Florida Wire & Cable, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 26, 2001

333 N.L.R.B. 378 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 378
Florida Wire & Cable, Inc. and United Steel Workers
of America, Local 9292, AFL–CIO–CLC. Cases
12–CA–19534, 12–CA–19587, and 12–CA–19711
February 26, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND HURTGEN
On September 20, 2000, Administrative Law Judge
Howard I. Grossman issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions, a supporting
brief, and an answering brief to the Respondent’s excep-
tions. The Respondent filed a reply to the answering
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW2
Substitute the following for paragraphs 7(b) and (c) in
the conclusions of law.
“(b) Failing to reinstate timely to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent positions, William Carter, Randolph
Cooke, Matthew Couitcher, Dwayne Cuthbert, Glenn
Gray, Gladys Jackson, Vandell Johnson, Lau Letioa,
Edward Norman, David Paquay, Raymond Proctor,
Theron Ring, John Toothman, Curtis Walker, and James
Walker.
“(c) Delaying the timely reinstatement of Keith Avin-
ger, Anthony Beckett, Alvin Champion, Roy Crumpler,
Calvin Gissentanner, Lloyd Goff, Larry Hudson, Rodney
Jefferson, Eulie Johnson, Myron Kelly, Ray Lewis,
Randy Nelson, Charles Pettyjohn, George Turner, John
Wheeler, and Charles Whitley.”

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
Member Hurtgen agrees with the findings of the judge. He would,
however, disavow any implication that departmental seniority is always
the preferred standard to apply in recalling strikers. See his partial
dissent in Alaska Pulp Corp., 326 NLRB 522 (1998), enf. denied 231
F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2000).
2 In accord with the General Counsel’s exceptions, we will amend
the conclusions of law to add the names of five former strikers that
were inadvertently omitted in the judge’s decision. We will also substi-
tute the attached “Notice,” containing the additional names and previ-
ously omitted standard remedial language, for that of the administrative
law judge.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Florida Wire & Cable, Inc.,
Jacksonville, Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order, ex-
cept that the attached notice shall be substituted for that
of the administrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT solicit employees to resign from the
Union.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they have to re-
sign from the Union in order to work past the expiration
date of a current collective-bargaining agreement.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they will never be
reinstated to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge employees
unless they accept reinstatement to jobs that were not
their former jobs or substantially equivalent positions.
WE WILL NOT discharge employees because they
cease work concertedly and engage in a strike.
WE WILL NOT fail to reinstate timely to their former
or substantially equivalent positions strikers who make
unconditional applications for reinstatement.
WE WILL NOT delay the reinstatement of strikers
who make unconditional applications for reinstatement.
WE WILL NOT confiscate picket signs from strikers
and destroy them in the presence of employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
333 NLRB No. 52
FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 379
WE WILL, to the extent we have not already done so,
reinstate to the same shifts on their former jobs or sub-
stantially equivalent positions Joseph Almond, William
Carter, Randolph Cooke, Matthew Couitcher, Dwayne
Cuthbert, Glen Gray, Gladys Jackson, Vandell Johnson,
Lau Letioa, Edward Norman, David Paquay, Raymond
Proctor, Theron Ring, John Toothman, Curtis Walker,
and James Walker, without prejudice to their seniority or
any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and
make them whole, with interest, for any loss of earnings
they may have suffered because of our failure or delay in
doing so.
WE WILL remove from our records all references to
our discharges of Joseph Almond, William Carter, Curtis
Walker, and James Walker, and inform them in writing
that this has been done and that the discharges will not
form the basis for any future discipline of them.
WE WILL make whole Keith Avinger, Anthony
Beckett, Alvin Champion, Ray Crumpler, Calvin Gissen-
tanner, Lloyd Goff, Larry Hudson, Rodney Jefferson,
Eulie Johnson, Myron Kelly, Ray Lewis, Randy Nelson,
Charles Pettyjohn, George Turner, John Wheeler, and
Charles Whitley for any loss of earnings they may have
suffered because of our delay, in reinstating them to their
former or a substantially equivalent position.
FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE, INC.

Thomas W. Brudney, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Eric J. Holshouser and Timothy B. Strong, Esqs. (Coffman,
Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A.), for the Respondent.
Glen M. Connor, Esq. (Whatley Drake, L.L.C.), for the Charg-
ing Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HOWARD I. GROSSMAN, Administrative Law Judge. The
original charge in Case 12–CA–19534 was filed on June 17,
1998,1 by United Steelworkers of America, Local 9292, AFL–
CIO–CLC (the Union). The latter filed the original charge in
Case 12–CA–19587 on July 22, the original charge in Case 12–
CA–19711 on October 9, and a first amended charge in the
latter case on January 29, 1999. A consolidated complaint
issued on August 31, 1999. It alleges that Florida Wire & Ca-
ble, Inc. (Respondent or the Company), told employees on or
about April 30 that they had to resign from the Union in order
to work past midnight on April 30, when an existing collective-
bargaining agreement (CBA) was scheduled to expire, and a
strike was anticipated. At the same time, the complaint alleges,
Respondent solicited employees to resign from the Union.
After a strike began on May 30, and after the employees later
made an unconditional offer to return to work, on July 16, the
complaint alleges, Respondent told strikers that they would
never be returned to their former or substantially equivalent
jobs, and threatened to discharge strikers unless they accepted
reinstatement to jobs that were not the same as or substantially
equivalent to their former jobs.

1 All dates are in 1998 unless otherwise stated.
As amended at the hearing, the complaint further alleges that
Respondent discharged four employees2 because they ceased
work concertedly and engaged in the strike, and that Respon-
dent failed to reinstate 14 employees3 to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent positions. As amended at the hearing, the
complaint also alleges that Respondent violated the Act by
failing to reinstate 16 strikers4 as early as it should have rein-
stated them.
Finally, the complaint alleges that Respondent, by its secu-
rity guards, confiscated picket signs from strikers and destroyed
them in the presence of employees.
This case was tried before me in Jacksonville, Florida, on
January 24 and 25, 2000. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the
Respondent, and the Charging Party filed briefs. On the basis
of my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and the
entire record, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Delaware corporation with a principle office
and place of business in Jacksonville, Florida, where it is en-
gaged in the manufacture and distribution of wire cable. Dur-
ing the 12 months preceding issuance of the complaint, Re-
spondent purchased and received at its Jacksonville facility
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points located
outside the State of Florida. Respondent is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Expiration of the CBA, the Strike, and Respondent’s
Alleged Statements that Employees had to Resign from the Un-
ion in Order to Continue Working, and Alleged Solicitation
to Resign
1. Summary of the evidence
The most recent CBA was scheduled to expire on midnight
of April 30. The parties had negotiated for a new agreement,
without success, and a strike appeared to be imminent. Re-
spondent had about 130 bargaining unit employees. At about
10 p.m. on April 30, Elaine Coffman, director of human re-
sources, convened a meeting in the breakroom of 6 to 10 em-
ployees working that night. Calvin Gissentanner, an employee
2 Curtis Walker, James Walker, William Carter, and Joseph C. Al-
mond.
3 William Carter, Glenn Gray, Ed Norman, James Walker, Randy
Cooke, Gladys Jackson, Raymond Proctor Sr., Anthony Wright, Matt
Couitcher, Vandall Johnson, Theron Ring, Dwayne Cuthbert, Lau
Letioa, and Curtis Walker.
4 John Wheeler, Myron Kelly, Calvin Gissentanner, George Turner,
Rodney Jefferson, Lloyd Goff, Randy Nelson, Charles Pettyjohn, Keith
Avinger, Roy Crumpler, Anthony Beckett, Euliu Johnson, Ray Lewis,
Larry Hudson, Charles Whitley, and Alvin Champion.

380 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and a strand and crew leader, testified that Coffman told the
employees that in order to continue working, they would have
to obtain a card and “get out of the Union.” They had to sign
the card, give it to the Union, and give the Company one (pre-
sumably a copy).5
Coffman denied making this statement. Instead, she averred,
she read a memorandum to employees.6 Respondent’s counsel,
on cross–examination of Gissentanner, asked him whether
Coffman read from a memo when she was talking to employees
about resigning from the Union. “She may have,” Gissentanner
responded, “but I didn’t notice a document in her hand.” Coun-
sel then read the memo to Gissentanner and asked him whether
any of this sounded familiar. “Some of that sounds familiar,”
the witness replied, “but I don’t know all that.”
Counsel pursued the issue, and asked the witness whether it
was possible that Coffman could have read this and that
Gissentanner simply did not remember. “I don’t remember all
that,” he replied. “I remember about the card where we could
get out of the Union, I know, and hand carry our copy of the
card to the ––,” Gissentanner finally agreed with counsel that
he could not affirm that Coffman did not make the statements
attributed to her.

5 Gissentanner also testified that another company manager, Jerry
Reimer, was present at the meeting.
6 According to Coffman, the memo read as follows:
This is in response to your comments on ___, 1988, about re-
porting to work during a strike and/or resigning from the Union.
If you cross a picket line and report to work during a strike, the
Union Steelworkers Local 9292 may fine you, and these fines are
enforceable in court. You can, however, report to work and avoid
these fines. The following are your rights during a strike:
(1) Employees have the right to resign from the Union at any
time during a strike.
(2) Employees have the right to work during a strike and earn
their regular wages and benefits.
(3) The Union cannot fine or otherwise penalize a member
who resigns in writing and then reports to work during a strike.
(4) Once the strike is over, the employee has the right to rejoin
the Union.
If you wish to strike, that is also your right. The Company is
not requesting that you resign from the Union in the event of a
strike, nor is it saying that it will give you any additional benefits
or pay if you decide to report to work. The Company, however,
wanted to make you aware of all your rights including your right
to resign so that you may continue to earn your full wages and
avoid Union penalties during a strike.
If you decide to resign from the Union, you should take the
following steps:
(1) Date and sign three copies of a letter of resignation ad-
dressed to the United Steelworkers Local 9292, one signed copied
(sic) to Florida Wire and Cable (you may use the attached sample).
(2) Mail one signed copy of the letter to the Secretary/Treasurer
of the United Steelworkers Local 9292, one signed copy to Florida
Wire and Cable, and keep the third copy for your records.
(3) The letter should be dated and hand delivered or sent by cer-
tified mail. The resignation will be effective the day the union re-
ceives the letter (i.e., you can begin working immediately if the let-
ter is hand delivered).
If you have any questions about the above, please ask for super-
visor or Elaine Coffman. R. Exh. 1.
Coffman also agreed that she left on the table a stack of
sample letters to the Union indicating a member’s resignation.
The letters had a “cc” at the bottom addressed to Coffman.
Although she claimed that they were stapled together when she
left the room, Coffman acknowledged that she later received
some of them in the mail.
Jeff Jackson was one of the strikers. He testified that, about
3 weeks after the strike began, he called Coffman and asked her
what he would have to do to come back to work. She replied
that he would have to fill out a “resignation paper” and return it
by certified mail. Jackson stated that he later received from the
Company a letter to the Union identical with those which
Coffman left on the breakroom table on April 30. Jackson
signed and mailed the letter. On cross–examination, Respon-
dent’s counsel asked Jackson whether the letter for the Union
which he received from the Company came with a copy of the
memo which Coffman left on the breakroom table. Jackson
denied seeing any such memo.
Coffman agreed that she sent Jackson a blank resignation let-
ter, and contended that she also sent a copy of the memo. She
was asked on direct examination whether she said anything to
Jackson which was “inconsistent with or different from” the
memo, and denied that she did so. Coffman further testified
that employees who resigned from the Union customarily
brought copies of the letter to Coffman because the Union did
not have an office, and Coffman had to know in order to stop
deduction of union dues. However, Union President Ronald
Register testified that there was a “Union hall,” and the record
contains correspondence pertaining to union business between
the Steelworkers District 9 at an office address in Orlando,
Florida, including a letter to this address from Coffman.7 In
addition, the sample resignation letter which Coffman prepared
for employees was addressed to “Local 9292” at an address in
Jacksonville, Florida.8
2. Factual and legal conclusions
Respondent argues that Elaine Coffman was a more credible
witness than those called by the General Counsel. She had
tendered her resignation from the Company, had “no prospect
of any ongoing relationship with” Respondent, and thus, had
“no interest” in the outcome of the proceeding.9 Coffman testi-
fied that she intended to leave Respondent at the time of the
latter’s future sale to another company, would be employed by
another employer not associated with Respondent, and thus,
would have “no interest” in Respondent. The pleadings estab-
lish that Elaine Coffman, at the time of her testimony, was Re-
spondent’s director of human resources and a supervisor within
the meaning of the Act.
Respondent further argues that “all” of the General Coun-
sel’s witnesses had “an interest” in the outcome of the case,
particularly those for whom the General Counsel was seeking
backpay.10 However, Jeff Jackson is not listed in the complaint
as an alleged discrminatee, and would not be entitled to back-
7 GC Exh. 9.
8 GC Exh. 10.
9 R. Br. 22.
10 R. Br. 23.

FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 381
pay in this proceeding.11 Jackson returned to his job by com-
plying with Coffman’s asserted requirement that he resign from
the Union. Gissentanner was also an employee of the Company
at the time of his testimony, and was a strand and crew leader.
“The average employee involved in this type of action is keenly
aware of his dependence upon his employer’s good will but
also for the necessary job references essential to employment
elsewhere.” Wirtz v. B.A.C. Steel Products, 312 F.2d 14, 16
(4th Cir. 1963). The Board has concluded that an employee in
these circumstances is not likely to give false testimony against
his employer. Federal Stainless Sink, 197 NLRB 489, 491
(1972).12
Respondent argues that “uncorroborated testimony of an in-
terested party generally does not amount to substantial evi-
dence.”13 Although Gissentanner and Jackson testified about
statements made by Coffman at different times, both witnesses
attributed identical statements to her. Respondent, on the other
hand presented no witness to corroborate Coffman, although
another manager (Jerry Reimer) was present during Coffman’s
April 30 discussion with employees, according to Gissentanner
(whom I credit). Reimer was not called as a witness.
Finally, Coffman testified that an employee whom she
named, called her prior to the April 30 discussion with employ-
ees and asked what would happen if he worked during the
strike. However, Coffman agreed that she stated in her pretrial
affidavit that she did not remember the name of any employee
who had called with such an inquiry, but that later examination
of timecards enabled her to recall this and other names. The
General Counsel’s witnesses, on the other hand, testified on
cross-examination without such contradictions. Their manner
of speaking and demeanor were more truthful than Coffman’s.
The Board has stated:
Although an employer does not violate the Act merely by
providing employees s with information relating to union res-
ignation, if it additionally creates a situation in which employ-
ees would tend to feel imperiled should they refrain from re-
signing, the employer’s conduct constitutes the unlawful so-
licitation of resignation from union membership. [Schenk
Packing Co., 301 NLRB 487, 489 (1991).]14
Coffman’s statement to employees that they had to resign
from the Union in order to continue working obviously tended
to make them feel imperiled if they failed to resign.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that Supervisor Coffman
told employees that they would have to resign from the Union
in order to work during the strike and that this constituted
unlawful interference with the employees’ Section 7 rights in
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
The record also shows that Coffman gave advice to employ-
ees on how to resign from the Union, displayed sample resigna-
tion letters at the April 30 meeting with employees, and mailed
such sample letters to employees (Jackson). I conclude that
these actions constituted solicitation of employees to resign
from the Union, and also violated Section 8(a)(1). Grondorf,
Field, Black & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 882 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
enf. as relevant 318 NLRB 996 (1995); Manhattan Hospital,
supra.

11 GC Exh. 1(m).
12 Accord: Soltech, Inc., 306 NLRB 269, 271 (1992).
13 R. Br. 23.
14 Accord: Manhattan Hospital, 280 NLRB 113 (1986), enf. 814 sub
nom. NLRB v. Manh Eye Ear Hospital, F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1987).
B. The Alleged Confiscation and Destruction of Picket Signs by
Security Guards
1. Summary of the evidence
Union President Ronald Register testified that Respondent’s
facility had a front and back gate, and that the Union originally
placed six pickets at each gate. After the Company obtained a
state court injunction against the Union, the latter was limited
to five pickets at each gate, and was required to place them no
closer than 50 feet from the entrance. The Union prepared
about 50 signs of various sizes, most of them 15 by 24 inches.
Many were not in use at any one time, and the Union kept them
in a tent across the street from Respondent’s facility. The plant
was surrounded by a fence and a gate about 75 feet from the
building. There was a ditch outside the fence, and, next to it a
public highway, Lane Avenue. Respondent’s plant manager,
Don Young, testified that the ditch was “between (Respon-
dent’s) property line” and Lane Avenue. According to Union
President Register, some of the picket signs were placed in the
ground in the ditch, and some were on chairs.
Register affirmed that the Company caused security guards
to come to the plant after the strike began. They were dressed
in uniforms and some of them carried video cameras. On the
day that Respondent obtained the injunction, May 21, the secu-
rity guards arrested three pickets. Ronnie Green, the president
of another union (Teamsters) was present, and asked whether
he could talk to the policemen. They agreed, and Green
stepped over a “little yellow marker” which had been
“sprayed.” The guards then “cuffed him and took him too.”
One of the pickets called Register and said that the guards were
“tearing up” the picket signs. Register testified that he saw
guards take some of the signs and place them in a garbage can.
Union members “yelled” at the guards that the signs were union
property, but the guards kept placing them in the garbage can.
Respondent’s plant manager, Don Young, gave a different
version of these events. He denied that any security guards had
been authorized to destroy picket signs. Young testified that a
“police officer from JSO” said that an officer had nearly been
struck by a truck leaving the property, and that his view of the
exit had been obstructed by signs that the pickets were “holding
up.” The police officer then instructed the pickets that they
would have to “get rid of” signs obstructing clear views of the
exit. Upon receipt of these orders, the pickets “discarded” their
signs on the road and into the ditch, which had “standing wa-
ter.” The signs became “wet and wrinkled,” and the guards
discarded them in the garbage. Pickets were across the street,
but made no objection.
On cross-examination, Union President Register denied that
the injunction had anything to do with obstructing views of the
exit. He also denied that there was any water in the ditch, and
denied that it had rained that day.

382 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. Factual and legal conclusions
Respondent makes the same arguments concerning credibil-
ity that it made in the case of Coffman and the General Coun-
sel’s prior witnesses—Young had tendered his resignation, and
“all” the General Counsel’s witnesses had an interest in the
proceedings, particularly those who anticipated backpay.
Young stated that he intended to resign when the business was
sold, but would stay on as a consultant during the “transition”
phase. The pleadings establish that he was the plant manager
and a supervisor at the time of his testimony. With respect to
Register, he is not alleged as a discriminatee, and therefore has
no right to backpay.
Respondent argues that the pickets had “abandoned” the
picket signs before the security guards threw them in the
trash.15 This contention is implausible, as is Young’s assertion
that the pickets made no objection while the guards threw the
picket signs into the garbage can. I do not credit Young’s hear-
say testimony about a police officer complaining that signs
were obstructing the view of the exit from the plant. The signs
were on chairs or in the ditch. Respondent does not contend
that they were on company property. I credit Register’s testi-
mony that there was no water in the ditch, and that it had not
rained. In sum, Respondent’s evidence is a complete fabrica-
tion.
Young was present when the security guards put the picket
signs into the garbage. He failed to disavow or prevent such
action, and thereby condoned and adopted it. Indiana Desk Co.,
276 NLRB 1429 (1985). The Board has held that an em-
ployer’s use of private guards to prevent picketing is a violation
of Section 8(a)(1). Holland Rantos Co., 234 NLRB 726 (1978),
enfd. sub nom. Eisenberg v. Holland Rantos Co., 583 F.2d 100
(3d Cir. 1978). Confiscation of picket signs, like outright pro-
hibition of picketing, deprives employees of their Section 7
rights, and I find that Respondent’s action violated Section
8(a)(1).
C. The Employees’ Offer to Return to Work, and the Com-
pany’s Response
1. Summary of the evidence
The Company hired replacement employees and continued to
operate the plant. On July 16, operation’s manager, Tom
Twardzik, informed the Union that the Company’s last pre-
strike offer was still on the table. Staff Representative C. G.
Lanham replied the same day by facsimile that the Union ac-
cepted the offer, was prepared to return to work immediately,
and asked the company to give instructions to former strikers
on “when and where” to report for work.16
On the next morning, July 17, Lanham arrived at the plant
with about 60 employees. He asked a guard for permission to
speak to a Company official. Plant Manager Young came out,
but did not speak to Lanham. The latter then returned to the
police lieutenant, and said that the strike had ended, and that he
wanted to talk to an official. Lanham returned to the gate with
the lieutenant, and Young came down and spoke with him.
Lanham explained his communications with Twardzik, and
Young said that the Union’s offer was denied. About an hour
later, Twardzik arrived, and told Lanham that the Company had
no current openings. He asked Lanham to submit a list of em-
ployees interested in returning. Lanham replied that they all
wanted to return. The same day, July 17, Twardzik sent
Lanham a letter stating that the Company was “fully manned”
and had “no openings.” He again asked the Union to submit a
list of employees willing to return, and stated that the Company
would send them notices of a place and time where they could
“positively indicate their interest in being recalled.” The Com-
pany would then start recalling them by “plant seniority” as
openings occurred.17

15 R. Br. 33.
16 GC Exh. 2.
On July 22 Lanham sent a letter to Twardzik repeating the
Union’s acceptance of the Company’s final offer and request-
ing that the employees be recalled to work.18 On the next day,
July 23, Lanham filed a grievance on behalf of all the union
members protesting the Company’s failure to abide by the sen-
iority provisions in “the new 1998 agreement.”19 On July 27
Lanham wrote Twardzik that he had just received the latter’s
July 27 letter. He repeated the Union’s offer, and enclosed a
copy of the new agreement signed by the Union’s officers.20
Lanham wrote to Respondent’s director of human resources,
Elaine Coffman, on July 30. He stated that the replacement
employees hired by the Company were probationary employ-
ees, and that the Company was required by the contract to al-
low other employees to bump probationary and temporary em-
ployees during the strike.21
On July 31, Director of Human Relations Coffman re-
sponded to the Union’s grievance of July 23 based on the Com-
pany’s alleged failure to abide by the seniority provisions of the
contract. Coffman stated that she had reviewed article 7 of “the
current labor agreement in its entirety,” and concluded that the
“Application of Seniority” provision applied to job vacancies,
reductions in force plant layoffs, and recall and bumping. None
of these events had occurred, according to Coffman, and the
grievance was denied.22 Nonetheless, about 2 weeks later, on
August 6, Coffman wrote a letter to Union President Register
stating that “review of the contract shows that plant seniority is
the appropriate criteria to use in recalling personnel to the
plant.” The letter enclosed the most recent “plant seniority”
roster and stated that recall would begin August 10 in accor-
dance with this list unless Coffman heard to the contrary from
the Union.23
17 GC Exh. 3.
18 GC Exh. 4.
19 GC Exh. 5.
20 GC Exh. 6.
21 GC Exh. 7. Sec. 7.1 of the contract provided that all employees
were considered to be probationary employees during the first 90 days
since the date of last hire, and that “such probationary employees shall
not have the right to the grievance procedure nor the right to bid on any
openings that may occur and those benefits to which all permanent
Company employees are entitled.” Sec. 7.8.1.7 covered bidding for
jobs. It states: “Probationary employees are not eligible to participate
in the bid process.” GC Exh. 17.
22 GC Exh. 9.
23 Sec. 7.2 of the contract stated that plant seniority was the length of
continuous service from the employee’s last date of hire. Sec. 7.3
provided that departmental seniority was the length of continuous ser-

FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 383
As indicated above, Respondent continued to operate the
plant with replacement workers during the strike. There were
approximately 123 strikers.24 Vacancies in the plant occurred
during the strike. Respondent filled these vacancies by posting
a job, and filling it with one of the replacement employees.
The Union was not informed of the posting. The Company
would then recall one of the strikers to the position vacated by
the promoted replacement worker. As a result of this proce-
dure, some strikers were not returned to their former jobs or
one that was substantially equivalent. Coffman asserted that
the job vacated by the replacement employee was the “truly
open” position. She began the recall on about August 20, util-
izing “plant seniority” as the selection process.
Prior to recalling strikers, Respondent began the transfer of
replacement workers into vacant positions in response to bids
from the replacement workers. On July 31, about 2 weeks after
the strike began, vacancies appeared in the core processes de-
partment, and the Company granted bids by Richard Haller,
Fredbert Tenchavez, and Benito Perez.25 Respondent’s records
show that Haller and Tenchavez each had a seniority date of
June 8, 1998, and that Perez had a seniority date of June 17,
1998.26 Accordingly, each received a job in response to a bid
less than 90 days after his hiring date, at a time when he was a
probationary employee.27 Replacement employee Kelon Yown
submitted a bid for a new job on August 3, 1998, and received
it on August 6.28 Yown’s seniority date was June 11, 1998.29
Accordingly, he was also a probationary employee at the time
he successfully bid for a new job. On August 17, 1998, Re-
spondent moved replacement employee Abday Battle to a va-
cancy created by the departure of the incumbent.30 Battle’s
seniority date was June 10, 1998.31 Battle was a probationary
employee. James Harrelson’s seniority date was June 3, 1998,
but he was awarded an electrician’s position on August 18,
when he was a probationary employee.32 All of the former
strikers were then available for employment. The CBA pro-
vided that “[p]robationary employees are not eligible to partici-
pate in the bid process.”33 Respondent continued to transfer
replacement employees to open positions after beginning the
recall of strikers.

vice in the department where the employee was employed since the
date of his entry into that department. Sec. 7.8, “Application of Senior-
ity,” applied to “job vacancies, reductions in force, plant layoffs, recall-
ing and bumping.” In any one of these circumstances, ability to per-
form the work and physical fitness were to be considered. If these
factors were relatively equal in comparing job applicants, seniority,
“departmental, then plant” was to be the “determining factor.” Sec.
7.8.l, entitled “Job Vacancies,” provided that jobs would be filled in
accordance with the provisions of Sec. 7.8. GC Exh. 17.
24 GC Exh. 20.
25 GC Exh. 19.
26 R. Exh. 3, p. 4, “Fabrication” seniority list.
27 See fn. 21, supra.
28 GC Exh. 19.
29 R. Exh. 3, p. 4, “Fabrication” seniority list.
30 GC Exh. 19.
31 R. Exh. 3, p. 4, “Fabrication” seniority list.
32 GC Exh. 19; R. Exh. 3.
33 Supra, fn. 2l.
2. Factual and legal conclusions
The parties agreed that the strikers were economic strikers.34
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967), the
Court held that an individual whose work ceases because of a
labor dispute remains an employee unless he has since obtained
regular or substantially equivalent employment, and that an
employer who refuses to reinstate him must show legitimate
and substantial justification for this refusal. The Court ob-
served that an action of this nature was so destructive of em-
ployee rights that it was an unfair labor practice without refer-
ence to the employer’s intent or motivation.
In Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366 (1968), enfd. 414 F.2d 99
(7th Cir. 1969), the Board held that economic strikers who
unconditionally apply for reinstatement at a time when their
positions are filled by permanent employees are entitled to “full
reinstatement” upon the departure of replacements unless they
have acquired regular and substantially equivalent employment,
or the employer can sustain his burden of proof that the failure
to offer reinstatement was for legitimate and substantial busi-
ness reasons.
A factual situation similar to that in the case at bar took place
in MCC Pacific Valves, 244 NLRB 931 (1979). In that case
there was a strike of 1 month’s duration after which the parties
resumed negotiations, and the employer reinstated about two-
thirds of the strikers. Thereafter, it began posting jobs for bid-
ding by employees then on the payroll, including striker re-
placements and reinstated strikers. There remained unrein-
stated strikers to whom jobs were not offered, or who were
offered jobs only if there were no bidders. Some strikers who
were not offered the posted jobs were invited to bid on the jobs
which arose as a result of a “so-called chain reaction” (id., p.
931). An opening was posted for which employees in the plant
placed their bids. As each employee whose bid was successful
moved into his new job, his prior job became vacant, and bids
were made to fill it. Jobs at the lowest end of the classification
scale finally became open, and the employer invited remaining
strikers to bid on these jobs, rather than the jobs which were
first posted. The Board held that the employer was not entitled
to prefer striker replacements then on the payroll to qualified
strikers awaiting reinstatement. The employer could not bypass
qualified unreinstated strikers by waiting to make a job offer to
them only if there were no successful bidders from among the
striker replacements, nor could it wait until the “chain reaction
effect” had run its course before offering unreinstated strikers
the initial job vacancies created by the departure of employees.
By doing so, the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the Act (id. at 936).
In Rose Printing Co., 304 NLRB 1076 (1991), the Board
considered the issue of whether an employer must offer former
strikers reinstatement to jobs which they are qualified to per-
form but which are not the same or substantially the same as
their prestrike jobs. In Fleetwood the Court had stated:
34 Although I have found that Coffman’s speech to employees on the
eve of the strike was an unfair labor practice, I make no finding at
variance with the position of the parties.

384 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The status of the striker as an employee continues until he has
obtained “other regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment.” . . . If and when a job for which the striker is qualified
becomes available, he is entitled to an offer of reinstatement.
The right can be defeated only if the employer can show “le-
gitimate and substantial business justifications.”35
The Board, in Rose Printing stated that the Court in Fleet-
wood did not address the issue here. “Significantly, there was
no discussion concerning the issue now under discussion, that
is, whether strikers are entitled to any jobs for which they are
qualified or whether the reinstatement obligation extends only
to their former jobs or substantially equivalent jobs. There was
no discussion of this issue because it was not before the Court.
Hence, the Court’s reference to a job for which a striker is
qualified” cannot be viewed as a resolution of that issue. Con-
cededly, Board, in striker reinstatement cases has sometimes
used the Fleetwood phrase “jobs for which the striker is quali-
fied.” These cases, however, did not involve the issue of the
kind of job to which the striker is entitled (cases cited) or make
clear elsewhere in the opinion the underlying assumption that
the positions at issue are the strikers’ old jobs or equivalent
positions.36 The Board cites numerous cases in which the cor-
rect analysis is made.37 “Although the Supreme Court has not
resolved the issue under discussion in this case, the Board has
done so.” Its position in Rose Printing is summarized as fol-
lows:
In considering whether an employer should be re-
quired to offer a replaced striker reinstatement to a non-
equivalent job which the striker is qualified to perform, we
do not quarrel with the assertion that “a lesser job with less
pay and/or reduced benefits may not be as attractive but it
is better than no job at all.” (citation) Our duty in defining
a former economic striker’s rights under Fleetwood and
Laidlaw, however, does not entail consideration of strik-
ers’ economic needs. Our duty is to ensure that strikers
who have unconditionally offered to return to work are to
be treated the same as they would have been had they not
withheld their service. They are therefore entitled to re-
turn to those jobs or substantial equivalents if such posi-
tions become vacant, and they are entitled to nondiscrimi-
natory treatment in their applications for other jobs.
. . . .
In addition, we note that a striker’s acceptance of a po-
sition which is not the same as or substantially equivalent
to that striker’s prestrike position does not extinguish the
statutory right to subsequent reinstatement to a vacant pre-
strike position or a substantially equivalent one. [Citation]
Acceptance of the General Counsel’s argument would
therefore mean that a striker would have two reinstatement
rights and that employers would have two correlative obli-
gations. That is, a striker would have a right to reinstate-
ment to any job which the striker is qualified to perform,
even if that job is not the same as or substantially equiva-
lent to the striker’s prestrike position. In addition, as soon
thereafter as the striker’s former job or a substantially
equivalent one became available, the striker would have a
right to transfer to that job. Similarly, even though an em-
ployer has acted lawfully in replacing a striker, the em-
ployer would be obligated to reinstate the striker to a va-
cant nonequivalent job which the striker is qualified to
perform. The employer would also be required to transfer
the striker to a prestrike job or to a substantially equivalent
one when it became available and to hire another person to
fill the vacancy left by the transferring striker. In our
view, a striker is not entitled to such preferential treatment
and an employer need not suffer such dislocation simply to
preserve the striker’s continuing employee status [id. at
1078].38

35 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). (Emphasis added.)
36 Rose Printing Co., 304 NLRB, 1077 at fn. 4 (1991).
37 Ibid. New Era Electric Corp, 217 NLRB 477 fn. 1 (1975); Certi-
fied Corp., 241 NLRB 369 (1979); Highlands Medical Center, 278
NLRB 1097 (1986); and Oregon Steel Mills, 291 NLRB 185 (1988).
As set forth above, the strikers in the case at bar made an un-
conditional offer to return to work on July 16, and 60 of them
showed up at the plant the next day. Respondent did not rein-
state any of them at that time, and engaged until late August in
the correspondence set forth above. In the meantime, it allowed
replacement employees, including probationary employees, to
bid for new jobs. This process continued after Respondent be-
gan recalling strikers, which it did by placing them in the vacan-
cies created by the departure of replacement employees to other
jobs in response to bids.
Respondent presents a series of arguments that its actions
were lawful. Thus, the Company contends that MCC Pacific
Values is inapposite, as follows:
MCC Pacific Valves and similar cases are inapposite, how-
ever here (in the case at bar), while FWC’s returning strikers
were recalled to the first available position for which they
were qualified, these same employees retained the contractual
right to bid into their former position as soon as it became
open. In contrast, the facts in MCC Pacific Valves and similar
cases indicate that in those cases, recall to a different job op-
erated to extinguish Laidlaw rights and potentially prevent a
former striker from returning to his pre–strike job. Here (i.e.,
the case at bar), the former strikers received every bit of their
Laidlaw rights i.e. the right to reinstatement to their former or
equivalent job), as well as the added benefit of more senior
strikers returning to work even sooner than they would have
been able to had the Company made the employees wait until
their position on an equivalent job came open.39
Respondent then proceeds to a discussion of Rose Printing.
The Company agrees that the case holds that offering a non-
equivalent position with the subsequent right to transfer into the
employee’s old position when it becomes available would cre-
ate rights in the returning striker above and beyond Laidlaw
rights. Respondent in fact quotes some of the language from
38 Accord: Towne Ford, Inc., 327 NLRB 193 (1998). The Board
found that the employer violated the Act by failing to reinstate strikers
to substantially equivalent positions.
39 R. Br. 39. Some repetitive language in the above quotation, an
obvious clerical error, has been eliminated.

FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 385
Rose Printing cited above in support of its position, and contin-
ues as follows.
FWC’s former strikers with higher plant seniority were more
than just reinstated; they were given a preference to return to
work as soon as possible. The undisputed facts show that the
returning employees were placed back to work by seniority in
the first position that became available for which they quali-
fied. To the extent that a former striker was not reinstated to
his previous position or another position which he desired, he
contractually retained the right to bid into a desired position as
soon as that job became available. Therefore, his Laidlaw
rights were never extinguished, and he was no worse off than
if the Company waited until his former position was open to
recall him. Such action indeed provided the more senior re-
turning strikers better treatment than they would have re-
ceived under the recall procedure the NLRB claims FWC
should have utilized.40
Respondent’s arguments are not supported by the evidence
or by Board law. Its contention that a recall to a different job
extinguishes the striker’s Laidlaw rights is flatly contradicted
by the language from Rose Printing quoted above. The Com-
pany’s reasoning that the striker is getting better treatment un-
der its recall program than the method mandated by the Board
is indistinguishable from the argument considered and rejected
by the Board in Rose Printing. The Company’s recall method
here is subject to the same criticism, which the Board stated in
Rose Printing. Respondent’s reliance on that case is inexplica-
ble, and its argument based upon it is an extended nonsequitur.
The Company claims that it had a “legal obligation” to reinstate
strikers to positions for which they were qualified, and cites
cases with opinions, contrary to Rose Printing.41 Those prior
decisions are explained in Rose Printing.
Respondent’s argument that its recall of strikers was pursu-
ant to their seniority rights under the CBA is similarly without
merit. To begin, Human Resources Director Coffman’s letter
to the Union dated July 31, states that article 7 of the CBA
(“Seniority”) does not apply to the facts in this case.42 One
week later, on August 6, Coffman wrote to the Union that, un-
der section 7.12 of the CBA, “plant seniority was the appropri-
ate criteria to use in recalling personnel to the plant.”43 Section
7.12 of the CBA, cited by Coffman, covers the Company’s
posting of a seniority list, not recall itself. The prior section,
7.11.2, provides that “[I]n all cases of job vacancies, [r]ecalls
to the plant will be on the basis of plant seniority, recalling the
senior plant employee first in keeping with the provision of
Article 7.8.” Section 7.8 (“Application of Seniority”) provides
that, in all cases of job vacancies, reductions in force, plant
layoffs and bumping, in the event competing applicants for a
job are relatively equal in ability to perform and physical fit-
ness, “Seniority (departmental, then plant ) . . . shall be the
determining factor.”. . . In the event that there is no qualified
applicant according to the ability to perform and physical fit-
ness criteria, “then departmental seniority followed by plant
seniority shall be the deciding factor” (emphasis added).44

40 Ibid at 49.
41 R. Br. 38. Toledo 5 Auto/Truck Plaza v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 1010 (6th
Cir. 1991); NLRB v. American Olean Tile Co., 826 F.2d 1498 (6th Cir.
1987); Arlington Hotel Co. v. NLRB., 785 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1986);
and Foote & Davies, 278 NLRB 72 (1986), in which I wrote the ALJ
decision.
42 GC Exh. 9.
43 R. Exh. 3l.
Despite these provisions, the Company used plant seniority
in recalling strikers. This procedure was contrary to the plain
language of the contract. Coffman argued at the hearing that
the contract does not refer to “strikes” (with one exception not
relevant), nor “strikers.” However, the CBA repeatedly uses the
phraseology, “In all cases of job vacancies” preceding the pro-
cedure for recall. It is obvious that the issues involved in this
case are job vacancies—the Company posted them. The con-
tract language does not exclude applicants returning from a
strike–it says, simply “in all cases of job vacancies.” The
Company’s procedure ignored this plain language. Further, as
definitively set forth in section 7.8 (“Application of Seniority”),
recalls shall be based first on departmental, then on plant, sen-
iority Respondent also ignored this contractual provision.
In addition, the Company allowed probationary employees to
bid on new jobs, contrary to section 7.8.1.7 of the CBA.45
The complaint alleges that Respondent’s failure to reinstate
the strikers to their former or substantially equivalent positions,
absent substantial and legitimate justification, violated Section
8(a)(3). This view is sustained in Towne Ford, Inc., 327 NLRB
193 (1998). Accordingly, consideration of the circumstances of
individual strikers is warranted. Since the complaint alleges
additional unlawful statements by Human Resources Director
Coffman, and unlawful discharges, it will be convenient to
consider these issues together.
D. The Recall of Strikers, Discharges, and Alleged
Unlawful Statements
1. The discharges
a. Curtis G. Walker
Curtis G. Walker was employed in 1967, and was a “wire
drawer” on the day shift at the time of the striker in 1998. He
went on strike, and after its conclusion, on August 17, received
a call from Human Resources Director Coffman offering him a
job in “galvanizing (galli)” on the nightshift. Walker replied
that, during a prior strike in 1980, all the strikers went back to
their prior jobs at the end of the strike. “Galvanizing” was
different from “wire drawing.” Coffman replied that she had
only one job to offer, and that Walker would be terminated if he
did not accept. Walker told her to send his vacation pay, and
Coffman sent him a letter with vacation pay terminating him on
August 23, 1998. The letter stated that he was being terminated
because he rejected the job which had been offered and that no
further position would be offered to him.46 In February 1999,
Coffman called him and asked whether he would like to go
back to wire drawing. Walker accepted.
44 GC Exh. 17.
45 Ibid.
46 GC Exh. 11.

386 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
b. James E. Walker
James E. Walker was employed by Respondent in 1968 and
was a storeroom clerk at the time of the strike in 1998. He
received a call from Coffman on August 17, in which she of-
fered him a job in “galvanizing (galli).” Walker had previously
worked at this job, and told Coffman that he could not accept it
because the lead and zinc made him sick. Coffman replied that
he would be terminated if he did not accept the job, and sent
him a letter dated August 26, 1998, confirming this and stating
that no further position would be offered to him.47 On May 12,
1999, Coffman called and said that she had a job in “galli.”
Walker accepted because he needed the money. He was later
transferred to his old position as a storeroom clerk. Walker
denied that his plant or departmental seniority had been re-
stored at the time of his return, although he believed that he
received this later.
c. William B. Carter
William B. Carter was hired in 1974 and was a maintenance
craftsman on the dayshift at the time of the strike in 1998. He
was not a member of the Union, but joined the strike in sympa-
thy.
After the strike ended, Carter received a telephone call from
Human Resources Director Coffman. They differ on the details
of this conversation, principally on the sequence in which sev-
eral topics were discussed. According to Coffman, she offered
Carter recall to a position as a “stranding rewinder.” Carter
replied that he was working at a “good job” as an engineer, and
did not know whether he wanted to return to the Company.
Coffman told him that he had to make a decision, and that the
Company would not offer him any other position. Carter re-
plied that he was happy where he was, and did not want to
come back. Coffman added that Carter did inquire about the
availability of a position as a maintenance craftsman, and
Coffman replied that there was no opening. Coffman then sent
Cartera letter, dated September 5, 1998, summarizing her ver-
sion of this conversation and terminating Carter.48
Carter testified that Coffman offered him a job as a “strander
rewinder” and told him that he would be terminated if he did
not accept. He could later apply to be rehired as a new em-
ployee, in which event he would lose his seniority. Carter de-
nied that he told Coffman he was happy working at another job,
or that he did not want to come back to Respondent. He told
her that he would come back to a job in maintenance.
Almost a year later, on July 12, 1999, Coffman called Carter
and offered him his old job as a maintenance craftsman at the
same pay. He accepted.
Coffman acknowledged that Carter asked about the availabil-
ity of his old position during her first conversation with him. It
is unlikely that Carter would first say that he did not want to
come back to the Company, and then inquire about the avail-
ability of his old job. I conclude that he did ask about his old
job, and told Coffman that he would be willing to come back to
it. His action about a year later accepting the job is consistent
with this version of the conversation.

47 GC Exh. 12.
48 GC Exh. 13.
d. Joseph C. Almond49
Joseph C. Almond was employed in 1989 and was in the
“galli” department on the first shift at the time of the strike in
1998. He testified that, after the strike, “about November 10, or
somewhere about mid-November,” he received a call from
Coffman offering him a job in “wire drawing” on the nightshift.
This process, according to Almond, is where “the different
grades of wire begin.” Almond testified that he was not familiar
with this work, and that the machinery “intimidated” him.
Further, he was disturbed by the fact that the work was on the
nightshift. After considering the matter, he called Coffman and
said that he could not take the job. If Coffman had offered him
his old job, he would have accepted. However, he decided to
pursue attempts to make his own living, in music, and lawn
mowing. Accordingly, he called Coffman back after consider-
ing the matter, and told her that he could not accept the position
which she had offered. He denied that he told Coffman he did
not want to return to the Company. She replied that she would
have to terminate him, and sent him a letter dated November
10, 1998, stating that he had “voluntarily resigned.”50
Respondent submitted a document entitled “1998 Job Bid
Log.” It shows that on August 20, October 31, November 12,
December 11 and 29, 1998, Respondent posted jobs in “galli,”
or “galvanizing,” and that it filled some of these jobs with re-
placement employees.51 The Company’s refusal to return Al-
mond to a job which he wanted, and which it was having diffi-
culty in getting other employees to accept, is inexplicable.
In September 1999, about 10 months after he had rejected
Coffman’s first job offer, Almond called Coffman and later
visited her in her office. He asked for employment, and she
offered him a job in “stranding” on the nightshift. Almond had
not been successful in the private work he had attempted,
“swallowed his pride,” and accepted Coffman’s offer. On
cross-examination, Almond was asked why he accepted the
“stranding” job in 1999 after having rejected the “wiredrawing”
job in 1998. Although “wiredrawing” and “stranding” were in
the new “core processes” department, they utilized “entirely
different machines,” according to Almond.
Coffman testified that, during her first conversation with
Almond (1998) she offered him a job in “stranding.” He re-
plied that he was playing with a band, and doing yard work,
and rejected the offer. Coffman asserted that she had no idea
that Almond would have accepted if she had offered him his
old job in the “galli” department.
49 The complaint does not list Joseph C. Almond as an alleged dis-
criminatee. At the hearing, the General Counsel moved to include his
name in par. 12 of the complaint. The General Counsel affirmed that he
had received Almond’s name from discharge letters submitted to the
General Counsel by Respondent, and that the circumstances were the
same as in the cases of other alleged discharges. Respondent opposed
this motion. The General Counsel pointed to para. 11, alleging the
Company’s refusal to reinstate named employees and others “similarly
situated.” I granted the motion on the ground that there was no show-
ing that Respondent had been prejudiced and suggested an appeal from
my ruling. There was no appeal.
50 GC Exh. 14.
51 GC Exh. 19.

FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 387
The record shows that a position in “galli” was available
throughout 1998 including mid-November, and that Almond
had worked in this department when the strike began. Instead
of offering this position to Almond, Coffman offered it to re-
placement employees. I conclude that Coffman’s offer to Al-
mond of a job in wire drawing after the strike was not to a sub-
stantially equivalent position and was on a different shift.
e. Factual and legal conclusions
The employees listed above were economic strikers. They
continued to be employees unless they had acquired “other
regular and substantially equivalent employment.” Fleetwood
Trailer, supra. There is no such evidence in the cases of Curtis
or James Walker, or William Carter, and the evidence pertain-
ing to Joseph Almond shows that his other employment was
neither regular nor substantial.
These employees were not required to accept reinstatement
to a position which was not the same as or substantially equiva-
lent to their former jobs, and refusal to accept such an offer did
not eliminate their reinstatement rights. Rose Printing, supra.
The evidence shows that the jobs which were offered to them
were not the same as or substantially equivalent, in part because
the offers were for jobs on a different shift. Harvey Engineer-
ing Corp., 270 NLRB 1290 (1984). I conclude that Respon-
dent’s failure to reinstate them to their former or substantially
equivalent jobs violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, as
did its discharge of them for their refusal to accept the proffered
jobs. Towne Ford, Inc., supra, Coffman’s statements to them
that she would have to terminate them for failure to accept the
proffered jobs were independently violative of Section 8(a)(1).
The fact that the Company later employed them does not
constitute repudiation of its unlawful discharges of them, in
part because in the cases of James Walker and Joseph Almond
they were still not reinstated to former or substantially equiva-
lent jobs, and for the reason that Respondent has not complied
with the requirements of Passavant Memorial Hospital, 237
NLRB 138 (1978). Its actions were not timely, unambiguous,
specific in nature, or free from other unlawful conduct.
E. The Alleged Failure to Reinstate Strikers to the Same or
Substantially Equivalent Positions
1. Gladys Jackson
Gladys Jackson had been employed for 3 years, and was in
the fabrication department at the time of the strike. Her rate of
pay was $9.61 Coffman called her at the end of January 1999,
and said that the Company had openings in stranding and the
galli. Jackson had previously tried the stranding position with-
out success, and accepted the galli job after the strike. Her rate
of pay was $9.61. A vacancy in fabrication appeared, and
Jackson bid on the job. She received it, but her departmental
seniority was not restored at the time. The Company restored it
about a week before the hearing.
2. Theron Ring
Theron Ring started working for Respondent in 1985, and
was a maintenance mechanic at the time of the strike in 1998.
He received a call from Coffman in October. She offered him a
job in stranding. Ring testified that he asked about a job in
maintenance, and that Coffman replied that he would never go
back to maintenance. Ring called her back after some delay,
and said that he would accept the stranding position. He then
thought it over again, and decided not to accept the job. Ring
testified that he was not familiar with operating the machines in
stranding, and that the Company did not give adequate training.
Although he had received a reporting date, he did not appear,
and did not inform the Company that he was not accepting the
job.
Coffman did not deny that Ring asked about a maintenance
job. However, she denied that she told him he would never be
in maintenance. Ring’s testimony that he asked about a main-
tenance job is unrebutted, and Coffman’s testimony is an in-
complete recital of the conversation. Ring was truthful in ap-
pearance, and his claim that he asked about his former job is
very probable and consistent with the requests of the other
strikers. Ring was a current employee at the time of his testi-
mony, a fact which under current Board law makes it unlikely
that he would testify falsely about his employer. I credit his
account of his conversations with Coffman, including her
statement to him that he would never be back in maintenance.
Ring’s failure to report did not constitute abandonment of his
reinstatement rights since stranding was not an equivalent posi-
tion. Alaska Pulp Co., 326 NLRB 522, 532 (1998).
3. Randolph Cooke
Randolph Cooke was hired in 1980, and was a die shop op-
erator on the dayshift at the time of the strike in 1998. His pay
scale was $9.78. The function of this position was to order dies
and keep supplies for the employees in the wiredrawing de-
partment. Although the die shop position was not a part of the
wiredrawing department, Cooke interacted with the employees
in wiredrawing, and on occasion engaged in special projects in
that position. This occurred three or four times a year, and
lasted about half an hour on each occasion.
Coffman called Cooke after the strike, and offered him a job
in stranding on the nightshift. He asked whether there were any
available jobs in the die shop. Coffman replied that there were
none, and that Cooke’s rejection of this offer “would be consid-
ered a termination.” Cooke accepted the job at a pay scale of
$9.45. There was more lifting and pushing in the stranding job
than there had been in the die shop position, and the work was
dirtier. It was the “difference between day and night,” accord-
ing to Cooke. His departmental seniority was not restored.
Cooke was next transferred to wiredrawing, at a pay scale of
$10.20. About a year before the hearing, i.e., about January
1999, Coffman told Cooke that she had a job in the die shop.
He bid for and received this position. However, Cooke did not
get his departmental seniority until about a week before the
hearing.
Coffman’s testimony on these matters is difficult to under-
stand. She testified that the die shop was part of wiredrawing,
that this job had been placed in “core processes.” Asked
whether Cooke worked in the same job before the strike as he
did after the strike, Coffman replied, “Same department.” This
was based on her contention that the die shop was a part of
wiredrawing, and that the latter had been subsumed in core
processing. Asked why, under this theory, Cooke had not im-

