Ford Global Technologies, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 18, 2020

15498027 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 18, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/498,027 04/26/2017 John Michael Galan Ferrer 83795244(65080-2414) 4881
113140 7590 09/18/2020
Bejin Bieneman PLC
Ford Global Technologies, LLC
2000 Town Center
Suite 800
Southfield, MI 48075
EXAMINER
TO, TUAN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/18/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@b2iplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOHN MICHAEL GALAN FERRER, JAYANTHI RAO, and
VICTORIA LEIGH SCHEIN
Appeal 2020-001416
Application 15/498,027
Technology Center 3600
Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, CARL M. DEFRANCO, and
ERIC C. JESCHKE, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-001416
Application 15/498,027
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a blind spot object detection system and
method. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A system, comprising a computer including a processor and a
memory, the memory storing instructions executable by the
processor to:
identify a destination roadway lane that is separated from
a current roadway lane of a vehicle by at least one intervening
roadway lane; and
upon determining that a blind spot of an operator of the
vehicle, extending across a roadway lane between the destination
roadway lane and the current roadway lane and into the
destination roadway lane, is free of objects, actuate a means for
providing an alert.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Basson US 2009/0063053 A1 Mar. 5, 2009
Belcher US 2013/0201012 A1 Aug. 8, 2013
Kuwabara US 2014/0081566 A1 Mar. 20, 2014
Shiraishi US 2016/0355178 A1 Dec. 8, 2016

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–9 and 11–19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Shiraishi, Kuwabara, and Basson. Final Act. 3.
Claims 10 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Shiraishi, Kuwabara, Basson, and Belcher. Final Act. 5.

Appeal 2020-001416
Application 15/498,027
3
OPINION
Claims 1, 2, 4–12, 14–20
Claim 1 is representative of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, 14–19 pursuant
to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Separate arguments are not presented for
claims 10 and 20, which we presume Appellant intended to argue based only
on dependency from their respective parent claims.
The Examiner relies on Shiraishi as disclosing the basic system of
claim 1 albeit without blind spot detection in a “destination roadway lane
that is separated from a current roadway lane of a vehicle by at least one
intervening roadway lane,” for which the Examiner relies on Kuwabara, and
“an alert” for which the Examiner relies on Basson. Final Act. 3–4.
Appellant and the Examiner appear to be in general agreement that Shiraishi
discloses at least some sort of “blind spot” detection scheme, but, arguably,
that detection extends only into an adjacent lane as opposed to “across” it
and into a “lane that is separated from a current roadway lane of a vehicle by
at least one intervening roadway lane.” Appeal Br. 9 (“The sensors [of
Shiraishi] 10 have specific areas of detection and define a blind spot D1 that
extends only into an adjacent lane.”).
Appellant argues that “blind spot” should be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. Appeal Br. 7–8. However, Appellant does not apprise us
of any instances in which this has not been done by the Examiner. Appellant
presents the ordinary and customary meaning of “blind spot” but Appellant
does not present any evidence or argument to demonstrate that Kuwabara, a
reference from the same art, uses the term “blind spot” in any way that is
inconsistent with that plain and ordinary meaning. Kuwabara might not
provide the elaborate definition of the phrase Appellant supplies, specifically
relating Kuwabara’s sensor areas to Kuwabara’s mirrors (Appeal Br. 11).
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Application 15/498,027
4
However, absent evidence to the contrary, it is a fair assumption that
references deriving from the same art share the same lexicon. In re
Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Prior art references may
be ‘indicative of what all those skilled in the art generally believe a certain
term means . . . [and] can often help to demonstrate how a disputed term is
used by those skilled in the art.’”). Indeed, Kuwabara acknowledges that one
skilled in the art would know what a “blind spot” is, and also acknowledges,
albeit generally, it is a function of the capabilities of the vehicle’s mirrors:
It is well known that an inner rearview mirror (rearview mirror)
and outer view mirrors (door mirrors or fender mirrors) in a
vehicle can have a blind spot that corresponds to a rearward area
on the left or right side of the vehicle.
Kuwabara para. 5.
It is not apparent what logical or evidentiary basis Appellant has for
the remark: “what the Final Office Action contended is Kuwabara’s
disclosure blind spots is in fact Kuwabara’s disclosure of sensor ranges, and
therefore irrelevant to the present claims’ recited blind spots.” Appeal Br. 9.
Though the precise areas themselves differ somewhat in the embodiments
depicted in Figures 1 and 9, Kuwabara consistently, and expressly, equates
the sensor detection areas or ranges 61, 62 as corresponding to the “blind
spot.” Ans. 11 (citing Kuwabara para. 29 and detection areas 61, 62 (“In
FIG. 1, the blind spot corresponds to areas 61 and 62 defined by the radial
lines.”)); see also Kuwabara Fig. 9 (cited at Final Act. 3) and para. 72
(discussing the difference in areas 61, 62 between Figures 1 and 9). The fact
that the example illustrated in Figure 9 of Kuwabara depicts only a vehicle
in an adjacent lane 52 (Appeal Br. 10) is of no moment as the detection area
clearly includes, and the system considers vehicular presence in, a lane
Appeal 2020-001416
Application 15/498,027
5
“separated from a current roadway lane of [vehicle 41] by at least one
intervening roadway lane.” Kuwabara’s system operates to provide a
warning to the driver of vehicle 41 so long as a vehicle is within the blind-
spot region, regardless of whether another vehicle 42 is in the adjacent lane
or a separated lane, and regardless of whether the intent of the driver of
vehicle 42 is to change to the adjacent lane or the separated lane. Kuwabara
paras. 28–29; Fig. 5 (steps S43, S44). We see no basis for Appellant’s
conclusion: Kuwabara does not teach or suggest “‘a blind spot’ as recited in
claim 1.” Appeal Br. 10.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1, 2, 4–12, and 14–19.

Claims 3 and 13
Appellant is reminded of the obligation under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) to define the claim grouping for our consideration. Here,
we will give Appellant the benefit of the doubt and assume Appellant
intended to include claim 13 with the arguments presented regarding claim
3, as the claims recite limitations that would raise substantially the same
issues. Appeal Br. 11.
With regard to claim 3, and presumably claim 13, Appellant argues:
Basson discloses passively detecting vehicles in the blind spot
and actuating indicators when the vehicles enter the blind spot
but does not teach or suggest any active actuation of the vehicle
to clear the blind spot.
Appeal Br. 11.
The Examiner points out that claim 3, unlike claim 2, does not require
any actual vehicular acceleration. Ans. 11. Indeed the Examiner is correct in
Appeal 2020-001416
Application 15/498,027
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this regard, and claim 3 does not depend from claim 2 to incorporate the
limitations of claim 2 either. Nevertheless, claim 3 does require processor-
executable instructions to actuate a means for providing an alert “upon
determining to accelerate the vehicle until the blind spot is free of objects.”
Claim 13 similarly requires a “means” for doing so. Thus, while, as the
Examiner points out, acceleration itself may not be required of claims 3 and
13, what is required is some software or other structure that will trigger an
alert if a determination is made to cause such acceleration. See, e.g., Ex parte
Schulhauser, Appeal No. 2013-007847, 2016 WL 6277792 (PTAB 2016)
(precedential). This differs from an alert actuated upon determining one or
more vehicles are in the blind spot (Ans. 11–12) and we do not find this
subject matter addressed anywhere by the Examiner.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3
and 13.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, and 14–19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Shiraishi, Kuwabara, and
Basson is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Shiraishi, Kuwabara, and Basson is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 10 and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Shiraishi, Kuwabara, Basson, and
Belcher is affirmed.
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Application 15/498,027
7
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 11–19 103(a) Shiraishi,
Kuwabara, Basson
1, 2, 4–9,
11, 12, 14–
19
3, 13
10, 20 103(a) Shiraishi,
Kuwabara, Basson,
Belcher
10, 20
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 4–12,
14–20
3, 13

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART