Gary R. Dunn, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 7, 2008
0120082608 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 7, 2008)

0120082608

08-07-2008

Gary R. Dunn, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Gary R. Dunn,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120082608

Agency No. 1E-857-0010-07

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts complainant's

appeal from the agency's April 23, 2008 final decision concerning

his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

During the relevant time, complainant was employed as an Express Mail

Technician (Tour 3) at the agency's Tucson Processing & Distribution

Center in Tucson, Arizona.

On June 25, 2007, complainant filed the instant formal complaint.

Therein, complainant alleged that the agency discriminated against him

on the basis of age (54) when on March 21, 2007 and April 28, 2007,

his bid job was abolished.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). On March 18, 2008, the AJ issued an order

dismissing the formal complaint from the hearing process. Specifically,

the AJ concluded that on February 14, 2008, she issued an Order to Show

Cause ordering complainant to show cause why sanctions should not be

imposed for his failure to cooperate in the processing of his complaint.

The AJ further concluded that because complainant did not respond to

her Order, she remanded the case to the agency for issuance of a final

decision. Therefore, the agency issued the instant final decision on

April 23, 2008.

In its April 23, 2008 final decision, the agency found no discrimination.

The agency found that complainant did not establish a prima facie case

of age discrimination. The agency further found even assuming, for

the sake of argument only, complainant established a prima facie case,

management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions, which complainant did not show were a pretext.

The Manager Distribution Operations (MDO) stated that he was the deciding

official to abolish complainant's bid job because it no longer required

eight (8) hours of work and it was no longer viable to retain the position

as a full-time slot. MDO further stated that there was not enough work

for complainant to perform, and that his minimum duties were transferred

to an Express Mail Clerk on Tour 1. MDO stated that while his two bid

jobs were abolished, complainant "retained his pay scale at no loss, and

also maintained his working schedule with the same days off. Therefore,

he suffered no loss. He was placed into another working position."

MDO stated that according to the Employee Labor Relations Manual and

the Clerk Contract agreement, management "has the right to abolish

position that are deemed no longer viable or serve a practical purpose

with respect to the needs of the Postal Service. An employee gainfully

employed is the goal and the necessity of the service." Furthermore,

MDO stated that complainant's age "had absolutely no barring on his

position or situation."

The Plant Manager (PM) stated that the decision to abolish complainant's

bid job was based on operational needs and the most effective use

of resources. Specifically, PM stated that MDO's decision to abolish

complainant's bid "was purely a business decision based on the fact that

[Complainant's] 8 hour work assignment had only about 2 hours (or less)

of actual workload, and that workload could be eliminated or absorbed

by the other Express technician on T2 and T1."

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably

give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate

responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.

See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

In the instant case, we find that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, and that complainant has not

demonstrated that these reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision

because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish

that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0408)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0408)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in

which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must

be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 7, 2008

Date

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0120082608

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036

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0120082608