FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 16, 2021

2020004630 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 16, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/047,715 02/19/2016 Sangeetha SANGAMESWARAN 83613125 1442
28395 7590 09/16/2021
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL
1000 TOWN CENTER
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
EXAMINER
HUDA, MOHAMMED NURUL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2191
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/16/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SANGEETHA SANGAMESWARAN,
JASON MICHAEL MILLER, JOHN NAUM VANGELOV, and
BRENNAN HAMILTON
Appeal 2020-004630
Application 15/047,715
Technology Center 2100
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s rejection. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Herein, “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 15/047,715

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The Application is directed to “obtaining over-the-air (OTA) updates
that allow a customer to update vehicle software without having to visit a
dealer.” Spec. ¶ 34. Claims 1–20 are pending; claims 1, 8, and 15 are
independent. Appeal Brief Claims Appendix. Claim 1 is reproduced below
for reference (emphases and limitation lettering added):
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
detect a vehicle key-off;
[a] responsive to the key-off, delete from a primary
memory of an electronic control unit (ECU) an existing software
version for which a new software version update exists in a
secondary memory of the ECU;
load the new software version from the secondary memory
into the primary memory; and
[b] upon detection of a failure during the load, delete the
new software version from the primary memory and reload the
existing software version from the secondary memory.
References and Rejections
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious in
view of Danne (US 2015/0301821 A1; Oct. 22, 2015) and Sonbarse (US
2007/0067763 A1; Mar. 22, 2007). Final Act. 3.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make
are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We disagree
with Appellant that the Examiner erred and adopt as our own the findings
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and reasons set forth by the Examiner, to the extent consistent with our
analysis below. We add the following primarily for emphasis.
Limitation [b]
Appellant first argues Examiner error with respect to limitation [b]:
claim 1 recites, inter alia, “upon detection of a failure during the
load, delete the new software version from the primary memory
and reload the existing software version from the secondary
memory.” The Examiner cites Sonbarse as curing the deficiency
of Danne with respect to this teaching, but Sonbarse teaches
using the secondary memory, not “deleting the new software
version and/or reloading the version to the primary memory from
the secondary memory.”
Appeal Br. 5. Appellant contends “Sonbarse clearly teaches simply
switching which memory is used, never teaching deletion of the primary and
reload of the working version contained in secondary memory.” Id. at 6.
Claim 1 recites two memories, a “primary memory” and a “secondary
memory,” with the system loading both “the new software version” and “the
existing software version” from the secondary memory to the primary
memory. See Appeal Brief Claims Appendix 1; see also Fig. 6 (depicting an
internal memory, and a secondary memory storing differing software
versions). The Examiner cites Danne for teaching the primary memory and
loading the software versions; the Examiner relies on Sonbarse for teaching
storing software versions in a secondary memory. See Final Act. 4, 5. We
find the Examiner’s determination of obviousness in view of Danne and
Sonbarse to be reasonable.
The Examiner finds Danne teaches or suggests loading a new software
version into a primary memory (of a vehicle), and—upon detecting a load
failure—deleting the new software version from the primary memory and
reloading the existing software version. See Final Act. 3–4; Danne Figs. 1,
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2, ¶ 5 (“The processor may be further configured to flash one or more
systems using the one or more application files.”). Appellant does not
challenge these findings with respect to Danne. Thus, we see no error in the
Examiner’s citation to Danne, in view of the record before us. See Final
Act. 4; Danne ¶ 36 (“the software manager tracks information to be able to
rollback to a file that was an incomplete transfer or unsuccessfully
downloaded”), ¶ 39 (“manage the download of the file by disabling a
running process, replacing the file, and restarting the process . . . [or] by
installing a parallel copy of the file and replacing the original file when the
system detects a reboot”).
Sonbarse stores various software versions in a secondary memory.
See Final Act. 5; Ans. 6; Sonbarse ¶ 18 (“memory device 114 is a . . .
storage device containing at least two memory banks, primary program
memory 110 and secondary program memory 112.”). We agree with the
Examiner that Sonbarse teaches or suggests ensuring successful software
upgrades by using a secondary memory to store backup software versions,
because Sonbarse’s “secondary program memory 112 contains the prior
version of system software operating in target processor. . . . and each time
primary program memory 110 is upgraded, the prior version of system
software is transferred to secondary program memory 112.” Sonbarse ¶ 20;
Ans. 6. That is, Sonbarse stores the different software versions in the
different memory banks (110, 112) of a secondary memory.
Appellant attacks the teachings of Sonbarse (see, e.g. Appeal Br. 5),
but does not show the Examiner errs in finding one of ordinary skill would
“modify [Danne’s] invention for managing a vehicle software update by
combining the teachings of Sonbarse where secondary program memory is
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guaranteed to always have a known good version of system software that
can be used if an upgrade attempt is not successful” (Final Act. 6). See
Danne ¶ 40 (“may recognize that the one or more file downloads are
incomplete and/or corrupt, therefore the system 100 may . . . retrieve the
previous file(s) based on the rollback information.”); Sonbarse Fig. 3 (step
306 (“Is software header valid?”), step 314 (“Load software from secondary
memory bank”)). Accordingly, we are not persuaded of Examiner error.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Examiner that the
combination of Danne and Sonbarse teaches or suggests limitation [b] as
claimed.
Limitation [a]
Appellant next argues the Examiner’s rejection is in error because the
references do not teach or suggest the claimed limitation [a]: “responsive to
the key-off, delete from a primary memory of an electronic control unit
(ECU) an existing software version for which a new software version update
exists in a secondary memory of the ECU.” Appeal Br. 6. Particularly,
Appellant contends “the prior art actually stops the upgrade process at key-
off, saving the state thereof so it can be resumed upon key-on,” which “is the
opposite of what is claimed.” Id. at 7.
We note Appellant’s argument is not responsive to the rejection. With
respect to limitation [a], the Examiner cites Danne’s disclosure that “vehicle
computing system may have a vehicle key-off mode to allow the system to
store one or more application files . . . such that these file(s) may be
uploaded by the system for the next key-on event in operation.” Final Act 4
(quoting Danne ¶ 79); see also Final Act. 13; Danne Fig. 5. In response,
Appellant argues a key-on event is the “opposite” of a key-off event, (Reply
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Br. 2), but does not address the Examiner’s reliance on the entirety of
Danne’s process flow: Danne will install software at the next key-on event,
which follows a key-off event. See Final Act. 13; Danne Fig. 5; ¶ 39
(“installing a parallel copy of the file and replacing the original file when the
system detects a reboot”). That is, the Examiner finds that—although Danne
teaches an intervening key-on event—Danne’s processing is responsive to
the key-off event, within the meaning of the claim, because the software is
installed after the key-off event. See Final Act. 4; Danne ¶ 79.
More importantly, we find the disputed limitations to be rendered
obvious by Danne’s disclosure of key-off event processing. Danne’s
“software manager component may update system components that cannot
be updated while the user is using the system.” Danne ¶ 37; Final Act. 4.
Danne, thus, teaches or suggests the “responsive to the key-off event”
limitation, in order to ensure the user is not using the system. This is further
confirmed by Danne’s disclosure that “the server 61 may require the
download and/or flash of the one or more files to be performed at a key-on
or key-off event.” Danne ¶ 63. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner
that Danne renders obvious limitation [a].
CONCLUSION
We are not persuaded the Examiner errs in finding independent claim
1 to be obvious in view of the cited references. Appellant does not present
separate substantive arguments for the remaining claims. See Appeal Br. 7.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 1–20.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed
1–20 103 Danne,
Sonbarse
1–20
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED