Full Speed Ahead, Inc.v.SRAM Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 10, 2008

No. 91171889 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2008)

Mailed:
December 10, 2008
jtw

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
______

Full Speed Ahead, Inc.
v.
SRAM Corp.
_____

Opposition No. 91171889
to Application Serial No. 78589700
filed on 3/17/2005
_____

Robert J. Adolph and James R. Uhlir of Christensen O’Connor
Johnson Kindness PLLC for Full Speed Ahead, Inc.

Richard B. Walsh, Jr. and Michael J. Hickey of Lewis, Rice
& Finersh, L.C. for SRAM Corp.
______

Before Seeherman, Walsh and Wellington, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Walsh, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Full Speed Ahead, Inc. (opposer) has opposed the
application by SRAM Corp. (applicant) to register SRAM
FORCE in standard characters for goods identified as
“bicycle parts, namely, gear shifting mechanisms, shifter
grip covers, handlebar grips, derailleurs, brakes, brake
levers, cranks, bottom brackets for frames, handlebars,
THIS OPINION
IS NOT A PRECEDENT OF
THE T.T.A.B.
Opposition No. 91171889
2
stems, hubs, chains, cassette sprockets, control cables for
use with gear shifting and brakes, control cable sealing
mechanisms, control cable housing, seat posts, pedals,
wheelsets, rims, headsets and quick release levers” in
International Class 12 and “clothing, namely, t-shirts,
sweatshirts, socks, jackets, aprons, hats, jerseys and
short pants” in International Class 25.1 Opposer filed the
notice of opposition on July 7, 2006.
Opposer asserts priority and likelihood of confusion
under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), as
grounds for the opposition. Specifically, opposer asserts
a likelihood of confusion between applicant’s SRAM FORCE
mark and opposer’s K FORCE mark based on opposer’s
ownership of Registration No. 3198864 for the K FORCE mark2
in standard characters for goods identified as “bicycles
and parts, namely front forks, bicycle cranks, bicycle
rims, seatpost, handlebar, bottom brackets, chainrings,
headset bearings, bicycle hubs, bicycle spokes, brake
device for bicycles, bicycle chain, handlebar stem, bicycle
gears” in International Class 12. Opposer filed the
underlying application for the K FORCE mark on March 21,

1 Application Serial No. 78589700, filed March 17, 2005, claiming
a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce under Trademark
Act Section 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b).
2 The registration displays the mark in standard characters, as
follows: K Force.
Opposition No. 91171889
3
2006, and the registration issued on January 16, 2007,
during the pendency of this proceeding. Opposer also
claims common law rights in the K FORCE mark with respect
to “bicycle parts” from at least as early as 2001.3
Applicant has denied the essential allegations in the
notice of opposition.
Opposer and applicant have filed briefs. We dismiss
the opposition as to both classes of goods for the reasons
stated below.
Before proceeding further we must address the status
of a cancellation proceeding applicant filed with respect
to opposer’s pleaded Registration No. 3198864 for the K
FORCE mark, Cancellation No. 92049613. Applicant filed the
petition to cancel on June 16, 2008, the same day applicant
filed its brief in this opposition proceeding, but
applicant made no mention of the cancellation proceeding in
its brief. Applicant filed the cancellation proceeding as
a separate proceeding, not as a counterclaim in this
proceeding. The only mention of the cancellation
proceeding in this proceeding occurred in passing in
opposer’s reply brief. See Opposer’s Amended Reply Brief
at 4. Recently, both parties filed a consented motion to

3 Opposer also refers to dilution in the notice of opposition.
However, opposer did not fully plead a dilution claim, nor did
opposer argue the dilution claim in its brief. Therefore, we
have given no consideration to a dilution claim in this case.
Opposition No. 91171889
4
extend the dates for the discovery conference and initial
disclosures in the cancellation proceeding, and the Board
denied that motion. See Order of October 28, 2008. In
view of the advanced stage of this opposition proceeding,
we will decide this proceeding without regard to the
cancellation proceeding.4
The Record
By rule the record includes the pleadings and the
USPTO file for the opposed application. Trademark Rule
2.122, 37 C.F.R. § 2.122. The record in this proceeding
also consists of testimonial depositions on behalf of
opposer of John Van Enkevort and Eric Hjertberg, including
numerous exhibits, and testimonial depositions on behalf of
applicant of Milan Milosevic, John Olin and Ronald Ritzler,
also including numerous exhibits.
Both parties have stated numerous and varied
objections to both testimony and exhibits.
Opposer objects to applicant’s Exhibits 22 and 23
which consist of applicant’s own answers to certain of
opposer’s interrogatories. Applicant introduced these
exhibits through its own witness during its testimony

4 In particular, if applicant had wanted us to consider the
outcome of the cancellation proceeding in rendering our decision
herein, it should have filed a motion to suspend this opposition
proceeding. As noted, applicant has not even mentioned the
existence of the cancellation proceeding.
Opposition No. 91171889
5
period. Although a party may not introduce its own answers
to interrogatories under a notice of reliance, it may
submit such responses as an exhibit to testimony if the
witness testifies to the accuracy of the responses.
Because the witness did so in this case, we overrule the
objection.
Opposer also objects to exhibits 24-86 and 93-99
because, opposer argues, they “… were offered by Applicant
without adequate foundation in that the witnesses through
which these exhibits were offered did not have knowledge
thereof adequate to authenticate them.” Opposer’s Brief at
2. In the absence of a more specific statement of
objections as to the particular exhibits, we overrule these
objections. We find no general defect with regard to the
foundation or the authenticity of these exhibits.
These exhibits relate generally to third-party uses of
“FORCE” marks. Mr. Milosevic testified as to the source of
these exhibits and, to an extent, as to his familiarity
with the products discussed or displayed in the exhibits.
Milosevic Test. at 24-60. Mr. Ritzler also testified as to
his familiarity with the third-party uses in these
exhibits. Ritzler Test. at 25-30.
Applicant also objects to certain testimony and
exhibits offered by opposer.
Opposition No. 91171889
6
First, and most importantly, applicant objects to the
admission into evidence of Exhibit 1, opposer’s K FORCE
registration. Opposer objects to this exhibit because
applicant did not plead the registration in the notice of
opposition. We overrule this objection. Although
applicant did not plead this registration in its notice of
opposition, opposer did plead the application from which
the registration issued. Notice of Opposition ¶ 3. As we
noted above, the registration issued while this proceeding
was pending. As a result of the reference in the notice of
opposition to the application, applicant had notice as to
opposer’s potential reliance on the K FORCE registration.
Furthermore, at the time opposer introduced the status and
title copy of the registration into evidence through the
testimony of Mr. Van Enkevort, applicant did not object on
the grounds applicant now asserts, nor on any other
specific grounds. The only timely potential objection to
this exhibit is applicant’s objection at the conclusion of
the Van Enkevort testimony to all exhibits without
specifying any grounds. However, even if there had been a
specific timely objection on the grounds now asserted, we
would overrule it. Accordingly, we deem the pleadings
amended to assert reliance on opposer’s K FORCE
registration and overrule applicant’s objection.
Opposition No. 91171889
7
Applicant also objects to admission of exhibits 3-5
and 9 on the grounds that the exhibits are not relevant.
The exhibits in question are: Exh. 3 – an invoice related
to the development of the K FORCE mark by an Italian
company; Exh. 4 – an article about the K FORCE products
featured at a Taipei trade show; Exh. 5 – a photo of K
FORCE products displayed at a Tokyo trade show; and Exh. 9
– copies of advertisements for the K FORCE products in an
Italian magazine. We recognize that the exhibits relate to
activities which took place outside the United States.
Opposer argues that they nonetheless had an effect on
relevant potential purchasers in the United States. While
this “effect” may be limited, in terms of relevance and
probative value, we decline to exclude these exhibits
entirely, but have considered them for whatever probative
value they may have. Accordingly, we overrule applicant’s
objections to these exhibits. We hasten to add that our
decision in this case is not dependent on these exhibits.
Applicant also notes 66 separate objections to
opposer’s testimony. Many of the objections relate to
matters of form only. For example, applicant’s objections
as to opposer’s questions include: “asked and answered,”
“leading,” “compound,” “calls for speculation,” “vague” and
“hypothetical.” Objections as to answers include:
Opposition No. 91171889
8
“narrative.” In a Board proceeding, these types of
objections ultimately serve little purpose. In particular,
at the point where the parties are briefing the case,
maintaining and reiterating these types of objections
serves little purpose. The Board is capable of weighing
the testimony appropriately without ruling on these types
of objections at trial. Accordingly, we overrule the
objections by applicant related purely to form.
As to the other grounds applicant asserts here in
objecting to testimony, such as, “relevance,” “hearsay,”
and “lack of foundation,” we find it unnecessary to address
each of those objections specifically. Cf. Carefirst of
Maryland Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas Inc., 77
USPQ2d 1492, 1494 (TTAB 2005). The objections relate
principally to the weight to be accorded the testimony in
question, and we have assigned weight to relevant
testimony, as appropriate. TBMP § 707.03(c).
Lastly, certain of the testimony and exhibits in this
case have been filed subject to claims of confidentiality.
We find those claims generally reasonable. Therefore, we
will respect those claims. This will limit our ability to
discuss some matters in the detail we might otherwise
provide.
Opposition No. 91171889
9

Standing
Because opposer has pleaded and shown that it owns a
registration for the K FORCE mark and that it has used the
K FORCE mark in commerce, opposer has established standing.
See generally Jewelers Vigilance Committee Inc. v.
Ullenberg Corp., 823 F.2d 490, 2 USPQ2d 2021, 2023 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
Priority
Priority is not at issue in this proceeding, again
because opposer has made of record a status and title copy
of a valid and subsisting registrations for its K FORCE
mark. See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc.,
496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974). Furthermore,
opposer has shown that it began using the K FORCE mark in
late 2003, prior to the filing date of the SRAM FORCE
application and prior to applicant’s use of the SRAM FORCE
mark. Van Enkevort Test. at 39. This use also serves to
establish opposer’s priority.
Findings of Fact
Opposer and applicant compete in the sale of bicycle
parts. Both sell parts in bulk to original equipment
manufacturers, that is, companies which sell fully
assembled bicycles, and to aftermarket purchasers. The
Opposition No. 91171889
10
parts in question are principally for road bikes, to a
somewhat lesser extent for mountain bikes and to a much
lesser extent for other types of bikes, such as BMX bikes.
In the aftermarket, specialized retailers, staffed by
knowledgeable personnel, may purchase parts and assemble a
bicycle from a set of parts for general sale or to fill a
custom order. Also, in the aftermarket, bicycle owners may
purchase individual parts or sets of parts through
specialized retailers. The bicycle owner may purchase
parts to assemble a custom-made bicycle or to
replace/upgrade specific parts. The bicycle owner may
assemble the bike or install the parts himself or herself,
or the owner may rely on a retailer or other specialist to
do so.
The bicycle owners/purchasers themselves are typically
serious bicycle enthusiasts who know a good deal about the
parts they are purchasing. Virtually all purchasers,
including those who purchase parts on behalf of bicycle
manufactures and those who purchase parts in the
aftermarket, are discriminating, sophisticated purchasers.
Bicycle parts range in cost and quality from the basic
and less expensive to the high-tech/high-end and more
expensive. An assembled bike may range in cost from $250
to $10,000. The parts opposer and applicant sell under the
Opposition No. 91171889
11
marks at issue here are generally for high-end, more
expensive bikes.
Two leading parts manufacturers, Shimano and
Campagnolo, have established a practice of selling sets of
compatible parts, identified as a “group set” or “gruppo.”
A group set ideally includes complete sets of drive-train
components, not including the frame, that is, shifters,
derailleurs, cranksets, bottom brackets, chains, cassettes,
wheel hubs and brake components. Shimano and Campagnolo
offer distinct group sets for different tiers ranging from
lower-end to high-end sets. Both applicant and opposer
aspire to emulate this model in the development and sale of
their product lines.
Applicant is a leading designer, manufacturer and
seller of bicycle parts. Applicant has used the SRAM mark
as its house mark for bicycle parts since 1988. SRAM is
the principal mark associated with applicant and its
products. The purchasers of bicycle parts generally
recognize the SRAM mark. Thus, the SRAM mark is a strong
mark in the industry. Applicant began to use its SRAM
FORCE mark in April 2006. Applicant has used the SRAM
FORCE mark on shifters, controls, brakes, derailleurs,
crank sets and bottom brackets. Applicant markets a set of
parts under the SRAM FORCE mark as a group set for
Opposition No. 91171889
12
approximately $1,500 per set, at the upper end, but not at
the top tier. Applicant’s SRAM FORCE products are sold
through normal trade channels for bicycle parts. Bikes
using SRAM FORCE parts are in the higher price range for
bikes generally, though the identification of goods in the
SRAM FORCE application is not limited in this respect.
Applicant is not aware of any instances of actual confusion
between its SRAM FORCE mark and opposer’s K FORCE mark.
Opposer also designs, manufactures and sells bicycle
parts. Opposer has focused its efforts on the design and
production of high-tech, lightweight parts. Opposer
targets its K FORCE products for use on bikes in the higher
price range and the top tier, though the K FORCE
registration does not limit the goods to this category.
Although the K FORCE registration identifies “bicycles”
among its goods, opposer does not make or sell bicycles,
only bicycle parts. Furthermore, although the K FORCE
registration includes an extensive list of parts in the
identification, opposer has only used its K FORCE mark on a
limited number of the parts identified. Those parts
include handlebars, stems, cranksets, seatposts, saddles,
wheel sets, and chain rings. Van Enkevort Test. at 16.
Opposer first used the K FORCE mark in commerce at the end
of 2003. Id. at 39. Although opposer plans to develop and
Opposition No. 91171889
13
sell a full group set under the K FORCE mark, opposer has
not done so to date.
Several third parties use marks which include FORCE,
the element common to the marks of opposer and applicant,
in the sale of bicycles, bicycle parts or accessories.
Those third-party uses include:
RITCHEY FORCE ROAD for bicycle stems (Exh. 41);
RITCHEY ROAD FORCE-K for bicycle tires (Exh. 41);
RITCHEY ORIGINAL FORCE DIRECTIONAL HANDLEBARS for
handlebars (Exh. 64);

RITCHEY FORCELITE for stems (Exh. 64);
RITCHEY FORCE COMP for stems (Exh. 64);
FORCE 99 MTB for stems (Exh. 48);
DELTA FORCE for handlebars (Exh. 46);
WORLD FORCE for handlebars (Exh. 44);
AEROFORCE for handlebar clipons (Exh. 28);
PEDAL FORCE for bicycle frames (Exh. 64);
G FORCE for frames (Exh. 64);
GP FORCE for tires (Exh. 56);
CROSS FORCE for bicycles (Exh. 42);
IMMORTAL FORCE for bicycles (Exh. 47);
MOUNTAIN FORCE 24 for bicycles; (Exh. 52);
CIRCLOCROSS FORCE for bicycles (Exh. 64);
CYCLE FORCE SPORT GEL BIKE SADDLE for saddles (Exh.
50);
Opposition No. 91171889
14

CYCLE FORCE for bicycle lights (Exh. 50); and
CYCLE FORCE for bicycle foot pumps (Exh. 59).
These examples include the most probative of those in the
record related to bicycle parts, as well as examples of
uses on bicycles and some types of bicycle accessories.
The record also includes other examples of the registration
or use of “FORCE” marks. This above list is limited to
marks for which there is evidence and/or testimony, beyond
registration listings in search reports, to support the
use.
Likelihood of Confusion
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act precludes
registration of an applicant’s mark “which so resembles a
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office… as to
be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of
the applicant, to cause confusion…” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
The opinion in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476
F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1977), sets forth the
factors to consider in determining likelihood of confusion.
We will discuss below each factor which is relevant in this
case below.
Opposition No. 91171889
15
The Goods and Channels of Trade for the Goods
In comparing the goods and the channels of trade for
the goods we must consider the goods as identified in the
application and any pleaded registration which is of
record. Paula Payne Products v. Johnson Publishing Co.,
473 F.2d 901, 177 USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973) (“Trademark cases
involving the issue of likelihood of confusion must be
decided on the basis of the respective descriptions of
goods.”).
In this case opposer relies both on its pleaded
registration and on its common law use of the K FORCE mark
on certain goods. Those goods include: handlebars, stems,
cranksets, seatposts, saddles, wheel sets and chain rings.
Opposer’s K FORCE registration identifies the following
list of goods which is somewhat broader: “bicycles and
parts, namely front forks, bicycle cranks, bicycle rims,
seatpost, handlebar, bottom brackets, chainrings, headset
bearings, bicycle hubs, bicycle spokes, brake device for
bicycles, bicycle chain, handlebar stem, bicycle gears.”
Applicant identifies its goods as “bicycle parts,
namely, gear shifting mechanisms, shifter grip covers,
handlebar grips, derailleurs, brakes, brake levers, cranks,
bottom brackets for frames, handlebars, stems, hubs,
chains, cassette sprockets, control cables for use with
Opposition No. 91171889
16
gear shifting and brakes, control cable sealing mechanisms,
control cable housing, seat posts, pedals, wheelsets, rims,
headsets and quick release levers.”
The following parts are included in the identification
in both the pleaded registration and the opposed
application: cranks, rims, seat posts, handlebars, bottom
brackets, hubs, brakes, chains, stems and gears.
Furthermore, opposer’s common law use extends to the
following goods also identified in the opposed application:
handlebars, stems, cranksets and seatposts. Thus, the
respective goods are, at least in part, identical and
otherwise closely related. In addition, because the goods
are identical in part, it logically follows that the
channels of trade for those goods are identical also. The
parties do not dispute this conclusion.
Also, opposer argues that there is a likelihood of
confusion here, in part, because opposer intends to use its
K FORCE mark on a group set of high-end, top-tier parts,
and that applicant’s use of SRAM FORCE on parts, which
opposer alleges to be of lower quality, will impair
opposer’s ability to do so. We find this argument
unpersuasive.
Bicycle parts are sold as part of as well as apart
from group sets. Both opposer and applicant sell parts
Opposition No. 91171889
17
apart from group sets. In fact, the evidence of opposer’s
use to date does not indicate use of the K FORCE mark to
identify a group set. Van Enkevort Test. at 23, 42 and
164. Furthermore, Mr. Van Enkevort states that opposer had
not yet used the K FORCE mark on front forks, headsets,
hubs, spokes, brakes, chains, cassettes or derailleurs
(gear components). Id. Nonetheless, we conclude that even
if both parties were to use their respective mark on group
sets, whether of the same or different tiers, we would not
decide this case differently.
The Strength of Opposer’s Mark
Applicant argues, “Opposer’s K Force mark is merely
one of a crowd of ‘FORCE’ marks utilized in the bicycle
industry.” Applicant’s Brief at 19. Applicant argues
further that, as a result of third-party use, the FORCE
component of opposer’s mark, the component common to the
two marks at issue, is weak. Applicant argues still
further that FORCE is weak because it is either merely
descriptive or highly suggestive of bicycle parts.
Opposer argues that the examples of third-party use
are not relevant because applicant’s goods are high end,
and the goods in the examples are not sold in that market
and that neither applicant nor opposer sells some of the
products of these third parties, for example, tires.
Opposition No. 91171889
18
Opposer also argues that the examples which are based on
registrations, without any evidence of use, should be
discounted, and that other evidence of third-party use is
otherwise lacking in probative value. Opposer also argues
that FORCE is not merely descriptive or suggestive.
We concur with opposer in concluding that FORCE is not
merely descriptive of the relevant goods. There is no
evidence of record to support that position. However, we
concur with applicant in concluding that FORCE is
suggestive of both opposer’s and applicant’s goods in that
it suggests strength, power and motion based on its
dictionary meaning.5 The evidence of third-party
registration and use of “FORCE” marks in the bicycle field
further supports the conclusion that FORCE, as used in the
respective marks, is suggestive.
Applicant has provided evidence of the registration
and use of FORCE as an element of marks in the bicycle
industry, on bicycles, parts for bicycles and on bicycle
accessories. We listed the most probative evidence of
third-party use in the Findings of Fact above.

5 We take judicial notice of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (11th ed. 2003) which, in relevant part, defines
“force” as “strength or energy exerted or brought to bear; cause
of motion or change; … active power…” University of Notre Dame
du Lac v. J. C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., Inc., 213 USPQ 594
(TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

Opposition No. 91171889
19
We decline to discount the evidence based on the
assertion that it does not address the high-end market.
The goods in opposer’s registration are not restricted to
the high-end market, nor are the goods in the application.
Furthermore, the record shows that competitors in the
industry, in fact, offer goods at different tiers,
including higher and lower tiers. In general, we have
accorded the evidence of third-party use appropriate weight
based on the quality of the exhibit and related testimony.
We also reject opposer’s argument that we totally
discount the evidence related to goods neither party sells.
Even though opposer or applicant may not sell certain
goods, that does not necessarily compel the conclusion that
the goods are not related for purposes of determining the
strength or weakness of a term as used in the relevant
field.
The examples of third-party marks noted in the
Findings of Facts include bicycles, bicycle parts and
bicycle accessories. The parts include parts identified in
the opposed application, as well as parts identified in
opposer’s pleaded registration and as to which opposer has
shown common law use. The third-party uses also include
related parts, such as, frames and tires, and assembled
bicycles. The marks used on parts, such as stems,
Opposition No. 91171889
20
handlebars and saddles, goods identified in opposer’s K
FORCE registration, are most probative, but marks used on
other parts, such as tires and frames, are probative also,
as are the marks used on bicycles. Finally, the marks used
on accessories, such as pumps and lights, possess limited,
but some probative value. When we view the evidence of
third-party use as a whole, we conclude that FORCE is
relatively weak in the bicycle field because it is
suggestive and because of third-party use.
Purchaser Sophistication
Applicant argues that the purchasers of bicycle parts
are knowledgeable, sophisticated purchasers, and as such,
less likely to be confused. Opposer disagrees and argues
that even sophisticated purchasers may experience trademark
confusion. The evidence shows that the goods at issue here
are relatively expensive, and not impulse items.
Furthermore, the evidence shows that all classes of
purchasers at issue here, those who purchase for original
equipment manufacturers, operators of retail and service
shops, and bicycle owners/enthusiasts, are knowledgeable
and sophisticated. Even opposer’s own witnesses confirm
this conclusion. Hjertberg Test. at 18 and 76. We find
Mr. Van Enkevort’s assertion in cross-examination that the
purchasers are not sophisticated unconvincing. Van
Opposition No. 91171889
21
Enkevort Test. at 88-89. Thus, we conclude that the
sophistication of the purchasers favors applicant in this
case.
The Marks
To determine whether the marks are confusingly
similar, we must consider the appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression of each mark. Palm
Bay Imports Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee
En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir.
2005). In this case, we note, in particular, that it is
appropriate to accord greater importance to the more
distinctive elements in the marks than to the less
distinctive elements in determining whether the marks are
similar. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
observed, “… in articulating reasons for reaching a
conclusion on the issue of confusion, there is nothing
improper in stating that, for rational reasons, more or
less weight has been given to a particular feature of a
mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on
consideration of the marks in their entireties. Indeed,
this type of analysis appears to be unavoidable.” In re
National Data Corporation, 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
Opposition No. 91171889
22
Opposer argues that K FORCE and SRAM FORCE are very
similar in sound, appearance and commercial impression
because FORCE is the dominant portion of each of the marks.
Opposer argues further that, “’K’ in Opposer’s K FORCE mark
is understood to be a phonetic reference to ‘carbon,’ a
principal manufacturing component of both Opposer’s and
Applicant’s products…” Opposer’s Brief at 13. Opposer
also argues that the inclusion of SRAM, applicant’s house
mark, in applicant’s mark is insufficient to distinguish
the marks, but rather that the house mark suggests a
connection between applicant and opposer, when there is no
such connection.
On the other hand, applicant argues that K FORCE and
SRAM FORCE differ when viewed in their entireties.
Applicant also argues that FORCE, the term common to both
marks, is weak, and that the K portion of opposer’s mark is
dominant, noting further that the marks begin with
different elements, SRAM versus K. Most importantly,
applicant argues that the presence of SRAM, its recognized
house mark, in applicant’s mark will preclude confusion.
We concur with applicant and conclude that the marks
are not similar when viewed in their entireties.
First, we note, as applicant argues, that the initial
elements in the marks differ significantly. Cf. Presto
Opposition No. 91171889
23
Products, Inc. v. Nice-Pak Products Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895,
1897 (TTAB 1988) (“… [it is] a matter of some importance
since it is often the first part of a mark which is most
likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and
remembered.”).
Furthermore, and more importantly, the leading element
in each of the marks is significant, if not dominant. In
the case of opposer’s K FORCE mark, K is at least as
significant as FORCE. Although opposer argues that K would
be relatively weak because it is a phonetic reference to
carbon, we have no evidence that potential purchasers would
perceive this reference. Furthermore, even if potential
purchasers perceived such a reference, that connotation
would not elevate FORCE to a dominant status. As we
discussed above, FORCE is a suggestive and relatively weak
term as applied to the relevant goods. See Knight Textile
Corp. v. Jones Investment Co., 75 USPQ2d 1313 (TTAB 2005).
Furthermore, we conclude that SRAM, applicant’s
recognized house mark, is the dominant portion of
applicant’s SRAM FORCE mark. Id. Again, we concluded
above that FORCE is suggestive and relatively weak in the
relevant field.
The decision in Knight Textile is instructive here.
In Knight Textile the applicant sought to register NORTON
Opposition No. 91171889
24
MCNAUGHTON ESSENTIALS for various items of “ladies
sportswear.” Knight Textile, 75 USPQ2d at 1314. Knight
Textile Corporation opposed registration based on its
registration for the mark ESSENTIALS for various items of
“women’s clothing.” Id. at 1314. In the opinion the Board
found that the applicant’s goods were “in part identical to
and otherwise highly similar to the goods in opposer’s
pleaded registration.” Id. at 1315. The Board then
concluded, as follows, with regard to the comparison of the
marks, “We find that the parties’ marks are dissimilar
rather than similar when viewed in their entireties in
terms of appearance, sound, connotation and overall
commercial impression.” Id. at 1315. The Board explains,
The marks obviously are similar in terms of sight,
sound and meaning to the extent they both consist of
or include ESSENTIALS. Just as obviously the marks
are dissimilar in sight, sound and meaning to the
extent that applicant’s mark, but not opposer’s,
includes and begins with the words NORTON MCNAUGHTON,
which would be perceived to be applicant’s house mark.
In terms of overall commercial impression, we find
that although the word ESSENTIALS is the entirety of
the commercial impression created by opposer’s mark,
in applicant’s mark it contributes relatively less to
the commercial impression than does the house mark
NORTON MCNAUGHTON. This is because… the word
ESSENTIALS is highly suggestive as applied to the
parties’ clothing items and as it appears in both
parties’ marks, especially in applicant’s mark. See
In re National Data Corporation, 753 F.2d 1056, 224
USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

Id. at 1315
Opposition No. 91171889
25
The Board observed further that, in the Knight Textile
case, the addition of the house mark was sufficient to
distinguish the marks, citing New England Fish Company v.
The Hervin Company, 511 F.2d 562, 184 USPQ 817 (CCPA 1974).
In Knight Textile, the critical factual issue was the
strength or weakness of ESSENTIALS. In concluding that
ESSENTIALS was highly suggestive the Board relied primarily
on a dictionary definition for “essential-s” and “twenty-
three extant ESSENTIAL registrations on the register in the
clothing field registered to twenty-one different owners.”
Knight Textile, 75 USPQ2d at 1316.
In this case, as applicant argues, we begin from a
significantly different starting point in our comparison of
the marks. Opposer’s mark is not FORCE alone but K FORCE.6
Therefore, there is an additional basis to distinguish the
marks, in addition to the inclusion of the SRAM house mark
in applicant’s mark.
As in the Knight Textile case, applicant here also
provided evidence of several third-party uses, not merely
registrations, which corroborate the suggestive meaning and
weakness of FORCE in the relevant field. See In re Red

6 Although at various points opposer asserts that applicant uses
FORCE alone, the evidence of such use is sparse. Moreover, the
arguments based on the use of FORCE are not relevant because the
mark in the opposed application is SRAM FORCE, not FORCE.

Opposition No. 91171889
26
Carpet Corp. v. Johnstown American Enterprises Inc., 7
USPQ2d 1404, 1406 (TTAB 1988).
The record here shows that SRAM is recognized as
applicant’s house mark; opposer has not disagreed with this
characterization. Thus, in this case SRAM functions like
NORTON MCNAUGHTON in the Knight Textile case. Here too the
house mark, SRAM, is dominant in forming the commercial
impression of applicant’s mark. As the Board said in
Knight Textile, “Based on this evidence, we find that
purchasers are able to distinguish among various ESSENTIALS
marks by looking to other elements of the marks. In this
case that other element is the presence of applicant’s
house mark NORTON MCNAUGHTON.” Knight Textile, 75 USPQ2d
at 1316 (footnote omitted). In the case before us,
purchasers would look to SRAM to distinguish applicant’s
mark from K FORCE.
Accordingly, we conclude that the marks of applicant
and registrant are not similar when viewed in their
entireties.
Bad Faith
Opposer also argues that applicant is guilty of bad
faith, asserting that applicant adopted its mark with
knowledge of opposer’s mark and with an intent to trade on
opposer’s good will. We must look to the record to see
Opposition No. 91171889
27
whether opposer has established bad faith. See Recot Inc.
v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
Opposer bases its claim of bad faith on evidence that
certain employees of applicant were aware that opposer had
adopted the K FORCE mark and that, although those employees
had expressed some concern, applicant proceeded with its
adoption of the SRAM FORCE mark with this knowledge.
Applicant argues that it acted in good faith in that
it conducted a search for the mark FORCE, that it
discovered a number of FORCE marks in the process, and that
it adopted the SRAM FORCE mark, rather than FORCE alone, in
view of the search results. Applicant denies any intent to
trade on the good will of opposer. We find the evidence
insufficient in this case to conclude that applicant acted
in bad faith. NASDAQ Stock Market Inc. v. Antartica
S.r.l., 69 USPQ2d 1718, 1733 (TTAB 1998).
Therefore, we have not considered bad faith as a
factor in reaching our conclusions with regard to
likelihood of confusion in this case.
Other Factors
In its brief opposer refers to the K FORCE mark as a
“famous trademark” at one point, although opposer does not
specifically argue that fame is a factor in this case.
Opposition No. 91171889
28
Opposer’s Brief at 16. For completeness, we note that we
have considered opposer’s evidence of its use and promotion
of the K FORCE mark and find it insufficient to establish
that K FORCE is a famous mark. Accordingly, we do not
regard fame as a relevant factor in this case.
Also, applicant asserts that there has been no actual
confusion with respect to the marks in this case. In view
of the evidence and circumstances in this case, including
the length, nature and extent of use of the respective
marks, we conclude that it is unclear whether there has
been a significant opportunity for confusion to occur.
Accordingly, we do not regard the lack of evidence of
actual confusion as a relevant factor in this case. In re
Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201,
1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Kangaroos U.S.A., 223 USPQ
1025, 1026-27 (TTAB 1984).
Conclusion
Finally, after considering all relevant, competent
evidence in this case bearing on the du Pont factors, we
conclude that applicant’s SRAM FORCE mark when used in
connection with the identified goods in Class 12, namely,
“bicycle parts, namely, gear shifting mechanisms, shifter
grip covers, handlebar grips, derailleurs, brakes, brake
levers, cranks, bottom brackets for frames, handlebars,
Opposition No. 91171889
29
stems, hubs, chains, cassette sprockets, control cables for
use with gear shifting and brakes, control cable sealing
mechanisms, control cable housing, seat posts, pedals,
wheelsets, rims, headsets and quick release levers,” is not
likely to cause confusion with opposer’s K FORCE mark.
Although opposer also opposed registration in Class
25, opposer did not present any evidence or augment with
respect to Class 25. Accordingly, for the same reasons we
conclude that there would be no likelihood of confusion
with respect to Class 12, and for the further reason that
opposer has not established any similarity or relatedness
of its goods with the goods in Class 25, we likewise
conclude that there would be no likelihood of confusion
between the respective marks with respect to Class 25.
Decision: We dismiss the opposition.