FLUOR TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 17, 2020

14459628 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/459,628 08/14/2014 Robert Van Velzen 1340US_4570-22501 1201
136940 7590 04/17/2020
Fluor Coporation
5601 Granite Parkway
Suite 500
Plano, TX 75024
EXAMINER
EL-BATHY, MOHAMED N
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
dallaspatents@dfw.conleyrose.com
intellectual.property.communications@fluor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROBERT VAN VELZEN and NARESH KAUSHIK
____________

Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, MICHAEL J. ENGLE, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 5–9, 12–16, 18, and 20–26.
Claims 3, 4, 10, 11, 17, and 19 are canceled. See Appeal Br. 5. We have
jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Fluor
Technologies Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628

2
The present invention relates generally to a project management
system. See Spec., Abstract.
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A project management system for a construction project,
the system comprising:
a project database storing project progress data with
respect to a first project discipline and a second project
discipline for the construction project, wherein the progress
data comprises a first set of progress data representing an actual
progress of the first project discipline and a second set of
progress data representing an actual progress of the second
project discipline; and
a project management engine coupled with the project
database and programmed to:
generate, from the first set of progress data, a first set of
forecasted progress data representing a prediction of future
progress of the first project discipline;
generate, from the second set of progress data, a second
set of forecasted progress data representing a prediction of
future progress of the second project discipline;
derive a forecasted concurrency metric as a function of
the first set of forecasted progress data and the second set of
forecasted progress data;
analyze the forecasted concurrency metric to identify a
potential defect in the construction project, wherein analyze the
forecasted concurrency metric comprises:
obtain, from the forecasted concurrency metric, a
forecasted temporal distance between a first forecasted
milestone of the first project discipline and a first forecasted
milestone of the second project discipline, wherein the first
forecasted milestone of the first project discipline is a time that
a task of the first project discipline is forecasted to finish,
wherein the first forecasted milestone of the second project
discipline is a time that a task of the second project discipline is
forecasted to begin;
obtain, from a benchmark concurrency metric, a
benchmark temporal distance between a first benchmark
Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628

3
milestone of the first project discipline and a first benchmark
milestone of the second project discipline, wherein the first
benchmark milestone of the first project discipline is a time that
the task of the first project discipline is planned to finish,
wherein the first benchmark milestone of the second project
discipline is a time that a task of the second project discipline is
planned to begin;
compare the forecasted temporal distance with the
benchmark temporal distance; and
identify the potential defect as a function of the
difference between the forecasted temporal distance and the
benchmark temporal distance;
generate a recommendation to avoid the potential defect,
and configure an output device to present the recommendation,
wherein the potential defect in the construction project is
corrected based on the recommendation,
wherein the first project discipline and the second project
discipline are different disciplines.

Appellant appeals the following rejections:
Claims 1, 2, 5–9, 12–16, 18, and 20–26 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Henry (US 2009/0055228 A1, Feb. 26,
2009), Dunne (US 2014/0344775 A1, Nov. 20, 2014), Danskin (US
8,775,229 B1, July 8, 2014), Fleiss (US 8,543,438 B1, Sept. 24, 2013), and
Blackburn (US 2009/0174768 A1, July 9, 2009) in combination with various
other prior art. See Final Act. 4–22.
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).

Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628

4
ANALYSIS
In reviewing Appellant’s various arguments, it appears that such
arguments are mainly emphasizing one particular feature in the claims, i.e.,
the first project discipline and the second project discipline are different
disciplines.
For example:
Appellant contends “the cited references fail to disclose two
differences (a forecasted temporal distance and a benchmark temporal
distance) between the two different project disciplines.” Appeal Br. 10.
Specifically, Appellant contends that “Danskin as a whole does not
expressly disclose the two different disciplines features of independent claim
1.” Appeal Br. 18.
Additionally, Appellant contends that “Fleiss’s disclosure of using
baseline algorithms and of using quality metrics compared against project
data . . . do not mean . . . two different project disciplines, and do not
provide any sort of logical bridge that would explain that Danskin’s
aggregation of resources . . . [teaches] two different project disciplines.”
Appeal Br. 22.
Furthermore, Appellant contends that “a prima facie case of
obviousness has not been made for independent claim 1 because the two
different disciplines features is not expressly, implicitly, or inherently
disclosed in any combination of Henry, Dunne, Danskin, Fleiss, Blackburn,
Hendrickson, and Bourne.” Appeal Br. 23.
In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, “[i]n regards to the
two different disciplines feature not being disclosed in the cited references
Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628

5
. . . , Danskin is not used to disclose this feature. Instead, Fleiss is used to
disclose this feature.” Ans. 5; see also Final Act. 9–10. While the Examiner
does rely upon Danskin to teach “forecasted and benchmark milestones in a
project schedule” (Ans. 6; see also Final Act. 8–9), it is Fleiss, not Danskin,
that the Examiner is relying on to teach a “multiple project schedule
environment,” i.e., different disciplines. Id.
For example, Fleiss teaches:
Example labor categories may include software architect,
software engineer, level-one programmer, level two-
programmer, test engineer, configuration and release engineer,
contractor, electrician, and so forth.
Fleiss 11:57–61.
Architecture 300 may establish project schedules for multiple
projects. Each project schedule may include but not limited to
details for schedule milestones, tasks including an assigned
generic labor categories, duration, and dependencies. . . . The
arrangement may support the examination of data sourced from
multiple concurrent proposed and active projects.
Fleiss 14:42–55. In other words, Fleiss discloses multiple projects, each
having different labor categories such as a software, test, and configuration
engineer, and so forth. We find Fleiss’ multiple projects and different labor
categories are consistent with the claimed “different [project] disciplines.”
For example, Appellant’s Specification states:
The progress data for each discipline is indicative of the
discipline’s progress toward completion of project activities
(e.g., tasks, projects, programs, etc.) with respect to time. For
example, the project database can store progress data with
respect to the process discipline, piping discipline, construction
discipline, or other disciplines.
Spec. ¶ 11.
Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628

6
Complicated projects such as construction of a nuclear power
plant usually involve multiple disciplinary areas. For example,
a construction project can involve a planning discipline, a
design discipline, an engineering discipline, a process
discipline, a piping discipline, a maintenance discipline, an
inspection discipline, a procurement discipline, a construction
discipline, and a training discipline. Each of these disciplines
can include tasks and sub-projects that contribute to the
completion of the project.
Spec. ¶ 38. In other words, similar to Fleiss’ above-noted teachings,
Appellant’s Specification also describes different engineering disciplines.
As such, we find unavailing Appellant’s contention that the combined cited
art, particularly Fleiss, does not teach “different disciplines” given the
aforementioned disclosures.
Furthermore, we note that Appellant’s argument against Danskin
separately from Fleiss does not persuasively rebut the combination made by
the Examiner. One cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually, where the rejections are based on combinations of references.
In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller,
642 F.2d 413, 425–26 (CCPA 1981). Specifically, Appellant’s arguments
do not take into account what the collective teachings of the prior art would
have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art and are therefore ineffective
to rebut the Examiner’s prima facie case of obviousness. See In re Keller,
642 F.2d at 425 (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the
primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.”) (Citations omitted).
Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628

7
Regarding Appellant’s argument that “the Examiner’s conclusion is
based [on] probabilities and possibilities that Danskin’s general disclosure
. . . [shows] two different project disciplines” (Appeal Br. 20), we note
firstly that the Examiner is not relying on Danskin for this teaching, and
secondly, as noted supra, that the Examiner has found actual teachings in
Fleiss. Thus, the aforementioned argument is misplaced and unpersuasive.
Appellant further contends that “Danskin’s express disclosure leads
away from any attempt to interpret Danskin’s aggregation of resources to
read on Appellant’s two different disciplines feature, and the Examiner has
not cited to any other reference” (Appeal Br. 23), and “the record is empty
of any rationale to modify the combination of cited references such that the
two different disciplines feature is disclosed and/or rendered obvious.” Id. at
24.
Here again, Appellant is placing an emphasis on Danskin to teach
“different disciplines” when the Examiner is relying on another reference,
i.e., Fleiss. Furthermore, we do not find, and Appellant does not establish,
that Danskin criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the use of
different disciplines. “The prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one
alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives
because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage
the solution claimed . . . .” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
Also, we find unavailing Appellant’s aforementioned argument that
the Examiner did not provide any rationale to modify, given the explicit
rationale in the Final Action, i.e., “in an effort to improve an organization’s
Appeal 2019-006257
Application 14/459,628

8
enterprise wide labor resource allocation over their project portfolio.” See
Final Act. 10.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of representative
claim 1. Appellant does not separately argue claims 2, 5–9, 12–16, 18, and
20–26 but, instead, relies on the arguments presented with respect to claim 1.
See Appeal Br. 24. Accordingly, we are also not persuaded the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 2, 5–9, 12–16, 18, and 20–26, for the same reasons
discussed supra.

CONCLUSION
All of the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 2, 5–9, 12–16, 18, and
20–26 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are affirmed.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 5–9, 12–
16, 18, 20–26
103 (at least) Fleiss,
Danskin
1, 2, 5–9,
12–16,
18, 20–26

No period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED