Ford Global Technologies, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 12, 2020

14628754 - (R) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 12, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/628,754 02/23/2015 Kenneth James Miller 83477607 1024
28395 7590 06/12/2020
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
SMITH, ISAAC G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3662
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/12/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte KENNETH JAMES MILLER,
DOUGLAS RAYMOND MARTIN, WILLIAM PAUL PERKINS,
and STEPHEN LI-CHUN SHEN
____________

Appeal 2019-005358
Application 14/628,754
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and
BRANDON J. WARNER, Administrative Patent Judges.

CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 on June 1, 2020, filed a Request for Rehearing (“Request”)
in response to our Decision dated March 30, 2020 (“Decision”). In the
Decision, we affirmed the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3–9, 11–14,
and 18–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over combinations based
on Tate (US 2012/0158227 A1, pub. June 21, 2012).
After consideration of Appellant’s Request, we do not modify our
Decision.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Ford Global Technologies, LLC as the
applicant and real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2019-005358
Application 14/628,754

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APPELLANT’S ASSERTIONS
Appellant asserts that we failed to properly account for the fact that
Tate’s engine may be running during a period of time or distance and,
therefore, “does not equate to an expected time duration of electric-only
operation.” Request 2.
ANALYSIS
Requests for Rehearing are limited to matters overlooked or
misapprehended by the Board in rendering the original decision. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.52. A request for rehearing “‘must state with particularity the
points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the Board”’
and “must specifically recite ‘the points of law or fact which appellant feels
were overlooked or misapprehended by the Board.”’ Ex parte Quist, 95
USPQ2d 1140, 1141 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (quoting MPEP
§ 1214.03).
A request for rehearing may not rehash arguments originally made in
the briefs. A request for rehearing is not an opportunity to merely express
disagreement with a decision. The proper course for an applicant
dissatisfied with a Board decision is to seek judicial review, not to file a
request for rehearing to reargue issues that have already been decided.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145.
With respect to the Tate reference, Appellant argues that “as pointed
out” in the Reply Brief, the amount of electricity predicted to be consumed
over a specified period of time and/or distance is made regardless of whether
the vehicle is in electric-only mode or not. Reply Br. 2. Appellant, again,
refers to its Reply Brief as previously arguing that:
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Application 14/628,754

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Tate is concerned with the electricity consumed to travel some
distance to a next charge station—not an expected time duration
of electric-only operation. An expected time duration of
electric-operation would serve no purpose within the context of
Tate, and therefore is not suggested by Tate.
Id. In reaching our Decision, we considered these arguments from
Appellant’s Reply Brief. Appellant does not explain how we
“misapprehended” either the facts or law apart from reaching an outcome
with which Appellant disagrees. Id.
In reaching our Decision, we found that Tate is directed to a system
for maximizing the electric-only range of a hybrid vehicle. Decision 9,
citing Tate, Abstract, ¶ 13. We also quoted Tate as teaching a system
“configured to maximize the electric-only driving range” of the vehicle.
Decision 9, quoting Tate ¶ 14. We also noted, approvingly, that the
Examiner considers converting statistics from distance into time as obvious
and trivial to one of ordinary skill in the art. Decision 8–9, citing Ans. 11.
Tate monitors the state of charge (“SOC”) of a vehicle battery and
charges the battery sufficiently to reach a charging station using electric-
only operation. Tate ¶¶ 4–5. Tate discloses using electronic computing and
storage to manipulate and store vehicle performance values and other
operating data. Tate ¶ 21. Such data includes driver behavior, vehicle speed
history, HVAC usage history, location history, dates and time of day when
the vehicle is operated, odometer readings, and historical fuel consumption.
Id. ¶¶ 22–24. In our Decision, we found that Tate’s system predicts the
amount of electricity that would likely be consumed over a specified period
of time. Decision 9, citing Tate ¶ 25.
Rudimentary algebra informs us that if a Tate vehicle traveling at 60
miles per hour needs to reach a charging station located 60 miles away and,
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Application 14/628,754

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therefore, increases its SOC range to 60 miles, Tate can calculate an SOC
duration of one hour. Logic, experience, and common sense informs us that
a vehicle operator could benefit from knowing how much time is required to
reach a charging station just as much as knowing how much distance must
be traveled to get there. With this in mind, we find unpersuasive Appellant’s
argument that an expected time duration of electric-only operation “would
serve no purpose” in Tate. Request 2.
In reaching our Decision, we were not persuaded by Appellant’s
arguments that the invention of claim 1 amounts to a patentable
improvement over the applied art. We remain of similar mind after
reviewing Appellant’s Request, the Tate reference, and reconsidering our
Decision.
In conclusion, Appellant’s Request does not persuade us that this
panel’s Decision overlooked or misapprehended any matter or that we erred
in affirming the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–9, 11–14, and 18–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
Appellant’s Request has been granted to the extent that we have
reconsidered our Decision in light of the arguments in the Request, but is
denied with respect to our making any modification to the Decision. Upon
reconsideration, the outcome of our Decision remains unchanged and is
summarized in the following table showing the final outcome of the appeal
after Rehearing.

Appeal 2019-005358
Application 14/628,754

5
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
§ Reference(s)/Basis Aff’d

Rev’d
1, 3-9, 11-
14, 18-20
112 Written Description 1, 3-9, 11-
14, 18-20
11, 14, 19 112 Indefiniteness 11, 14, 19
1 103 Tate, Saitou 1
3-5, 8 103 Tate, Saitou, Heap 3-5, 8
6, 9 103 Tate, Saitou, Heap,
Dufford
6, 9
7 103 Tate, Saitou, Heap,
Thai-Tang
7
11 103 Tate, Saitou, Tsuchikawa 11
12, 13 103 Tate 12
14 103 Tate, Tsuchikawa 14
15 103 Tate, Tsuchikawa, Rosen 15
18, 20 103 Tate, Heap 18, 20
19 103 Tate, Heap, Tsuchikawa 19
Overall
Outcome
1, 3-9, 11-
14, 18-20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
DENIED