section. The Union, like the employer herein, can act and
negotiate only through designated representatives. The effect
of allowing an employer to control or determine who should
negotiate for the Union would be not only to destroy the
Section 7 right of employees "to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing," but would require the
Union to bargain with the Company concerning the member-
ship of that committee, a purely internal matter unrelated "to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions
of employment," the only subjects concerning which either
party is required to bargain.i 2
The Board has consistently held that the entire relationship
between employees and their union stands apart from any
proper concern of the employer in a refusal-to-bargain case. In
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 113 NLRB
1288, where an employer insisted upon conditioning the
representative's right to act upon an employee vote of
approval, the Board held that the employer has no right, once
a majority representative has been established, to concern itself
with the authority of the union officers designated to speak or
act on behalf of the employees. In agreeing with the Board, the
Supreme Court characterized the employer's unlawful insis-
tence as a matter which "... relates only to the procedure to
be followed by the employees among themselves ... It
substantially modifies the collective system provided for in the
statute by weakening the independence of the representative
chosen by the employees." N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of
Borg-Warner Corporation, 356 U.S. 342, see also Prudential
Insurance Company ofAmerica, 124 NLRB 1390, 1397.
Admittedly, the rule, like the right of free speech and
coerce . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for the
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances
12 Section 9(a) of the Act.
268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
assembly, is not absolute, nor must it be mechanically applied.
But the rare occasions when it has not been given its full scope,
reflected by cases on which Respondent relies, are far
removed from that found here Thus, in Bausch & Lomb
Optical Company, 108 NLRB 1555, the "precise issue"
presented was whether the employer had violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act "by refusing to deal with the duly
certified representative of its employees because such represen-
tative has established a business enterprise in the same locality
and industry as that of the employer and has thus become one
of its direct competitors." The Board concluded "that the
particular circumstances of this case warrant exercise by the
Board of its authority to determine that while the Union
retains its dual status of bargaining agent and business
competitor it is not a proper representative of the Respon-
dent's employees for the purposes of invoking Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act " The facts in N.L.R.B. v David Buttrick Company,
361 F.2d 300 (C.A. 1) are similar to, and its decision is
founded on, the rationale of Bausch & Lomb, supra, the
existence of a local union's possible disqualifying conflict of
interest arising out of the contractual relationship of its
International with a competitor of the employer involved.
Both cases are clearly inapposite. 13
Instead, I deem controlling herein the Board decisions in
Standard Oil Company, 137 NLRB 690, enfd. 322 F.2d 40
(C.A. 6), and American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corpora-
tion, 155 NLRB 736, presently under review in the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals In Standard Oil, the respondent, as
the Company herein, refused to bargain with the Union
because of the presence of the latter's bargaining committee of
persons described as "temporary International representatives"
which organization the Board assumed, arguendo, "did not
represent" the employees involved in the negotiations. The
Board held that the refusal was violative of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act On review by the court of appeals, the court
said "The Company's objection to the finding of the Board
that it violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act presents the
question of whether the Company was obligated to meet and
conduct bargaining negotiation in the presence of temporary
International representatives. The Company objected to the
presence of the temporary representives for the reason that
they were neither employees of the particular refinery where
negotiations were being conducted nor were they regular
International representatives assigned to that refinery. The
basic reasoning behind these objections was an apprehension
that the presence or participation of the temporary employees
in the bargaining at the separate refinery would amount to
companywide bargaining or at least evidence an acquiescence
in such bargaining. The officers of the Company believed that
the appointment of the temporary representatives and their
participation in the bargaining was part of a subtle plot to
bring about companywide bargaining. The unions disclaimed
any intention or purpose to try to force companywide
bargaining." In affirming the Board's decision, the court of
appeals added. "Absent any finding of bad faith or ulterior
motive on the part of the unions we conclude that it was the
duty of the Company to negotiate with the bargaining
committee of the unions at the respective refinery plants even
though the temporary representatives were present. "
Here, there is no probative testimony that at any time
between April 20, 1966, when Moore accepted Callahan's
disavowal at "face value," and May 4, the Union, by its
inclusion of the seven outsiders on its committee was acting in
"bad faith or [with] ulterior motive." Instead of putting the
Union Committee to a test of the continuing good faith of its
April 17 disavowal by waiting to hear the scope of its
demands, Respondent's committee bluntly refused to hear the
Union Committee's protestations and arbitrarily walked out of
the Conference Room.
On the other hand, there is compelling testimony adduced
from Respondent's own witnesses, which requires rejection of
the Company's amended defense with respect to its May 4
refusal to bargain. Thus, Hilbert, the Company's labor relations
counsel, testified that in Moore's private office during the
morning of May 4, when the Company's committee was
advised that the Union Committee which the Company was
awaiting included men who apparently were members of
unions other than IUE, he advised Respondent's committee
that "the Union is, apparently, seeking to apply the rule of
American Radiator and Standard case," adding that he
believed that rule to be "novel" and predicting that it "would
be upset by the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Sixth Circuit."
He further testified that if "the seven representatives of other
unions ... hadn't been present, [the Company] would have
proceeded with the meeting on May 4 and have over-
looked . . . the illegality of the [alleged] lock-in, ... that it
was and still is the Company's position, whether it be with
respect to pre-negotiating meeting or the [then] currently
expected negotiation meetings, that it is not obligated under
the disagreement with the American Radiator rule to sit down
with the committee on which there are also individuals who,
whatever may be their purpose there, happen to be also
representatives of other unions."
In the American Radiator case, the union involved, Standard
Allied Trades Council (SATC) appeared at the bargaining table
for negotiations in behalf of employees at that Respondent's
Louisville, Kentucky plant. Included among those appearing
for the SATC were a representative of the Industrial Union
Department (IUD) of the AFL-CIO, two representatives of
Local 254 of United Automobile Workers (UAW), and a
representative of the International Brotherhood of Boiler
Makers, (IBB), none of which organizations had been
designated, certified or recognized by that employer as the
bargaining agent for its Louisville employees, nor were any of
these organizations members of the SAC. The Company
objected to the presence of the aforesaid "outsiders" or
"strangers" and stated that, so long as they were present, it
would not negotiate. Squarely relying on the court of appeals'
affirmance in Standard Oil Company, supra, the Board held
that the employer had no veto power over the members of the
SAC committee and that by refusing to negotiate with that
committee it violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
There is not a word of testimony that during the Company's
private conference on the morning of May 4, or at the brief
session with the Union Committee which followed, that except
for the prematurity issue heretofore considered, the Com-
pany's unequivocal decision to refuse bargaining with the IUE
Committee was based on any ground other than the mere
13 Compare also N.L.R.B. v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 182 F.2d 810,
813 (C.A. 6) with N.L.R.B. v. Roscoe Skipper, Inc., 213 F.2d 793
(C.A. 5)
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
presence of the seven men in question.' 4 Indeed, Hilbert's
testimony aforementioned, given on July 29, 1966, long after
most of the circumstances upon which Respondent now relies,
conclusively establishes that "this was and still is the Com-
pany's position."15 That position, however, was and is
untenable in light of the Court of Appeals' decision in
Standard Oil Company, supra, and that of the Board in
American Radiator.
According to Hilbert's own testimony, in the private
conference in Moore's office during the morning of May 4 he
recognized and considered the presence of the "outsiders" on
the Union's committee as the Union's exercise of, and reliance
upon, the right proclaimed and vouched for by the Board in its
American Radiator decision However, instead of obeying the
mandate of that decision, resting as it does on the Court of
Appeals' decision in Standard Oil, Moore and his committee
accepted Hilbert's opinion and belief "that the rule of
American Radiator was novel.... [predicted it] would be
upset by a Circuit Court of Appeals," and should not be
followed. Respondent, in its brief, continues to express its
disagreement with that decision and contends that it was
wrongly decided.16 Not only am I personally without doubt
concerning the soundness of the Board's decision in American
Radiator, as a Trial Examiner and arm of the Board it is not
for me to speculate upon the fate of that case in the Circuit
Court of Appeals For me it is enough that the facts therein are
sufficiently indistinguishable from the record herein as to
make the Board's rationale and decision binding upon me.
I also reject Respondent's other contention that "the unions
were seeking unlawfully to expand the Board's certified
bargaining units." Whatever desires the CCB entertained for
informal meetings with Respondent, that venture was effec-
tively put aside by the Union and Callahan by the latter's letter
of April 13, 1966, to the apparent satisfaction of Moore as
appears by his letter of April 20. In any event, there was
nothing unlawful in the early pursuit of that endeavor. With
respect to such a proposal, the parties were "free to bargain or
not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree." N.L.R.B. v.
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 356 U.S. 342,
349, N.L.R.B. v. American Compress Warehouse, 350 F.2d
365 (C.A. 5). A problem with respect thereto would arise only
if the Union had adamantly insisted upon such broad
negotiations to a point of impasse.
Here, however, Moore acknowledged on April 20, 1966,
that it was then "clear [to him] that IUE was not supporting
Joint negotiations" and Hilbert testified that upon receiving
Callahan's letter of April 13 the Company "understood that
they had given up the coalition attempt, the joint bargaining
attempt."i 7 Regardless, therefore, of all that happened before
April 20, 1966, on that day, and at least until the morning of
May 4, Respondent was convinced that the anticipated
demands and negotiations were being proposed only in behalf
of IUE. In that state the record, insofar as the Company's
refusal to bargain on May 4 is concerned, the mass of evidence
relied on by Respondent consisting of statements, circulars,
teletypes, newspaper items, etc., issued prior to April 20 by,
and pertaining to the aims and activities of the unions
269
represented on the CCB and its Steering Committee lose
meaningful significance
Nor am I persuaded by anything that occurred or was
published between April 20 and May 4, 1966, that the Union
together with the seven international unions who had represen-
tatives on the CCB were on May 4, or at any time "pledged to
maintain a unanimous and uniform front with respect to the
[unions] demands throughout negotiations and pledged that
no one of them would consummate the contract covering any
bargaining unit with Respondent until all should do so."
Insofar as reliance is placed on circulars issued by, or
statements attributed to, any local union, either before,
during, or after April 1966, I find such reliance to be
unavailing. "The overwhelming weight of judicial authority,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, is that a
local union is a legal entity apart from its international .. not
a mere branch or arm of the latter" so that, without more, and
merely because of the relationship between the two organi-
zations, liability is thereby not imposed on the international
for the conduct of the local. LB.E.W. (Franklin Electric
Construction Company), 121 NLRB 143, 146, citing
Coronado Company v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295,
299, and United Mine Workers v. Coronado Company, 259
US. 344, 393. And though it is true that, in their zeal to
achieve the goals announced by the CCB in November and
December 1965, the president of the AFL-CIO and officials
of one or more international unions represented on the CCB
thereafter made exaggerated statements concerning those aims
and hopes, I find that circumstance unavailing to Respondent.
Whatever beliefs may have been engendered in the Company's
mind by such statements, they were effectively dispelled and
removed by the Union's renunciation and disavowal of April
13, 1966, and so recognized and acknowledged by Respondent
on April 20. The May 4 refusal was not interposed because the
Company believed that it was being confronted with a demand
for multi-union bargaining.
The behavior of IUE and its decision to include represen-
tatives of seven other international unions on its Negotiation
Committee can be reconciled only with the negation of the
alleged pact rather than its existence. Had, in fact, such a
secret pact or conspiracy existed on May 4, the designation of
seven conspirators on the IUE Committee would be the last
thing that IUE as a co-conspirator would do. Any discussion
required for the carrying out of the "conspiracy" would
obviously' be conducted outside of the bargaining sessions.
Cautious conspirators would normally do nothing that would
betray their plot, such as the unconcealed addition to the IUE
Negotiation Committee of seven "conspirators." On the other
hand, if Respondent sincerely believed on May 4 that the
Union's letter of April 13 was a sham, that a conspiracy to
enforce multi-union bargaining still prevailed, and that the
appointment of the seven men to the IUE Committee was
merely a "strategem or subterfuge after deliberate equivo-
cation" as Respondent now urges, absence of the seven men
from the conference table on May 4 could not assure
Respondent that the alleged conspiracy or "lock-in" no longer
existed. With all the means of communication available to the
14 Respondent , in its posthearing brief conceded that "the Company , controlling here because it is plainly distinguishable on the facts ," I find
on April 20, accepted Mr. Callahan 's abandonment at face value " nothing referred to in its brief, or in the entire record , which alters my
15 At another point in his testimony on July 26, 1966, Hilbert conclusion that American Radiator is indistinguishable and controlling
affirmed "that if the IUE was willing to come in now without the seven herein.
newcomers .... [ the Company ] would sit down with the IUE and 17 In it brief , Respondent further conceded that "the Company, on
negotiate with that organization ." April 20, accepted Mr. Callahan 's abandonment at face value."
16 Though Respondent also argues that American Radiator "is not
270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
eight unions, exhaustively developed by Respondent during
the hearing, mere absence from the negotiation table of
representatives of the seven other unions would serve as no
obstacle to effective enforcement of the alleged conspiracy or
lock-in agreement.
Respondent had within its power the right and opportunity
to apply the acid test as to IUE's intentions. All it need have
done on May 4 was to engage in discussions to determine
whether the enlarged bargaining committee really sought to
represent employees outside of IUE's bargaining unit Not only
did it fail to do so, it did not even deign to ask Callahan or
Abramson for what purpose the "outsiders" were appearing
Finally, and assuming that Respondent on May 4 in good
faith believed that the committee which it confronted on that
day was there for the committed purpose of negotiating a
multiunion contract in pursuance to the alleged pact described
in Respondent's amended Answer, that belief, in light of my
contrary finding heretofore recorded, is of no avail to
Respondent in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in
N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 at 742. The Court there held
The duty to "bargain collectively" enjoined by section
8(a)(5) is defined by section 8(d) as the duty to "meet ...
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." Clearly, the
duty thus defined may be violated without a general failure
of subjective good faith; for there is no occasion to consider
the issue of good faith if a party has refused even to
negotiate in fact-"to meet ... and confer"-about any of
the mandatory subjects. A refusal to negotiate in fact as to
any subject which is within section 8(d), and about which
the union seeks to negotiate, violates section 8(a)(5) though
the employer has every desire to reach agreement with the
union upon an over-all collective agreement and earnestly
and in all good faith bargains to that end. (Emphasis in
original text.)' 8
Only a few weeks ago, the Circuit Court of Appeals, in
N.L.R.B. v. M & M Oldsmobile, Inc., 377 F.2d 712, (C.A. 2),
also had occasion to consider whether or not an employer's
good faith, but erroneous, belief that it was not legally
obligated to bargain constituted a valid defense to an allegation
that such refusal was violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The court of appeals there said
Respondent also contends that its "good faith" allowed it
to maintain "forever" its position that the contract had not
come into existence. It is true that discussion of the duty of
collective bargaining under the Act frequently emphasize
the requirement of good faith .... But Respondent
misconceives the statutory duty, which includes not only a
state of mind but also objective acts. There are situations in
which it is not enough that an employer is convinced he is
right, in such circumstances, an employer's state of mind is
irrelevant and he acts as his peril . See cases collected in
Duvin, The Duty to Bargain Law in Search of Policy, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 248, 266-86,...N.L.R.B v Katz, supra,
United Aircraft Corp. v. N.L.R.B, 33 F.2d 819, 822 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 910. [Emphasis supplied.]
On the entire record, I find that on May 4, 1966, when
Respondent refused to recognize and negotiate with the
committee designated by the Union, the Company's refusal
was based on one circumstance alone-that the Union had
designated as members of its committee men who were not
members of the IUE but who normally served as represen-
tatives of other unions. By that refusal, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
F. The Refusal To Bargain On and
After August 15, 1966
As noted in Statement of the Case, supra, the hearing in the
100) injunction proceeding was conducted on July 25-29,
1966. On August 2, while the application for the injunction
was pending in the District Court, but before the Court's
decision thereon, Callahan wrote Moore that IUE "hereby
serves notice" of its intention to terminate the current GE-IUE
national agreement, and proposing a meeting of the parties on
August 15, 16, and 17 to consider IUE proposals, which he
enclosed, for contract changes On August 9, Moore replied
agreeing to meet on August 15 "provided there will be no
representatives of other unions present. We want to be
absolutely clear about this .... To avoid any confusion about
this, we would want specific assurances from you that we
would not be confronted with a mixed group at any time
unless the courts allow it." On August 15, in a telephone
conversation between Abramson and Hilbert, the latter re-
affirmed the Company's refusal as set forth in Moore's letter of
August 9.
On August 18, 1966, Judge Frankel's opinion, findings and
conclusions were filed, followed by his order on August 23
granting the injunctive relief requested by the Regional
Director described above and thereby requiring the Company
to bargain with the committee designated by the Union. On
August 18, upon being advised of Judge's Frankel's decision,
Moore wired Callahan that, in view of the court's decision, the
parties start meeting immediately. His telegram, however,
contained the following caveat:
You understand, of course, that we will promptly appeal
the order. Therefore, this meeting and any further meetings
between us on the same basis are being conducted under a
protest on our part against the presence of a mixed union
bargaining committee which includes representatives of
other unions which do not bargain with us nationally. i 9
Under Moore's protest of August 18, meetings between the
Company and the Union's mixed committee began on August
23 and continued for about 6 weeks without a settlement
being reached. With the aid of a panel of Federal Mediators
and Cabinet members invoked on October 2 at the request of
the President of the United States in order to avoid a
18 See also Garment Workers v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 731, 738-739,
and N.L.R.B. v. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (C.A. 6).
19 On August 24, 1966, Respondent appealed Judge Frankel's
decision to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On September
8, 1966, the district court decision was reversed , not on the merits of
the issues involved herein, but exclusively on "the propriety of the
Section 10 (j) temporary injunction issued against the General Electric
Company " General Electric Co v. McLeod, 366 F.2d 847 (C.A. 2). On
September 20, pursuant to the Company's motion for an immediate
mandate, the court of appeals directed the district court to vacate its
injunction . On September 21, on request of the Board 's Regional
Director , a stay of the mandate of the court of appeals was entered by
Mr. Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court (87 S.Ct . 5),pending action on
the Regional Director 's petition for a writ of certiorari . The effect of
this stay was to reinstate the injunction ordered by Judge Frankel. On
January 16 , 1967, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and set aside
the judgment of the court of appeals (385 U S. 533 , 87 S.Ct. 637).
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 271
threatened strike,20 negotiations continued until October 14,
1966, when the parties reached agreement on a national
contract to expire on October 26, 1969.21
For substantially the reasons explicated in section III, E,
above, I also find and conclude that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act on August 9, 1966, when
Moore declined Callahan's urgent request of August 2 to begin
negotiations with the Union Committee on August 15, a date
admittedly within the mandatory bargaining period. On that
day, August 9, Moore wrote Callahan that Respondent was
willing to meet with the Union Committee on August 15
provided only "there will be no representative of other unions
present," a position reiterated by Hilbert to Abramson on
August 15.
The Company's willingness to negotiate on August 15, albeit
with a Union Committee manned only as demanded by
Respondent, is realistically inconsistent with and belies its
position that it refused to bargain with the Union on that day
only because the Union was still maintaining a coalition with
the seven other international union members of the CCB
"pledged to confront the Company" with uniform demands
for multiuinon and companywide collective bargaining.22 Not
only have I found that no such lock-in or pledge ever existed
but, as previously pointed out, absence from the conference
table on the part of representatives of the seven other
International unions could not, as the Company's experienced
and competent negotiators must have realized, serve as any
assurance to Respondent that the IUE was not, in fact,
locked-in or pledged as the Company still pleads.
The familiar quotation that "the proof of the pudding is in
the eating" may appropriately be invoked here, for there is not
a scintilla of evidence that at anytime during the 24 meetings
between the Company and the Union Committee which began
on August 23 pursuant to the District Court order, that any
member of the Union Committee which confronted the
Company demanded, suggested, or intimated that the
Committee was bargaining, or seeking to bargain, for any
employees other than those represented by the IUE. The same
absence of testimony is noted with respect to the 14
subcommittee meetings that were held during the same period.
The significance of what appears immediately above is not
lost or diminished by the activities of the CCB, IAM, SMW,
AIW, the AFL-CIO and George Meany its president, and the
Federal Mediators, which are exhaustively referred to in
Respondent's brief. Insofar as the activities of the CCB are
concerned, there is no evidence that the Company was ever
aware of the committee's voluminous teletype activities or
reports, now heavily relied upon, until they were produced
pursuant to Respondent's subpena at the hearing before me in
November and December 1966.
In addition to the numerous teletypes just referred to,
Respondent offered in evidence Respondent's Exhibits 52 and
62. These exhibits are Xerox copies of three additional
teletypes, the original of which Respondent contends were
submitted to its "community relations" specialist at Bridge-
ville, Pennsylvania, by officials of IUE Local 640 for posting at
Respondent's plant at that location, where Local 640 is the
certified collective-bargaining representative They purport to
be copies of teletypes sent by the CCB "to all CCB COORDS."
The relevant portion of the two teletypes found on Exhibit 62,
were dated October 2, 1966 and read as follows: "The IUE has
agreed to the President's request and is postponing the strike
for 2 weeks. The Union agreed after Chief Mediator Simpkins
gave his word that the contract would remain in force during
these 2 weeks. You are to instruct your locals not to go out on
strike tonight-Repeat, not to go on strike." Exhibit 52, taped
at 10 a.m., October 3, 1966, states that "news reports ..
indicate" that IUE Local 301, UAW Local 771, and a third
AFTE local had gone out on strike "over local issues " The
results of strike vote by other locals of IAM, AFTE, the
Teamsters, and Plumbers Union were also reported. The
teletype added "While those who are out are legally on strike
over unresolved grievances or local issues, and while we can
understand their feelings, they are nevertheless breaking the
discipline of the coalition effort." (Emphasis added.)
Respondent, in its brief, contends that the offered exhibits
"contain significant language relative to the actual role played
by the CCB in the 1966 negotiations, an issue central to this
proceeding." The General Counsel and the Union objected to
their receipt in evidence on the ground that proper foundation
concerning their authenticity had been laid Ruling on their
admissibility was reserved. Though I have doubts concerning
the sufficiency of the foundation laid, I have nevertheless
concluded to overrule the objections and to admit the two
exhibits in evidence as part of the record herein.
Notwithstanding the ruling just announced, I find nothing in
the two exhibits which causes me to deviate from or modify
the conclusion arrived at in earlier portions of my decision
pertaining to what Respondent has characterized as "the actual
role played by the CCB in the 1966 negotiations." Were it not
for what Respondent apparently believes to be the crucial
statement in Exhibit 52, "breaking the coalition effort,"
neither exhibit would merit further individual consideration.
That statement, however, is so ambiguous that one can only
speculate as to its intended meaning and significance. Respon-
dent speculates that it reflects the possession of power by the
CCB to impose "discipline" on the constituent members of
that Committee, a contention which has heretofore been
rejected as groundless. A more reasonable speculation can be
indulged in by considering the context in which the statement
is found.
The teletype under consideration expresses concern over the
action of local unions by engaging in strikes "over local issues"
and grievances, facts which are of no relevance to the issue
before me. The reference to these strikes, however, sheds light
and gives meaning to the ambiguous statement relied on by
Respondent. These local strikes were imposed at almost the
same time that the President interjected members of his
cabinet and Federal mediators into the negotiations between
the Union and Respondent thereby improving the prospects
for early agreement on a national contract between the parties.
Because it feared that strike action against Respondent by
local unions over local issues would "rock the boat" and
jeopardize the negotiations in which the parties and the
20 As previously noted, the Union had terminated the existing
agreement between the parties, the termination to become effective
October 2 , 1966. Because of "reasons related to national defense," the
President requested the Union , and the latter agreed, to refrain from
striking for a period of 2 weeks from October 2
21 During most of the time after the Presidential panel entered the
negotiations until they were concluded 2 weeks later, the Company and
the Union met separately with that panel Their face -to-face confron-
tation totaled only 6 hours.
22 For the full scope of this alleged pledge see Statement of the Case,
supra.
272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Federal Government were then engaged, the CCB, having a
limited, but nevertheless, legitimate interest in the success of
those negotiations, sought to avoid all possible obstruction
thereto. I adhere to my earlier finding that each member of the
CCB retained complete autonomy over all its own activities
and affairs and find that the CCB had no authority or power to
impose "discipline" upon the Union or any other constituent
member thereof.
I have no doubt that all of the unions represented the CCB,
their officials, and the president of the AFL-CIO, had and
showed great interest in the GE-IUE negotiations then current.
All the unions referred to had collective-bargaining agreements
with Respondent. As previously pointed out, the Company,
during negotiations with IUE in 1958, 1960, and 1963,
informed that union that with respect to its offer to IUE it was
submitting substantially the same offer to the other unions
with which it maintained collective-bargaining relationship.
Indeed, Hilbert so testified specifically, stating that the offer
Respondent makes to "IBEW, AFTE, IAM, etcetera, turns out
to be substantially similar to the one that [Respondent]
initially made to IUE or UE." Among the most likely subjects
for which common proposals to all the unions could be
anticipated were holidays and vacations, arbitration, provisions
dealing with automation, antidiscrimination clause, pensions
and insurance program. There is no contention that it was
wrong for the several unions dealing with a single enterprise to
consult together, nor is it less permissible for unions so
situated to share research and information. In light of that
circumstance, and the frustration engendered among the
unions represented on the CCB by the practice described in
earlier portions of his Decision, it becomes readily apparent
why the CCB continued to function and keep its constituent
members advised of the status of the negotiations between
Respondent and the IUE.2 3
Notwithstanding the utter absence of any testimony that
the Union Committee after April 13 ever asked the Company
to join with it in coordinated multiumon bargaining, the
record establishes that on August 23, when negotiations
between the parties began pursuant to the District Court order
of that day requiring and obligating Respondent to bargain
only with "IUE and its constituent locals," the Company
apparently interjected the coalition or multi-union bargaining
issue into the negotiations. Presumably because of that tactic,
the Union's General Counsel, on August 25, wrote Moore as
follows.
Dear Mr. Moore
I find it necessary to confirm by letter, statements made
by me to you, and your Committee across the bargaining
table, in response to some inquiries and statements you
made yesterday (Wed. Aug. 24, 1966).
On Tuesday morning, August 23, 1966, the IUE handed
over to you and your Committee copies of a sixty-three
page document entitled, "Proposals to the General Electric
Company by the IUE-GE Negotiating Committee."
On Wednesday morning, August 24th, you took the
23 The Company 's willingness on October i4, when settlement with
the IUE was reached, to accept the request of the Federal Mediators
that a portion of the agreement reached with IUE "apply to all the
unions in the coordinated bargaining group" is, contrary to Respon-
dent's, contention , of no significance . In view of the extent to which the
Company was engaged in the production of jet engines for the Air
Force, parts for helicopters destined for Viet Nam, etc., it is not
surprising that the Federal Mediators sought and obtained the coopera-
occasion, while referring to the proposals of the IUE, to ask
whether the IUE Proposals were "solely an IUE document."
I responded to that question then, that anything that you
receive, or will receive, across the Negotiating table is, and
will be, solely and exclusively, an IUE document. I asked
you then whether you understood that statement clearly, to
which you replied that you "understood the words." In
response to this, John Stanley, a member of the IUE
Negotiating Committee stated that "the Company better
get to believe them."
Later on, during the afternoon session, for reasons that
only became clear to me now, you took the occasion to
discuss the National Bargaining Goals of the Steering
Committee and tried to provoke me into a discussion of
what the other International Unions would do at their own
bargaining table. I then stated, as I again say to you now,
for the 100th time-that we are bargaining solely and
exclusively for the IUE, even though we may be discussing
some of the national bargaining goals. I asked you also to be
sure to enter into your minutes this clear statement and
position of the IUE.
You have, with studied cunning and trickery attempted
to provoke discussions about bargaining activity at other
bargaining tables. At each such discussion I have had to
remind you that such discussions have no place at this
bargaining table.
It apparently suits your purpose to cast doubt on our
repeated insistence that IUE limit its proposals and discus-
sions to the IUE bargaining unit.
We therefore urge you to abandon your efforts to widen
the scope of our discussions and follow our example of
refusing to discuss the bargaining activities or proposals of
other unions.
Very truly yours,
IRVING ABRAMSON,
General Counsel
On the entire record I find that Respondent's conduct
referred to in Abramson's letter was part and parcel of a
previously devised litigation posture designed by Respondent
to conceal the true reason for its earlier refusal to negotiate
with the Committee designated by the Union-the presence of
the seven so-called "outsiders."
The final chapter in the history of the controversy, enacted
after settlement with IUE was reached, provides further
evidence that the alleged lock-in pleaded as a defense in
Respondent's amended answer never existed. Thus, several of
the "co-conspirators" signed longer-term contracts containing
settlement provisions which otherwise varied from those
agreed to by IUE. Though the agreement with IUE was
reached on October 14, 1966, strikes were still in progress by
the AFTE and the Steamfitters during the hearing herein,
months after the settlement with IUE IBEW, at Westinghouse,
rejected the IUE settlement and struck for a period in excess
of 4 weeks thereafter.
tion of the Company in avoiding further negotiations with other unions
pertaining to the final item then under consideration with IUE,
retroactivity of the wage scale, a subject in which all of the unions with
whom Respondent maintained a collective -bargaining relationship
would soon bargain . In this connection , see fn. 18, supra In any event,
there is no testimony or claim that this was insisted upon, or even
proposed by the Union's Committee.
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. 273
By reason of all the foregoing I find and conclude that by
refusing to meet and negotiate with the Committee designated
by the Union on and after August 15, 1966, until it was
required to do so by the District Court order, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
G The Alleged Mootness of the Controversy
Respondent, in its brief, urges that by reason of the
execution of its contract with the Union on October 28, 1966,
for a term ending October 26, 1969, "there is no longer an
existing dispute" between the Union and the Company There
is no merit to this contention. By its statements and conduct
pertaining to the controversy between the parties, Respondent
leaves no doubt that at this moment, and hereafter, absent the
compulsion of a court decree enforcing a Board order, the
Company persists and will continue to persist in its steadfast
refusal to recognize any IUE committee which includes
members of any other union. Indeed, in its brief herein filed
on April 4, 1967, Respondent concedes that its refusal "to
meet with the seven outsiders present . . continues to be [its]
position to this moment."
The thrust of the District court temporary injuncfron has
admittedly spent itself In any event, limited as that injunction
was to "final disposition of the matters involved pending
before" this Board, the instant proceeding is, of necessity, not
moot. Furthermore, it is needless for me to speculate on how
many occasions will arise in the future when a confrontation
between the parties will arise 24 Respondent leaves no doubt
that, unless otherwise compelled by Board and court order, it
will continue its refusal to face any committee that includes
"outsiders." The promotion of industrial peace, the underlying
objective of the Act, requires that Respondent be placed under
the restraint and command of the Recommended Order that
follows. See N.L.R.B. v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc, 339 U S.
563; NL R.B v. General Motors Corporation, 179 F 2d 221,
222 (C A. 7), N.L.R.B. v. Heck's Inc., 369 F.2d 370 (C.A. 6)
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section 11I, above,
occurring in connection with Respondent's operations as set
forth in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial
relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon
the entire record in the proceeding, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. General Electric Company is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE), and its constituent locals listed in
appendix A of the complaint herein as corrected and amended
in appendix I of the Respondent's amended answer are, and
have been at all times material herein, labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The various certified units of the Respondent's employ-
ees referred to immediately above, constitute units appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material herein, the IUE and its constituent
locals named above herein collectively referred to as the
Union, have been, and are now, the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the units so referred to
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5 By failing and refusing on and after May 4, 1966, to
bargain collectively with the Committee designated by the IUE
in national level negotiations, Respondent has engaged in, and
is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and that it take certain affirmative action of the type which is
conventionally ordered in such cases, as provided in the
Recommended Order below, which I find to be necessary to
remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair labor practices
and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law
and the entire record, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
hereby issue the following
RECOMMENDED ORDER
General Electric Company, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain with the IUE by declining to meet
with the selected negotiating committee of the IUE because of
the presence of any representatives of other unions whom the
IUE has invited or designated to attend the negotiations for
the purpose of participating in the discussion and advising or
consulting with IUE.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action*
(a) Meet and bargain, upon request of the IUE, with the
selected bargaining committee of the IUE, including any
representatives of other unions whom the IUE has invited or
designated to attend the negotiations for the purpose of
participating in the discussion and advising and consulting with
the IUE.
(b) Post at all its plants, installations, and other places of
business in the United States, at which bargaining units
represented by the IUE or any of its constituent locals are
24 Moore's letter to Lasser on November 17, 1965, states that
negotiation concerning "pension and pensioneers ' insurance items . . is
closed until 1968."
274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
located, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."25
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 2, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of at least
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that
such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith 26
25 If these Recommendations are adopted by the Board , the words
"a Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommendations of a Trial Examiner " in the notice . If the Board's
Order is enforced by a decree of the United States Court of Appeals, the
notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a
Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" for
the words "a Decision and Order."
26 If these Recommendations are adopted by the Board, this
provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
the Second Region, in writing within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner
of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to
effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, we hereby notify our employees that
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
(IUE) by declining to meet with the selected negotiating
committee of said union because of the presence of any
representatives of other unions whom the IUE has invited
to attend the negotiations for the purpose of participating
in the discussion and advising or consulting with the TUE.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL meet and bargain upon request of the IUE
with the selected bargaining committee of the IUE, in-
cluding any representatives of other unions whom IUE has
invited to attend the negotiations for the purpose of
participating in the discussion and advising and consulting
with the IUE
GENERAL ELECTRIC
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This Notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this Notice or
compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 5th Floor, Squibb
Building , 745 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York, 10022,
Telephone 751-5500.