FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 25, 2020

14938010 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 25, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/938,010 11/11/2015 David A. HERMAN 83577521 2725
28395 7590 03/25/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
PRATT, EHRIN LARMONT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/25/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAVID A. HERMAN, OMAR MAKKE, and
NICHOLAS COLELLA
Appeal 2019-004837
Application 14/938,010
Technology Center 3600
Before ADAM J. PYONIN, MELISSA A. HAAPALA, and
AMBER L. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s rejection. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford
Global Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to a method and apparatus for “sharing a
vehicle’s state of health” to, for example, “ensure that there are no
diagnostic engine faults, brake faults or other critical faults in the vehicle
before sharing the ride,” or “to ensure that the rear child locks are not
enabled.” Title, Spec. ¶ 29. Claims 1–20 are pending; claims 1, 9, and 18
are independent. Appeal Brief Appendix 1–4. Claims 1, 9, and 18 are
reproduced below for reference (some formatting and emphases added):
1. A system comprising: a processor configured to:
receive a ride-hailing request including minimum vehicle
health standards;
determine that a health report, indicating vehicle system
health conditions, for a vehicle chosen to service the request,
meets minimum standards specified in the request; and
send the vehicle health report to a ride-sharing matching
system responsive to the request and determination.

9. A system comprising: a processor configured to:
receive a pickup request from a passenger device;
request a vehicle health report, detailing vehicle system
health, from a candidate vehicle; and
relay the pickup request to the candidate vehicle after a
health report is received, and responsive to determining that the
health report meets a minimum set of standards specified in the
pickup request.

18. A system comprising: a vehicle processor configured to:
determine that a local device m wireless communication
with a vehicle corresponds to a passenger device from which a
pickup request was initiated; and
transmit a vehicle health report directly to the local
device, upon receiving a report request from the local device,
after determining that the device corresponds to a device from
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which a passenger pickup request was received and that the
vehicle is tasked with fulfilling the request.

References and Rejections
Claims 1–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being patent
ineligible. Final Act. 2.
Claim(s) 18–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as being
anticipated by Le (US 2013/0273847 A1; Oct. 17, 2013). Final Act. 5.
Claim(s) 1–4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being
anticipated by Camacho (US 2014/0358896 A1; Dec. 4, 2014). Final Act. 6.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Camacho and Khanna (US 2015/0206267 A1; July 23, 2015). Final Act. 8.
Claims 6–8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Camacho and Le. Final Act. 9.
Claims 9–17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable
over Khanna in view of Camacho. Final Act. 11.

ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. Any arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to
make are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We
discuss each of the grounds of rejection below.

Patent Eligibility
The Examiner determines the claims are patent ineligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101, because “the claimed invention is directed to a judicial
exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea)
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without significantly more.” Final Act. 2 (emphasis omitted); see also Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (describing the two-step
framework “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.”).
After the filing of the Appeal Brief in this case—but prior to the
mailing of the Answer or the filing of the Reply Brief—the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application
of § 101 (“Guidance”). See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Notice”); see also
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October
Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf). “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Notice at
51; see also October Update at 1.
Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).2

2 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Notice - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial
exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, does the Office then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
We agree with, and adopt as our own, the Examiner’s eligibility
analysis in the Answer. Ans. 4–12. We add the following primarily for
emphasis and clarification with respect to the Guidance.

A. Step 2A, Prong One
Appellant does not challenge the Examiner’s analysis pursuant to Step
2A, Prong One of the Guidance. See Reply Br. 2 (challenging the “practical
application test” of Step 2A, Prong Two). In any event, we agree with the
Examiner’s determination that the claims encompass commercial
interactions and fall within the “certain methods of organizing human
activity” grouping of the Guidance. See Ans. 9–10. Claim 1 recites a
processor configured to perform the steps of receiving, determining, and
sending. The Examiner determines these limitations recite a judicial
exception:
The claim 1 limitations recite a series of steps a user follows to
request a vehicle health report which encompasses commercial
interactions such as marketing or sales activities or behaviors;
business relations; managing personal behavior or relationships
or interactions between people including social activities,
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teaching, and following rules or instructions that falls within the
enumerated group of “certain methods of organizing human
activity.”
Ans. 9, 10. The Examiner has properly analyzed the claim limitations with
respect to the abstract idea groupings under Prong One of the Guidance, as
the Examiner has identified the specific limitations in the claim that fall
within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in the
Guidance. See id.; Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Accordingly, we find no
error in the Examiner’s determination that the claims recite a judicial
exception under Prong One of the Guidance. See Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. 54;
cf. ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759, 768 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (“[T]he invention of the patent is nothing more than the abstract idea
of communication over a network for interacting with a device, applied to
the context of electric vehicle charging stations.”); Audatex N. America, Inc.
v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 703 F. App’x 986, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
proposed claims are directed to the abstract idea of “providing a vehicle
valuation through the collection and use of vehicle information.”); Vehicle
Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 635 F. App’x 914,
917 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The claims at issue are drawn to a patent-ineligible
concept, specifically the abstract idea of testing operators of any kind of
moving equipment for any kind of physical or mental impairment.”).
Additionally, the claim 1 limitations “receive a ride-hailing request
including minimum vehicle health standards,” and “determine that a health
report, indicating vehicle system health conditions, for a vehicle chosen to
service the request, meets minimum standards specified in the request” relate
to obtaining information and making decisions based on the received data.
See Spec. ¶¶ 2, 3. These limitations reasonably can be characterized as
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“[m]ental processes” that entail steps of “observation, evaluation, judgment,
opinion.” Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; see also October Update at 7, 8.
Accordingly, we conclude independent claim 1, and independent
claims 9 and 18 which include similar limitations, recite a judicial exception
under Prong One of the Guidance. See Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54; see also
October Update at 2.

B. Step 2A, Prong Two
Appellant argues the claims are patent eligible pursuant to Step 2A,
Prong Two of the Guidance. Specifically, Appellant argues:
under the practical application test, the claims unquestionably
present a practical application of the abstract idea, in that the
practical result of the claims is that a vehicle chosen to service
the request is able to report (or a report is provided about the
vehicle) that it meets the required minimum health conditions,
therefore confirming its eligibility to service the request. This is
a highly specific niche carved out by the claims, avoiding broad
pre-emption, and moreover this is plainly a practical application
that results in the practical solution of the vehicle being able to
confirm that it meets vehicle-health standards.
Reply Br. 2. Appellant further contends independent claims 1, 9 and 18
recite specific limitations that meet “the practical application test mandated
by the new guidance.” Id. at 3.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in determining the claims are
not integrated into a practical application under Prong Two of Step 2A of the
Guidance. See Ans. 10–12; October Update at 12, 13. The features relied
on by Appellant (such as with respect to minimum health requirements for a
vehicle) are part of the judicial exception discussed above in Prong One, and
do not comprise additional elements, individually or in combination, that
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integrate the exception into a practical application. See Notice, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 54, 55. Claim 1 recites the additional element of “a processor,” in
addition to the limitations reciting the judicial exception. Claims 9 and 18
recite similarly, at a high level, usage of generic computing equipment. See
Ans. 12. These claimed “additional element[s] merely recite[] the words
‘apply it’ (or an equivalent) with the judicial exception, or merely include[]
instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely use[] a
computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea.” Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Even if we consider the disputed limitations as additional elements,
we disagree with Appellant’s contentions that such limitations remove the
claims from the realm of ineligible subject matter. The claimed method
coordinates cars for ride hailing.3 That the claims may “improve a user
experience” does not integrate the recited exception into a practical
application. The claims do not change the underlying or other technology;
rather the claimed techniques merely communicate health reports for a
candidate ride-hailing vehicle. See Ans. 4, 5; cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v.
IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“This invention makes the
trader faster and more efficient, not the computer. This is not a technical
solution to a technical problem.”).

3 Separately, we note the claimed features, such as checking minimum
vehicle health standards for a ride hailing request, can be considered broadly
comparable to a taxi dispatcher or taxi stand coordinator assigning taxis
based on passenger requests (e.g., handicapped accessible taxis; child
booster seat availability, air conditioning status, etc.). See Spec. ¶ 41
(“[T]he passenger mobile device may connect directly to the vehicle in order
to both verify a previously received score and ensure that certain vehicle
systems (rear child locks, for example) are set to a passenger-preferred
state.”).
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Furthermore, we determine the specificity of the presently recited
techniques is insufficient to establish patent eligibility. See Alice, 573 U.S.
at 222, (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)) (“In holding that
the process was patent ineligible, we rejected the argument that
‘implement[ing] a principle in some specific fashion’ will ‘automatically
fal[l] within the patentable subject matter of § 101.’”). Similarly, any
questions on monopolization—or preemption—in the instant case have been
resolved by the analysis herein and by the Examiner. See Two-Way Media
Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“[W]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter under the Alice framework, as they are in this case,
preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.”).
Accordingly, we determine claims 1, 9, and 18 do not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54. As the claims recite a judicial exception and fail to integrate the
exception into a practical application, the claims are “directed to the . . .
judicial exception.” Id. at 54.

C. Step 2B
Appellant argues the “claims perform an atypical function, in that they
provide a health report about a requested vehicle. This is not common in
ride-sharing requests or taxi request, the current model is effectively ‘you
get what you get.’” Appeal Br. 6. Appellant further argues claim 18 is
patent eligible because “[i]t is not common for such devices (the ones used
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to request vehicles) to directly communicate with the vehicles, and yet this
claim provides for such communication.” Reply Br. 2.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs. Sending communications
between particular devices is part of the recited abstract idea discussed
above, and does not comprise additional elements, individually or in
combination, that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
See Notice, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55–56; see also id. at 55 n.24. Further,
Appellant has not persuasively shown the claimed elements, such as the
“local device in wireless communication with a vehicle” recited by claim 18,
are not well understood, routine, or conventional. See Ans. 12; Spec. ¶ 2, 3,
10 (“the process connects directly to the vehicle (via BLUETOOTH, WiFi,
or some other suitable wireless connection)”); 13–28; Camacho ¶¶ 2–6; Le
¶¶ 2–4.
We agree with the Examiner that the additional elements recited by
independent claims 1, 9, and 18—individually and in combination—are well
understood, routine, and conventional. See Final Act. 3, 4; Ans. 4, 5; Alice,
573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications
controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic
calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method
claims.”). Thus, the independent claims limitations, individually and as an
ordered combination, do not provide significantly more than the recited
judicial exception.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in determining independent
claim 1, 9, and 18 are patent ineligible.

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Anticipation
A. Claim 18
The Examiner finds independent claim 18 is anticipated by Le.
Specifically, the Examiner finds:
As claimed the vehicle processor configured to determine that a
local device in wireless communication with a vehicle is met by
the vehicle computing system structure from the Le reference.
The limitations of corresponds to a passenger device from which
a pickup request was initiated does not impact the system. The
system claim interpretation differs from a method claim
interpretation because the claimed structure must be present in
the system regardless of whether the function is actually
performed.
Ans. 13, 14.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s anticipation rejection is in error,
because “[t]he claims call for a specific determination” of whether a local
device “‘correspond[s] to a passenger device from which a pickup request
was initiated’[, which] significantly impact[s] the [claimed] system.” Reply
Br. 3. Appellant asserts this limitation is not disclosed by Le. See Appeal
Br. 14.
We are persuaded the Examiner’s rejection is in error. Le discloses
“health and wellness, or vehicle safety applications can send output to the
vehicle for delivery to a driver.” Le ¶ 39 (emphasis added). Claim 18, in
contrast, recites “transmit a vehicle health report directly to the [passenger’s]
local device . . . after determining that the device corresponds to a device
from which a passenger pickup request was received.” That is, the claimed
steps require a determination of a particular device to transmit certain data.
We agree with Appellant that the determination and transmitting limitations
are accorded patentable weight, and the Examiner has not identified a
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disclosure in the cited reference relating to such limitations. See Reply Br.
3.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 18.

B. Claim 1
Appellant argues the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of independent
claim 1 is in error, because “claim 1 recites, inter alia, ‘send the vehicle
health report to a ride-sharing matching system responsive to the request and
determination,’” whereas Camacho’s “individual vehicle health reports
(specifically those corresponding to vehicles determined to meet specified
standards as claimed) never appear to be sent anywhere.” Appeal Br. 14, 15.
Appellant contends Camacho merely sends “a list of vehicles, not [] health
reports on those vehicles,” as the “vehicle database uses the parameters
specified by a user to cull out a set of vehicles . . . and then returns the listing
of vehicles deemed.” Id. at 15.
We are persuaded the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 1 is
in error. The Examiner finds “the Camacho reference ratings engine sends
operational health of an identified vehicle which represents individual
vehicle health report(s) to the multi-user vehicle database,” because
Camacho discloses “the vehicle and user information is transferred from
vehicles and ratings server to the multi-user vehicle database query engine
for rendering a variety of individualized ratings.” Ans. 15; Camacho ¶¶ 17,
19, 23, 49, 54. We agree with Appellant that this does not meet the claim
requirements.
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Camacho’s vehicle information is forwarded to a database and query
engine during operation of the vehicles. Camacho ¶ 23, 49, 54; see also
Camacho ¶¶ 17, 19). Camacho, as cited by the Examiner, stores the vehicle
information in the database for later use, such as for assigning a vehicle in
response to a vehicle request. See Final Act. 6; Camacho ¶ 23 (“[D]atabase
and query engine 109 maintains a multitude of both current status
information as well as historical information (both driver and vehicle) upon
which rating criteria are applied to render vehicle and driver ratings.”). As
the cited portions of Camacho have already stored the health information,
they do not send a health report in response to a ride-hailing request.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown Camacho
discloses the claim 1 limitation of “send[ing] the vehicle health report to a
ride-sharing matching system responsive to the request and determination.”
See Reply Br. 4. Accordingly, we find the Examiner’s anticipation rejection
of independent claim 1 is in error. We do not sustain the Examiner’s
anticipation rejection of independent claim 1.

Obviousness
A. Claim 9
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9 is in error
because, in Khanna and Camacho, “there is never a teaching of requesting a
vehicle health report from a vehicle that is later sent a pickup request
responsive to receiving the report.” Appeal Br. 17. Appellant contends the
combination of cited references “lacks the components of requesting the
health report and relaying the request to the vehicle responsive to receiving
the health report and determining that the minimum standards are met.” Id.
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We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding the limitations of
claim 9 to be obvious in view of the combined teachings of Khanna and
Camacho. The Examiner finds Khanna teaches the claimed “receive a
pickup request from a passenger device,” and “relay the pickup request to
the candidate vehicle after a . . . report is received, and responsive to
determining that a . . . report meets a minimum set of standards specified in
the pickup request.” Final Act. 12. We agree, because Khanna teaches a
pickup request is relayed to a vehicle selected by a user from a list of
vehicles meeting a minimum set of criteria.4 See Khanna ¶ 14 (“When the
[pickup] request is sent to the transportation service, a set of drivers that are
available to fulfill the request is determined and provided to the user. The
list of available drivers is . . . sorted based on any suitable criteria” including
criteria “preferred by the user.”); Khanna ¶ 15 (“When a user selects a
particular driver from the list of drivers provided to the user’s client device,
a request is sent to the driver.”). The Examiner further correctly finds
Camacho teaches the claimed “request a vehicle health report, detailing
vehicle system health, from a candidate vehicle.” Final Act. 12; Camacho
¶ 54 (“[V]ehicle and user data of the types enumerated in FIG. 2 is acquired
by telematics units . . . incorporated into vehicles. Such vehicle and user
information is transferred from vehicles, via the telematics units and the
ratings server 145, to the multi-user vehicle database and query engine
109.”).

4 Separately, we note claim 9 recites “request a vehicle health report” and
“after a health report is received” (emphases added), such that the claim
does not require the received health report to be the requested vehicle health
report.
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We note claim 9 requires the pickup request is relayed to a vehicle
after a health report is received, but does not state a timeframe for requesting
a vehicle health report from the vehicle. Thus, we agree with the Examiner
that one of ordinary skill would use Camacho’s teaching of requesting and
storing a candidate vehicle health report for later use, in Khanna’s system of
relaying a pickup based on user-specified criteria. See Final Act. 12, 13;
Khanna ¶¶ 12–15; Camacho ¶ 41. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the
Examiner errs in finding the limitations of claim 9 to be obvious in view of
the combined teachings of the references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not . . . that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references.
Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”)
We sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent
claim 9.
CONCLUSION
We are persuaded the Examiner errs in finding independent claims 1
and 18 are anticipated by the cited references. Thus, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of these claims. We further do not sustain
the rejections of claims 2–8, 19, and 20 dependent from claims 1 or 18.
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding claims 1, 9, and 18
are patent ineligible, and claim 9 is obvious in view of the cited references.
Appellant does not present separate substantive arguments for the claims
dependent thereon. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s eligibility rejection of
claims 1–20 and the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 9–17.
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The Examiner’s decision is affirmed because we have affirmed at
least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
18–20 102(a)(1) Le 18–20
1–4 102(a)(2) Camacho 1–4
5 103 Camacho, Khanna 5
6–8 103 Camacho, Le 6–8
9–17 103 Khanna, Camacho 9–17
Overall
Outcome
1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED