Ford Motor Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 30, 1961

131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (N.L.R.B. 1961)

1462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Ford Motor Company (Sterling Plant, Chassis Parts Division)
and Joseph S. Urban, Thadeusz L. Pilawski, Walter E. Huff,
Elmer G. Bialk
Local 228, Inernational Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, (UAW) AFL-
CIO and Joseph S. Urban, Thadeusz L. Pilawski, Walter E.
Huff, Elmer G. Bialk. Cases Nos. 7-CA-1856,7-CA-1883,7-CA-
1884, 7-CA-1885, 7-CB-446, 7-CB-455, 7-CB-456, and 7-CB-457.
June 30, 1961
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 26, 1960, Trial Examiner Samuel Ross issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of
the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also
found that the Respondent Union had not engaged in certain other
alleged unfair labor practices and recommended that the complaint
be dismissed as to these allegations. Thereafter, the Respondents
filed exceptions and supporting briefs. The General Counsel filed a
brief in support of the Intermediate Report.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
these cases,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner except as modified herein.
In agreement with the Trial Examiner, and for the reasons given
in the Intermediate Report, we find that the Respondent Company
violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) by suspending and later discharg-
ing employee Urban and by discharging employees Pilawski, Bialk,
and Huff, and that the Respondent Company further violated Sec-
tion 8(a) (1) by prohibiting Urban from engaging in organizational
activity during his nonworking time. However, contrary to the
Trial Examiner, we do not believe that the record here establishes
1 As the record and the exceptions and briefs adequately present the issues and the
positions of the parties, the Respondents' requests for oral argument are denied.
131 NLRB No. 174.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1463
that the Respondent Union either caused or attempted to cause the
Company to discriminate against Urban.'
The Trial Examiner found that by Union Committeeman Ligouri's
action in giving the Company an affidavit in which Ligouri had stated
that Urban was the leader of the September 26 "meeting" and that
"they" had threatened a work stoppage, the Union caused or at-
tempted to cause the Company to violate Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
We disagree. The affidavit was given by Ligouri was in response to
a request of the Company, and, so far as appears from this record,
set forth what Ligouri believed to have occurred on September 26.
While the Trial. Examiner found the affidavit to be false, there are
circumstances present attesting to Ligouri's belief that Urban was
the leader at the meeting. Thus, Ligouri first learned of the meeting
from Modestino who reported that "Urban and his bunch" were hold-
ing a meeting; Ligouri was aware that Urban was the president of
the Society of Skilled Trades, of which most of the employees at the
meeting were members ; and at the meeting Ligouri observed Urban
standing in the center of the group of assembled employees. As to
the work stoppage threat, we note that Ligouri's statement here was
in response to a leading suggestion by the Company's interrogator,
and, further, that Ligouri did not identify Urban as the one who
made this threat. Considering both the circumstances under which
the affidavit was given and what was said in that affidavit, we cannot
find that Ligouri's action in giving that affidavit amounted to either
a causing of, or an attempt to cause, the Company to discriminate
unlawfully against Urban. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent
Union did not violate Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) in this regard.'
As no exceptions were taken to the Trial Examiner's findings that the
Respondent Union did not violate the Act in respect to Charging Par-
ties Bialk, Huff, and Pilawski, we adopt those findings pro forma, and
shall dismiss the complaint as to the Respondent Union.
We do not agree with our dissenting colleague that the arbitration
proceeding in this case should be accepted in lieu of a resolution of
the legal issues raised by the complaint. Unlike Spielberg Manu-
facturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080, this is not a situation where an
impartial arbitrator has passed upon a question of fact subsequently
presented to the Board for a new determination. It is conceded that
the umpire in the instant case ruled solely on the factual question
whether these employees had participated in or instigated a work
stoppage in violation of the existing contract. He did not have be-
fore him, nor did he pass upon the question, now presented to the
2 Board Member Rodgers would affirm the Trial Examiner ' s finding that Respondent
Union violated the Act by causing, or attempting to cause , the Company to discriminate
against Urban.
s As we have found , contrary to the Trial Examiner , that the Union did not cause or
attempt to cause the Company to discriminate against Urban , the remedy recommended
by the Trial Examiner is modified so as to provide that the Company alone shall make
Urban whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against him.
1464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Board, whether Respondent Company initially had the legal right
to suspend Urban for engaging in an "unauthorized" meeting during
his own lunch hour. Nor did he pass upon the question whether
Urban"s fellow employees had a statutory right, apart from contract,
to engage in a work stoppage to protest this unfair labor practice.
We do not, as our dissenting colleague suggests, reach an "opposite
conclusion" from that of the umpire. Accepting the umpire's factual
conclusions, we nevertheless agree with the Trial Examiner that Urban
was engaged in concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the Act
for which he was unlawfully suspended by the Respondent Company.
We also agree with the Trial Examiner, again without necessarily
disagreeing with the umpire, that Urban's fellow employees were pro-
tected under the doctrine of the Mastro Plastics Corporation et al. v.
N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, when they struck to protest this unfair labor
practice. We regard these issues as too important to leave undecided.
It is the function of the Board to remedy unfair labor practices, not
merely for the benefit of the immediate employees involved, but to pro-
vide protection to all employees. Holding these employees "to their
choice" does not seem to us to fulfill the Board's duty.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in these cases, and pursuant to Section 10(e)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Ford Motor Com-
pany (Sterling Plant, Chassis Parts Division), Utica, Michigan, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in International Society of Skilled
Trades, or any other labor organization, by discharging or refusing to
reinstate Joseph S. Urban, Elmer G. Bialk, Walter E. Huff, Thadeusz
L. Pilawski, or any other employee because of their membership in or
activities on behalf of International Society of Skilled Trades or any
other labor organization, or in any other manner discriminating
against employees in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
(b) Prohibiting employees from engaging in organizational ac-
tivity and/or the discussion of grievances on company property during
nonworking time.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be
validly affected by an agreement, authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the
Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
dition of employment.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1465
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Joseph S. Urban, Elmer G. Bialk, and Thadeusz L.
Pilawski, immediate and full reinstatement to their former or to sub
.stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or
other rights and privileges, and make Joseph S. Urban, Elmer G.
Bialk, Walter E. Huff, and Thadeusz L. Pilawski whole for any loss
of earnings they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination
against them, as provided in the section of the Intermediate Report
entitled "The Remedy," as modified herein.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board, the
General Counsel, or their agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records relevant to an analysis, de-
termination, or verification of the amount due under the terms of this
Order.
(c) Post at the Sterling Plant, Chassis Parts Division, in Utica,
Michigan, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 4
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
Seventh Region, after being duly signed by the Company's repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Company immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company
and its representatives to insure that such notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has
taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it
alleges violations of Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act by Local
228, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America, (UAW) AFL-CIO.
MEMBER LEEDOM , dissenting in part:
I agree with my colleagues that Respondent Company violated
Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by prohibiting Urban from engaging in
organizational activity during his nonworking time. I cannot, how-
-ever, agree with them that the arbitration award ought to be given no
effect because it was unfair and repugnant to the Act, and I would
therefore dismiss the remaining allegations of the complaint, in accord
with well-established Board precedent.'
4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080.
599198-62-vol. 131-94
1466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
With respect to the alleged procedural unfairness, although the
record establishes that the local union officials' were hostile to the
dischargees, there is no evidence that the International or the repre-
sentative of the International who handled the proceeding before the
umpire was hostile to them. In addition, the dischargees acquiesced in
the proceeding, and they apparently had full opportunity to present
their case to the umpire. And, finally, they complimented the union
representative at the conclusion of the hearing on his presentation of
their case. In these circumstances, I cannot find any procedural in-
firmities which warrant the Board's refusal to give effect to the arbi-
tration proceeding.°
With respect to the substantive validity of the arbitration award,
my colleagues have found that the dischargees were discriminated
against in violation of the Act. They have based this finding, how-
ever, on resolutions of conflicting testimony and of conflicting con-
tentions concerning applicable precedent, where the testimony and
precedent are such that other reasonable men could, as the umpire here
did, reach the opposite conclusion. I am unable to agree with my
colleagues that it is conceded that the umpire decided only a question
of fact, and not of law. Throughout his opinion, the umpire charac-
terized the walkout not only as a violation of the contract but as
"illegal," a characterization requiring not only a determination of
facts, but also an interpretation of the facts, but also an interpretation
of the contract and a conclusion as to the legal rights of the parties
flowing from the facts as found and the contract as interpreted. More-
over, since the legality or illegality of a walkout is in the last analysis
governed by the Act, the umpire's conclusions that the walkout was
"illegal" necessarily required him to consider the employees' rights
under the Act.' Thus, in concluding "that Urban's fellow employees
were protected under the doctrine of the Mastro Plastics Corporation
v. N.L.R.B.," my colleagues are necessarily disagreeing with the
Umpire.
Nor are my colleagues "accepting the umpire's factual conclusions."
Thus, they have adopted the Trial Examiner's finding "that nothing
that Urban said or did while he was being checked out of the plant on
September 27, even assuming that Urban told employees he was `fired,'
could be construed by any reasonable person as `instigation' of a work
stoppage or as `designed to instigate a work stoppage."' Yet, the
Umpire found that "evaluation of the credible testimony requires the
6 In my opinion the facts relevant to this issue are very similar to those in Max B.
O8cherwttz, at at, doing business as I. Oscherwitz and Sons , 130 NLRB 1078, in which
my colleagues gave effect to an arbitrator 's award, and are wholly unlike the facts in
Honolulu Star-Bulletin , 123 NLRB 395 , on which they now rely.
7 Compare Monsanto Chemical Company, 130 NLRB 1097, in which the Board de-
clined to give effect to an arbitrator' s award because the arbitrator precluded himself
from considering the applicability of the Act to the conduct involved.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1467
conclusion that Urban triggered the walkout rumor by his statements
and was thus largely responsible for the walkout that followed."
Further, as to the other three alleged discriminatees, my colleagues
have, like the Trial Examiner, refused to decide whether they gave
leadership to or instigated the work stoppage. Yet, the Umpire spe-
cifically found that two of them instigated or helped instigate the
walkout and one was merely a participant. Thus, the only aspect of
the alleged 8(a) (3) violations which the Umpire did not directly con-
sider was the legality of Urban's initial suspension, although he did
consider the suspension as part of the context of the other events.
Under all the circumstances therefore, and viewing the factual
context as the umpire found it, it cannot in my opinion be said that
the umpire's decision is to clearly repugnant to the purposes and pol-
icies of the Act that the Board must, in order to effectuate the policies
of the Act, treat it as a nullity. The dischargees initially chose the
grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract as the forum in
which to litigate the validity of their discharges. In the circumstances
here , and in conformity with the National policy of encouraging the
voluntary adjustment of labor disputes,' I would hold them to their
choice.
CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH and MEMBER BROWN took no part in the
consideration of the above Decision and Order.
8United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp ., 363 U.S. 593; see
also United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U . S. 564, and
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U . S. 574.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Society
of Skilled Trades, or in any other labor organization, by discharg-
ing or refusing to reinstate Joseph S. Urban, Elmer G. Bialk,
Walter E. Huff, Thadeusz L. Pilawski, or any other employee
because of their membership in or activities on behalf of Inter-
national Society of Skilled Trades, or any other labor organiza-
tion, or in any other manner discriminate against employees in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employees from engaging in organiza-
tional activities and/or the discussion of grievances on Company
property during nonworking time.
1468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of his rights guar-
anteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such
rights may be validly affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized by Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as amended by the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
WE WILL offer to Joseph S. Urban, Elmer G. Bialk, and
Thadeusz L. Pilawski, immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority and other rights and privileges.
WE wiLL make Joseph S. Urban, Elmer G. Bialk, Walter E.
Huff, and Thadeusz L. Pilawski whole for any loss of earnings
they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from
becoming or remaining, members of International Society of Skilled
Trades, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this
right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING
PLANT, CHASSIS PARTS DIVISION),
Employer.
Dated---------------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed by Joseph S . Urban , Thadeusz L. Pilawski , Walter E. Huff, and
Elmer G. Bialk , the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the
Regional Director for the Seventh Region (Detroit , Michigan ), issued his consoli-
dated complaint dated July 28, 1959, against Ford Motor Company, Sterling Plant,
Chassis Parts Division , herein sometimes called Ford or the Company, and Local 228,
International Union, United Automobile , Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of America, (UAW) AFL-CIO, herein sometimes called UAW, the Local or the
Union . In substance , the consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent Ford, in
and about September and October 1957, suspended , disciplined , and discharged the
four Charging Parties from their employment with Ford by reason of their member-
ship , advocacy , adherence , and concerted activity in and on behalf of the Society of
Skilled Trades of Macomb County, herein called the Society, and thereby engaged
in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a),(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat . 136, herein called the Act , and that by its conduct
aforestated and by denying to employees the right to discuss grievances and to engage
in other concerted activity during nonworking hours, Respondent Ford has engaged
in and is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a),(l) of the
Act. The complaint further alleges that Respondent Local 228, UAW, attempted to
cause and caused Respondent Ford to suspend and discharge the Charging Parties
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1469
for the reasons aforestated and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices in violation
of Section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) of the Act. The Respondents have filed answers
which, in substance, deny the substantive allegations of the complaint and the com-
mission of unfair labor practices and allege that the Charging Parties were suspended,
disciplined, and discharged for various acts of misconduct. Pursuant to notice, a
hearing was held before me in Detroit, Michigan, on October 27, 28, 29, and 30 and
November 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1959. All parties were represented at the hearing by counsel
and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. All parties have submitted
briefs which I have carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT FORD
Respondent Ford, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the manufacture and sale
of automobiles. During the calendar year 1957, a representative period, Respondent
Ford manufactured, sold, and shipped from its plants in the State of Michigan directly
to points and places outside said State, automobiles valued at in excess of $1,000,000.
On the foregoing admitted facts, I find that Respondent Ford is engaged in interstate
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. TAE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 228, International Union , United Automobile , Aircraft and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, (UAW) AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within
the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
1. The organization of Ford's skilled trades employees by the Society of
Skilled Trades
This case involves only the Sterling Plant, Chassis Parts Division , of Respondent
Ford. For many years, the International UAW has been the certified representative
of all the production and maintenance employees in said plant , including tool and
diemakers and other skilled craftsmen. During the period material herein, there
was in effect a national collective-bargaining agreement negotiated in 1955, between
Respondent Ford and the International UAW which was administered by Respondent
Local 228, UAW, on behalf of the International UAW. The contract contains,
inter alia , a valid union-shop provision and pursuant thereto, all of the employees in
the aforestated unit were members of Respondent Local 228.
The terms of the 1955 agreement, insofar as they applied to the tool and diemakers
and other skilled craftsmen , was a source of dissatisfaction among the skilled trades
employees of Ford. Consequently , in the fall of 1955, there was organized an
independent union originally named the Society of Skilled Trades of Macomb
County I whose objective was to seek collective -bargaining representative status for
skilled craftsmen in the automobile manufacturing industry by carving out craft
units of skilled trades employees from existing production and maintenance units .2
The Charging Party Joseph S. Urban joined the Society in October 1955, and
immediately became active in its organizing efforts, not only in Ford's Sterling plant,
but in other plants in the Detroit area. Urban was the original organizer for the
Society at Ford's Sterling plant. He composed and distributed Society literature in
the plant. He solicited and signed up members , collected dues, and designated and
appointed employees in the plant to assist him. In January or February 1956, Urban
was elected president of the Society. He regularly wore a shop coat with the name
"Society of Skilled Trades" embroidered on the back. The other Charging Parties
were likewise members of and active in the Society 's organizing efforts. Elmer G.
Bialk joined the Society in 1955 and in 1957 he was financial secretary and treasurer
and collected dues from employees in the shop. Walter E. Huff joined the Society
early in 1956, and although he had no official position, he was one of the organizers
who solicited and signed up members . Similarly, Thadeusz L. Pilawski joined the
i The Society subsequently affiliated with and changed its name to International Society
of Skilled Trades.
2 The job classifications which the Society was attempting to organize included tool and
diemakers , electricians , millwrights , machinery repairmen , pipefitters , and hydraulic men.
1470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Society at or near its inception in the fall of 1955 and was one of the organizers who
solicited membership. All three regularly wore the Society's button in the shop.
The Society's organizing efforts met with considerable success at Ford's Sterling
plant, and by April 1956, it had signed up as members 75 to 80 percent of the skilled
tradesmen in the shop. Since, in view of the union-shop provision in Ford's contract
with International UAW, these employees had to retain their membership in UAW,
they thus became and remained members of both unions.
2. The hostility of Respondent Local 228, UAW, to the Society's
organizing efforts
As would be expected, the efforts of the Society to organize and carve out a unit of
skilled craftsmen from the production and maintenance unit at Ford's Sterling plant
were vigorously opposed by Respondent UAW. UAW pamphlets hostile to the
Society were distributed in the Sterling plant to Ford's employees and posted on
walls, posts, and bulletin boards. Moreover, in April 1956 a resolution was adopted
by Respondent UAW, on the motion of UAW Plant Committeeman James Liguori,3
"that any member of Local 228 who is active and in the future will be active in the
Society of Skilled Trades" is barred from holding or running for office in Respondent
Local 228.
3. Respondent Ford's hostility to the Society
Respondent Ford admitted that it was opposed to the Society's objective of carving
out skilled trades units from the existing production and maintenance units? Re-
spondent Ford nevertheless contends that its position in the conflict between the
Society and UAW "was one of the studied impartiality" and that its conduct, both
before and during the events giving rise to the charges herein, was motivated by a
policy of neutrality so "that there would be no basis for concluding that there was
anything but a proper application of the Company's uniform rules against infraction
of-its disciplinary authority in the plant." Conversely, the General Counsel asserts
that Respondent Ford's opposition to the Society was implemented by Ford from the
inception of the Society's organizational efforts by "measures to curb the Society." 5
Since the extent of Ford's hostility to the Society is material to a proper evaluation of
the charges in this case, a brief examination of the record in this respect appears
appropriate.
Some of the rules of employee "Conduct in the Plant" are set forth in a booklet
entitled "Your Future with Ford" which Ford generally distributes to all new em-
ployees and those recalled from layoff status. Included in these rules are the fol-
lowing:
Unauthorized distribution of written or printed literature or propaganda of
any type on Company property.
Posting or removing of notices or signs from bulletin boards on Company
property without specific authority.
Soliciting on Company property without permission.
Notwithstanding the above rules, beginning with the fall of 1955 and continuing
thereafter without interference by Ford until the spring of 1956, the organizational
3 Liguori was one of a number of elected officials of Respondent Local 228, UAW, in
Ford's Sterling plant, whose salaries were wholly paid by Ford, but who did no production
work and spent all their time in the plant on UAW business. Other such Local 228
officials were Ernest Modestino, president, Andrew Hrabscak, plant committeeman, and
Richard Blake, skilled trades department committeeman
4 On April 30, 1958, subsequent to the events giving rise to the charges herein, the
Society filed an RC petition (Case No. 7-RC-3766) seeking representation of a unit of
skilled trades employees at Ford's Sterling plant. Respondents Ford and UAW both
moved to dismiss the petition on the identical ground that the unit was inappropriate and
only a companywide (nationwide) unit was appropriate in view of the history of company-
wide bargaining On May 13, 1958, the Regional Director granted Respondents' motions
and dismissed the petition. Cf.: General Motors Corporation, Cadillac Motor Car Division,
120 NLRB 1215.
6In his brief, the General Counsel also contends that Ford's favoritism to UAW was
demonstrated, inter aria, "by contractual provisions" which gave "bulletin board rights"
to UAW and by "full-time" UAW committeemen on the premises (see footnote 3, supra)
Since these contractual provisions were the product of collective bargaining negotiations
between Ford and UAW, engaged in before the advent of the Society and the commence-
ment of the latter's organizational campaign, I cannot perceive any merit to this basis for
the General Counsel's contention and I therefore reject it.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1471
efforts of the Society and the UAW's opposition thereto included the distribution and
posting of literature in the plant by both unions.
On April 25, 1956, Almon Marler, a pipefitter employed by Ford at the Sterling
plant, who was then, and, from its inception, had been the financial secretary and
treasurer of the Society, brought to the plant two different types of Society literature
with the intention of distributing them during his lunch hour. Marler put the litera-
ture in his clothes locker. A short time later, Marler was directed by a Ford plant
guard to open his locker, his literature was seized and Marler was escorted to Ford's
labor relations office. There, Marler was charged by Ford's Labor Relations Repre-
sentative Valenti with "possession of unauthorized literature on Company property"
and with "soliciting money on Company property without permission" and was
questioned by Valenti .6 Marler requested representation by a lawyer but Valenti
refused to permit it. During the interrogation, Marler denied knowledge of the rules
quoted above but freely acknowledged that it was his intention to distribute the litera-
ture during his lunch hour. He told Valenti that similar literature was being dis-
tributed by Respondent UAW and suggested that the Company permitted UAW to
do so. Valenti replied that the distribution of certain types of UAW literature was
permitted. Marler asserted that he had seen all kinds of UAW literature in the
plant and requested permission to solicit for the Society during lunch time. Valenti
told Marler he could not solicit and organize for the Society on company property
at any time. Valenti asker Marler for the names of the Society's officials and in-
quired as to whether any of them were employed at the plant. Marler refused to
furnish any names to Valenti other than that of Urban as president.? At the con-
clusion of the interrogation, Marler was suspended from work for 2 days without
pay on the aforestated charges, notwithstanding that Ford's rules do not proscribe
"possession" but only "distribution" of literature and there was admittedly no evi-
dence that Marler had solicited money on company property.8 Marler requested
the return of the literature but Valenti refused, allegedly because it was needed as
evidence to prove "you were going to pass them out." Obviously this was un-
necessary in view of Marler's frank admission, recorded stenographically, that such
was his intention.
Marler also credibly testified that sometime in 1956, while he was working on a
job in the toolroom of Ford's Mound Road plant,9 Chester Bargiel, general fore-
man of the toolroom, told him that he knew that Marler was is member of the
Society, that "they were causing a lot of trouble," "that he didn't want them in there,"
that he intended "to do his best to get them out of here" and that Marler should "stay
out of that building." 10
The Charging Party, Thadeusz Pilawski, also testified credibly that on one or two
occasions about 4 to 6 months prior to his discharge by Ford, General Foreman
Bargiel told him that he should. not wear the Society's button in the plant.ll
9 A transcription of the interrogation in question and answer form was received in
evidence as Company's Exhibit No. 8.
4 He furnished Urban's name only because it was already stated in the literature which
was in Valenti's possession.
8 On May 9, 1956, Marler filed a charge with the Board (Case No. 7-CA-1449) charging
Ford with violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act by reason of its conduct de-
scribed above. On June 13, 1956, the Regional Director dismissed the charges because of
insufficient evidence of violation. No appeal was taken from the Regional Director's
dismissal.
B The Sterling plant is the new plant site of Ford's Chassis Parts Division which was
formerly located at Mound Road.
10 On cross-examination, Marler fixed the date of his conversation with Bargiel as Janu-
ary or February 1956. He was then confronted with his affidavit (Company's Exhibit
No. 6), executed for the Board on May 25, 1956, in connection with Case No. 7-CA-1449,
which contained no reference to Marler's aforestated conversation with Bargiel. Marler
explained that he either did not relate this incident to the Board agent because he did not
regard it as material to his case, or because it may have occurred after he executed the
statement to the Board. I was favorably impressed with Marler's demeanor and testimony
and credit his testimony and explanation in this respect. When Bargiel testified, he
denied that he knew that Marler was "associated with the Society." In view of Marler's
open advocacy of the Society, the presence of his name on the literature distributed in
the plant, and the fact that he always wore the Society's button on his cap (Company's
Exhibit No. 6), I do not believe Bargiel's denial of knowledge of Marler's membership in
the Society. For the foregoing reasons, I credit Marler's testimony that Bargiel ordered
him to stay out of the toolroom because of Bargiel's hostility to the Society.
n Since this testimony is consistent with Bargiel's hostility to the Society, I do not
credit Bargiel's denial that he so told Pilawski.
1472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On April 14, 1957, Respondent Ford disciplined Society President Urban by giv-
ing him "a two day suspended penalty" on the charge of "posting unauthorized litera-
ture" on the wall of the cutter grinder room, notwithstanding that Urban denied
that he had posted the Society meeting notice in question and the Company had no
evidence to the contrary, but relied solely on the fact that Urban's name, as presi-
dent of the Society, was mimeographed thereon. As a consequence, Urban there-
after ordered all distribution of Society literature in the plant to cease.
Significantly, the like distribution of anti-Society literature resulted in no disciplin-
ary action by Foard against any of Respondent Local 228's officers or officials. Al-
though Ford's Labor Relations Representatives Valenti and O'Connor admitted their
knowledge of the presence of UAW literature in the plant, they testified that they
were unable to ascertain who distributed the literature in the plant despite efforts
to do so. However, no explanation was offered by them or by any witness as to
why Respondent Local 228 officials could not have been held responsible for the
literature infractions on the same basis that Urban had been held responsible for
posting a Society meeting notice merely because his name was mimeographed
thereon.12
On the foregoing record of disparate treatment and interference with the Society's
right to engage in organizational activity on the Company's premises,13 I find that,
contrary to the contention of Respondent Ford that its position in the conflict be-
tween the Society and UAW was one of "studied impartiality," the Company pursued
a policy of hostility and of active opposition to the Society. However, since these
incidents occured more than 6 months before the filing of the charges herein, and,
under Section 10(b) of the Act, are barred from consideration as such, I make no
finding that by its conduct described above, the Company engaged in unfair unfair
labor practices.
B. The current unfair labor practices
1. The `mmeeting" in the cutter grinding room on September 26, 1957
One of the reasons asserted by Ford for its suspension and subsequent discharge
of Joseph Urban, the Society's president, was that on September 26, 1957, he gave
"leadership to an unauthorized meeting on company property" in violation of Ford's
rules prohibiting such meetings without permission. The meeting or gathering of
September 26, occurred in the following manner:
For a number of years prior to 1957, Ford's employees have been concerned'
about the Company's use of employees of outside vendors in the plant. This griev-
ance, which was one of a continuing nature, was based on Ford's practice, in connec-
tion with the purchase or installation of machinery, of utilizing employees of the
machinery vendors, not only to install and regulate the new equipment, but also,
to service the machines for considerible periods of time, thereby, in the opinion
of Ford's employees, depriving the latter of work which they regarded as rightfully
theirs.14 In the latter part of September 1957, this grievance was further aggravated
by the fact that employees of at least one of the outside vendors were working over-
time, whereas some of Ford's employees had been advised that they were being laid'
off on September 27, 1957. One of the sources of dissatisfaction was the continued
use of outside vendors' employees on a type of machine called Ingersolls which had'
been installed in the plant as far back as 1955.
On the morning of Thursday, September 26, 1957, Charging Party Joseph Urban,
president of the Society, asked Richard Blake, UAW's Skilled Trades committeeman
in the plant,15 if he could explain what was being done about the vendors' employees
12 Valenti and O'Connor testified that Joseph Washington, a candidate for UAW office,
Hrabscak, a UAW committeeman, and Burke, •a UAW skilled trades committeeman, were
disciplined in connection with unauthorized literature infractions, but none of these cases
involved literature opposed to the Society' s organizing efforts and I therefore do not con-
sider this testimony as material on the question of whether Ford engaged in disparate
treatment toward the Society in its organizational campaign. O'Connor also testified that
UAW Committeeman Dillard was interrogated by Ford in connection with a complaint
that Dillard was soliciting signatures to an undescribed petition, but denied that he had
done so However, O'Connor did not testify that Dillard was disciplined.
13 Cf. Walton Manufacturing Company, 126 NLRB 697.
14 By the foregoing, I do not intend to express any opinion regarding the merits of the
"outside vendor" grievance.
15 Blake was formerly a member of the Society but had resigned therefrom shortly before
this date because of UAW's resolution, alluded to above, banning active Society members.
from holding office in Respondent UAW.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1473
in view of the impending layoff . Blake replied that he was then too busy to speak
with Urban . However, they arranged to meet at lunch time in the toolroom grind-
ing area to discuss the question . 16 The place selected for the meeting between Blake
and Urban was one which both visited frequently during the lunch period. Urban
admitted that he mentioned to a few of his friends and fellow Society members that
he was meeting Blake to discuss the vendor problem and that those who were in-
terested in the problem were welcome to join the discussion . Among those to whom
Urban spoke were Charging Parties Bialk and Huff with whom Urban regularly
ate lunch in the toolroom grinding area. Bialk mentioned to Urban that there was
another grievance pending in which he was interested and Urban said that while
Blake was there , he could take that up with him.17
Urban went to the appointed place at about 11:25 a.m ., when lunch period began.
About 10 Ford employees regularly work in this area and a similar number, although
not necessarily the same employees , regularly eat lunch there . The number of em-
ployees who were present in the grinding area during the lunch hour of September 26
was variously estimated by the numerous witnesses who testified in this case from
as low as 10 to as high as 40 . From my appraisal of the record to the extent which
I credit it , I have come to the conclusion that approximately 20 employees is the
correct figure and that of this number , slightly less than half were employees who
regularly work in that area.18
When Urban first arrived at the grinding area, he and the others who were there
engaged in casual conversation and awaited the arrival of UAW Committeeman
Blake.19 The latter, instead of keeping his appointment with Urban , telephoned
Ernest Modestino , president of Respondent UAW Local 228, who was then at a
meeting with Ford 's Labor Relations Representatives Valenti and O'Connor in
Valenti's office. Blake suggested that Modestino come down to the grinding area.
In response to this suggestion , not only Modestino but also UAW Committeemen
Liguori and Hrabscak , who were with Modestino in Valenti 's office, went down to
the area where Urban and the other employees were awaiting Blake.20 Hrabscak
walked up face to face to Urban and in an admittedly very loud and angry voice
which Hrabscak demonstrated at the hearing in this case , shouted, "the G- d-m
Society of Skilled Trades can't hold a G- d-m meeting here. What are you trying
to do f-k up these people here?" "You son of bitches are trying to take over this
local and you ain't as long as I am here." Hrabscak also shouted that someone
in the Society had threatened to beat up the president of Local 228 , offered to fight
on the latter 's behalf and boasted that notwithstanding his age of 52 years, he had
"five good minutes of fight left" in him. When Hrabscak finally subsided from this
loud, profane , and vulgar outburst , Urban replied that nobody was holding a meet-
ing and that Hrabscak had not been invited. Hrabscak then stalked away. After
Hrabscak left, Urban asked Modestino if Hrabscak 's statement that Modestino had
been threatened with physical violence was true. Modestino answered "it is nothing.
16 The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of Urban whom I regard as a credible,
forthright, and reliable witness. Urban's version of this conversation with Blake was
corroborated by Blake when he was interrogated the next morning by Ford's Labor Rela-
tions Representative Valenti (General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-ttt). At the hearing in
this case, Blake testified that Urban said they (the Society) were going to have a meeting
at lunch time and would like to have him there to discuss the vendor problem and the
layoffs which were to take effect the next morning. On cross-examination by Ford's
counsel, Blake contradicted this testimony by stating that Urban did not tell him what
grievances he wanted to talk about. Blake also testified that he told Urban that meetings
on company property were prohibited. Urban denied that there was any discussion be-
tween him and Blake regarding the alleged prohibition of meetings on company property.
In view of the inconsistency between Blake's testimony with his version of this incident
as reported to the Company, the internal contradiction in Blake's testimony alluded to
above, and my favorable appraisal of Urban's reliability, I credit the latter and conclude
that Blake did not say anything to Urban regarding an alleged prohibition against holding
meetings on company property.
14 This grievance involved an open louver over the toolroom grinding section which was
causing drafts in that area.
18 UAW Committeeman Blake and Ford's General Foreman Bargiel so testified, and,
since it is in accord with my own appraisal of the record, I credit their testimony in
this respect.
1e Based on the credited testimony of Urban and employee George Zubczaw.
w Blake also went over to that area, arriving just after Modestino, Ligouri, and
Hrabscak.
1474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Forget it." After Hrabscak's departure, there was no further "commotion" and
Urban and the others who were in the grinding room, in small groups, engaged in
simultaneous peaceful and orderly questioning of Modestino, Ligouri, and Blake in
respect to what Local 228 was doing about the "outside vendors" problem, the draft
from the louver over the grinding room and the possibility of going on a 4-day week
to share the work instead of having some employees laid off.21 At the conclusion
of the lunch period, all of the employees returned quietly to their jobs. The afore-
described "meeting" was observed by Ford's General Foreman Bargiel and Plant
Superintendent Czegus who watched from the aisle. Neither Bargiel nor Czegus
made any attempt to disperse the "meeting," nor did they tell any of the employees
involved that they were violating any company rules by engaging in the "meeting." 22
On the record herein, I find and conclude that the meeting of employees in the
toolroom grinding area was orderly and peaceful before UAW Committeeman
Hrabscak arrived and after he left and that the only "commotion" thereat was that
engendered by Hrabscak.
2. The alleged rule against holding meetings on company property
Since, as aforestated, Urban was first suspended and later discharged because he
acted as "chairman" of the aforedescribed gathering or meeting on company prop-
erty in violation of a alleged company rule prohibiting such conduct, an examination
of the record in respect to the existence and publication of said rule is obviously
pertinent.
According to Valenti, Ford's labor relations representative, a meeting was a
gathering of two or more employees for the discussion of group problems, in respect
to which one or more of the participants is not personally involved. According to
Valenti, such gatherings or discussions were prohibited in the plant at all times and
the prohibition was not limited to working time. Valenti further testified that a
discussion of union matters or of a grievance by an employee with anyone other
than his UAW committeeman or foreman would be included within the ban, and
that such a discussion between an employee and an officer of the Society would
constitute a meeting if the Society's officer was not personally affected by the griev-
ance or union matter in question. Valenti admitted that the rule in question had
never been published or posted by the Company and does not appear in any written
form.
The collective-bargaining agreement between Ford and UAW provides the follow-
ing in respect to Rules and Regulations:
Art. IV, Sec. 5: RULES and REGULATIONS
The right of the Company to make such reasonable rules and regulations,
not in conflict with this Agreement, as it may from time to time deem best
for the purpose of maintaining order, safety, and/or effective operation
of the Company's plants, and after advance notice thereof to the Union
and the employees, to require compliance therewith by employees, is rec-
ognized. The Union reserves the right to question the reasonableness of
the Company's rules or regulations through the grievance procedure.
The record does not establish that notice of the rule prohibiting meetings on company
property was ever given to the Union or employees.
Ford, nevertheless, maintains that not all of its rules are published, and that under
its contract with UAW, it can discipline employees "for cause." According to
Valenti, in order for an employee of Ford to know all the rules of conduct to which
he is expected to abide, he would have to read all of the 5,000 to 6,000 decisions of
the impartial umpires 23 Specifically, Respondent Ford contends that its rule pro-
hibiting meetings on company property without permission was recognized by an
impartial umpire in a 1950 decision.24 That case involved imposition of discipline
by Ford against employees who made speeches to other employees in the Company's
lunchroom "without permission from the Company and in deliberate violation of
u Charging Party Huff discussed with Ligouri the possibility of Sosnowskl, one of the
employees who was to be laid off, substituting for him while Huff took a vacation.
22 Bargiel first saw the gathering as Hrabscak was leaving. Czegus observed Hrabscak
"hollering and screeching" (General Counsel's Exhibit No 2-i). According to the record
herein, that was about 15 to 20 minutes before the gathering broke up.
23 There is no distribution of these decisions to the employees of the Company nor any
posting thereof.
24 M-2077-Company's Exhibit No. 22.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1475
its specific orders." Moreover, the tenor of the speeches in that case "was such as
to incite hostility toward the Company and its supervisors and to encourage dis-
harmony and disruption in the building." 25 Nowhere in that decision is there any
reference to a rule against the holding of meetings on company property. The Com-
pany contends that the decision recognizes the alleged rule against meetings by
reason of the statement therein that "The Union can reach its membership in meet-
ings outside the plant." On its face, this was solely a reference to the place where
the Union could reach its members for the making of speeches and I see in it no
implication that meetings on company property are prohibited. I therefore reject
as wholly without merit, the Company's contention that this decision establishes the
existence of any rule against holding meetings.
None of the employee witnesses who testified knew of the existence of any rule
prohibiting meetings of employees during the lunch time. On the contrary, they
testified without contradiction that it was common practice for groups of employees
to meet during lunch periods and discuss all types of subjects, including union matters,
grievances, and even to play cards without interference or objection by the Com-
pany. Indeed, Valenti admitted that during lunch period, employees are permitted
to visit with one another and frequently do so, that they are permitted to talk with
each other and that discussion of union matters is permitted 26 In its brief, the Com-
pany contends that notwithstanding the foregoing uncontradicted record to the con-
trary, employees were nevertheless aware of the prohibition against "meetings" on
company property. In support of that contention, the Company cites the statement
of employee Kiley during the Company's investigation of the work stoppage which
occurred on September 27, 1957, immediately after Urban's suspension because of his
alleged leadership of the "meeting" described above. During this investigation,
employee Kiley told the Company that when the employees who walked out assem-
bled in the Company's parking lot, one or more of them said that they had better go
to the UAW local hall because meetings on company property were prohibited.
Valenti admitted that Kiley's statement might have been based on the Company's
suspension of Urban because of the "meeting" of September 26, and Valenti further
admitted that he made no effort to ascertain when or how the employees became
aware of the alleged rule. Under these circumstances, I do not regard employee
Kiley's statement as indicative of knowledge of the alleged rule, but rather of an
awareness of the action which the Company had just taken against Urban because
of the alleged "meeting" of the day before. The Company's brief further asserts
that Urban was aware of the alleged rule. As support therefor, the Company refers
to testimony that Urban, when allegedly told by UAW committeemen that meetings
on company property were prohibited, consistently responded that it was not a
meeting.27 I do not regard Urban's response as support for the inference which the
Company seeks to draw therefrom, that Urban knew of the existence of a rule against
meetings. A more denial that a gathering is a meeting does not imply knowledge
that meetings are prohibited. Urban, a witness whom I regard as truthful, denied
knowledge of the existence of such a rule and I credit his denial.
The only witnesses who testified that they knew of the existence of the alleged
prohibition against "meetings" were Ford's Labor Relations Representatives Valenti
and O'Connor and Respondent UAW's Committeemen Blake, Hrabscak, and Ligouri.
Valenti and O'Connor's knowledge of the alleged "rule" was primarily based on the
umpire decision alluded to above, which, as I have found, does not support the
existnce of any such rule. I have already found that Blake did not know of the
existence of the alleged rule. Ligouri gave no testimony regarding how he acquired
knowledge of the alleged rule. I place no reliance on his unsupported conclusion re-
garding the rule's existence, especially in view of his obvious hostility to Urban and
the Society and my lack of regard for his credibility as a witness. Hrabscak's knowl-
25 The foregoing quotations are from the umpire's decision.
"I find these admissions by Valenti wholly incompatible with his definition of what
allegedly constitutes a prohibited "meeting."
27 Urban testified that only Hrabscak so told him at the gathering of Sentember 26 and
that he made the response aforestated. I have hereinbefore refused to credit the testimony
of UAW Skilled Trades Committeeman Blake that on the morning of September 26, he
told Urban that meetings on company property were prohibited. See footnote 16, supra.
Blake admitted that he had very little knowledge of the rule and I am not persuaded by
Blake's testimony that he had any knowledge of the alleged rule prior to Urban's suspen-
sion. For the same reasons, I also do not believe Blake's testimony , denied by employee
Terrien , that on the morning of September 26, Blake told Terrien that meetings on com-
pany property were prohibited.
1476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
edge of the alleged "rule" was based on prior experience with the Company in which
he was allegedly stopped from holding meetings on company property by threat of
disciplinary action if he continued. Ford's Labor Relations Representative Kirkum,
who allegedly made this threat to Hrabscak, was not called by the Company to
support Hrabscak's testimony in this respect and no explanation was made for his
failure to testify. No documentary testimony was offered to support Hrabscak's un-
supported testimony. On the contrary, Valenti testified that prior to the Urban case,
there had never been any charge ever made at the Sterling Plant against any employee
for holding unauthorized meetings on company property. Like Ligouri, Hrabscak
was evidently motivated by a desire to support the Company's actions in respect to
the Charging Party and by hostility to the Society and its officers. In the absence of
any evidence that the specific offense against Hrabscak was in regard to holding
meetings, as distinguised from making speeches, I do not credit Hrabscak's un-
supported testimony that he had knowledge of a rule against holding meetings,
especially since I also find no probative evidence of the existence of such a rule.
On the foregoing record, I am not persuaded that Ford ever had a rule prohibiting
the holding of meetings on company property without permission. Moreover, as-
suming arguendo that such a rule did exist, according to Valenti's definition of a
meeting, the rule was more honored by its breach rather than by its observance.
3. Urban's suspension by Ford for acting as "chairman"
of the "meeting" on September 26
According to Valenti, on September 26, after UAW Officials Modestino, Hrabscak
and Ligouri left his office to attend Joe Urban's "meeting," Valenti discussed the
question of investigating the "meeting" with his assistant, O'Connor. This alleged
discussion apparently consumed the entire lunch period of 30 minutes allotted to the
toolroom employees for by the time Valenti and O'Connor went down to the tool-
room to investigate, the "meeting" had already terminated. No explanation was
offered by either Valenti or O'Connor regarding the need for discussion of investi-
gation at a time when they could have acquired first-hand knowledge of the alleged
unlawful meeting by simply following the UAW officials down to the toolroom. The
only investigation allegedly made by Valenti and O'Connor that afternoon was to
ask Plant Superintendent Czegus and General Foreman Bargiel if there had been a
"meeting" and whether they had authorized it. Bargiel and Czegus replied that
there had been a "large gathering" and considerable "commotion."
Ligouri and Modestino testified that after their meeting with Urban on Septem-
ber 26, they immediately contacted Ford's Labor Relations Representative Hockins,
allegedly for the purpose of obtaining his agreement to remove the employees of the
outside vendor who were working on the Ingersolls. According to Ligouri, Hockins
agreed and the vendor's employees were removed that afternoon. Contrary to the
testimony of Ligouri and Modestino, the documentary record in this case discloses
that the Ingersoll grievance was not settled on September 26, 1957, and in fact was
withdrawn by the Union on October 25, 1957.28 Moreover, Modestino also testified
that at the "meeting" with Urban, he had told Urban that he could do nothing about
the outside vendor problem other than to pursue it through the grievance procedure.
Accordingly, I do not credit the testimony of Ligouri and Modestino that their ob-
jective in contacting Hockins directly after the "meeting" with Urban on Septem-
ber 26 was related to the outside vendors' grievance or that the vendor's employees
on the Ingersolls -were removed from the plant that afternoon.
The following morning, September 27, at about 8 a.m., Valenti called UAW Com-
mitteeman Ligouri to the Labor Relations office. Ligouri, referring to the "meet-
ing" of the day before, asked Valenti "what we were doing." Valenti replied, "we
were investigating the occurrence." 29 He then asked Ligouri whether there had been
an unauthorized meeting in the toolroom. Ligouri responded, "Yes." 30 Valenti
28 Trial Examiner's Exhibit No 1.
20 In view of my finding above that Modestino and Ligouri did not consult with Hockins
after their "meeting" with Urban in respect to the Ingersoll grievance and in view of
Ligouri's above quoted inquiry and his subsequent furnishing of a statement to Valenti
which charged Urban with alleged infractions of the Company's rules, I am impelled to the
Inference that after their meeting with Urban, Modestino and Ligouri contacted Ford's
Labor Relations Representative Hockins for the purpose of reporting what had transpired
at the meeting with the expectation and intention that the Company would take action
based thereon I can perceive no other rational explanation fon Ligouri ' s Inquiry and
Valenti's reply quoted above
80 Obviously , whether the "meeting" had been authorized by the Company was a matter
within Valenti's and not Ligouri's knowledge. Valenti offered no explanation for asking
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1477
then allegedly asked Ligouri whether he knew who "the leader of it was" and Ligouri
replied, "Joseph Urban." Valenti testified that because he was aware of the "con-
flict between UAW and the Society of Skilled Trades," he then told Ligouri, "If what
you are telling me is true, you should not object to putting this in affidavit form, so I
would not be taking any action against Mr. Urban on an unfounded statement, just
between two conflicting parties." 31 Ligouri agreed. Valenti then summoned a ste-
nographer and proceeded to take Ligouri's statement in question and answer form.
In the course of this interrogation, Ligouri made the conclusionary accusation that
"Urban was the leader there" but Valenti made no effort whatsoever to question
Ligouri as to the facts upon which Ligouri based that conclusion. Moreover, when
Ligouri in describing what occurred at the "meeting" said, "They didn't like the
people getting laid off while the vendors were in here working on the jobs," 32
Valenti suggested by leading questions "They were not going to work?" and "They
indicated a work stoppage?" At the hearing in this case, Valenti was asked why, in
view of the lack of any previous information from Ligouri that a threat of a work
stoppage had been made at the meeting, Valenti had suggested "that they were not
going to work" and "they threatened a work stoppage." Valenti replied, "I can't
give you any logical reason why I assumed [that]." He then said he based this
assumption on his experience in respect to a previous work stoppage 5 years earlier.
I am not persuaded by and do not credit Valenti's attempted explanation after his
admission that he had no "logical reason." After the interrogation, Ligouri signed
the statement and swore to its truth before a notary public employed by the Com-
pany.33 Thereupon, based only on Ligouri's conclusionary statement that Urban
was the "leader" at the "meeting" and without knowledge of any facts upon which
that conclusion was based, and notwithstanding that Ligouri's statement did not
identify Urban as the person who allegedly had threatened a work stoppage, and
without any investigation, Valenti immediately prepared a charge against Urban,
charging him with "(1) Acting as chairman of an unauthorized meeting on 9/26/57;
(2) Giving leadership to and aiding and abetting an attempted violation of Article 5,
Section 3 [of the collective-bargaining agreement between UAW and Ford]." 34
Immediately thereafter at 8:40 a.m. on September 27, 1957, Urban was summoned
to the labor relations office and UAW Committeemen Blake and Hrabscak were
summoned to represent him 35 All three were then interrogated in the presence of a
stenograper concerning the "meeting" in the grinding room of the day before. The
charges against Urban were read to him by Valenti as was also the applicable pro-
vision of the contract. Urban denied the charges, denied that the gathering was a
meeting, and denied that he or anyone else had acted as "chairman" or spokesman
for the group. Neither Blake nor Hrabscak gave any support to the charge that
Urban was the "chairman" of the "meeting" despite suggestions by Valenti that "in
a meeting of this [kind], one person will stand out" and his request for their "opin-
ion" as to who was "leading or chairing this." Moreover, notwithstanding attempts
by Valenti to elicit through leading questions that a threat of a work stoppage had
been made at the grinding room gathering, both Hrabscak and Blake denied that they
had heard any threat of a work stoppage if the "outside vendor" or other complaints
were not satisfactorily adjusted. Urban likewise denied making any such threat.
As aforestated, during this interrogation, Blake also corroborated Urban's statement
as to the casual manner in which the "meeting" had occurred. Thus, Blake told
Valenti that as he passed Urban's work station on the previous morning, Urban had
said, "they had a few problems" and that when he told Urban that he was then
busy, Urban had said "a couple were going to have dinner together so maybe we could
this "loaded" question. Moreover, Ligouri's affirmative response to this question, which
embraced within it a matter not within Ligouri's knowledge, should have alerted Valenti,
if he were really objective in his alleged "investigation," to the lack of reliability of
Ligouri's information.
81 The concluding quotation mark in the above sentence was erroneously placed by the
reporter after the word "form." I hereby correct the record so that the concluding
quotation mark is placed at the end of the quoted sentence where it properly belongs.
8' Who "they" were was not explicated by Ligouri to Valenti.
38 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2jj.
84 This clause prohibits the Union and its members from causing or participating in "any
sitdown, stay-in, slowdown, curtailment of work, restriction of production, or interference
with the operations of the Company."
85 During the course of the interrogation which followed, Urban objected to representa-
tion by Hrabscak because, inter alla, -the latter exaggerated in respect to the number of
employees who were present during the alleged "meeting." Hrabscak nevertheless was
permitted by Valenti to remain as as observer and witness.
1478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
settle it then." During the interrogation, Valenti also asked Urban whether he was
an officer of the Society and questioned his authority "to organize on Company prop-
erty." Urban refused to state his connection with the Society but asserted "we have
a right to organize." Valenti replied "I have no control to what you belong outside
of here." He also said, "I don't care what you do outside."
Although the interrogation of Urban, Blake, and Hrabscak 36 did not develop any
facts to support the charges against Urban, at the conclusion of the interrogation
Valenti advised Urban that he was suspended indefinitely pending investigation of
the charges against him and that if he were "found innocent," he would be paid for
the time lost. In so doing, Valenti said, inter aha, "Don't feel merely because I find
you guilty I am suspending you." 37 Valenti also advsied Urban that he would be
"escorted out of the plant" by a "Security Guard."
Valenti admitted at the hearing in this case that at the time of Urban's suspension,
the only evidence of Urban's leadership at the meeting was Ligouri's conclusionary
statement and "that was the reason we suspended him." He further testified that
since Urban was not personally involved in the particular grievances which had
been discussed at the "meeting" in the grinding room and had nevertheless arranged
to talk with Blake regarding such grievances, that was "strong indications that he
was leading the group or at least purporting to represent the group." Valenti also
admitted that he may have been persuaded that Urban was the chairman of the al-
leged "meeting" by his knowledge of Urban's leadership in the Society. Valenti
further admitted that Ligouri's statement that "they" [unidentified] were threatening
a work stoppage was not supported by anything said to him by either Urban, Blake,
or Hrabscak.38 Valenti also admitted that in itself, the charge of giving leadership
to an unauthorized meeting on company property was not an offense warranting
discharge. When asked why then, he deemed it necessary to suspend Urban pend-
ing investigation, Valenti testified that he relied on an opinion by an impartial
umpire which suggested that course of action instead of imposing a "fast penalty."
I do not credit Valenti's alleged reliance on an umpire opinion for his action in
suspending Urban.39 Unlike the case in which the umpire made his suggestion, a
case in which discharge was an appropriate penalty, Urban's alleged offense of "acting
as chairman of an unauthorized meeting" was admittedly not one for which discharge
was warranted. Moreover, at the time of the suspension of Urban, at least two of
the four UAW officials who had attended the "meeting" had failed to corroborate the
other charge against Urban of giving leadership to and aiding and abetting an at-
tempted work stoppage. Moreover, the latter charge was based on Valenti's own
suggestion to Ligouri that a threat of a work stoppage had been made at the "meet-
ing" and on an assumption, unsupported by any evidence, that the "they" in Ligouri's
statement who had threatened a work stoppage, referred to Urban.40
In respect to the necessity for Urban to be escorted out the plant by a security
guard the record clearly discloses and I find that prior to this date, the practice of
providing a guard escort was only followed in respect to employees who were dis-
charged or drunk41
Under all these circumstances, including the absence of any rule prohibiting meet-
ings on company property, Valenti's lack of a plausible explanation for assuming that
a work stoppage had been threatened at the "meeting," his like failure to adequately
explain why Urban could not have been continued in his employment pending the
investigation, the assignment of a security guard to escort Urban from the plant al-
though Urban had not been discharged, and Valenti's disparate failure to take any
36General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-ttt.
37I regard this statement by Valenti as indicative of a prejudgment by Valenti of
Urban's guilt of the charges against him.
28 In fact, the Company found no evidence to support this charge and it was later
dropped
39 The only umpire's opinion on which Valenti allegedly relied was one which issued in
1943, in a case where an employee had viciously assaulted his foreman and was initially
disciplined by a layoff of 1 week before full investigation of the incident. Based upon
further investigation of the incident during the suspension period, the company decided to
discharge the employee when he returned to work. The union urged before the umpire
that the employee had been subjected to a "double penalty" for a single offense The
umpire concluded that the employee had been properly discharged but suggested that the
company could avoid "cases of this character" if the employee were suspended pending
investigation
40 This was the only basis for the charge against Urban of giving leadership to and
aiding and abetting an attempted work stoppage
43 There is no suggestion in the record that Urban was drunk at the time.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1479
disciplinary action against UAW Committeeman Hrabscak for creating the "com-
motion" at the "meeting" by his loud, vulgar, and profane outburst and threat to
fight, all of which Hrabscak had admitted during the interrogation and which, ad-
mittedly, was a violation of company rules, I am impelled to the conclusion that
motivations other than reliance on the umpire's descision described above caused
Valenti to order Urban's suspension and removal from the plant by a security
guard.42
4. The work stoppage on September 27, :1957, and Ford's investigation thereof
At approximately 11 a.m. on September 27, Ford Security Guard Cushing escorted
Urban from the labor relations office to Urban's workbench. There, Urban cleared
out his tools and personal belongings from his drawer and gathered up the tools
which belonged to the Company. During this process which consumed about 5 to
10 minutes , some of the employees who worked in that area asked Urban why he
was being escorted out by a guard. According to Urban's credited testimony, he
told these employees 43 that he had been summoned to the labor relations depart-
ment because of the gathering in the toolroom on the previous day, that he thought
Hrabscak had testified falsely and had acted more like a company representative
rather than his representative , that he had been suspended by Ford and that he
thought he was being "framed ." Some of the employees responded with such com-
ments as "Gee, you can 't call a committeeman in this plant any more" and "you can't
talk to each other any more." Employee Terrien asked Urban "do you think we
should walk out, Joe," and Urban replied, "Act your age." 44 From his bench,
Urban was escorted by the guard to the toolroom crib to return some company-owned
tools. On his way to the crib, some employees observed Urban with the plant guard
and called out and asked "what is going on." Urban did not stop to answer. To
one such employee, John Jongens, Urban merely shrugged his shoulders. To an-
other, Christopher Pace, Urban said, "You can see what's going on. I am being
escorted out." At the tool crib, Urban had to wait several minutes because the
crib attendant was busy. While there, Urban was asked in Polish by employee
George Zubczaw who speaks no English, what was transpiring. Urban replied to
Zubczaw that it looked like the Company was trying to get rid of him.45 Urban
also told that to the crib attendant when he turned in the company tools. From
the toolroom crib, Urban was escorted to another tool crib to return another com-
pany tool. By the time Urban and the guard arrived at this tool crib, the attendant
had gone to lunch and the crib was locked. The guard told Urban to wait there
while he arranged for the crib to be reopened. While waiting in this area for about
10 minutes, Urban was asked by the toolmakers who worked in that area, "what's
going on ." Since Urban had plenty of time, he told them the whole story of his
suspension , the reason therefor, and of Hrabscak' s actions and statements before
Ford's labor relations department 46 When the guard returned, he told Urban
that he could wait no longer for the tool crib to be reopened and suggested that
Urban lock up the company tool in the drawer of his workbench. Accordingly
Urban and the guard went back to Urban's bench. En route, the guard told Urban
that the employees appeared to be incensed about his suspension . This remark
caused Urban to think that his fellow employees and Society members might engage
in a work stoppage in protest against his suspension. Urban therefore told em-
ployee Joe Wellman "to go in the tool room" and "if you think there is going to be
trouble, tell them not to walk out on my account." Wellman agreed. At his work-
bench, Urban locked up the company tool and then, still accompanied by the guard,
started back up the aisle to leave the plant. En route, employee Pete Zbercot called
out to him, "what's going on." Urban replied, "I am being escorted out of the
plant. I am being suspended." Zbercot then told Urban, "the fellows from the tool-
room just walked by here a little while ago with their coats and lunch buckets. I
48 Valenti admitted that nothing Urban had said or done after the "meeting" disclosed
any need for suspension.
48 Milton Terrien, Charlie Demonaco, Amos Beard, Ed Krymski, and one or two more
that Urban did not recall.
44 Urban explained on cross-examination that by this remark he meant that "it was
silly to walk out."
45 Zubczaw, a witness called by the Company to prove that Urban, while checking out,
made false and inflammatory statements that he was discharged, corroborated Urban's
testimony in this respect.
48 The employees to whom Urban spoke on this occasion were Bert Lee, Ray Cagle, Mike
Bagariek, and possibly also Tommy Pcholinski.
1480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
think they are walking out." This was Urban 's first knowledge of the work stoppage
which occurred on September 27. Finally, Urban and the guard stopped in the
cafeteria for a cup of coffee and then Urban left the plant. The elapsed time be-
tween the time Urban left the labor relations office and the time he left the plant
was approximately 1 hour.47
As I reconstruct the events of September 27 from the credited testimony in the
lengthy record herein, while Urban was walking about the plant with the guard,
some followers and fellow Society members came to the conclusion that Urban was
fired or that he was being "framed." It was suggested by one or more of these
employees that they meet in the parking lot at lunch time to get additional informa-
tion regarding what had happened to Urban and to discuss what action to take
about it. News of the Company's action against Urban and of this meeting spread
through the plant by word of mouth from one employee to another. At lunch
time, approximately 11:25 a.m., about 27 employees walked out of the plant to
attend the meeting. In the parking lot, the leaderless group was still without
definitive information as to what to do about Urban, and one or more of them sug-
gested that they had better get off the premises and go down to the UAW union hall.
Accordingly, they all drove down to the union hall approximately 9 miles away.
At this point, the employees who went to the hall necessarily must have realized
that it would be impossible for them to return to the plant within the allotted half
hour allowed for lunch, and, that therefore, they were participating in a strike or
work stoppage. I therefore find and conclude that the decision to engage in a strike
or work stoppage was made when the employees in the parking lot decided to go to
the union hall and not in the plant before they went to lunch. At the union hall,
the employees sat around discussing what had happened to Urban and waited for
the arrival of the UAW president and committeeman, for whose presence, a tele-
phone call had been made.
After Urban left the plant, he concluded that those who had left the plant must
have gone to the UAW local union hall, so he drove down there. At the hall,
Urban was asked by the striking employees what had happened. He explained that
he had been suspended, not fired, that their work stoppage was a foolish thing and
suggested that they return to work 48 All the striking employees then returned to
the plant and reported back to work between 1:45 and 2 p.m., approximately 13/4
to 2 hours after their usual lunch hour had expired.
That afternoon, all who participated in the brief strike were called up to Ford's
labor relations office, were charged with participating in an authorized strike in
violation of the no-strike clause in the contract,49 and each was separately inter-
rogated by one or more of Ford's labor relations staff, Kirkum, Valenti, O'Connor,
and Hockins, in the presence of a UAW committeeman. With practically no
exception, all admitted their participation in the work stoppage. However, instead
of assessing penalties or discipline, the employees involved were grilled, allegedly
for the purpose of determining who were the "leaders" of the strike 50 The inter-
47 The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of Charging Party Joseph Urban
48 The UAW plant committee also went down to the local hall and told the employees
the same thing
49 The collective-bargaining contract between Ford and UAW contained the following
no-strike provisions
Article V. Section 4 Limitations on Right to Strike
The Union will not cause or permit its members to cause , nor will any member of
the Union take part in, any strike of the Company's operations, or picketing of any
of the Company's plants or premises, except with respect to the procedure provided for
in Article VII, Section 23 of this Agreement [not material here] and then only after
such procedure has been exhausted
Ford's labor relations representative , O'Connor , learned about the proposed meeting in
the parking lot just before the beginning of the lunch period of the employees involved
He thereupon ordered the guard at the gate to take down the badge numbers of all tool-
room employees who went out of the gate that day. The Company later sent someone
down to the UAW hall to record the license numbers of all the cars there . The General
Counsel contends that the foregoing is evidence that the Company had sufficient advance
knowledge of the work stoppage to have avoided it, but nevertheless , welcomed it as a
means of ridding itself of the chief protagonists of the Society . Since it is my opinion
that the Company was under no obligation to avoid the work stoppage , I shall not burden
this Report further with any findings based on this contention
69 O'Connor told all those whom he interrogated that he knew the names of the "leaders."
All of the interrogators based their questioning on the assumption , contrary to my findings
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1481
rogators told the employees that the penalty for participation in the work stoppage
included discharge, that the rulings of the impartial umpires gave Ford complete
discretion in respect to the severity of the penalties in such cases, and that their
punishment would depend on their cooperation with Ford's labor relations repre-
sentatives, which as the interrogations developed, meant furnishing Ford with the
names of those from whom they had heard about the meeting in the parking lot.
The interrogators also asked the participants in the work stoppage whether they
were married, how many children they had, what they would tell their wives if they
were fired, and, in some cases, how they would like it if their wives became the sole
providers for their families. Notwithstanding the coercive interrogations, the em-
ployees who participated in the work stoppage stated that there was no "leader"
and that no one specifically had requested them to attend the meeting in the park-
ing lot or to go to the UAW local hall. Most of them stated that they could not
remember from whom they heard about the meeting or the suggestion to go to the
hall. One employee, Ralph Kolowich, who had told Ford's labor relations repre-
sentatives, Valenti and Kirkum, that "the fellows said that they were going out"
and further said "I don't want to name them," was threatened with a charge of
"instigating" the work stoppage instead of the lesser charge of "participating," if
he did not furnish the name or names of the employees who said that. Kolowich
then told Valenti that the first one from whom he heard "that the fellows were
going out" was Charging Party Pilawski.51 Another employee, Otto Dixon, said he
heard about the walkout from William T. Smith and John Major.52 Another,
Joseph Priska, told Valenti and Kirkum that he heard that a "fellow [Urban] was
suspended" from Charging Party Pilawski, and that William Watson had told him
"they were going to walk out and that they were going to the local hall." 53 Based
on the foregoing, Pilawski was called into Valenti's office, the charge against him
was changed from "participation" to "instigation" of the work stoppage, and he
was suspended indefinitely. The participants in the work stoppage other than
Pilawski and employee Leon Ugorowski,54 were permitted to return to work.
On Monday, September 30, 1957, Ugorowski was questioned again by Valenti
and Kirkum and told them that during the morning of September 27, he had heard
from employees William T. Smith and Christopher Pace that Urban had been fired
and that Pilawski had told him at about 11:30 a.m. on September 27, that the tool-
room "had walked out already." Ugorowski did not say that he was requested to
join the walkout by Pilawski.
Later in the morning of September 30, Charging Parties Bialk and Huff were
called back to the Labor Relations Department. At that time, according to the
chronological record of the interrogations, the only information in the Company's
possession which even purported to implicate Bialk and Huff in anything other than
participation in the work stoppage, was that supplied during the interrogations of
the preceding Friday by employees Loyd, Pietroski, Faber, and Kachman. Accord-
ing to Loyd's statement,55 he saw Bialk and Huff walk out of the plant together at
lunch time the preceding Friday and they told him "they were going to lunch."
Later that day, Loyd had seen them at the local hall. Pietroski's statement 56 dis-
closed that he had left the plant with Huff for the purpose of transferring to Huff's
truck a kitchen sink which he had purchased for Huff, that while in the parking lot
for that purpose, he and Huff learned about the plans of the other employees to go
to the local hall in connection with Urban's rumored discharge, and that Huff had
said "we may as well go down, everybody else is going down." Faber's statement 57
merely stated that he went down to the local hall with Bialk in the latter's car.
Kachman's statement 56 disclosed that on the preceding Friday, a group of men were
above, that the decision to engage in a strike was made before the employees left the plant
and on the further erroneous assumption that one or more employees "instigated" the
strike by passing along the news of the meeting in the parking lot.
11 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-ff.
52 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-k. The term "walkout" as used by the interrogators
was and is misleading. The interrogators used and /or understood this term as synony-
mous with "strike" or "work stoppage." Many of the employees apparently used the term
in its literal sense , that is, walking out of the plant to the parking lot.
51 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-ggg.
64 Ugorowski had been charged by Ford as a "leader" of the work stoppage because,
according to the guard' s record , he was the first one who had walked out to the parking
lot. Like Pilawski, he was suspended from work on the afternoon of September 27.
ec General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-mm.
11 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-zz.
67 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-m.
11 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2-aa.
599198-62-vol. 131-95
1482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the crib when Urban was checking in his company tools "and a few guys by the
crib said `Let's go for a meeting at lunch time"' and that among those who were at
the crib at that time were Walter Huff and Elmer Bialk. According to Bialk's
credited testimony which is consistent with what he told the Company during his
interrogations, he was aware of the meeting that was to be held in the parking lot,
but he nevertheless went directly from the plant to the Sunnybrook, a country club
near the plant, for lunch. When he returned to the parking lot, the other employees
who had left the plant had already gone to the UAW hall and he then drove to the
hall accompanied by Faber whom he picked up at the lot. Bialk's absence from the
meeting in the parking lot when the employees decided to go to the local UAW hall
was known by the Company and was obviously inconsistent with "leadership" or
"instigation" of the work stoppage which occurred only when the decision to go to
the local UAW hall was made. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the lack of
evidence in the Company's possession that Bialk or Huff had "instigated" or given
"leadership" to the work stoppage of September 27, they were charged with this
offense by Ford on September 30, and suspended indefinitely from further em-
ployment.
Thereafter, on October 2 and 3, 1957, the Company recalled and separately ques-
tioned the employees who had been charged with participating in the work stoppage.
These interrogations were for the most part conducted in the presence of the entire
Ford labor relations department consisting of Kirkum, Valenti, O'Connor, Hockins,
and Simon, before Plant Superintendent Czegus and General Toolroom Foreman
Bargiel, and before UAW Committeemen Ligouri, Hrabscak, and Blake. I have
carefully reviewed the transcripts of these interrogations in the chronological order
in which they were taken before the aforementioned awesome array of company
and UAW officials 59 Based on this study, I am impelled to the conclusion that far
from being an impartial investigation to determine responsibility for the work
stoppage on September 27, the Company through coercive, inquisitorial and sug-
gestive interrogation sought to establish justification to discharge the Charging Parties.
One example is sufficient to demonstrate the type of investigation conducted by the
Company. As aforestated, Kachman had previously told interrogator O'Connor that
Charging Parties Bialk and Huff had been at the tool crib on September 27, when
"a few guys at the crib said, `Let's go for a meeting at lunch time.' " At his second
grilling, Kachman told O'Connor that he "went all to pieces" during the previous
interrogation and was "almost ready to again." The transcript of his prior interroga-
tion was read to Kachman by O'Connor and he was asked if it were correct. Kach-
man replied that he could not truthfully answer, that no one prompted him to walk
out of the plant and that he was upset for having mentioned the names of Bialk and
Huff. Kachman then said that he had seen Bialk and Huff at the crib but could not
remember that he talked with them at that time or later in the parking lot or locker-
room O'Connor continued, nevertheless, to press Kachman as to whether "they"
said "there was going to be a meeting." Kachman reluctantly replied, "Yes, sir," but
added, "Down in the Tool Room everyone was mentioning it." O'Connor then told
Kachman that the case might "be taken to the National Labor Relations Board." 60
Kachman also said, "I don't want to sign anything. Do with me what you want." He
then conferred privately with UAW Committeemen Blake, Hrabscak, and Ligouri.61
He returned and still refused to sign the statement or confirm its truth saying, "I
don't really know." "I was so confused." "I don't know what I said." "I am
too scared." O'Connor then told Kachman, "You leave us no alternative. . . . You
are suspended. You will be off until Monday or until you decide what course of
action to take." Faced with suspension from work, Kachman then agreed to sign.
Notwithstanding the coercive means by which his agreement to sign was obtained
and the doubts which he had expressed regarding the accuracy of his statements,
O'Connor then hypocritically asked Kachman whether he signed the statement
"voluntarily" and whether it was "the truth to the best of his knowledge." Kachman
answered "Yes," to both questions.
During their second interrogations, employees who made the mistake of admitting
that they knew from whom they had heard that there was to be a meeting in the
parking lot but were disinclined or refused to name names, were subjected to especially
68 Company Exhibits Nos 50, 52 53-aa, 15, 53-p, 4, 10, 13, 2, 53-g, 53-1, 53-1. 53-q,
53-w. 53-s and General Counsel's Exhibits Nos 2-hhh, 2-n, 2-rr, 2-111, 2-kkk, and 2-ddd
Bo This statement was made by Ford interrogators to many of the employees who were
questioned on October 2 and 3
Cl According to a later statement by Kachman and his credited testimony in this case,
the UAW committeemen suggested that he sign the transcript of his interrogation. Com-
pany's Exhibit No 51.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1483
severe coercion, including threats of discharge. One such, William T. Smith, was
told by Valenti, "that statement will hang you." Several such employees were sent
out of the room to discuss with the UAW committeemen, the advisability of escaping
more severe punishment for themselves by supplying names to the Company.
Throughout these interrogations, the Company, by leading questions, attempted to
draw from those questioned that it was one or more of the Charging Parties who
suggested the meeting in the parking lot or the visit to the UAW hall. Moreover,
although there was no prior history that participants in a work stoppage, as dis-
tinguished from instigators, had ever been discharged for this offense, and although,
contrary to the statements made by Ford's interrogators, neither the contract nor
the impartial umpires allowed Ford complete discretion to discharge employees for
participation in a work stoppage, the UAW representatives did not so advise any
of the employees who were questioned, but instead, cooperated with the Company
in its coercive interrogation, in some instances asking questions, in others suggesting
that employees sign their statements and in one instance, telling an employee that
he need not "be afraid to start talking." 62
In this fashion, the Company succeeded in getting the "evidence" upon which
it allegedly relied to subsequently discharge the Charging Parties.63 Significantly,
William T. Smith, Christopher Pace, and John Major whose names frequently cropped
up during the interrogations as employees who had also told others of the meeting
in the parking lot were not similarly charged with instigation of the work stoppage.
Although Pace did not participate in the walkout, Valenti admitted that there could
be "instigation without participation." 84 Moreover, despite the obvious lack of
cooperation in the "investigation" by many of those who were questioned, and
notwithstanding the Company's statement to them that it had discretion to impose the
penalty of discharge for participation in the work stoppages, none of the employees
charged with "participation" were discharged. Most of these employees received
reprimands and warnings and loss of pay for the time they were out during the
work stoppage and while they were questioned.65
5. The discharge of Joseph Urban
On October 8, 1957, the Company recalled Urban for further interrogation and
charged him with making false and inflammatory statements that he had been fired
or discharged, designed to instigate an unauthorized work stoppage, and with instiga-
tion of an unauthorized work stoppage on September 27, while he was checking out
of the plant with the security guard. At the same time, the original charge against
Urban of "acting as chairman to an unauthorized 'meeting on company property
was changed to "giving leadership" to said meeting and the charge that he had given
leadership to and aided and abetted an attempted work stoppage on September 26
was dropped.66 Urban denied that he had told any employee that he had been
discharged. He admitted, however, that he may have said to some employees
"I am out," "I am going out" and "They finally got me." 67 The only witness who
testified that Urban said he was fired or discharged was the plant guard, Cushing.
However, Cushing, in his interrogation by the Company, had also told it and so
testified in the hearing herein, that on several occasions during Urban's peregrina-
tion with him about the plant, Urban had warned employees against walking out
on his account. Similarly, a number of employees had also told the Company that
on September 27, at the UAW Local hall, Urban had told them that they should not
12 The latter statement was made by UAW Committeeman Ligouri to one of the
employees
11 Pilawski was recalled and discharged on October 3 at 1 •15 p m. and Bialk and Huff
on October 7 at 2 .15 and 3 30 p in , respectively Urban's discharge will be separately
reported hereinafter
61 Major, like Blake (see footnote 15, supra) had resigned from the Society shortly be-
fore to run for office in the UAW.
65 One employee was given a suspension from work of 1 week because he 'bad given false
information to the Company regarding his participation in the walkout.
60 See footnote 38, supra
87 Christopher Pace, who during the Company's interrogations stated that Urban told
him he was discharged, testified at the hearing in this case that Urban said she was out,
but admitted that this meant to him that Urban was fired John Jongens, who, because
of his illness, did not testify at the hearing herein, and who, like Pace, had furnished a
statement to the Company in which he stated that Urban said on September 27, 1957, that
he was discharged, testified before the Michigan Employment Security Commission that
his statement to the Company was wrong and that he had heard through the grapevine
and not from Urban that Urban was fired.
1484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have engaged in the work stoppage and should return to work immediately. In
addition, Valenti admitted that a number of employees had told the Company during
its "investigation" that Urban had told them that he had been suspended. Moreover,
it is quite significant that of all those to whom Urban spoke while he was checking
out (see footnotes 43 and 46, supra), only one, Milton Terrien, participated in the
work stoppage. The Company, nevertheless, completely disregarded and swept
under the rug all information in its possession which did not support its predetermined
judgment of Urban's guilt 68 Urban's warnings to employees not to walk out was.
interpreted by the Company as meaning the converse or as "the workings of negative
psychology." 69 At the conclusion of Urban's interrogation on October 8, Urban
was notified that he was fired for "giving leadership to an unauthorized meeting on-
company property on September 26, 1957; instigating an unauthorized work stop-
page on September 27, 1957; and making false and inflammatory statements designed
to instigate an unauthorized work stoppage on September 27, 1957."
6. The alleged grievance and arbitration proceedings by UAW on behalf of the
Charging Parties
On October 10, 1957, the Charging Parties protested their discharge by filing
grievances through Respondent UAW. The documentary record of the grievances
as they progressed through the second and third stages 70 of the grievance procedure
discloses that UAW did not assert the "innocence" of the Charging Parties of the
charges for which they had been discharged, but contended only that the penalty
of discharge was too severe?i No claim was made by UAW on behalf of Urban
in respect to the nonexistence of the rule against meetings on company property nor
even as to the failure of the Company to comply with the contract 72 in respect to
the formulation of the alleged rule. Furthermore, no protest was made by the UAW
on behalf of Urban on the ground that the rule, even if it existed, had not been
brought to the employees' attention and had never before been enforced in the plant.
Moreover, no protest was made by the Union on the ground that the alleged rule.
as applied to Urban's discussion of grievances during the employees' lunch period,
was an infringement of employees' rights guaranteed by the Act.73
While these grievances were pending, UAW Committeeman Hrabscak, whose
duties include the processing of second stage grievances, told employee William
Kahl when the latter suggested that UAW was not properly representing the Charg-
ing Parties, "This is all propaganda by the Society of Skilled Trades and I hope they
fire every one of those bastards." Similarly, on an unspecified date 2 or 3 months
after the Charging Parties were discharged, when employee Leo Moses inquired
about the Charging Parties, Hrabscak said, "those bastards got what they deserved."
On another occasion, UAW Committeeman Ligouri, whose duties likewise included
the processing of second stage grievances, told employee Moses that merely because
the Charging Parties had UAW representation did not indicate that they would be
defended and he (Ligouri) was willing to bet that they would lose the umpire-
decision. In February 1958, before the umpire hearing, Hrabscak told employee
James Ray that the Charging Parties got what they deserved and that UAW was
not going to defend them. Likewise, UAW Committeeman Dillard told employee
William Hedge shortly after the Charging Parties were discharged, "Well, they [the
Charging Parties] should have been fired. They are nothing but trouble makers
anyway." 74
88 See footnote 37, supra
88 General Counsel's Exhibit No 3-c, paragraph F.
10 Under the procedures provided by the collective-bargaining agreement, there is no
first stage of the grievance procedure when the discipline is imposed by Ford's labor
relations department.
71 The Charging Parties have consistently maintained and still maintain their innocence-
of the charges leveled against them by the Company.
72 See B 2, paragraph 3, supra
73 Republic Aviation Corporation v. N L.R.B., 324 US 793 ; Walton Manufacturing
Company, 126 NLRB 697.
74 The foregoing is based on the credited testimony of Kahl, Hedge, Ray, and Moses
whom I regard as disinterested witnesses. Ligouri and Hrabscak denied that they had
made these statements I do not credit their denials Both were obviously hostile to
the Society and, as UAW officials, were interested in these proceedings in which UAW is-
charged with unfair labor practices Ligouri's statement to Ford on September 27 was
the basis of the initial charges against Urban that he had threatened a work stoppage
during the September 26 meeting. That charge, made by Ligouri under oath, was not
supported by any of the approximately 20 people who were at the gathering in the grind--
FORD MOTOR COMPANY ( STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1485
The Company denied the Charging Parties' grievances on December 6, 1957.
Thereafter , their cases were processed before an impartial umpire by Archie Accaicca,
a representative of the International UAW. The hearing before the umpire took
place on March 19 and 20, 1958 . During the preparation for that hearing, Accaicca
suggested to the Charging Parties that they refrain from any reference to the Society
because it had "no bearing" on the case . Although not requested by the Charging
Parties as witnesses , Accaicca nevertheless called as his witnesses before the umpire,
UAW Officials Hrabscak , Blake, Ligouri, and Modestino . 75 On April 23, 1958, the
umpire sustained the Company discharge of Urban , Bialk, and Pilawski , but con-
eluded that "serious doubt" existed as to the accuracy of the evidence on which the
Company allegedly relied to support the charge of "instigation" against Huff.
Accordingly, the charge against Huff was reduced to "participation " in the work
stoppage and he was ordered reinstated without backpay.76
7. The proceedings before the Michigan Employment Security Commission
In July and August 1958 , after the umpire hearing and decision , a hearing was
held before the Michigan Employment Security Commission upon the claims of the
Charging Parties for unemployment compensation . The Company contended that
the Charging Parties were not entitled to compensation because they had been dis-
charged for "misconduct." The record of the proceedings before the Michigan
Employment Security Commission 77 disclose that UAW Officials Modestino,
Hrabscak , and Ligouri testified on behalf of the Company . The Michigan Employ-
ment Security Appeal Board concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish
either that Urban had "actually solicited other workers to join in a group meeting
to present their grievances to the union committeemen ," or that his "utterances" to
employees as he was checking out of the plant "advocated his fellow employees to
walk out in protest to his suspension , and that these utterances appear to be state-
ments of his belief as to what happened or would happen as a result of his suspen-
sion." 78 Accordingly , Urban's claim for compensation was allowed.
Huff's like claim for compensation was disallowed solely because his participa-
tion in the work stoppage of September 27, 1957, is regarded as "misconduct" within
the meaning of the Michigan statute. Like the impartial umpire, the referee did not
find that Huff had instigated the work stoppage , but instead found that Huff's par-
ticipation was "without premeditation , on the impulse and without any considera-
tion that he might be overstaying his lunch period." 79
On the claims of Bialk and Pilawski for unemployment compensation, the referee
ruled that although neither Bialk nor Pilawski told any employee to participate in
the walkout, they "caused or contributed to said walkout" and were guilty of "mis-
conduct" which rendered them ineligible for unemployment compensation 80 by tell-
ing employees "of the meeting to be held on the parking lot to discuss Joe Urban's
ing room , including the other UAW officials , and as aforestated , was later dropped by
the Company . Both Ligouri and Hrabscak testified on behalf of Ford against the
Charging Parties before the impartial umpire and later , before the Michigan Employment
Security Commission but refused , in this case, to acknowledge that they had so testified
on behalf of the Company . Indeed , Hrabscak asserted that he had testified for Urban.
Based on the foregoing and their demeanor , as well as contradictions in their testimony,
I do not regard either Ligouri or Hrabscak as reliable witnesses upon whom I can rely.
75 No transcript was made of the umpire proceedings and there is, therefore , no record
of the nature of the testimony of these four UAW officials . However, in view of the
nature of their testimony before me and the Michigan Employment Security Commission,
I must infer that it was similarly hostile to the Charging Parties. Two employees,
Leo Moses and Christopher Pace , preferred charges within the Union against Ligourl
and Hrabscak because of their hostile testimony before the umpire , but for reasons not
disclosed by the record , the charges were withdrawn.
76 Under the collective-bargaining agreement, article V, section 5, compensation for back-
pay could only be ordered by the umpire if Huff was "innocent" of all the charges,
including that of "participation."
77 General Counsel's Exhibits Nos. 9, 10, 11 , 12, and 13.
78 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 13.
70 General Counsel's Exhibit No. 10.
80 General Counsel's Exhibit No . 11. The term "misconduct ," as used in the Michigan
statute under consideration , generally is held to include "participation in an unauthorized
walkout."
The appeals of Bialk, Pilawski, and Huff from the aforementioned adverse rulings were
denied.
1486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
discharge" and by "participating" in the walkout by remaining away from work
during working hours.
C. Analysis of the evidence and concluding findings
1. The unfair labor practice charges against the Company
The complaint in this case alleges, inter alia, that the Company engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by denying to
employees the right to discuss grievances and to engage in other concerted activities
on company property during nonworking hours as guaranteed by the Act. As here-
inbefore found, on September 27, 1957, during the interrogation of Urban in con-
nection with the charges arising out of the meeting in the plant the day before, Ford's
labor relations representative, Valenti, advised Urban that he was prohibited from
engaging in organizational activity on company property on behalf of the Society.
This prohibition was not limited to Urban's working time. The right of employees
to engage in organizational activity on company premises during nonworking time
has been recognized as a protected activity by both the Board and the courts and is
settled law 81 Accordingly, by prohibiting Urban from engaging in organizational
activity on company property during his nonworking time, it is clear and I find
that Respondent Ford interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees from
engaging in rights guaranteed by the Act, and thereby engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
A basic question presented by this case is whether the strike or work stoppage of
Ford's employees on September 27, 1957, was an unfair labor practice strike because
it was caused by or resulted from the Company's alleged unfair labor practice in sus-
pending Urban from his employment on the morning of September 27 because of
Urban's participation in the meeting in the plant on September 26. The General
Counsel urges that Urban's suspension by the Company was an unfair labor practice
and violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act on two grounds: (1) As a matter
of law and without considering the Company's motivation, because it was based
on Urban's activity protected by the Act; and (2) because it was motivated by the
Company's hostility to the Society. The Company contends that its suspension of
Urban was not an unfair labor practice as alleged in the complaint because Urban
was suspended for violating a company rule prohibiting meetings on company prop-
erty, and in this connection, it asserts that such meetings are not a form of activity
protected by the Act. The Company further contends that since Urban was advised
at the time of his suspension that if he was found innocent of the charges against
him, he would be recalled and paid for the time he lost, his suspension was not an act
of discrimination within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. Finally, the
Company urges that in suspending Urban, it was motivated solely by considerations
of maintaining plant discipline. I shall consider first the contentions of the parties
in respect to whether Urban' s suspension violated the Act as a matter of law.
I have heretofore found and concluded that there was no company rule prohibiting
meetings on company property. However, assuming arguendo, that such a rule did
exist in the plant , such a prohibition as that encompassed within the Company's
definition of a "meeting," 82 would in itself constitute an unlawful restraint of employ-
ees' rights guaranteed by the Act, insofar as the rule was applicable to employees'
nonworking time.83 No evidence was offered by the Company to show that the
alleged rule was necessary to maintain production or discipline. or indeed for any
reason . The record establishes that insofar as Urban and his fellow employees were
concerned, the "meeting" of September 26, was a peaceful and orderly discussion
of grievances at lunch time which, as admitted by General Foreman Bargiel, did not
interfere with production. The Company contends that under the Livingston Shirt
case.84 it can lawfully refuse to permit meetings on its property and therefore the
holding of such a prohibited meeting is not a form of concerted activity protected by
the Act. The fallacy in this argument is that the case on which it is bottomed is
wholly inapposite to the issues in this case. The Livingston Shirt case, supra, which
reversed the Board's prior Bonwit-Teller doctrine,85 holds merely that it is not an
ss See footnote 73, supra
82 Two or more persons who gather to discuss a grievance in which one of the partici-
pants is not personally involved.
av Republic Aviation Corporation v. N.L R B , supra; Walton Manufacturing Company,
supra
94 Livingston Shirt Corporation et al, 107 NLRB 400.85
Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 NLRB 608.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1487
unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to make his premises available to a
union for the making of speeches prior to an election. Nothing in the Livingston
Shirt case suggests that the holding of meetings by employees in the plant during non-
working time is not a form of protected concerted activity. The type of meeting
involved in this case, a discussion of grievances by employees during nonworking
time with their duly certified representative is clearly a form of concerted activity
protected by the Act. Indeed, I can perceive nothing which can more closely
approximate the mutual aid and protection guaranteed by the Act than the employees'
discussion with their union representative of the grievances herein, one of which, the
vendor problem, affected their job tenure, and the other, the open louver, their
health and safety.86 For the foregoing reasons I reject the Company's contention
that Urban's suspension was based on activity unprotected by the Act, and I find
and conclude that Urban was suspended from his employment for engaging in pro-
tected concerted activity.
The Company further contends that its suspension of Urban does not constitute
an act of discrimination within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, because
its action in respect to Urban did not constitute the imposition of a discipline since
Urban was advised that if he was found innocent of the charges against him, he would
be recalled and paid for the time he lost. I regard this contention as wholly without
merit. Respondent' s action changed Urban's job status from that of a person
employed and working to one in a state of limbo who might or might not be recalled
to work. It is not necessary to establish the discrimination proscribed by Section
8 (a) (3) of the Act for the employee to have an actual monetary loss.87 It is suffi-
cient to establish the violation that Urban's job status was changed. This action,
regardless of motivation, necessarily discouraged concerted activity protected by the
Act. Accordingly, I find and conclude that by suspending Urban from his employ-
ment on the morning of September 27, 1957, for his "leadership" of the meeting of
September 26, the Company engaged in discrimination against Urban which dis-
couraged membership in and activity on behalf of the Society, and thereby engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
Moreover, I believe the record also amply sustains the General Counsel's allegation
that Urban's suspension was motivated by the Company's hostility to the Society. I
base this conclusion on the following considerations:
From the inception of the Society's organizing campaign, the Company demon-
strated its hostility to the Society by its disparate enforcement against the Society
of the rule prohibiting the distribution of literature on the Company's premises and
by not enforcing the rule in respect to UAW's like distribution of anti-Society litera-
ture. The Company's hostility to the Society was further disclosed by the remarks
of General Toolroom Foreman Bargiel to Society Treasurer Marler that the Society
was "causing a lot of trouble," "that he didn't want them in there," and that he
intended "to do his best to get them out of there." This hostility was further shown
by Bargiel's statement to Charging Party Pilawski that he should not wear the
Society's button in the plant. Additionally the Company admitted it was opposed to
the craft unit objective of the Society. The continuing animus of the Company
against the Society was demonstrated on September 27, 1957, by Ford's labor rela-
tions representative, Valenti, when he told Society President Joseph Urban that he
could not engage in organizational activity on behalf of the Society on the Company's
premises without limiting that prohibition to working time. From the foregoing, I
am persuaded and find that from the inception of the Society and continuing until
the time when the incidents upon which the instant charges are based occured, the
Company has been hostile to the Society and its objectives.
The manner in which and the nature of the charges preferred against Urban
persuade me that hostility to the Society was the motivating factor in Urban's suspen-
sion . There was, as heretofore found, no evidence of the existence of any rule pro-
hibiting "meetings" on company property, of any knowledge of the alleged rule on
the part of the Company's employees, or of prior enforcement of said alleged rule
against any employee. There was likewise no evidence that could support a reason-
able belief by the Company that there had been a formal meeting in the plant on
September 26, 1957, or that Urban acted as "chairman" thereof. On the contrary,
the record before the Company showed only that the alleged "meeting" was the re-
sult of Urban's informal request to UAW Committeeman Blake to discuss grievance
matters with "a couple [of employees who] were going to have dinner together."
86 See Salt River Valley Water Users Association, etc., 99 NLRB 849; Moss Planing
Mill Co ., 103 NLRB 414; Nu-Car Carriers, Inc., 88 NLRB 75.
87 M. Brown-Dunkin Company, Inc., 125 NLRB 1379 ; and Association of Motion Picture
Producers, Inc., et at., 79 NLRB 406, 490, where the discriminatees benefited monetarily.
1488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
There was likewise no evidence that Urban was responsible for the size of the
gathering 88 Valenti made no effort to elicit from Ligouri any facts upon which an
objective investigator would ordinarily rely in determining whether Ligoun's con-
clusionary accusations against Urban had any substance. Indeed, Valenti's leading
suggestion to Ligouri that a work stoppage had been threatened at the September 26
"meeting" and his inability to furnish a plausible explanation for making this sug-
gestion, are significant indications that the Company's alleged investigation of the
"meeting" was a farce and was intended only as a pretext for ridding itself of the
Society's principal proponent.89 In this respect, it is significant that even Ligouri's
statement did not name Urban as the person who had allegedly threatened a work
stoppage at the September 26 meeting and yet, Urban was nevertheless charged
with this baseless offense. Moreover, notwithstanding company efforts to obtain
corroboration of this charge, it was not supported by any witnesses and the Company
was subsequently forced to drop this charge.
Furthermore, the Company was unable to show any necessity for Urban's suspen-
sion from work pending "investigation" of the alleged rules infractions by Urban,
especially since the unauthorized "meeting" charge was admittedly not, in itself, a
dischargeable offense, and at the time of the suspension, UAW Officials Blake and
Hrabscak, who had been at the meeting, had already demonstrated the lack of merit
of the charge that Urban had threatened a work stoppage. The umpire decision
allegedly relied on by Valenti for suspending Urban was, as hereinbefore found,
inapposite to the situation in the Urban case, and I do not believe Valenti reasonably
could have or did rely thereon in suspending Urban. Valenti admitted that nothing
Urban had done indicated that he could not have been trusted to remain at work
pending the "investigation." 90 Valenti also was unable to furnish any plausible
explanation for the fact that Urban was provided with a security guard to escort him
from the plant, a practice previously utilized by the Company only in the case of em-
ployees who are discharged. I rely, finally, on the Company's disparate failure to
take any action against UAW Official Hrabscak, notwithstanding its knowledge that
in violation of company rules, Hrabscak, by his loud, vulgar, and profane shouting
and threat to fight, had caused the only disturbance which occurred at the "meeting"
which was otherwise peaceful and orderly and did not interfere with production.
For all of the foregoing reasons, I find and conclude that the Company's asserted
reasons for its suspension of Urban from his employment were pretextual and that
its action against Urban was motivated by its hostility to the Society and to dis-
courage membership therein. Accordingly, I find and conclude that by suspending
Urban from his employment because of its hostility to the Society, the Company
discouraged membership in the Society and activity in support thereof, and thereby
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of
the Act.
I have hereinbefore found that Urban was engaged in lawful protected concerted
activity by his arrangement of and participation in the "meeting" of September 26,
1957. Accordingly, insofar as Urban's subsequent discharge on October 8. 1957,
was based on his participation in said "meeting," regardless of the Company's moti-
vation therefore, it discharged Urban for engaging in protected concerted activity
and thereby the Company engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
Moreover, since I do not believe that there was any rule in the plant prohibiting
meetings on company property, and the evidence obtained by the Company during
its "investigation" of the charges against Urban between the date of his suspension
and his subsequent discharge by the Company on October 8, 1957, did not and could
not reasonably support the charge that Urban had acted as "chairman" or given
"leadership" to a "meeting" in violation of any rule of the Company, insofar as Ur-
ban's subsequent discharge was based on this alleged rule infraction, I am persuaded
and find for the same reasons hereinbefore explicated in respect to Urban's suspen-
sion , that this assigned reason for Urban's discharge was pretextual and that the
Company was motivated by hostility to the Society. I am further persuaded by the
record herein that nothing that Urban said or did while he was being checked out
sa See like finding of Michigan Employment Security Commission See B 7, paragraph 1,
supra.
zD See footnote 37 and B 2, paragraph 3, supra, for indications that even before the
"investigation" the Company had determined to take "action" against Urban and had
prejudged his guilt.
90 This is obviously distinguishable from the case allegedly relied on by Valenti that
involved an employee who had viciously assaulted his foreman , and if allowed to work,
might well do so again.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1489
of the plant on September 27, even assuming that Urban told employees he was
"fired," could be construed by any reasonable person as "instigation" of a work
stoppage or as "designed to instigate a work stoppage." On the contrary, the record
of Urban's admonition to his followers not to walk out on his account, his efforts
through employee Wellman to prevent a work stoppage, his prompt advice to those
who walked out to return to work, and the fact that of all the employees to whom
Urban spoke while checking out, only one participated in the work stoppage, all of
which was known to but studiously ignored by the Company, persuade me that the
Company not only could not reasonably believe but did not believe that Urban had
instigated the work stoppage and that insofar as the Company based its discharge of
Urban on his alleged instigation of the work stoppage, that reason was a pretext to
conceal its true motivation therefor, its hostility to the Society.
Accordingly I find and conclude for the reasons set forth above, that by discharg-
ing Urban from his employment on October 8, 1957, because of its hostility to the
Society, the Company discriminated against Urban in respect to hire and tenure of
employment, discouraged membership in the Society, and thereby engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.91
The unfair labor practice charges against the Company in respect to the suspen-
sion and subsequent discharges of Bialk, Huff, and Pilawski stand in a somewhat
different posture than that of Urban. According to the Company's answer herein,
these three employees were allegedly discharged by the Company because of their
"giving leadership to, instigating and participating in [the] unauthorized work stop-
page" on September 27, 1957. However, neither during the hearing in this case,
nor in its brief, did the Company contend that the discharge of these employees was
based on their mere participation in the work stoppage. None of the other em-
ployees who merely particiapted in the work stoppage on September 27 were dis-
charged, and the record does not disclose that the umpire has ever sustained the
discharge of any employee of the Company for mere participation in an unauthorized
strike 92 Accordingly, it is clear and I find that the Company based its discharge
of these three employees, not on their participation, but on their alleged "leadership"
and "instigation" of the strike.
The General Counsel alleges that the discharges of Bialk, Huff, and Pilawski by
the Company violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, on two grounds. The
first ground asserted by the General Counsel is that even assuming that these three
employees did in fact instigate or give leadership to the work stoppage of September
27, they had a right to do so because the strike or work stoppage in question was
caused by the Company's unfair labor practice in suspending Urban, and that,
therefore, the work stoppage was concerted activity protected by the Act, notwith-
standing the no-strike clause in the contract between UAW and the Company 93
In this respect, the General Counsel relies on the Supreme Court's decision in the
Mastro Plastics case,94 that a waiver of the right of employees to engage in a strike
caused by the employer's unfair labor practice will not be assumed but must be
"explicitly stated."
As hereinbefore found, the suspension of Urban on the morning of September 27,
1957, was an unfair labor practice by the Company within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The short work stoppage in which the employees
engaged on September 27, 1957, was caused by and was the direct and proximate
result of the Company's unfair labor practice in suspending Urban. Employee
Terrien, in response to questions by company counsel, agreed that he had walked out
of the plant in protest of the Company's action against Urban. Other employees,
including Charging Parties Bialk and Huff credibly testified that the motivation of
their participation in the short work stoppage was to "protest" the Company's action
in respect to Urban. Other employees testified credibly that they left the plant and
went to the parking lot for the purpose of ascertaining what happened to Urban and
to decide what action to take in respect thereto. Of course, there was no strike or
work stoppage while the employees were in the parking lot since they were then on
their lunch hour. However, as heretofore found, when the employees decided to
01 For the reasons hereinafter explicated in respect to my consideration of the dis-
charges of Bialk, Huff , and Pilawski, I also find and conclude that Urban's discharge by
the Company , even assuming arguendo , that he had instigated the work stoppage of
September 27, was based on Urban's protected concerted activity , and therefore also
violates Section 8(a) (1) and ( 3) of the Act on that additional ground.
92 Indeed , in the case of Huff, the charge was reduced by the umpire to "participation"
and Huff was reinstated to his job . See B 6, paragraph 3, supra.
93 See footnotes 34 and 49, supra.
94Ma8tro Plastics Corporation v. N.L.R .B., 350 U.S. 270.
1490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
leave the parking lot to go to the local UAW hall, a trip from which the employees
could not have returned before the conclusion of their lunch period, they were then
engaged in a strike or work stoppage . On the entire record, I am convinced and
find that the cause of the strike, whether expressed by the employees as a protest
against the Company's action against Urban or as an effort to ascertain what had
happened to Urban and to decide what action to take, was the Company's unfair labor
practice in discriminatorily suspending Urban for engaging in lawful, protected con-
certed activity and because of its hostility to the Society. Accordingly, I find and
conclude that the work stoppage on September 27, 1957, was an unfair labor practice
strike 95
In the Mastro Plastics case, supra, the Supreme Court said:
While we assume that the employees could have waived their right to strike
against such unfair labor practices, and that Congress by explicit statutory
provisions, could have deprived strikers, under the circumstances of this case,
of their status as employees, the questions before us are whether or not such a
waiver was made by the Carpenters in their 1949-1950 contract... .
The Court then held that the no-strike provision in that case which is substantially
identical to the contractual provision herein, 96 did not operate as a waiver of the
employees' strike which was caused by the employer's unfair labor practices. The
Court, in this connection said:
Whatever may be said of the legality of such a waiver [of the right to strike
against unfair labor practices] when explicitly stated, there is no basis for im-
plying its existence without a more compelling expression of it than appears in-
this contract. There has been no court decision called to our attention which
has held that the employees' right to strike against unfair labor practices has
been waived by language such as that which is before us.
Like the Mastro Plastics case, I find no language in the instant contract which waives
the right of employees to engage in a strike caused by the Company's unfair labor
practices.
Respondent Ford contends that the holding in the Mastro Plastics case should
be limited to cases "where such serious unfair labor practices had been committed
by the employer that the pledge not to strike could not be interpreted to be applic-
able." I find nothing in the Supreme Court's decision which supports the conclusion
that the holding in that case is limited to only "serious" unfair labor practices. In
any event, I regard the Company's unfair labor practices herein of interfering with
its employees' organizational rights and in suspending the leader of one of two con-
flicting unions for engaging in protected concerted activity and because of hostility
to that union, as among the most serious and fundamental unfair labor practices pro-
scribed by the Act. Accordingly, I find and conclude that the activities of Bialk,
Huff, and Pilawski in connection with the work stoppage of September 27, even
assuming that they included giving leadership to and instigation of the work stoppage,
were concerted and protected by the Act, and that the Company, by discharging these
three employees for engaging in such protected concerted activity, engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act97
95I reject as without merit, the Company's specious contention that the work stoppage
in question was not caused by its unfair labor practice in respect to Urban merely because
some employees expressed their reason for participation in the work stoppage as motivated
by a desire to ascertain what had happened to Urban and to decide on a course of action
to take Indeed, as aforestated, Respondent's counsel himself elicited from employee
Terrien that the stoppage was a protest against the Company's action against Urban.
On the record, there is no question that Urban's suspension was the only cause of the
work stoppage
5a In the Mastro Plastics case, the contract provided as follows :
5 The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement, there shall be no
interference of any kind with the operations of the employers, or any interruptions
or slackening of production of work by any of its members. The Union further
agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of
this agreement.
%Mastro Plastics Corporation v. N.L.R B., supra; of. Mid-West Metallic Products, Inc.,
121 NLRB 1317, where the Board concluded that a contractual provision not to strike
"until all steps in the grievance procedure-have been observed," was, by implication, a
waiver of the right to strike over unfair labor practices when the grievance procedure
could be completed in 5 days. The contract in the instant case does not contain a
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1491
The General Counsel also asserts that the Company's discharge of Bialk, an officer,
and Huff and Pilawski, organizers of the Society, violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act, because it was motivated not by a true belief by the Company that they
had instigated or given leadership to the strike or work stoppage on September 27,
but by the Company's hostility to the Society and by the activity of these three
employees on behalf of the Society. Although there is strong support in the record
to support this contention, in view of my finding above that the discharge of Bialk,
Huff, and Pilawski violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act because it was
based on their protected concerted activity, I do not regard it necessary and therefore
will not further burden this report with an analysis of the record or further find-
ings in this respect.
2. The unfair labor practice charges against UAW
As aforestated, the complaint herein alleges that Respondent UAW Local 228
attempted to cause and caused the Company to suspend , discipline and discharge
Urban, Bialk, Huff, and Pilawski and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act. The UAW officials
who testified in this hearing all denied that they requested the Company to prefer
charges or take any disciplinary action against the Charging Parties. Valenti, the
Company's principal witness, testified that the decision to take disciplinary action
against the Charging Parties was solely that of the Company and was not requested
by Respondent UAW or its officials. Notwithstanding the foregoing, I am none-
theless persuaded that the record sustains the complaint against UAW in respect to
,causing or attempting to cause the disciplinary action taken by the Company against
Urban. I base my conclusion in this respect on the following evidence:
There is no dispute that the Union was hostile to the Society and I have herein-
before so found. I have further found that immediately after the UAW officials
attended the meeting in the toolroom and participated in the discussion of the griev-
ances with Urban and the other employees, UAW Officials Modestino and Ligouri
reported back to Hockins what had transpired at the "meeting." 98 Moreover, I
have also found that when Ligouri asked Valenti the following morning what he was
doing about the meeting and Valenti replied that he was investigating it, the im-
plication is fairly obvious that the report of Ligouri and Modestino to Hockins of
the events of the day before was made with the expectation and intention that the
Company would take some action in respect to it. Moreover, the record discloses
that Ligouri furnished Valenti with his sworn statement accusing Urban of alleged
rule infractions with knowledge that it would be used by the Company in connection
with some disciplinary action against Urban. Thus, Valenti told Ligouri, "If what
you are telling me is true, you should not object to putting this in affidavit form, so
I would not be taking action against Mr. Urban on an unfounded statement, just be-
tween two conflicting parties." I am further persuaded that the action taken against
Urban was the result of UAW instigation by the falsity of the statement in Ligouri's
affidavit that a work stoppage had been threatened at the "meeting" and by the con-
-clusionary accusation therein that Urban was "the leader there." I also regard as
significant in this regard, the fact that based on Liguori's affidavit alone and without
any information in its possession upon which the Company reasonably could have
based a belief that the statement was true and without any investigation to deter-
mine its truth, the Company immediately preferred charges against and suspended
Urban. Indeed, Valenti admitted that Urban' s suspension was based solely on
Ligouri's affidavit. I have already found that Urban's suspension was a discrimi-
nation against Urban by the Company in respect to hire and tenure of employment in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Since that discrimination was
caused by Ligouri's affidavit given with knowledge that it was to be used for "taking
action against Mr. Urban," it follows and I find that the discrimination against Urban
was caused or attempted to be caused by Ligouri, an elected official of UAW. and that
UAW is responsible therefore 99 As aforestated, UAW Officials Ligouri, Modestino,
and Hrabscak cooperated with the Company in its "investigation" of the charges
comparable provision which defers strike action pending exhaustion of the grievance
procedures , and such procedures in the instant case , including submission to the umpire
for decision , requires from 6 to 8 , months.
98 See B 3, paragraph 2, supra; see also footnote 29.
99 My conclusion that UAW caused, or attempted to cause the Company to suspend
Urban is consistent with the veiled threat made to Urban by UAW International Repre-
sentative McIntosh because of Urban's advocacy of the Society, that, "Your neck is
sticking out."
1492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
against Urban and, indeed, supplied statements upon which the Company allegedly
relied in taking the action which it did against Urban. Since Urban was later dis-
charged by the Company inter alia, because he had acted as chairman or given leader-
ship to the meeting, the charge which was based on the affidavit of UAW Official
Ligouri, I am persuaded and find that the discharge of Urban by the Company for
this reason was likewise caused or attempted to be caused by Respondent UAW, and
that thereby UAW engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act.
In respect to Bialk, Huff, and Pilawski, however, the only evidence in the record
which negates the testimony of the Company and the Union that the Company alone
was responsible for their selection for suspension and discharge is the obvious co-
operation of the Union in the inquisitorial "investigation" began on September 27,
by which the Company secured the statements upon which it allegedly relied to
suspend and discharge these three employees. I do not regard the said cooperation
alone as sufficient to establish that the Union caused or attempted to cause the Com-
pany to suspend and discharge Bialk, Huff, and Pilawski, and I shall therefore recom-
mend that the complaint against UAW in respect to these three Charging Parties be
dismissed.
3. The defense of the arbitration proceedings before the umpire
The Company contends that in view of the submission of their grievances by the
Charging Parties to the umpire pursuant to the collective-bargaining contract, in
accordance with the Board's policy of honoring arbitration awards as expressed in
the Spielberg case,100 the umpire's decision should be followed and the complaint
herein dismissed. In the Spielberg case, supra, and the Board's decisions in Hono-
lulu Star-Bulletin,101 and Monsanto Chemical Company,102 the Board expressed its
policy of favoring and adopting arbitration awards although not bound by law to do
so, but not where the award "is at odds with or repugnant to the Act." Thus, in
the Monsanto case, the Board refused to adopt an arbitration award sustaining the
discharge of an employee for nonpayment of union dues at a time when the Union
had no right to enforce a union-security clause in the contract because it had not
been authorized by a union-authorization election. The Board said in that case:
It is thus clear that the terms of the arbitration award directing the discharge of
McClellan unless he paid the dues in question were contrary to existing law.
There can be no justification for deeming ourselves bound, as a policy matter,
by an arbitration award which is at odds with the statute.
In this case, the Charging Parties were all discharged for engaging in protected con-
certed activities guaranteed to employees by the Act; Urban for giving leadership to a
meeting with fellow employees at lunch time and for allegedly instigating a work
stoppage to protest his unlawful suspension from employment for engaging in said
protected activity; and Bialk, Huff, and Pilawski for instigating a strike or work
stoppage to protest the Company's unfair labor practice inherent in Urban's sus-
pension. Under these circumstances, it would be repugnant to the Act's basic guaran-
tees of the right of employees to engage in protected concerted activity, to adopt an
arbitration award which sustained the Company's discharge of employees for en-
gaging in lawful protected concerted activity. Moreover, another reason exists for
not adopting or following the umpire's decision in respect to the Charging Parties.
The proceedings before the umpire were not fair and regular in that Accaicca, the
UAW official who represented the Charging Parties, admittedly called as his witnesses,
Modestino, Ligouri, Hrabscak, and Blake whose hostility to the Charging Parties'
interests, as evidenced by their statements to the Company, was already known. It
is apparent that an arbitration proceeding such as this, in which the Charging Parties
were represented by a union hostile to their interests, and in which the union repre-
sentative who was supposed to be the advocate of the Charging Parties, furnished
witnesses hostile to the latters' interests, is the very antithesis of a fair and regular
arbitration proceeding which the Board as a matter of policy will adopt.103
Accordingly, I reject as wholly without merit the Company's contention that the
umpire's decision should be adopted by the Board.
100 Spielberq Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080.
101123 NLRB 395.
102 97 NLRB 517.
103 Honolulu Star-Bulletin, supra.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY (STERLING PLANT, ETC.) 1493
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Company set forth in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the
several States, and tends to lead to labor disputes burdening commerce and the free
flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent Company has engaged in activities violative of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act and that Respondent Union has engaged in
activities violative of Section 8(b)(2) and (1) (A) of the Act, it will be recom-
mended that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies and purposes of the Act. Having found that the
Respondent Company discriminated against Joseph S. Urban and that the Respond-
ent Union caused or attempted to cause the Company to so discriminate, I will
recommend that the Company be ordered to offer Joseph S. Urban immediate and
full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position without pre-
judice to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and will also recommend that
Respondents Company and Union shall jointly and severally make Urban whole for
any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against
him, by the payment of the sum of money equal to the amount he would normally
have earned as wages from the date of his suspension on September 27, 1957, to the
date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period, with
backpay computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed by the Board in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 29,1-294. Having also found that
Respondent Company has discriminated against Elmer G. Bialk, Walter E. Huff,
and Thadeusz L. Pilawski in respect to hire and tenure of employment, I shall also
recommend that the Respondent Company be ordered to offer Bialk and Piluawski
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tion without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and to make
Bialk, Huff and Pilawski, whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered by
reason of the discrimination against them by payment of a sum of money to each
of them equal to the amount each normally would have earned as wages from the
date of his suspension to the date of the offer of his reinstatement,I04 less the net
earnings of each during said period, with backpay to be computed on a quarterly
basis in the manner prescribed above in respect to Joseph Urban.
I will also recommend that the Respondent Company make available to the Board,
upon request, payroll and other records, to facilitate the determination of the
amounts due under this recommended remedy.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committeed, the commission
of similar and other unfair labor practices reasonably may be anticipated. I shall
therefore recommend that the Respondents be ordered to cease and desist from in
any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to employees under the provisions
of the Act and from further discrimination against employees.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record of the
case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By causing the Company to discriminate against Joseph Urban in violation of
Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(b) (2) of the Act, and has restrained and coerced
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has
thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of employment of Joseph S.
Urban, Elmer G. Bialk, Walter E. Huff, and Thadeusz L. Pilawski, thereby dis-
couraging membership in International Society of Skilled Trades, Respondent Com-
pany has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3 )
of the Act.
3. By the foregoing conduct and by prohibiting employees from engaging in or-
ganizational activity and the discussion of grievances on company premises during
nonworking time, Respondent Company has interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has
104 Since Huff was reinstated by the Company on April 28, 1958, pursuant to the umpire's
decision, backpay for Huff shall terminate on that date.
1494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( I) of
the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
5. The General Counsel has not sustained the burden of proof of the allegations
contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint insofar as they relate to Elmer G.
Bialk, Walter E. Huff, and Thadeusz L. Pilawski.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
O