FOX SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 23, 2020

14760017 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/760,017 07/09/2015 Zachary FIELDS FEG1839US2 9093
78537 7590 09/23/2020
Cantor Colburn LLP - Fox Entertainment Group
20 Church Street
22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
REPSHER III, JOHN T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2143
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ZACHARY FIELDS, DANNY TELLO, ANDY BLONDIN, and
GEOFFREY K. HULL
____________________

Appeal 2019-003481
Application 14/760,017
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, JUSTIN BUSCH, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

BUSCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of
claims 1–22. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies “Fox Sports Productions, Inc.” as the real party
in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosure generally relates “to presentation of and
interaction with a three dimensional (3D) representation of a vehicle.” Spec.
¶ 1. More specifically, the claimed subject matter includes methods and
systems for presenting a 3D representation of a vehicle to a viewer,
accepting input indicating a desired view of the vehicle, and changing the
3D representation to correspond to the user input. Spec. ¶¶ 4–6, Figs. 3–4.
Claims 1 and 12 are independent claims, and claim 1 is reproduced below:
1. A method for viewer interaction relative to a 3D
representation of a vehicle, comprising:
providing an interface to a viewer;
presenting a 3D vehicle representation to the viewer;
receiving input from the viewer relative to a desired aspect
or perspective of the vehicle; and
adjusting or changing the 3D vehicle representation to
correspond with an indicated desired aspect or perspective, the
indicated desired aspect or perspective of a vehicle comprising
manipulation of a virtual 3D vehicle by a broadcast analyst on-
air, with selection of components in various states of assembly
and manipulation of the virtual 3D vehicle to provide specific
display of partially assembled or isolated components using a
broadcast display interface, and wherein said broadcast further
includes advertising presented therein along with display of said
manipulated virtual 3D vehicle.
The Pending Rejections
Claims 1–22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as indefinite for
failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which
the applicant regards as the invention. Final Act. 3–4.
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Claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 10–13, 16, 17, 21, and 22 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious in view of Sells (US 2009/0005928 A1; Jan. 1,
2009), Segal (US 2011/0298935 A1; Dec. 8, 2011), and Dengler (US
2005/0001852 A1; Jan. 6, 2005). Final Act. 7–19.
Claims 3, 4, 7–9, 14, 15, and 18–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as obvious in view of Sells, Segal, Dengler, and Hertenstein (US
2011/0218825 A1; Sept. 8, 2011). Final Act. 20–27.
ANALYSIS
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112(B)
The Examiner rejects claims 1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter which applicant regards as the invention. Final Act. 3–4. The
relevant portions of claim 1 recite “receiving input from the viewer relative
to [1] a desired aspect or perspective of the vehicle” and “adjusting or
changing the 3D vehicle representation to correspond with [2] an indicated
desired aspect or perspective, [3] the indicated desired aspect or perspective
of a vehicle comprising manipulation of a virtual 3D vehicle by a broadcast
analyst on-air.” Appeal Br. 31 (bracketed reference numerals added to
indicate the limitations we refer to as “phrase 1,” “phrase 2,” and “phrase 3,”
respectively).
Specifically, the Examiner finds it is unclear whether phrase 3 refers
back to (i.e., has antecedent basis in) phrase 1 or phrase 2. Final Act. 3–4;
Ans. 23. The Examiner also finds it is unclear whether “a vehicle,” recited
in phrase 3, refers back to any previously recited vehicle limitation, such as
“the vehicle” recited in phrase 1. Ans. 23. Similarly, the Examiner finds it
is unclear whether (3) “the indicated desired aspect or perspective of a
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vehicle,” recited in claim 12, refers back to (1) “a desired aspect or
perspective of the vehicle” or (2) “a viewer indicated desired aspect or
perspective.” Final Act. 4; Ans. 24–25.
Appellant argues these limitations are not inconsistent or unclear.
Appeal Br. 5–6; Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant argues “[i]t directly follows that
when viewer provides input relative to a ‘desired aspect or perspective’, that
viewer has indicated a desired aspect or perspective.” Reply Br. 2.
Appellant also argues phrase 2 clearly relates to an aspect or perspective “of
a vehicle” because the claim recites “changing the 3D vehicle representation
to correspond with” the recited aspect or perspective. Appeal Br. 5. Thus,
Appellant appears to argue phrase 1 refers to a viewer-desired vehicle
perspective and phrases 2 and 3 refer to the same desired vehicle perspective
once the viewer has indicated that perspective. See Appeal Br. 5; Reply
Br. 2–3. Accordingly, we understand Appellant to assert that phrases 1
through 3 are all referring to the same vehicle perspective and that phrases 2
and 3 are modified to show that the user already has indicated that the
particular vehicle perspective is desired.
Notwithstanding Appellant’s inconsistent terminology and article use,
a person of ordinary skill in the art may have understood each of phrases 1
through 3 (i.e., “a desired aspect or perspective of the vehicle,” “an indicated
desired aspect or perspective [of the vehicle],” and “the indicated desired
aspect or perspective of a vehicle”), taken individually, to refer to the same
vehicle perspective. However, even assuming that these terms clearly and
unambiguously refer to the same perspective, the remaining claim language
further confuses, rather than clarifies, the meaning of claim 1.
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Reviewing the meaning of the claim as a whole demonstrates the
ambiguity in the various limitations. When construing claim terminology
during prosecution before the Office, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, reading claim
language in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We presume that claim terms have their ordinary and
customary meaning. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning is the meaning that
the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question.”)
(Internal quotation marks omitted).
Method claim 1 recites four steps. The first step merely recites
“providing an interface to a viewer.” Appeal Br. 31. Notably, the only other
reference to any “interface” in claim 1 is “a broadcast display interface.”
Appeal Br. 31. It is unclear whether the “broadcast display interface”
recited in claim 1 is part of the “interface” recited in the first step. Certain
dependent claims appear to reference the “interface” recited in claim 1—for
example, claim 5 recites that “said interface comprises a touchscreen display
interface,” claim 6 recites “said interface comprises a mobile device
interface,” claim 7 recites “said interface comprises a web interface,” claim
8 recites “said interface comprises a touchscreen display at a first interface
and a mobile interface at a second location,”2 and claim 9 recites “said
interface comprises a production broadcast display screen and at least one

2 Presumably Appellant intends this limitation to read: “said interface
comprises a touchscreen display at a first location and a mobile interface at a
second location.” We encourage the Examiner and Appellant to clarify this
language.
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remote mobile device configured to control the production broadcast display
screen.” Appeal Br. 31–32. Notably, at least in light of claims 8 and 9,
claim 1’s interface may include multiple elements (e.g., a screen and a
mobile device configured to control the screen) and more than one interface
(e.g., interfaces at two locations).
The second step recites “presenting a 3D vehicle representation to the
viewer.” Appeal Br. 31. The third step recites “receiving input from the
viewer relative to a desired aspect or perspective of the vehicle” (this
limitation includes phrase 1). Appeal Br. 31. Notably, neither step requires
using the interface recited in the first step. We construe the second step to
require displaying to a viewer a three-dimensional image of a vehicle
(whether presented using two-dimensional or three-dimensional technology,
see Spec. ¶ 24 (describing a 3D representation as “either actual 3D or a 2D
representation of the 3D object”)) and the third step to require a system to
accept viewer input (in any manner) concerning an “aspect or perspective of
the vehicle” that the user wants to view.
The final step recites:
adjusting or changing the 3D vehicle representation to
correspond with an indicated desired aspect or perspective, the
indicated desired aspect or perspective of a vehicle comprising
[1] manipulation of a virtual 3D vehicle by a broadcast analyst
on-air, with selection of components in various states of
assembly and [2] manipulation of the virtual 3D vehicle to
provide specific display of partially assembled or isolated
components using a broadcast display interface, and wherein said
broadcast further includes advertising presented therein along
with display of said manipulated virtual 3D vehicle.
Appeal Br. 31. As seen in the quoted language, the final step includes
phrases 2 and 3.
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Because “the 3D vehicle representation” is an image presented to the
viewer, the plain and ordinary meaning of this limitation would require
changing that image displayed to the viewer in the second step to an image
representing the vehicle corresponding to a desired aspect or perspective
indicated by the viewer input received in the third step. This is consistent
with the Specification, which describes the invention as allowing “a viewer
to adjust a representation of a vehicle to a desired aspect or perspective.”
Spec. ¶ 21, Fig. 1; see also Spec. ¶ 22 (“[T]he viewer may be any type of
viewer, such as a broadcast commentator, a vehicle expert, or any other type
of viewer, such as the end user of a computer interface, a user of a mobile
device, etc.”).
However, claim 1 recites two additional limitations (numbered in the
final step reproduced above) regarding “the indicated desired aspect or
perspective of a vehicle.” Specifically, this indicated desired vehicle
perspective comprises manipulation of a virtual 3D vehicle (presumably the
same vehicle for which a 3D vehicle representation is presented to the
viewer) by “a broadcast analyst on-air” and to provide a particular display
“using a broadcast display interface.” We note that claim 1 recites two
people: (1) a “viewer” to whom the first step provides the interface and the
second step presents the 3D vehicle representation and from whom the third
step receives input (the input being “relative to a desired aspect or
perspective of the vehicle) and (2) “a broadcast analyst on-air” (in the phrase
“the indicated desired aspect or perspective of a vehicle comprising
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manipulation of a virtual 3D vehicle by a broadcast analyst on-air”).3
Appeal Br. 31.
Generally, the plain meaning of a claim ascribes different meanings to
different terms. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93
F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Assuming the “viewer” and “broadcast
analyst on-air” are not the same person and accepting Appellant’s assertion
that phrases 1 through 3 all refer to the same desired vehicle aspect or
perspective, it is unclear how this desired aspect or perspective can (1) be
indicated by the received viewer input and (2) comprise “manipulation of a
virtual 3D vehicle by a broadcast analyst on-air . . . and manipulation of the
virtual vehicle . . . using a broadcast display interface.” Specifically, if the
adjusted 3D vehicle representation corresponds with a desired perspective
indicated by the viewer, it is unclear how the representation also can
comprise manipulation by a different person.
We find nothing in the Specification to clarify this or to suggest that
another person (e.g., the broadcast analyst or other intermediary)
manipulates the vehicle representation to correspond with the received
viewer input. To the contrary, the Specification indicates that the viewer is
the person controlling the manipulation of the vehicle. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 36
(“viewers can thoroughly explore 3D aspects of a vehicle” by “allow[ing] a
viewer to navigate through aspects and perspectives of the vehicle” thereby
“provid[ing] a rich viewing experience.”). To the extent the “viewer” and

3 It is further unclear whether the term “on-air” describes the broadcast
analyst or indicates that the “manipulation” is done “on-air.”
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“broadcast analyst on-air” are intended to be the same person, the claims do
not clearly convey that.4
Reviewing the rest of claim 1 (and corresponding limitations in
independent claim 12) and the dependent claims fails to clarify these
ambiguities. For example, claim 1 also recites that “said broadcast further
includes advertising presented therein along with display of said
manipulated virtual 3D vehicle.” However, there is no prior recitation of “a
broadcast,” so it is unclear what broadcast this limitation is further defining.
The only previous references to the term “broadcast” in claim 1 are “a
broadcast analyst on-air” and “a broadcast display interface.”
Claim 2 recites a third person—“a broadcast personnel.” Appeal
Br. 31. The use of two different terms suggests that the “broadcast
personnel” and “viewer” are different people, but claim 2 explicitly recites
that “said input [(from the third step in claim 1)] from a viewer is input from
a broadcast personnel.” Appeal Br. 31. Claim 3, which depends from claim
2 further recites “said presentation comprises manipulation of a virtual 3D
car by a broadcast analyst.” Appeal Br. 31 (emphases added). Once again,
it is unclear whether (1) claim 3’s “a broadcast analyst” is the same person
as any or all of claim 1’s “broadcast analyst on-air,” claim 1’s “viewer,” and

4 We note the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was withdrawn.
Ans. 22. Depending on the scope of the claims after Appellant clarifies
them, we leave it to the Examiner to consider whether the amended claims
recite eligible subject matter or are directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Two-
Way Media Ltd. V. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329 (2017);
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir.
2016). For example, if the viewer and broadcast analyst are the same
person, the claim appears to be directed to presenting information (a 3D
representation of a vehicle) that may be modified in response to user input.
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claim 2’s “broadcast personnel and (2) claim 3’s “virtual 3D car” is the same
as claim 1’s “virtual 3D vehicle.” Claim 4 recites “said presentation further
comprises selection of a vehicle component and manipulation of a displayed
aspect of said vehicle component by said broadcast analyst.” To the extent
claim 1’s “broadcast analyst on-air” is different than “a broadcast analyst
recited in claim 2,” it is unclear in which of these two people claim 3’s “said
broadcast analyst” refers back and has antecedent basis.
The patent statute requires that a claim “particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor
regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b); see In re Packard, 751 F.3d
1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“claims are required to be cast in clear—as
opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefinite—terms”); see also Ex parte
McAward, Appeal 2015-006416, 2017 WL 3669566, at *5 (PTAB Aug. 25,
2017) (precedential) (explaining that the USPTO finds a “claim is indefinite
when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear” (quoting
Packard, 751 F.3d at 1314)).
For the above reasons, we agree with the Examiner that independent
claims 1 and 12, as well as claims 2–11 and 13–22 depending therefrom, are
indefinite. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–22 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
Appellant argues the rejection of all pending claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 based on the limitations recited in independent claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 15–19. Appellant also presents separate arguments for certain dependent
claims with respect to the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103. See Appeal
Br. 19–27 (arguing claims 5, 8, 12, and 21–26 recite additional limitations
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that distinguish the claims over the cited prior art). Therefore, we select
independent claim 1 as representative with respect to Appellant’s arguments
applicable to all pending claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We
subsequently address Appellant’s separate arguments regarding claims 5, 8,
12, and 21–26.
It is ordinarily improper to reject a claim over prior art when the
meaning of a claim cannot be determined. As the predecessor to our
reviewing court explained, “[a]ll words in a claim must be considered in
judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art” and “[i]f no
reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim,
the subject matter does not become obvious—the claim becomes indefinite.”
In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970); see also, In re Steele, 305
F.2d 859, 862-63 (CCPA 1962) (“As we have previously indicated, our
analysis of the claims leaves us in a quandary as to what in fact is covered
by them. We think the examiner and the board were wrong in relying on
what at best are speculative assumptions as to the meaning of the claims and
basing a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 thereon.”).
However, in this case, we dispose of the rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 based on a determination that the rejection’s rationale for combining
the prior art is not properly supported. In particular, the Examiner finds
Sells teaches the majority of the limitations recited in independent claims 1
and 12, but finds Segal teaches the recited “broadcast analyst on-air” and
“using a broadcast display interface.” Final Act. 9 (citing Segal ¶ 34, Figs.
1–5). The Examiner concludes it would have been obvious to incorporate
these aspects from Segal into Sells “because users of known teleprompters
were generally limited to viewing the passive content displayed in
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conjunction with teleprompter prompts, as they had no way in which they
could interact with any content so-displayed.” Final Act. 10–11 (citing
Segal ¶ 6). This is merely a statement from Segal encapsulating alleged
deficiencies in conventional systems that Segal’s invention allegedly
addresses. See Segal ¶ 6.
Appellant contends the Examiner has not sufficiently supported the
proposed combination. Appeal Br. 23; see Appeal Br. 26 (incorporating the
arguments asserted with respect to claim 1 with respect to claim 12). In
particular, Appellant argues “[t]here is no way that a teleprompter and a
camera setup would assist the stated purpose of Sells, which is to assist a
heavy machinery owner diagnose problems with the machinery and to order
replacement parts for that equipment.” Appeal Br. 23. Appellant also
contests the Examiner’s proposed reasoning because “Segal already
describes basic interactive media content” but does not teach or suggest that
Sells’ system for diagnosing a physical vehicle and ordering parts “should be
somehow integrated into a newscast room and presented on a teleprompter.”
Reply Br. 5.
In response to Appellant’s arguments, the Answer merely (1) explains
that a motivation may be found in the references or the knowledge of an
ordinarily skilled artisan, (2) finds Sells and Segal are analogous art to the
invention, and (3) repeats the reasoning provided in the Final Action (i.e.,
quoting Segal’s statement of the problems Segal’s invention allegedly
solves) without further explanation addressing Appellant’s arguments. See
Ans. 26–27.
“A patent composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely
by demonstrating that each element was, independently, known in the prior
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art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401 (2007). Although it
may “be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of multiple
patents,” in order to “facilitate review, this analysis should be made
explicit.” KSR, 505 U.S. at 418. Accordingly, “rejections on obviousness
grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there
must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
The Examiner does not explain why active content in conjunction
with teleprompter prompts would have been beneficial or advantageous to
one of ordinary skill in the art. Nor does the Examiner explain how
modifying Sells’ system for diagnosing issues with a vehicle and ordering
parts to include Segal’s teleprompter features would have been routine,
predictable, or otherwise obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan. The
Examiner provides no other reason why one of ordinary skill in the art
would have combined Sells’ and Segal’s teachings. In other words, the
Examiner does not support a reason a person of ordinary skill in the art
would have combined Sells’ interface for manipulating views or
perspectives of a vehicle with a broadcast display interface.5
Our decision should not be construed to mean that we find the
proposed combination deficient or that there is no valid reason for
combining the relevant teachings from Sells, Segal, and Dengler. We cannot
sustain the rejection because the Examiner’s stated reason to modify Sells is

5 We note that, to the extent the claimed broadcast display interface is only a
label for the “interface” presented to the user and the “broadcast analyst on-
air” is merely a label for the “viewer,” the Examiner may determine Sells
teaches or suggests these elements even absent Segal’s teachings.
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not supported by a rational underpinning. Instead, the rejection merely
asserts the alleged result of combining the identified teachings without
explaining how or why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
combined these teachings. On this record, without such support, we cannot
sustain the rejection of claims 1–22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References / Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–22 112(b) Indefinite 1–22
1, 2, 5, 6, 10–13,
16, 17, 21, 22 103 Sells, Segal, Dengler
1, 2, 5, 6,
10–13, 16,
17, 21, 22
3, 4, 7–9, 14, 15,
18–20 103
Sells, Segal,
Dengler, Hertenstein
3, 4, 7–9, 14,
15, 18–20
Overall
Outcome 1–22

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED