Gauley Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 29, 1982

260 N.L.R.B. 1273 (N.L.R.B. 1982)

GAULEY INDUSTRIES, INC.
Gauley Industries, Inc. and United Mine Workers of
America. Cases 6-CA-13873 and 6-RC-8862
March 29, 1982
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND
MEMBERS JENKINS AND HUNTER
On November 2, 1981, Administrative Law
Judge Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Deci-
sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and
to adopt his recommended Order.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Gauley Indus-
tries, Inc., Camden-on-Gauley, West Virginia, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended
Order.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Productr.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings
Neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party filed exceptions
to the Administrative Law Judge's findings in fn 5 of his Decision that
certain statements made by Coffindaffer did not violate Sec 8(aXI) of the
Act.
In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's recommendation that the
Employer's objection to the election be overruled, Chairman Van de
Water and Member Hunter find that the alleged misrepresentation therein
does not warrant the setting aside of the election under the majority or
dissenting views expressed in General Knit of California Inc., 239 NLRB
619 (1978)
In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt, pro forma, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's recommendation that the challenges to the ballots of
Brentford Brown and George Brewster be overruled.
I Upon careful examination, we are of the opinion that the record is
insufficient to permit a determination of the eligibility of W E Straley.
and, accordingly, we decline to adopt the Administrative Law Judge's
recommendation that the challenge to his ballot be sustained. Rather, we
shall order that the Regional Director open and count the determinative
challenged ballots of the other six employees whose eligibility was in dis-
pute, and issue a revised tally of ballots. Only in the event that Straley's
ballot remains determinative after the revised tally shall a further hearing
on his eligibility be held
In accordance with his partial dissent in Olympic Medical Corporation,
250 NLRB 146 (1980), Member Jenkins would award interest on the
backpay due based on the formula set forth therein
260 NLRB No. 181
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 6-RC-8862
be, and it hereby is, severed from Case 6-CA-
13873, and that Case 6-RC-8862, be, and it hereby
is, remanded to the Regional Director to open and
count the ballots of Mary Christian, Kenneth
Martin, Thomas Peyatt, Jeffrey Workman, Brent-
ford Brown, and George Brewster, and thereafter
prepare and cause to be served on the parties a re-
vised tally of ballots including therein the count of
said ballots. In the event the revised tally of ballots
shows that Petitioner has received a majority of
the valid ballots cast, without the ballot of W. E.
Straley being determinative, the Regional Director
shall issue a certification of representative. In the
event that the ballot of W. E. Straley remains de-
terminative after the issuance of a revised tally of
ballots,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing be held
before a duly designated hearing officer for the
purpose of receiving evidence to resolve the issues
raised by the challenge to the ballot of W. E. Stra-
ley, and that the Regional Director is hereby au-
thorized to issue notice thereof.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing officer
designated for the purpose of conducting such
hearing shall prepare and cause to be served on the
parties a report containing resolutions of the credi-
bility of witnesses, findings of fact, and recommen-
dations to the Board as to the disposition of said
issues. Within 10 days from the date of issuance of
such report, either party may file with the Board in
Washington, D.C., eight copies of exceptions there-
to. Immediately upon the filing of such exceptions,
the party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof
on the other party and shall file a copy with the
Regional Director. If no exceptions are filed there-
to, the Board will adopt the recommendations of
the hearing officer.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: Pursu-
ant to an original unfair labor practice charge filed on
September 19, 1980,' a complaint issued on October 21,
alleging that Respondent independently violated Section
8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating employees, by threat-
ening employees with plant closure and other unspecified
reprisals, by stating that designation of the Union would
be futile, by conditioning the continued employment of
employees upon their rejection of the Union, by solicit-
ing grievances while implying their correction if employ-
ees rejected the Union, by creating the impression that
union activity was subject to surveillance, by informing
employees that raises were to be withheld because of
union activity, by promising employees wage increases if
I All dates refer to 1980, unlers , thersxise indicated
1273
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union were rejected, by informing terminated em-
ployees that they would not be rehired because of their
union activity, by creating the impression that a union
official was subject to bribery, and by informing employ-
ees that a layoff had been accelerated because of their
union activity. The complaint further alleges that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by,
on September 15, discharging employees Mary E. Chris-
tian, David Fletcher, Roger L. Lloyd, K. Wayne Martin,
Dewey J. Meadows, Thomas Peyatt, and Jeffrey M.
Workman. In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied
that any unfair labor practices were committed.
Following issuance of said complaint, an election was
conducted in Case 6-RC-8862 on December 5, with the
tally of ballots showing that of 19 eligible voters 9 cast
votes for, and 6 against, representation by the Petitioner.
Seven cast challenged ballots which are determinative.2
Thereafter the Employer filed a timely objection found-
ed upon the Petitioner's alleged misconduct interfering
with the validity of the election.
On December 11, the Regional Director for Region 6
issued his "Order Directing Hearing on Challenged Bal-
lots and Notice of Hearing," and on March 26, 1981, said
Regional Director issued his "Order Directing Hearing
on Objection and Notice of Hearing." By virtue thereof,
a hearing was directed upon the challenges and the Em-
ployer's objection as raising substantial and material
issues best resolved on record testimony. Also on March
26, 1981, said Regional Director issued an "Amended
Order Consolidating Cases," in which Cases 6-CA-
13873 and 6-RC-8862 were consolidated for purposes of
hearing, ruling, and decision by an administrative law
judge.
Pursuant thereto, said proceeding was heard by me on
June 4, 1981, in Webster Springs, West Virginia. After
close of the hearing, briefs were filed on behalf of the
General Counsel, Respondent Employer, and the Charg-
ing Party Petitioner.
Upon the entire record herein, including my personal
observation of the witnesses while testifying and their
demeanor, and upon consideration of the post-hearing
briefs, I hereby find as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Employer is a West Virginia corporation,
with a place of business in Camden-on-Gauley, West Vir-
ginia, from which it is engaged in the business of milling
magnetite. In the course and conduct of said operation,
Respondent, during the 12-month period preceding Sep-
tember 30, purchased and received at said facility prod-
ucts, goods, and materials exceeding $50,000 in value di-
rectly from points outside the State of West Virginia.
The complaint alleges, the answers admits, and I find
that Respondent Employer is now, and has been at all
2 Those cast by Mary Christian, Kenneth Martin, Thomas Peyatt, and
Jeffrey Workman were challenged by the Board agent because their em-
ployment status was governed by the unfair labor practice charges pend-
ing in Case 6-CA-13873. The ballots of George Brewster, Brentford
Brown, and W. E. Straley were challenged by the Petitioner on supervi-
sory grounds.
times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
II. THE L ABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find
that United Mine Workers of America, herein called the
Union, is now, and has been at all times material herein,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
IIl. CONCLUDING FINDINGS
A. The Issues
This proceeding relates to an organization campaign
waged among Respondent's previously unrepresented
employees, which opened on September 2, 1980. On that
date, Larry O'Dell, an International organizer for the
UMW, began contacting Respondent's employees. Subse-
quently, an initial union meeting was held on September
14 at the home of employee Mary Christian. There were
I I employees in attendance and all signed authorization
cards. Later, the Union filed its election petition in Case
6-RC-8862 on October 10. The election was conducted
on December 5.
The complaint in Case 6-CA-13873 charges Respond-
ent with various acts of interference, restraint, and coer-
cion between September 14 and September 29. With a
single exception, these allegations are founded upon
statements imputed to Bernard Coffindaffer, Respond-
ent's president. Beyond Coffindaffer's alleged miscon-
duct, the complaint includes a single 8(a)(1) allegation to
the effect that Kenneth Ward, Respondent's plant man-
ager, informed employees that a layoff had been acceler-
ated by union activity. The layoff in question is the sub-
ject of further allegations to the effect that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) by discharging seven employees
on September 15, the day after the initial union meeting.
Respondent asserts that all 8(a)(l) allegations are lack-
ing in credible substantiation and are nonmeritorious,
and, with respect to the terminations, it is further assert-
ed that they were prompted solely by economic consid-
erations.
In Case 6-RC-8862, it will be recalled that the Union
achieved a 9-to-6 numerical majority at the December 5
election. However, the results were inconclusive in light
of seven determinative challenged ballots and the Em-
ployer's timely filed objection. The issues derived from
the challenges have in general terms been set forth previ-
ously. 3 The objection derives from alleged statements on
the part of union officials whereby eligible employees
were informed that the Employer made over $1 million
in the prior year and in 1980 was making money "hand-
over-fist." On behalf of the Employer it is argued that
this was a deliberate lie and a misstatement of material
fact made at a time allowing no opportunity for re-
sponse.
' See fn. 2, supra
1274
GAULEY INDUSTRIES, INC
B. Case 6-CA-13873
1. Interference, restraint, and coercion
a. The events of September 14
As will be recalled, the first union meeting was held at
the home of Mary Christian on September 14. It was at-
tended by 11 employees, including the 7 alleged discri-
minatees. Witnesses for the General Counsel describe
Coffindaffer as having reacted immediately after conclu-
sion thereof by embarking upon a pattern of intimidation.
Thus, employees Donald Phillips and Rick Cobb, after
attending the meeting, left in a single vehicle with Ken
Martin and Workman. Cobb was dropped off, where-
upon the others drove to a garage in Camden where
Workman's vehicle had been parked. Shortly after their
arrival, Coffindaffer, together with his wife, pulled into
the garage area. Coffindaffer got out of his vehicle and
approached Workman asking if Workman had keys to
the plant. When Workman responded in the negative,
Coffindaffer told him "there is no work tomorrow." At
this point, the conversation grew heated and spread to
all three employees. According to a composite of the tes-
timony of Workman, Phillips, and Martin, all three were
informed by Coffindaffer that he knew what they were
up to, that he was closing the plant down, that it was up
for sale, and that they no longer had a place of employ-
ment. Coffindaffer went on to indicate that if the men
wanted a raise they could turn in their uniforms and in-
surance cards and he could afford to give them a raise.
Coffindaffer stated further that he did not want the
UMW or Teamsters on his property, asked the men what
they wanted, and then took off his shirt throwing it in
the direction of Martin, stating, "you want the shirt off
my back, there it is . . . you couldn't get blood out of a
turnip." Coffindaffer stated that the men would not suc-
ceed and that his family would fight them to the end.
According to Coffindaffer, that evening, he and his
wife, while returning from a picnic, passed the garage in
Camden-on-Gauley and observed Workman, Phillips,
and Martin. He admits that he initiated the confrontation,
explaining that he did so because he no longer wanted
Workman in the plant. 4
' Coffindaffer, together with his wife, asserted that, during prior
weeks, production time had been lost at the plant due to equipment
damage caused by what they tiewed to be industrial sabotage As I un-
derstand Coffindaffer's testimony, he viewed Workman as responsible for
such acts. Mrs. Coffindaffer testified that her husband approached the
men that evening because they were in the vicinity of the plant, and due
to the industrial sabotage that had taken place in the past, they suspected
that perhaps the men were up to no good that evening. Her explanation
is not entirely consistent with that of her husband And, indeed, Coffin-
daffer's explanation for his taking this opportunity to confront Workman
seemed implausible. For he related that his disenchantment with Work-
man was based on two specific incidents, one of which had occurred
some 8 days, and the second, some 2 to 6 weeks, earlier. No reference is
made by Coffindaffer as to anything occurring in the supervening period
which would explain his belated, but sudden, need to confront Workman
as to such matters on September 14. Comndaffer's account as to the ensu-
ing conversation included a denial of knowledge that the three men had
just attended a union meeting or any mention of "union" in the course
thereof He also denied stating that the plant would be closed the next
day, or instructing the men to pick up their checks. He did, however.
acknowledge that wages and fringe benefits were discussed Contrary to
the Coffindaffers, the contention by the proponents of the complaint that
Based upon the credited testimony of Martin, Work-
man, and Phillips, I find that Coffindaffer approached
the men after having gained knowledge of their union
activity and conveyed that knowledge by implication in
the course of the ensuing conversation, when he threat-
ened to close the plant in reprisal for what he knew they
were "up to." Respondent thereby violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act. s
That Coffindaffer was aware of union activity on Sep-
tember 14 receives further confirmation from an incident
which occurred later that same evening. At the time,
Donald Phillips was visiting Rick Cobb, another employ-
ee who at the time of the hearing was actively employed
by Respondent. At or about 8:30 p.m., Coffindaffer ap-
proached Phillips and Cobb, stating "if we wanted to
forget our plans, that the gate would be open for us to
come to work Monday morning."' Coffindaffer acknowl-
edged the encounter. His testimony, however, throws
little light on the specifics, centering as it did upon the
following colloquy with Respondent's counsel:
Mr. Holroyd: Did you say anything to them that
if you want to forget your plans you can come to
work in the morning?
Mr. Coffindaffer: I had lockout on my mind with
one man, Jeff Workman. He was not coming near
my mill, he didn't have no keys so I wasn't going to
let him in no more. The work lockout was never
mentioned to anyone else and it was never insinuat-
ed, but Workman wasn't coming and I knew it.
Mr. Holroyd: Well, did you tell Phillips that he
and Cobb could come the next morning if they'd
forget their organizing plans?
Mr. Coffindaffer: I didn't use no such statement.
I told everybody the gate was open, that's the only
words I used, the gate was open.
I credit Phillips and Cobb. Here again, it is considered
unlikely that they would have concocted a story so prej-
udicial to the interest of their employer in this proceed-
ing. Furthermore, based on their versions of the conver-
sation, I find that Coffindaffer's reference to the employ-
ees' "plans," in the context, was a veiled, though suffi-
ciently clear, reference to union activity. It is concluded
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) by Coffin-
daffer's statement to the effect that continued employ-
ment of Cobb and Phillips was conditioned upon aban-
donment of their union activity.
this entire incident was provoked by Coffindaffer's knowledge of union
activity and his reaction to it is corroborated convincingly by the testi-
mony of Donald Phillips, an incumbent employee at the time of the hear-
ing, who earned in excess of S18,000 while employed by Respondent in
1980. 1 did not behelse that Phillips' corroborative version of the incident
was manufactured
I I do not find that Coffindaffer's references to the fact that his family
would fight the employees to the end, and his opinion that their union
activity would fail to succeed, when considered independent of his threat
of plant closure, constituted violations of Sec. 8(aX I)
I Cobb. when asked to repeat what was stated by Coffindaffer, averred
that Coffindaffer expressly referred to plans of employees concerning the
Union Although the difference is not viewed as material, the latter testi-
mony has been taken by mne as representing Cobb's interpretation of what
Aa, said, rather than the word., actually used
1275
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In another incident, employee Dewey Meadows who
had attended the union meeting that afternoon testified
that, on the evening of September 14, he received a tele-
phone call from Coffindaffer. Coffindaffer questioned
Meadows as to whether he was aware of "anything
about picketing or striking or anything at his plant the
next morning." Meadows indicated that he had no such
knowledge. Coffindaffer denied the incident. I credit
Meadows. 7 Based on his testimony, I find that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(l), inasmuch as Coffindaffer's
inquiry was lacking in legitimate purpose and was calcu-
lated to discern Meadows' knowledge of union activity
and hence would tend to result in disclosure of his senti-
ment. 8
b. The events of September 15
On the morning of September 15, Don Phillips report-
ed for work, but informed Coffindaffer that, while he
wanted to work, his support of the UMW would contin-
ue. Coffindaffer, according to Phillips, told him to get
together with the other employees and assemble their
grievances and demands and present them to his secre-
tary, adding that his books were open for the employees
to see. Coffindaffer's position with respect to Phillips'
testimony was manifested in the following colloquy with
Respondent's counsel:
Mr. Holroyd: Okay. Mr. Phillips also testified
that you told him to get their grievances together
with others and bring them in with others and take
them to the secretary you would get that, them re-
solved. Did you have that conversation?
Mr. Coffindaffer: No. But if he had such a thing
on his mind, why didn't he do it? I never saw a
scrap of information from nobody, except rumor.
Here again, I regarded Phillips as the more reliable
witness. Based on his account, I find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by soliciting grievances under
conditions tending to impede employee exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Coffindaffer's sug-
gestion as to the accumulation and submission of employ-
ee demands was expressed in response to Phillips' mani-
7 Meadows was terminated on September 15, and was named in the
complaint as among the alleged discriminatees However, it appears that
special allowances were made in his case Thus, Meadows. after the
layoff, was told by Coffindaffer, on the evening of September 15, to
report to Craigsville where he was to work under Charlie Blake. Mead-
ows did so, and worked for about a month. tie was paid by Chelyan Oil
Co., a firm which Coffindaffer identified as among those in which Coffin-
daffer's family held an interest. Thereafter, in October, Coffindaffer re-
called Meadows, and he has remained in the employ of Respondent con-
tinuously since that date. Meadows impressed me as a more beliesable
witness than Coffindaffer.
s Mary Christian testified that on September 14 she received a message
from her sister to the effect that Coffindaffer had telephoned indicating
that Christian had been dismissed. On September 15, Christian reported
for work and inquired of Coffindaffer as to her job status. Coffindaffer
advised that he needed her, and also exclaimed that he had broken up a
union meeting the night before at "the gas station" This latter testimony
of Chnstian is consistent with the mutually corroborative and credited
testimony of Phillips, Cobb, Meadows, Workman, and Martin as to Cof-
findaffer's knowledge, as of September 14, that employees had engaged in
union activity. Her testimony is credited in this respect over that of Cof-
findaffer.
festation of his continuing support of the Union. In such
a context, rather than an abstract expression of manage-
ment's continuing interest in production and efficiency of
operation,9 a management-endorsed alternative to union
representation was proffered, which would be taken by
Phillips as carrying "compelling inference" that the
grievances reported would be acted upon favorably and
possibly corrected. '
Randall Phillips testified that, on September 15, Cof-
findaffer told him that he knew all the employees had
signed cards and that "he couldn't afford the union . . .
He had a lot of bills." According to Phillips, Coffindaffer
went on to state that, while he had intended to put
Tommy Peyatt, one of the alleged discriminatees,
through mechanic school, he would not do so because of
what Tommy Peyatt had done to him. Coffindaffer also
allegedly told Phillips that Workman and Martin had
started the Union. Coffindaffer's denial was not believed,
and the testimony of Randall Phillips, an incumbent em-
ployee at the time of the hearing, is preferred. Based
thereon, I find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l)
by coercive interrogation, by creating the impression of
surveillance, and by implying that an employee would be
subject to retaliation because of his union activity.
The most dramatic occurrence on September 15 was
the layoff. It is noted that most of those included worked
their shifts that day. However, in the course thereof, the
following was posted in the plant:
Please Notice:
To the EMPLOYEES of this Company.
Due to extreme economic conditions, it is necessary
to cut-back on supplies, Employee Labor, all
manner of things.
We regret this action. We hope some day the high
cost of things will lessen and the company will
make a profit.
You are hereby notified the following persons will
no longer be EMPLOYED here - after 4 p.m. this
date:
Jeffery M.
Workman
K. Wayne Martin
David A. Fletcher
Mary F. Christian
Roger L. Lloyd
Dewey J. Meadows
Thomas A. Peyatt
Please turn in all keys you have in your possession;
turn in all Uniforms due the National Linen Service
and arrange with Mrs. Haddix to pick up your final
pay check now being prepared.
/s/ Bernard L. Coffindaffer
In explaining the timing for his action in this regard,
Coffindaffer testified that he called his attorney, Hol-
royd, earlier that same day, advised him of "the situa-
tion," and on the advice of Holroyd prepared and posted
the notice. No explanation emerges from Respondent's
9 Cf Centre Engineering, Inc., 253 Nt.RB 419 (1980)
"'See. e.g., Ralev'v Inc., 236 Ni.RH 971 (1978)
1276
GAULEY INDUSTRIES, INC.
evidence as to why Coffindaffer sought advice of coun-
sel at that juncture.
Those named in the notice attended the union meeting
at Christian's home on September 14, and signed union
authorization cards on that occasion. All are alleged to
have been discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
the issues pertaining thereto will be discussed below.
2. Other miscellaneous 8(a)(1) allegations
Don Phillips and Rick Cobb testified that, a few days
after the layoff, Coffindaffer approached them indicating
that he had heard that everybody had signed cards and
inquiring as to whether they had done so or knew any-
thing about it. While the testimony of Phillips and Cobb
is somewhat less than symmetrical, I do believe that they
were questioned concerning union activity on that occa-
sion by Coffindaffer. Based thereon I find that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1).
Anna Mae Fletcher, an incumbent employee at the
time of the hearing, testified that, several days after the
September 14 meeting, she asked Coffindaffer for a raise.
He agreed to give her a raise, while advising her that he
knew that all the employees had signed cards. However,
a few days later, according to Fletcher, Coffindaffer ap-
proached her advising that "he had got a letter from . . .
the International or something like that . . . he just
couldn't give me a raise right then but would double my
salary after this thing blowed over." Coffindaffer first in-
dicated that he did not believe that he had made a state-
ment to Fletcher concerning the withholding of a wage
increase, but then went on to imply to the contrary by
affording the following explanation:
I misunderstood the NLRB regulations on the
poster they sent me, okay.
And it says, "promising or granting promotions or
pay raises or other benefits, et cetera, to employ-
ees," you know, I was capable of carrying out the
promise so I was afraid of this thing, I was afraid of
this, I didn't really read it carefully.
To the extent of any conflict, I accept the testimony of
Fletcher over that of Coffindaffer and find that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1) by creating the impression of
surveillance and by placing the onus for the withholding
of a promised increase upon the Union, while at the
same time renewing that promise, albeit conditionally,
upon rejection of the Union.
Fletcher also testified to a further encounter with Cof-
findaffer while she, Mrs. Coffindaffer, and George Brew-
ster were working. She relates that Coffindaffer ap-
proached them and removed two $100 bills from his
wallet. He handed the bills to Brewster, and told Brew-
ster to give them to the union representative, stating fur-
ther that Brewster should tell them "when this thing's
over, there'll be $300 more." Brewster declined. As a
witness for Respondent, Brewster acknowledged that the
incident occurred but, according to his version, someone
made a comment about joining the Union, whereupon
Coffindaffer took two $100 bills and told Brewster "if
you wanted to go down and join the union. . . I'll give
you the money and take it out of your next paycheck."
In the total circumstances, the testimony of Fletcher
seemed the more probable, and I find that, by manifest-
ing a propensity to commit bribery as a means of com-
promising employee self-organizational rights, Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Fletcher testified to a further conversation with Cof-
findaffer concerning a union meeting held on September
25, in connection with the National Labor Relations
Board investigation of the instant unfair labor practice
charge. On that occasion, Coffindaffer assertedly told
her that he knew that the employees met at the "grill,"
but that she was not among them, because she had
worked all day. Here again I credit Fletcher over Cof-
findaffer and find that Respondent thereby violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(l) by creating the impression that protected ac-
tivity of employees was subject to surveillance.
The final independent 8(a)(l) allegation is highly sig-
nificant to the issues of discrimination emerging from the
terminations of September 15. Thus, according to the tes-
timony of Donald Phillips, on September 24, while Plant
Manager Ward, in reference to the layoffs, stated "that
he knew they were coming, but the union had speeded
them up." Ward denied having made any such statement.
I regarded Phillips as the more trustworthy and credit
his testimony. Based thereon Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. The Layoffs of September 15
Respondent is engaged in the processing of ore into
magnetite, a business described by Plant Manager Ward
as nonseasonal, with the upswings and downswings non-
predictable.
As indicated, on September 15, seven employees who
attended the union meeting of the previous day were ter-
minated. According to Respondent, these layoffs, though
allegedly founded upon economic considerations, were
considered permanent with those terminated lacking any
expectancy of recall.
I have heretofore found that the layoffs were effected
shortly after Coffindaffer acquired knowledge of union
activity and on the day after employees attended the first
union meeting. Said discharges were timed to correspond
with a pattern of unlawful conduct through which Cof-
findaffer clearly manifested his hostility to union activity.
Thus, the elements of knowledge, timing, and union
animus join together to support a strong prima facie
showing of union-related discrimination.
By way of defense, Respondent points to the fact that
its operations had never been profitable, that its losses
over the years had been considerable, that employees
had previously been informed that layoffs were immi-
nent, and that an earlier decision to effect the layoffs on
September I had been deferred. Although the defense is
partially confirmed through Respondent's financial
papers, it also rests at critical points upon parole testimo-
ny of Coffindaffer and Ward, both of whom impressed
me as thoroughly unreliable.
In any event, prior to the layoff, Respondent's fiscal
history reflected continuing financial adversity. Accord-
ing to Coffindaffer, corporate losses for the preceding
fiscal years ending March 31 were as follows:
1277
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1976-77 $ 62,000
1977-78 $114,000
1978-79 $593,000
1979-80 $174,410.081"
As for the period following March 31, 1980, Coffin-
daffer testified that office personnel prepared monthly re-
ports on the Company's financial status. The Company's
earnings experience during the months of April, May,
and June 1980 is not disclosed by the record. However,
Respondent did elect to place in evidence a monthly
report covering July 1980, which shows an operating
loss of $37,320.64 for that month. Coffindaffer testified
that he received the July statement between August 15
and 20, whereupon he determined that he "couldn't
bring in any more outside money" and "knew I had to
make economy moves from within."
Analysis fails to suggest that the July losses would
necessarily portend a continuing pattern. During the
summer of 1980, the Company was engaged in construc-
tion and maintenance activities of a nonrecurrent nature.
The labor costs associated therewith, at least in part,
would have been chargeable against income in July. Fur-
thermore, in July the Company lost 2 weeks of produc-
tion in consequence of the strike in the coal mines and
thus it is entirely possible that during that month fixed
expenses would have mounted without offset normally
derived from a regularity of production. Finally, al-
though the monthly statement for August 1980 was not
introduced into evidence, on cross-examination by the
General Counsel, Coffindaffer admitted that in August
1980 the Company enjoyed a net operating profit of
$1,301.83. The selective utilization of financial data,
whether or not innocent, fails to inspire confidence in
the defense.
Furthermore, while Respondent is hardly portrayed as
a financially healthy concern, the defense demonstrates
that Respondent's adverse financial posture was historic.
Yet, the September 15 terminations appear on the record
to have been unprecedented. When examined as to
whether he found it necessary to lay off employees in
the past, Coffindaffer could only recall that employees
had been discharged for thievery. Beyond testimony of
witnesses for the General Counsel that a 2-week tempo-
rary layoff was experienced in the summer of 1979, there
is no evidence that the Company had ever before perma-
nently laid off employees for economic reasons.
Moreover, Coffindaffer's testimony that he regarded
the alleged discriminatees as having been permanently
discharged arouses suspicion on other grounds as well.
Thus, he explains that finality was assigned to the termi-
nations because he did not anticipate that these individ-
uals would be needed in the future. In contrast, Plant
Manager Ward had testified that Respondent's operations
were nonseasonal, with ups and downs in demand unpre-
dictable. Indeed, within a month of the discharges, three
of the seven-Meadows, Lloyd, and Fletcher-were re-
called.
" Coffindaffer's testimony is confirmed for this period by the corpo-
rate income tax return filed with the IRS covering the period ending
March 31. 1980. See Resp Exh. 7. However, Resp. Exh. 6 is an account-
ant's report covering the same period which reflects a net operating loss
of $182,746.55.
Doubt which arises from the above, together with
other factors, impairs the weight accorded to the fact
that Respondent manifested an intention to sell the plant
prior to the advent of union activity, or at least prior to
its acquisition of knowledge thereof. A desire to sell is
not necessarily inconsistent with the maintenance of busi-
ness operations on an indefinite basis at least till a suit-
able purchase arrangement is consummated. Here, it is
clear that Respondent not only maintained operations
throughout, but also invested in substantial maintenance
and construction, as well as the acquisition of new equip-
ment during the period immediately preceding the Sep-
tember 15 terminations.
Perhaps the most critical flaw which emerges from the
defense relates to the explanation as to why Coffindaffer,
in what appears to have been an act of suddenness, se-
lected September 15 as the date for the layoff. It is true
that both Plant Manager Ward and Coffindaffer testified
that the possibility of layoffs had previously been an-
nounced to employees and that initially it was decided to
effect the layoff on September 1. However, neither
Coffindaffer nor Ward testified that employees were ap-
prised that a layoff would take place specifically on Sep-
tember 1, or on any future date. Further, their explana-
tions as to why the layoff did not take place as allegedly
planned was contradictory. Thus, Ward testified that the
layoff was deferred by "a two-week period to get the
building washed and to get the things done before the
Winter set in...." On the other hand, Coffindaffer's
explanation makes no reference to business needs, but
was expressed as follows:
I didn't have the heart to lay people off that had
kids to get ready for school. .. . and I know they
needed a fair and square pay day and I didn't make
no September Ist cut.
As for selection of September 15, Coffindaffer's own
testimony implies strongly that that determination was
made sometime during that very day. Thus, in account-
ing for certain aspects of his conduct on September 14,
Coffindaffer averred that he told no one that the plant
would close the following day, going on to state, "I had
lock out on my mind with one man, Jeff Workman ...
The word lock out was never mentioned to anyone else
and it was never insinuated...." It thus appears on the
face of Coffindaffer's own testimony that, as of Septem-
ber 14, no determination had been made to effect the lay-
offs. Consistent with findings heretofore made, that de-
termination was made after Coffindaffer consulted with
his attorney, Holroyd, the day following the September
12 The Wall Street Journal on September 15 carried an advertisement
to this effect.
13 Coffindaffer, with corroboration from Ward, testified that he pre-
pared notes used as a guide in addressing employees at a meeting held on
August 18. See Resp. Exh. 4. Included therein is a notation as follows:
"Cut-back, 10 or 12 const. work." Although Coflindaffer and Ward insist
that this was conveyed to employees at that meeting, witnesses for the
General Counsel who were identified by Cofflindaffer as present at that
meeting denied that the possibility of a layoff was mentioned. I believed
the latter. It is further noted that the authenticity of Respondent's Exhibit
4 is no greater than the credibility of the witnesses who attempted to
confirm its truth.
1278
GAULEY INDUSTRIES, INC
14 union meeting, and on the heels of Coffindaffer's ac-
quisition of knowledge of such union activity. The de-
fense offers no other explanation as to why Coffindaffer
acted at that time.
At a very minimum, the record in this case confirms
the statement attributed to Plant Manager Ward by Phil-
lips that the layoffs were accelerated because of the
union activity. As the testimony of Coffindaffer and
Ward concerning the circumstances prompting the layoff
is rejected, the defense is deemed lacking in credible
foundation. Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel
has established by a preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by, on September 15, discharging David Fletcher,
Dewey Meadows, Jeffrey Workman, Roger Lloyd, Tom
Peyatt, Mary Christian, and K. Wayne Martin.
D. Case 6-RC-8862
1. The objections
The specific objection filed by the Employer relates to
statements imputed to Union Representative O'Dell in
the course of telephonic conversations with certain em-
ployees the evening before the election. Thus, Joseph
Lester, a truckdriver, related that he received such a call
from O'Dell who attempted to persuade him to change
his vote to prounion. In doing so, O'Dell explained the
benefits the Union could provide, going on to indicate
that Coffindaffer was making enough profits to provide
these benefits. James Heinz, also a truckdriver, testified
to a similar conversation in which O'Dell allegedly
stated that Coffindaffer had made a lot of money and
could afford to go union. Dewey Meadows testified to a
conversation which took place in the presence of five
others a couple of weeks before the election in which
O'Dell allegedly stated that the Company was making a
lot of money. The statements attributed to O'Dell are not
viewed as warranting a rerun election. General commen-
tary as to the earnings of an employer subject to an orga-
nization drive, without more, by union officials is gener-
ally taken as campaign augmentation or "puffing" which
is subject to evaluation by employees. It is true that in
General Knit of California, Inc., 239 NLRB 619 (1978),
the Board overruled Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc.,
228 NLRB 1311 (1977), and returned to the standard of
review for alleged misrepresentations set forth in Holly-
wood Ceramics Company, Inc., 140 NLRB 221 (1962).
Pursuant thereto, the Board will consider the impact of
alleged misstatements upon an election by reference to
the following:
In evaluating the probable impact of a party's state-
ment on the election, one factor which the Board
will consider is whether the party making the state-
ment possesses intimate knowledge of the subject
matter so that the employees sought to be persuad-
ed may be expected to attach added significance to
its assertion. [140 NLRB at 224, fn. 10.]
Consistent therewith, misrepresentations as to the profit
position of an employer may well preclude the proper at-
mosphere for the conduct of an election. Nonetheless,
Board policy with respect to such campaign rhetoric has
not reached the level of absolute censorship. 14 In this in-
stance, O'Dell's remarks appear to have been made in an
argumentative vein, and without reference to confirmato-
ry facts which would tend to lend credence to the
claimed profitability of the Employer. The element of
special knowledge of the subject matter was lacking and
O'Dell's view would be subject to evaluation by the em-
ployees. Accordingly, the Employer's objection is over-
ruled.
Beyond the objection specifically raised by the Em-
ployer, Anna Mae Fletcher testified that, the night
before the election, O'Dell visited her at her home and
told her that he had "heard" that Fletcher and Cobb
would be fired the next day if they "didn't vote." This
matter was developed at the hearing, which in turn con-
stituted a segment of the investigation of the question
concerning representation. Accordingly, it is considered
relevant to assessment of the validity of the election. It is
concluded, however, that Fletcher's testimony in this re-
spect furnishes no substantial basis for setting aside the
first election. O'Dell's statement on its face purported to
convey a rumor, as to a matter not within the Union's
control, and whose coercive reach related to participa-
tion in the election, rather than the manner in which the
employee or enployees voted. Accordingly, I find that
this remark raised no substantial issue affecting the valid-
ity of the election. '5
2. The challenges
It having been found that Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged Mary Christian, Kenneth Martin, Thomas
Peyatt, and Jeffery Workman in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, it shall be recommended that the chal-
lenges to their ballots be overruled.
Remaining for consideration are the challenges to the
ballots of Brentford Brown, George Brewster, and W. E.
Straley. All were challenged by the Petitioner as super-
visors within the meaning of the Act. In this respect, it is
noted that Respondent's operations appear to be con-
ducted by an onsite blue collar work force of approxi-
mately 20 employees. Coffindaffer appears to have taken
an active part in plant operations. Kenneth Ward at
times material was the plant manager. As I understand
the Employer's position, Coffindaffer and Ward were the
sole supervisors of production and maintenance oper-
ations.
Brentford Brown was the plant manager until January
1980. At that time he was injured on the job and quali-
fied for workmen's compensation. In consequence, his
active employment ceased. Ward was then hired to re-
place Brown as plant manager. In May 1980, when
Brown returned to work, Brown continued to be com-
pensated on a salary basis, but Ward was retained as
plant manager. However, upon Brown's return, Coffin-
daffer conducted a meeting with employees in which he
indicated that the men would be divided into groups and
'' See, e.g.. Electronic Components Corporation of .Vorth Carolina, 215
NLRB 829 (1974); Cumberland Wood and Chair Corp., 211 NLRB 312
(1974)
'5 See, e g, Janler Plastic Mold Corporation, I1r6 NLRB 540 (1970)
1279
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Brentford Brown would be the overseer of "outside
work." Thereafter, Brown worked manually with others
while instructing them as to the performance of various
tasks both inside and outside the mill.
There is no evidence that during the eligibility period
Brown had authority to hire,'" fire, discipline, or effec-
tively to recommend the same. Nor does it appear that
Brown held authority to control the hours of work of
employees, or that he directed employees in their work
exercising independent judgment of a nonroutine nature.
In this latter respect, it is concluded that, at best, Brown
acted as a conduit relaying work assignments communi-
cated by Coffindaffer or Ward and simply exercised lead
authority, of a routine nature, drawing from his many
years of experience. I find that he was not a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act,'7 and, accordingly, the
challenge to his ballot is overruled.
George Brewster described himself as a "leader" who
worked all shifts. He was hired in May 1980. Generally,
he works with a crew which is designated by Coffin-
daffer or Ward and which implement orders originating
with the latter. At a meeting in the summer of 1980, em-
ployees were told by Coffindaffer that Brewster would
be in charge of cleanup operations. However, Brewster
possessed no authority to hire, fire, or to suspend those
who failed to perform their work. Where discipline was
indicated, Brewster would simply report the indiscretions
to his supervisor, but had never been authorized to take
corrective action. Brewster works with the men perform-
ing manual labor, and his authority appears to have been
confined to telling those assigned to his crew what to do,
and to report those who failed to respond. Although
Brewster could tell employees to move from job to job,
and would receive information from employees who
elected to take time off, there is no evidence that he
acted independently in approving such requests. With re-
spect to direction of work, it does not appear that Brew-
ster utilized independent discretion of a nonroutine
nature, or that he possessed any authority removing him
from the category of a nonsupervisory leadman. 8 Ac-
cordingly, I find that he was eligible to participate in the
election and the challenge to his ballot shall be over-
ruled.
W. E. Straley is a licensed electrician who retired on
August 15, 1980. His duties were assumed by George
Peyatt. When Peyatt resigned from the Company's
employ, Straley returned in October 1980 to perform
electrical work on an "on-call" basis. He is listed on the
Employer's payroll records as "electrical chief."
Straley's most recent employment was as a social secu-
rity annuitant, and his hours of work are regulated so as
to preserve his eligibility for such benefits. During the
" Randy Phillips testified that he was hired in January 1980 after being
interviewed by Brown. However, this took place apparently when
Brown was plant manager and prior to his injury in January 1980 Ac-
cordingly, it is not relevant to an assessment of his status during the elec-
tion eligibility period.
I? The fact that Ward and Coffindaffer on one occasion drew on
Brown's expertise in connection with a railroad car derailment has been
considered but is not viewed as warranting a contrary result
" Although rank-and-file employees were paid on an hourly basis,
Brewster in September was placed on a salary While I have considered
this factor, it is not viewed as sufficient to alter the result.
last quarter of 1980, his hours were limited to 169 or less
than 5 weeks based upon a 40-hour workweek. During
this period, Straley also appears to have furnished advice
to the Employer in connection with electrical problems
on a compensation-free basis.
At the time of the election, Straley occupied the posi-
tion of vice president of the Company."9 In his capacity
as a vice president, Straley was called upon to sign cor-
porate resolutions, and hence to exercise corporate au-
thority. In the total circumstances, it would appear that
Straley holds a special status through which he possesses
interests sufficiently distinct from those of rank-and-file
enployees in the appropriate unit to warrant a conclusion
that he has "no substantial and continuing interest" in the
wages and hours and working conditions of unit employ-
ees. The challenge to his ballot shall be sustained. 20
3. Summary
As the objections have been overruled in their entire-
ty, and as the challenges to the ballots of Christian,
Martin, Peyatt, Workman, Brewster, and Brown re-
mained determinative, it shall be recommended that the
Regional Director open and count said ballots and issue
a revised tally and the appropriate certification based
thereon.
CONCI.USIONS OF LAW
1. Gauley Industries, Inc., is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. United Mine Workers of America is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
coercively interrogating employees concerning union ac-
tivity; by threatening employees with plant closure be-
cause of their union activity; by conditioning continued
employment of enployees upon their rejection of the
Union; by soliciting grievances while implying that steps
would be taken to correct them if the Union were reject-
ed; by creating the impression that union activity was
subject to surveillance; by informing employees that
wages were to be withheld because of union activity but
that wage increases would be grailted upon rejection of
the Union; by informing terminated employees that they
would not be rehired because of union activity; by mani-
festing an intention to bribe union officials; and by in-
forming employees that a layoff was accelerated by
virtue of their union activity.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by on September 15, 1980, discharging employees
Mary E. Christian, David Fletcher, Roger L. Lloyd, K.
Wayne Martin, Dewey J. Meadows, Thomas Peyatt, and
Jeffrey N. Workman in reprisal for their union activities.
'9 The Employer describes Straley's incumbency as a vice president as
one served in an "acting" capacity However, it appears that this qualifi-
cation is based on nothing more than the fact that there had been no new
election of corporate officers in 1980 It is fair to infer that his tenure as a
corporate official was based upon prior designation.
20 See, e.g., Dennis G. Maietta and Frank ,M .aietta. t/a Maiertra Con-
iracting. 251 NLRH 177, 183 (1980) See also N;L.R.B v J C Lewis
Motor Company, Inc., 180 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1950).
1280
GAULEY INDUSTRIES, INC.
5. The unfair labor practices found above have an
effect upon commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THF REMEDYI
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it shall be recommended that Re-
spondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain af-
firmative action deemed necessary to effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. As Respondent's retaliatory discharge of
seven employees upon discovery of union activity was
accompanied by a pattern of coercive conduct so egre-
gious as to threaten the very existence of employee
rights protected by Section 7 of the Act, a broad order,
precluding Respondent from "in any other manner" in-
terfering with, coercing, or restraining employees in the
exercise of said rights, shall be recommended.
Having found that Respondent terminated, in violation
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, employees Mary
Christian, David Fletcher, Roger Lloyd, K. Wayne
Martin, Dewey J. Meadows, Thomas Peyatt, and Jeffrey
M. Workman, it shall be recommended that Respondent
be ordered to offer each immediate reinstatement to his
or her former position, 2' or, if not available, to a substan-
tially equivalent position, without loss of seniority or
other benefits, and to make each whole for any loss of
earnings he or she may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them, by payment of a sum of
money equal to the amount he or she normally would
have earned from the date of his or her discharge to the
date of a bona fide offer of reinstatement, less net interim
earnings during that period. Backpay shall be computed
on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in F W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and shall in-
clude interest as specified in Florida Steel Corporation,
231 NLRB 651 (1977).22
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue
the following recommended:
ORDER 23
The Respondent, Gauley Industries, Inc., Camden-on-
Gauley, West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
union activity.
21 Although it might be possible that certain of these employees would
have been laid off for legitimate economic reasons at some date after Sep-
tember 15, that is a matter which might be resolved on credible convinc-
ing proof in the compliance stages of this proceeding Furthermore, al-
though Roger Lloyd. Dewey Meadows, and David Fletcher have been
reemployed, it is not entirely clear that their restoration meets statutory
requirements, and, hence, they shall be covered by the traditional rein-
statement order
2: See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962)
23 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National I.abor Relations Board, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided
in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections theretio
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
(b) Threatening employees with plant closure because
of their union activity.
(c) Conditioning employment of employees upon their
rejection of the Union.
(d) Soliciting employee grievances in a manner dis-
couraging union activity.
(e) Creating the impression that union activity is sub-
ject to surveillance.
(f) Telling employees that their wage increase was to
be withheld because of their union activity and promis-
ing employees wage increases if they rejected the Union.
(g) Telling terminated employees that they would not
be rehired because of their union activity.
(h) Telling employees that a layoff was accelerated by
virtue of the union activity.
(i) Creating the impression that a union official was
subject to bribery.
(j) Discouraging membership in a labor organization
by discharging or in any other manner discriminating
against employees with respect to their wages, hours, or
tenure of employment.
(k) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Offer Mary E. Christian, David Fletcher, Roger L.
Lloyd, K. Wayne Martin, Dewey J. Meadows, Thomas
Peyatt, and Jeffrey M. Workman immediate reinstate-
ment to their former positions or, if not available, to sub-
stantially equivalent positions, without loss of seniority,
discharging their replacements if necessary, and make
them whole for any earnings lost by reason of the dis-
crimination against them in the manner defined in the
section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze and determine the amount
of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its facility in Camden-on-Gauley, West Vir-
ginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."24 Copies thereof, on forms provided by the Region-
al Director for Region 6, shall be signed by Respondent's
authorized representative and posted immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National t abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to) a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National L abor Relations Board"
1281
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 6-RC-8862 be sev-
ered from this proceeding and remanded to the Regional
Director for Region 6 for the opening of the determina-
tive challenged ballots, issuance of a revised tally, and
the appropriate certification based thereon.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportunity to
present evidence and state their positions, the National
Labor Relations Board found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and has or-
dered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form. join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all such
activities.
Accordingly, we give you these assurances.
WE WIL . NOT coercively interrogate our em-
ployees concerning their union activity.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with plant
closure because of their union activity.
WE WILL NOT solicit grievances from our em-
ployees while implying to correct them if they
reject the Union.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that the
union activity of our employees is subject to sur-
veillance.
WE WILL NOT inform employees that their wage
increases were withheld because of their union ac-
tivity or that they will receive wage increases if the
Union is rejected.
WE WIL.L NOT inform employees that those ter-
minated will not be rehired because of their union
activity.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that union
officials could be bribed.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that a layoff
was accelerated by virtue of their union activity.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, coerce, or restrain employees in the exercise
of the rights set forth at the top of this notice.
WE WILL NOT discourage our employees from
engaging in union activity by discharging or in any
other manner discriminating with respect to their
conditions of work or job tenure.
WE WILL grant immediate reinstatement to Mary
E. Christian, David Fletcher, Roger L. Lloyd, K.
Wayne Martin, Dewey J. Meadows, Thomas
Peyatt, and Jeffrey M. Workman to their former
positions without loss of seniority and other benefits
and we shall make them whole for their lost earn-
ings by reasons of our discrimination against them,
with interest.
GAULEY INDUSTRIES, INC.
1282