Flyte Tyme Worldwide

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jun 3, 2014

04-CA-115437 (N.L.R.B. Jun. 3, 2014)

JD−31−14
Mahwah, NJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
FLYTE TYME WORLDWIDE
and 04–CA–115437
MATTHEW D. MILLER, ESQ., An Individual
Noelle M. Reese
for the General Counsel.
David G. Islinger, Esq. (Jackson Lewis, P.C.)
for the Respondent.
Matthew Miller, Esq. (Swartz Swidler, LLC)
for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint in this matter
alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining and enforcing an
Arbitration Agreement Policy (AAP) that requires its employees to “forego any rights they
would otherwise have to resolution of employment related disputes by collective or class action.”
The complaint also alleges that Respondent responded to a class action civil complaint against
Respondent in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey by filing a “Motion
to Dismiss and Enforce the Parties’ Agreement to Compel Arbitration” on an individual rather
than on a class-wide basis, thus further violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent filed an
answer denying the essential allegations in the complaint.
On April 10, 2014, I granted a joint motion to submit this case to me for decision on
stipulation of facts, thus waiving a hearing under Section 102.35(a)(9) of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations. The parties thereafter filed briefs, which I have read and considered.
Based on the entire record in this case, including the stipulation, the agreed upon exhibits,
and the briefs of the parties, I make the following
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Findings of Fact
The stipulation of the parties sets forth the following:
* * * * *5
5. (a) At all material times, Respondent, a New Jersey corporation with a facility in
Mahwah, New Jersey, has been engaged in providing interstate and intrastate limousine
transportation services.
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(b) During the past year, Respondent, in conducting its business operations described
above in subparagraph (a), received gross revenues in excess of $500,000, including gross
revenues in excess of $50,000 from its interstate operations, and performed services valued in
excess of $50,000 outside the State of New Jersey.
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(c) At all material times, Respondent has been an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent’s headquarters is located at 81 Franklin Turnpike, Mahwah, New Jersey
and it provides limousine transportation services out of five facilities in New Jersey, 20
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New York and California.
7. (a) Since March 2012, Respondent has issued to its employees the “Flyte Tyme
Limousine Driver’s Employee Handbook & Driver’s Guidebook” (Handbook), setting forth
terms and conditions of employment applicable to Respondent’s employees, and Respondent has 25
maintained those terms and conditions at all material times. A copy is attached as Exhibit 5.
(b) The Handbook includes in Section 6, pages 38 – 40 Respondent’s “Arbitration
Agreement Policy” (AAP).
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In pertinent part, the AAP provides that “You are required to arbitrate any and all
disputes, claims, or controversies (“claim”) against the Company that could be brought in a
court including, but not limited to, all claims arising out of your employment, the cessation of
employment or any other dispute, including any claim that could have been presented to or
could have been brought before any court.” Such claims specifically included those under the 35
Fair Labor Standards Act and other state and federal statutes, but were not limited to those
specifically mentioned. The AAP also provides that “all claims [are] to be pursued on an
individual basis only. By signing this Agreement you waive your right to commence, or be a
party to, any class or collective claims or to jointly bring any claim against the Company with
any other person,” with exceptions not relevant here. Exhibit 6 to the stipulation.40
(c) At all material times, Respondent has required as a condition of employment that
its employees to sign a “General Handbook Acknowledgement” (Acknowledgement), attached
as Exhibit 7.
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(d) By requiring employees to adhere to the AAP in the Handbook and by requiring
them to sign the Acknowledgement referred to above in subparagraphs (a) through (d),
Respondent has maintained and enforced the AAP.
8. (a) On or about July 12, 2013, Matthew D. Miller, Esq., representing Respondent’s 5
employee Christopher Burns and other individuals similarly situated, filed a class action
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that
Respondent was violating the Fair Labor Standards Act. A copy of the Complaint is attached as
Exhibit 8.
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(b) On or about October 22, 2013, Miller, representing Respondent’s employees
Christopher Burns, Arturo Torres, William Coffield, Mark Terry, Miguel Casanova, Ronald Lee,
Reginald Hayes, Dave Gardner and other individuals similarly situated, filed a “First Amended
Individual, Collective Action, and Class Action Civil Complaint” (a copy is attached as Exhibit
9) against Respondent in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging 15
that Respondent was violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, the New Jersey Wage and Hour
Law, the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law.
(c) On October 15, 2013, Respondent filed a “Motion to Dismiss and Enforce the 20
Parties’ Agreement to Compel Arbitration” (Motion to Compel) in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. A copy of the Motion to Compel is attached as Exhibit 10.
(d) On October 15, 2013, Respondent filed a “Brief in Support of Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss and Enforce the Parties’ Agreement to Compel Arbitration.” A copy is 25
attached as Exhibit 11.
(e) On November 18, 2013, Miller filed “Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Individual Arbitration.” A copy is attached as
Exhibit 12.30
(f) On December 30, 2013, Respondent filed “Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in
Further Support of its Motion to Dismiss and Enforce the Parties’ Agreement to Compel
Arbitration.” A copy is attached as Exhibit 13.
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(g) On January 10, 2014, Respondent filed “Answer and Defenses to Amended
Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Torres, Coffield, Terry, Casanova, Lee, Hayes, and Gardner.” A
copy is attached as Exhibit 14.
(h) On March 4, 2014, the Honorable Joseph A. Dickson, the United States 40
Magistrate Judge of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, issued his
Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Compel Individual
Arbitration denying the Motion. A copy of the Report is attached as Exhibit 15.
(i) On March 17, 2014, Respondent filed “Defendant’s Objections to Magistrate45
Judge Joseph Dickson’s Report and Recommendations.” A copy is attached as Exhibit 16.
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9. On April 13, 2012, Respondent required Christopher Burns to sign the “General
Handbook Acknowledgement” as a condition of employment. A copy is attached as Exhibit 17.
10. On April 6, 2012, Respondent required David Gardner to sign the “General
Handbook Acknowledgement” as a condition of employment. A copy is attached as Exhibit 18.5
11. Christopher Burns and David Gardner are the only employees named in the class
action lawsuit referred above in paragraph 8(b) that have signed the “General Handbook
Acknowledgement.” The other named employees referred above in paragraph 8(b) separated
from Respondent before the Handbook had issued in March 2012.10
12. (a) Employee Christopher Burns worked for Respondent as a driver from in or
around January 2010 to on or about June 3, 2013.
(b) Employee Arturo Torres worked for Respondent as a driver from in or around 15
2009 to in or around the end of 2010 and then again from in or around June 2011 to in or around
the end of 2011.
(c) Employee William Coffield worked for Respondent as a driver from in or around
May 2008 to in or around November 2011.20
(d) Employee Mark Terry worked for Respondent as a driver from in or around May
2008 to in or around November 2011.
(e) Employee Miguel Casanova worked for Respondent as a driver from in or around 25
April 2011 to in or around September 2011.
(f) Employee Ronald Lee worked for Respondent as a driver from in or around
September 2007 to in or around November 2011.
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(g) Employee Reginald Hayes worked for Respondent as a driver from in or around
April 2009 to in or around May 2011.
(h) Employee David Gardner worked for Respondent as a driver from in or around
February 2011 to in or around September 2012.35
13. Respondent’s employees are not represented by a labor organization at any of its
locations.
14. The parties stipulate that if Respondent’s Arbitration Agreement Policy is found to 40
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, then Respondent’s enforcement of the AAP by filing its
Motion to Compel described above in paragraph 8(c) likewise violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
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The Issues Presented1
1. Whether the Respondent’s maintenance and enforcement of its Arbitration
Agreement Policy violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5
2. If Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in the Complaint, what
is the appropriate remedy?
Discussion and Analysis
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As indicated above, the General Counsel alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining its AAP, which precluded employees from filing class action
arbitrations or lawsuits, and by enforcing its AAP by filing a motion to dismiss a class action
lawsuit filed by its employees and to compel arbitration under the AAP. I agree and find the
violations alleged.215
This case involves an application of the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton, Inc., 357
NLRB No. 184 (2012), which was denied enforcement in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir.
2013).3 In D.R. Horton, the Board held that an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
“requiring employees to waive their right to collectively pursue employment-related claims in all 20
forums, arbitral and judicial” because “the right to engage in collective action—including
collective legal action—is the core substantive right protected by the NLRA and is the
foundation on which the Act and Federal labor policy rest.” 357 NLRB No. 184, slip op. 12
(emphasis in original). The Board also concluded that its view was “consistent with the well-
established interpretation of the NLRA and with core principles of Federal labor policy” and did 25
not “conflict with the letter or interfere with the policies underlying the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) . . . .” Id., slip op. 10. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Board’s position on the latter
point. 737 F.3d at 361-363. But I am constrained to follow Board precedent that has not been
reversed by the Supreme Court or the Board itself. See Pathmark Stores, 342 NLRB 378 fn. 1
(2004); Iowa Beef Packers, 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963), enforced in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 30
1964).4

1 The issues presented section was part of the stipulation of the parties.
2 The parties stipulated that if Respondent’s AAP is found to violate the Act then Respondent’s
attempt to enforce the AAP by filing its motion to dismiss and compel arbitration is likewise unlawful.
3 The court of appeals enforced that part of the Board’s order dealing with a violation of Section
8(a)(1) because the arbitration policy in that case effectively prohibited the filing of a charge with the
NLRB. That issue is not involved in this case. Thus, Respondent’s contention (Br. 11) that the absence
of such language in this case requires dismissal of the complaint lacks merit. The alleged violation
dealing with interference with the substantive right to file class action lawsuits or arbitrations is separate
from any violation involving interference with filing charges with the Board.
4 I reject Respondent’s contention (Br. 14) that the Board’s D.R. Horton decision is “null and void”
because the Board did not have a valid quorum at the time it issued its decision. The Fifth Circuit
rejected a similar argument made in the D.R. Horton case itself, albeit for technical reasons. 737 F.3d at
350-352. More importantly, the Board has rejected the contention when it was raised in other contexts.
See Belgrove Post Acute Care, 359 NLRB No. 77, slip op. 1, fn. 1 (2013). And, as indicated above, I am
bound to follow Board law, unless or until it is reversed by the Supreme Court or the Board itself.
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Thus, I must reject Respondent’s suggestion (Br. 3-11) that I decline to follow the
Board’s D.R. Horton decision and instead rely on the Fifth Circuit’s denial of enforcement, as
well as Administrative Law Judge Bruce Rosenstein’s decision in Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
No. 14-CA-100530 (Nov. 8, 2013), which dismissed a similar complaint because, in his view, 5
the Board’s position in D.R. Horton is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). Judge Rosenstein’s decision
is pending review by the Board and has no independent precedential value. But, in any case, I
disagree with his view that American Express requires a decision contrary to that of the Board in
D.R. Horton. American Express did not involve the substantive Section 7 right of employees to 10
band together, including by filing class action lawsuits or arbitrations, which provided the
rationale of the Board’s D.R. Horton decision. Nor did American Express involve, as here, an
employer who compels its employees to waive their Section 7 substantive rights. Likewise
distinguishable for the same reasons is the Supreme Court’s decision in CompuCredit v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012), also cited by Respondent in support of its position.515
Alternatively, the Respondent contends (Br. 11-12) that the agreement in this case does
not fall within the purview of the D.R. Horton decision. In particular, Respondent contends that
the instant case is distinguishable from D.R. Horton because here, unlike in D.R. Horton, the
employees have filed a class action lawsuit and a district court has jurisdiction over a motion to 20
dismiss. It also contends that this case is different than D.R. Horton, where the employer
apparently refused to proceed with an arbitration proceeding, because here Respondent did not
interfere with the class action lawsuit and simply asserted what it viewed as legitimate defenses
to the lawsuit. These alleged differences do not require a different result in this case. The
gravamen of the violation both here and in D.R. Horton is the interference with the Section 7 25
right of employees to pursue a class action lawsuit or arbitration.
Indeed, the General Counsel contends (Br. 15), that this case has an even stronger basis
for a violation than in D.R. Horton because the employees of the Respondent, unlike those in
D.R. Horton, are involved in interstate transportation. See numbered paragraphs 5 and 6 in the 30
stipulation of the parties, set forth above. Thus, according to the General Counsel, the FAA
excludes from its coverage employees such as those involved in this case. In D.R. Horton, the
Board noted that the FAA does not apply to contracts of employment of transportation workers.
357 NLRB at slip op. 9, fn. 20, citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
Although Respondent’s employees are indeed interstate transportation workers, it is not clear 35
that they are exempt from coverage under the FAA.6

5 Both CompuCredit and American Express were decided after the Board’s decision in D.R. Horton,
but neither mentioned D.R. Horton.
6 The Supreme Court’s Circuit City decision mentions, as a rationale for the exemption,
Congressional concern with the transportation of “goods.” 532 U.S. at 121. That language seems to
undercut the General Counsel’s position because it is clear that Respondent’s employees primarily
transport passengers. On the other hand, it could be argued that, incidental to the transportation of
passengers, they also transport passengers’ luggage and perhaps, independently, packages. The
distinction between the transportation of passengers and the transportation of goods has taken on
particular significance in post Circuit City cases. See Kowalewski v. Samandarov, 590 F. Supp. 2d 477,
484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); and JetBlue Airways Corp. v. Stephenson, 931 N.Y.S.2d 284, 286-287 (2011)
(finding that eligibility for exemption hinged on the primary purpose of the industry, and, although
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I do not reach the transportation workers issue because it is not necessary to do so to find
a violation here, so long as the Board’s D.R. Horton decision is viable in its application to all
workers. Moreover, the Respondent did not brief the issue, choosing a broader attack on the
Board’s D.R. Horton decision. However, on review, the Board may decide to address this issue, 5
after full briefing. And, of course, it would be required to address the issue, should the Board’s
rationale in D.R. Horton that Section 7 trumps the FAA be rejected.
The Respondent further contends (Br. 14-16) that continued prosecution of this case
violates Respondent’s First Amendment rights and the administrative proceedings should be 10
stayed pending the final outcome of the parties’ litigation in the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey. That contention also lacks merit. In Bill Johnson’s v. NLRB, 461
U.S. 731, 747 fn. 5 (1983), the Supreme Court clearly stated that the Board could enjoin a
lawsuit that seeks relief that is unlawful under the National Labor Relations Act. And it cited
numerous authorities where that had been done and approved by the courts. Thus, the Board 15
need not await a determination by state or federal courts before it finds an unfair labor practice
for filing lawsuits contrary to Board law. Nor has footnote 5 of the Bill Johnson’s decision been
affected by the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in BE &K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536
U.S. 516 (2002). See J.A. Croson Co., 359 NLRB No. 2, slip op. 7-8 (2012).
20
Finally, I reject Respondent’s contention (Br. 16-19) that Section 10(b) of the Act
precludes any consideration of the charge and the complaint in this case. Respondent alleges
that the alleged unfair labor practice occurred only at the point in time when employees signed
the arbitration agreement, which would have been more than 6 months before the charge was
filed in contravention of Section 10(b). But, contrary to Respondent, the unfair labor practice 25
alleged in this case was not “inescapably grounded” on the signing of the agreements. Compare
Local Lodge 1424 v. NLRB (Bryan Manufacturing), 362 U.S. 411 (1960). The complaint
clearly states that the violation is based on “requiring employees to adhere to the AAP” and
alleges specifically that Respondent “has maintained and enforced the AAP.” G.C. Exh. 2,
paragraph 3(e). Moreover, the parties have stipulated that “[a]t all material times” Respondent 30
required that its employees adhere to the AAP as a condition of employment. There is thus no
doubt that the AAP was maintained and enforced from the date the AAP was imposed as a
requirement and throughout the employment of those who were bound by it. Indeed, the ultimate
act of enforcement of the AAP was Respondent’s filing in district court of its motion to dismiss
the lawsuit and compel individual arbitrations. And that action was eight days before the filing 35
of the charge in this case. Paragraph 1, Exhibit 1, of the stipulation. Accordingly, there is no
Section 10(b) impediment to the complaint. 7
40

JetBlue carried both passengers and cargo, the JetBlue pilots “primarily” moved passengers, and,
therefore, were not exempt from the FAA)..
7 Even apart from Respondent’s action in the district court, it is clear that the mere existence of the
unlawful AAP constitutes a continuing violation at all points during its existence. See Carney Hospital,
350 NLRB 627, 640 (2007) and cases there cited.
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Conclusions of Law
1. By maintaining and enforcing its AAP and by filing a motion to dismiss a class
action lawsuit filed by employees and to compel arbitration under the AAP,
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5
2. The above violations are unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act.
Remedy
10
Having found that Respondent committed the unfair labor practices set forth above, I
shall order it to cease and desist from such conduct and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. That includes the grant of litigation expenses, an
order that it withdraw its motion to dismiss and compel individual arbitration, and a broad
posting requirement at all of Respondent’s locations. Contrary to Respondent’s position (Br. 12-15
13), those remedies are traditional in cases such as this, where the Board finds that a lawsuit has
been filed or pursued in violation of the Act. See Allied Trades Council (Duane Reade, Inc.),
342 NLRB 1010, 1014 (2004); Federal Security, Inc., 359 NLRB No. 1, slip op. 14, including
fn. 123 (2012). See also J.A. Croson, cited above, at 359 NLRB No. 2, slip op. 10, citing
authorities for the notion that the grant of litigation expenses for maintaining an unlawful 20
lawsuit is a traditional Board remedy, although, in that case, the Board, citing special
circumstances not present here, declined to order that particular remedy. Likewise traditional is
an order requiring a notice posting at all locations where an unlawful rule or policy was in effect.
See Target Co., 359 NLRB No. 103, slip op. 3 (2013).
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On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the entire record herein, I issue
the following recommended8
ORDER
30
The Respondent, Flyte Tyme Worldwide, its officers, agents, successors and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from
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(a) Maintaining or enforcing a binding arbitration agreement (the AAP) that waives the
right to maintain class or collective action in all forums, arbitral and judicial.
(b) Enforcing such agreements by filing motions in court to dismiss collective action
lawsuits or arbitrations and to compel individual arbitration, pursuant to the terms of the AAP.40
(c) Requiring employees to sign binding arbitration agreements that prohibit collective
and class litigation in all forums, arbitral and judicial.

8 If no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be waived for all purposes.
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(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.5
(a) Within 7 days after the Board Order, file a motion with the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey in Case No. 13-cv-04297-ES-JAD, asking to withdraw the
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and Enforce the Parties’ Agreement to Compel
Individual Arbitration of the claims of Christopher Burns, Arturo Torres, William Coffield, 10
Mark Terry, Miguel Casanova, Ronald Lee, Reginald Hayes, David Gardner or otherwise raise
the Agreement as a defense to their claims in that action.
(b) Reimburse Christopher Burns, Arturo Torres, William Coffield, Mark Terry, Miguel
Casanova, Ronald Lee, Reginald Hayes, David Gardner for any legal and other expenses 15
incurred related to their opposing the Motion to Dismiss and to Compel Individual Arbitration or
any other legal action taken to enforce the AAP, plus interest in accordance with Board law.
(c) Rescind or revise the nationwide handbook provisions regarding the
AAP to make it clear to employees that the agreement does not constitute a waiver in all forums20
of their right to maintain employment-related class or collective actions.
(d) Notify employees of the rescinded or revised agreement by providing them a copy
of the revised AAP or specific notification that the agreement has been rescinded.
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(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all of its facilities where the AAP
has been in effect copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily 30
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of business or closed 35
the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since October 23, 2013.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director for40
Region 4 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region
attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.”
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Dated, Washington, D.C., June 3, 2014.
5
_________________________________
Robert A. Giannasi
Administrative Law Judge10
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain or enforce a binding arbitration agreement (the Arbitration Agreement
Policy or AAP) that waives the right to maintain class or collective action in all forums, arbitral
and judicial.
WE WILL NOT enforce agreements by filing motions in court to dismiss collective action
lawsuits or arbitrations and to compel individual arbitration, pursuant to the terms of the AAP.
WE WILL NOT require our employees to sign binding arbitration agreements that prohibit
collective and class litigation in all forums, arbitral and judicial.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 7 days after the Board Order, file a motion with the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey in Case No. 13-cv-04297-ES-JAD, asking to withdraw our
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint and Enforce the Parties’ Agreement to Compel
Individual Arbitration of the claims of Christopher Burns, Arturo Torres, William Coffield,
Mark Terry, Miguel Casanova, Ronald Lee, Reginald Hayes, David Gardner or otherwise raise
the Agreement as a defense to their claims in that action.
WE WILL reimburse Christopher Burns, Arturo Torres, William Coffield, Mark Terry, Miguel
Casanova, Ronald Lee, Reginald Hayes, David Gardner for any legal and other expenses
incurred related to their opposing our Motion to Dismiss and to Compel Individual Arbitration
or any other legal action taken by us to enforce the AAP, plus interest.
WE WILL rescind or revise our nationwide handbook provisions regarding our
AAP to make it clear to our employees that the agreement does not constitute a waiver in all
forums of their right to maintain employment-related class or collective actions.
WE WILL notify our employees of the rescinded or revised agreement by providing them a
copy of the revised AAP or specific notification that the agreement has been rescinded.
FLYTE TYME WORLDWIDE
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the
National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want
union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To
find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain
information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 710, Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
(215) 597-7601, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/04-CA-115437 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, (513) 684-3750