388 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mediately received his departmental seniority, Coffman agreed
that the failure to do so was a mistake.
In lieu of disentangling Coffman’s testimony, I credit
Cooke’s simple and straightforward account. He was offered a
job in stranding, and this job was more difficult and dirtier than
the job as a die operator. The job was on the nightshift, com-
pared to Cooke’s prestrike job on the dayshift. He was told that
failure to accept the job would be considered a termination. His
pay rate was less than his prestrike pay, and he did not receive
his departmental seniority.
4. Vandell Johnson
Vandell Johnson was hired in 1970, and was a warehouse-
man and inventory clerk at the time of the strike in 1998.
Coffman called him in August, and said that she had a job
available on the nightshift in the galli at an hourly rate of $9.45.
Johnson had heard from other employees that they had received
letters from the Company stating that they would be terminated
if they did not accept the Company’s offer. He accepted the job.
Johnson testified that his job in galli was entirely different
from his prestrike job. In the latter, he drove forklifts and
helped with inventories. He characterized the galli work as a
“labor job.”
Johnson was later transferred to his prestrike job, but the date
is uncertain. He did not receive his departmental seniority at
this time. It was given to him about a week before the hearing
in this matter.
Johnson’s testimony is uncontested and is credited.
5. Matthew Couitcher
Matthew Couitcher was employed in 1988 and was a fabrica-
tion machine operator on the dayshift at the time of the strike in
1988. After the strike, he received a letter from Coffman dated
November 2, advising him that she had a position for him in
core processes on the nightshift. If she did not hear from
Couitcher within 7 days, she would terminate him and he would
not be offered any52 further openings. Couitcher called her and
said that this was not his old job. According to his testimony,
Coffman replied that he could take it or be fired. He accepted.
A month or 2 after he returned to work, Couitcher bid on an
opening on his prestrike job, and was awarded it. However, he
refused to accept it, and testified that the reason was Coffman’s
statement to him that he would be the “junior” employee in the
department. Couitcher testified that this meant he would be the
first to be laid off in the event of a layoff, and that he would
have the last choice of shift.
Later, in March 1999, another opening in Couitcher’s pre-
strike job appeared. He bid on it and was awarded the job on
the dayshift. However, Couitcher still does not have his de-
partmental seniority.
Coffman testified that Couitcher told her during the first
conversation that the Union had informed Couitcher that, in the
event of a victory in the case before the Board, only those em-
ployees who had not bid back into their original departments
would have their seniority restored. Coffman agreed that any
such position was “unreasonable” and “ridiculous,” and
Couitcher denied it.

52 GC Exh. 22.
I note that Coffman claimed that, a week before the hearing,
she had restored the departmental seniority of all strikers who
had bid back to their original positions. Couitcher bid back to
his original position but testified under oath a week later that
his departmental seniority had not been restored, and that he
was close to being the most junior employee in the department.
I credit Couitcher’s testimony that Coffman told him he would
be the junior employee in the department if his first bid for the
job was successful.
6. Lau Letioa
Lau Letioa was hired in 1981, and was a maintenance me-
chanic at $11.86 hourly on the dayshift at the time of the strike.
On October 17, Coffman sent Letioa a letter offering him a
position in core processes, and advising him that he would be
terminated if she did not hear from him within 7 days, and that
no other employment offer would be made.53 Coffman also
called Letioa, and said that the job was in wiredrawing at a rate
of $9.45. Letioa asked about his prestrike maintenance job, and
Coffman replied that he would have to accept the wiredrawing
job and bid on the maintenance job. Letioa asked whether he
could stay at home and bid on the maintenance job from there,
but Coffman rejected this procedure. About 2 weeks later,
Letioa was allowed to bid on a maintenance job, and received it
at his old wage rate. However, his departmental seniority was
not restored until the week before the hearing. Letioa’s testi-
mony is uncontested and is credited.
7. Dwayne B. Cuthbert
Dwayne B. Cuthbert was hired in 1988, and was a high–
speed rewinder in the fabrication department on the dayshift at
the time of the strike in 1998. The wage rate was $9.6l.
Coffman called Cuthbert, and offered him a job in the stranding
department on the nightshift at a rate of $9.45. Cuthbert ac-
cepted the position. After about 3 months, a position in
Cuthbert’s old department was posted, and Cuthbert received
the award. However, it was for the nightshift, unlike Cuthbert’s
prestrike job. Cuthbert testified that the Company had a day-
shift position available, but added, “They had their favorite
people they wanted to put on the dayshift.” After a few weeks
on the nightshift, a dayshift position was posted, and Cuthbert
received it. However, Cuthbert did not have his departmental
seniority, there was a reduction in force, and he was compelled
to go back to the nightshift. Cuthbert affirmed that his depart-
mental seniority had not been returned on the date that he testi-
fied. His testimony is credited.
8. Edward Norman
Edward Norman was employed in 1975 and was doing in-
ventory control work in the storeroom at a rate of $9.93 at the
time of the strike in 1998. After the strike, Coffman called and
had a conversation with Norman’s wife.54 Coffman said that
there was an opening in the galli. Mrs. Norman asked whether
53 GC Exh. 23.
54 Respondent did not object to the hearsay nature of Coffman’s
conversation with Norman’s wife.

FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 389
there was an opening in the storeroom. Coffman replied that
the storeroom did not exist as it had previously, and that the
only opening was in the galli. If Norman rejected this offer, he
would be terminated. Norman accepted at an hourly rate of
$9.45.
There were one or two postings for a job in the storeroom for
which Norman did not bid. His reason was the fact that the
employees in the department were being trained to do other
jobs, and Norman did not want to do other work. He finally bid
on a job which he thought was similar to his prior job, but ac-
knowledged that he will still have to learn other jobs. He has
not received his departmental seniority.
9. Glen Gray
Glen Gray was hired in 1988 and was a fabrication operator
on the nightshift at the time of the strike in 1998. Coffman
called on December 28, and said that she had a position on the
nightshift in the galli. Gray asked whether any other position
was available, and Coffman replied that there was none. Gray
described the work in the galli as much heavier, and dangerous
with molten metal. The employees had to move reels of wire
weighing hundreds of pounds.
Gray accepted because, he said, he had no other choice. On
his bid he stated that he intended to seek restoration of his plant
and departmental seniority. On January 12, 1999, a job was
posted for a fabrication operator on the nightshift. Gray bid for
the job and received it. He testified that he did not receive his
departmental seniority until about a week before the hearing.
However, he was transferred to the dayshift before this took
place.
After Gray was transferred to the dayshift, the Company re-
quested a volunteer for overtime work. Gray did not want the
job, but was compelled to accept it because the other machine
operator did not want it. The other employee had departmental
seniority over Gray, having acquired it when he was hired dur-
ing the strike. As Gray put it, “I’ve worked there for 11 years,
and the other employee had been there since the strike.” The
CBA requires the Company to offer mandatory overtime work
plantwide before compelling a departmental employee to do the
work.55 There is no evidence that the Company did so on this
occasion.
10. Raymond Proctor
Raymond Proctor was hired in 1966 and was a senior main-
tenance mechanic on the dayshift at the time of the strike in
1998. Coffman called and asked him whether he knew how to
run a strander. Proctor replied that it had been 25 years since
he had done so, and asked whether he could go back to mainte-
nance. He testified that Coffman told him that he would never
be back in maintenance. He, therefore, accepted the strander
position on the nightshift at $9.45. His wage rate as a senior
mechanic had been $11.69.
The Company transferred Proctor to fabrication after about a
month on the strander. An opening in maintenance was posted,
but Proctor did not bid on it. He stated that he thought the
Company was trying to make fun of him. He acknowledged
that Coffman asked him whether he was going to bid on the
job, but denied saying that he was happy in fabrication. An-
other opening in maintenance was posted in April 1999. Proc-
tor bid on it at this time, and received it at a wage rate of
$12.05.

55 GC Exh.. 17, art. 20.3.
Coffman’s testimony is consistent with Proctor’s, except for
her denial that she told him that he would never be back in
maintenance. She had made similar threats in the past. Proc-
tor, on the other hand, was an employee of the Company at the
time of his testimony. I credit his account on this issue.
11. Flozzell Perkins
Flozzell Perkins was hired in 1988, and was in the fabrica-
tion department at the time of the strike in 1998. Perkins joined
the strike, but called Coffman and said that he wanted to return
to work. He testified that he told the Company that he wanted
to go back to fabrication, but was informed that the only open-
ing was in the galli. Perkins accepted this, He testified that the
job in galli was different from his job in fabrications. He testi-
fied that there were “plenty of openings” in fabrication because
a lot of people had quit.” Perkins affirmed that other employ-
ees who had less seniority received those jobs. He testified that
he had no opportunity to bid for one of these jobs until late in
1998. He did so because he was having trouble with a co–
worker on the galli.
Respondent’s job bid log shows openings in fabrication for
the months of August, October, and November, and that Per-
kins was transferred to fabrications on November 22.56
Coffman testified that she asked Perkins on several occasions to
bid for a job in fabrications, and that he did not do so until No-
vember.
12. John Toothman
John Toothman was hired in 1973 and was a yardman at the
time of the strike in 1998. Coffman called him after the strike
and asked him to report for work. She did not state the nature
of the job. Toothman reported on September 2, and Plant Man-
ager Don Young assigned him to the galli. After about 5
months, the Company told him that a job was available in the
yard on the nightshift. He bid for and received this job. The
employee on the dayshift later transferred to another job, and
Toothman was changed to the dayshift.
Coffman contended that material handling positions were
available, and that if Toothman had bid on one of these, he
would have been doing essentially the same thing as he was
before the strike. Coffman stated that she explained this to
Toothman, but that he refused her advice.
13. David Paquay57
David Paquay was a fabrication operator on the dayshift at
the time of the strike in 1998. After the strike, Coffman called
56 GC Exh. 19.
57 David Paquay is not alleged as a discriminatee in the complaint.
Nonetheless, the General Counsel elicited testimony from him, Re-
spondent cross-examined him and Director of Human Resources
Coffman testified concerning him. I conclude that the issues concern-
ing Paquay were fully litigated. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 NLRB
1248 (1995).

390 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and offered him a job in wiredrawing at night. Paquay’s wife
was ill and required his assistance during the day, but he
needed the job and accepted. He testified that another em-
ployee and the Union informed him that his seniority would not
be restored if he bid back into his old job and the Union won its
case before the Board. He related this to Coffman, who did not
believe it. Paquay took the wiredrawing job at night, but
threatened to quit, and was then offered 12–hour shifts days for
2 months, then the same shift at night for 2 months. He wanted
to work only days, and accepted a job in quality assurance,
outside the bargaining unit. The Company told him that he
could not return to the bargaining unit.
Paquay was never offered his former or an equivalent job,
and retains his statutory rights to his former job despite the
Company’s statement to him that he had lost all such rights.
14. Factual and legal conclusions
I have concluded above that a proper construction of the
CBA, indeed, its plain language, required Respondent to use
departmental seniority in filling “all cases of job vacancies.”
Although Coffman announced to the Union her intention to use
plant seniority, there is no evidence that the parties ever dis-
cussed the matter, nor any clear and unmistakable evidence that
the Union waived its statutory rights. Coffman claimed that
one employee had been recalled on the basis of plant seniority,
rejected the job, and was discharged for this reason. However,
one example does not establish a prior practice, and there is no
evidence that the Union knew anything about this.
The Board has had occasion to consider the relative merits of
a recall procedure based on departmental seniority, as con-
trasted with a different method utilized by the employer. The
Board stated:
[W]e find that departmental seniority is the most accurate
method for determining the order in which strikers would
have been reinstated pursuant to a lawful plan. Seniority has
been traditionally used as the basis for many job actions, e.g.,
promotions. Thus, this method has the virtue of being the
procedure which the Respondent, prior to the unfair labor
practices, agreed to apply to the bargaining unit, including the
affected individuals, and which it chose to apply during and
after the strike to determine job priorities among nonstrikers,
crossovers, and permanent replacements. [Alaska Pulp Corp.,
326 NLRB 522, 523 (1998).]
Respondent’s job bid log shows that many positions identical
with strikers’ former jobs, or which may be shown to be
equivalent, became available after the strikers’ applied for rein-
statement.58 Most of these jobs were offered to replacement re
employees including some probationary employees. The de-
partmental seniority dates of replacement employees necessar-
ily were later than those of the strikers, many of whom were
employees of long standing. The failure of the Respondent to
offer such jobs to unreinstated strikers violated Section 8(a)(3).
Towne Ford, Inc., supra. Some have still not been fully rein-
stated, and Respondent’s assertion that it restored all depart-
mental seniority rights about a week before the hearing is chal-
lenged by the testimony of several former strikers. Although
the order in which violations occurred depends on the depart-
mental seniority dates, this determination can be postponed to
the compliance stage of this proceeding. Waterbury Hospital v.
NLRB, 950 F.2d (7th Cir. 1991), enfg. 300 NLRB 992 (1990).
The General Counsel agrees that the record evidence is insuffi-
cient to determine the sequence in which two or more employ-
ees would have been recalled, and concurs with this proce-
dure.59
58 GC Exh. 19.
Finally, I credit the testimony of Theron Ring that Coffman
told him he would never go back to his former job in mainte-
nance of Randolph Cooke that Coffman said that Cooke’s re-
jection of a stranding job would mean termination; and of Mat-
thew Couitcher that Coffman told him that he could either ac-
cept a different job or be fired, and that he would be junior in
the department. All these statements violated Section 8(a)(1).
E. Strikers Recalled to Former Jobs, But Allegedly Later Than
They Should Have Been
The General Counsel cites evidence that strikers were de-
layed in being reinstated to their former jobs because other
strikers, who had not worked in those jobs, were placed in
them. Thus, Raymond Proctor was reinstated to a strander
position. Coffman testified that absent this assignment, Rodney
Jefferson would have been reinstated to this job utilizing de-
partmental seniority as the criterion. Instead, Jefferson’s rein-
statement was delayed. Similarly, the recalls of Matthew
Couitcher, Dwayne Cuthbert, Lau Letioa, and Pete Sutton to
positions which were not the same as or equivalent to their
former positions caused delays in reinstatement to other strik-
ers. This evidence is augmented by Respondent’s records—the
job bid log, and the seniority dates of some of the employees.
In similar circumstances, the Board has stated that “the delay
in the reinstatement of maintenance department employees
caused by the Respondent’s improper reinstatement of leadmen
was not inconsequential. The minimum delay any striker
would have experienced was 2 weeks.” Alaska Pulp Corp.,
supra, 326 NLRB at 325. I conclude that the delay in rein-
statement of the strikers listed above in footnote 4, plus David
Paquay was caused by improper reinstatement of the strikers
listed above in section E, and violated Section 8(a)(3).
In accordance with my conclusions above, I make the fol-
lowing
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Florida Wire & Cable, Inc., is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, Local 9292, AFL–CIO
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. The following employees of Respondent constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
All production and maintenance employees, truck drivers and
crew leaders employed by Respondent at its Jackson plant at
59 GC Br. 41.

FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 391
825 North Lane Avenue, but excluding all office and clerical
employees, professional employees, salespersons, guards,
quality control and scheduling departments, and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
4. At all times since May 1, 1995, the Union has been the
certified exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
unit described above, and has been recognized as the exclusive
representative by Respondent. This recognition has embodied
in a series of collective-bargaining agreements the two most
recent of which were effective from May 1, 1996, to April 30,
1998, and from July 17, 1998, to April 30, 2000.
5. From about April 30 to about July 16, 1998, certain em-
ployees of Respondent in the unit described above ceased work
concertedly and engaged in a strike.
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by engag-
ing in the following conduct.
(a) Telling employees that they had to resign from the Union
in order to work past the expiration of a current collective-
bargaining agreement.
(b) Soliciting employees to resign from the Union.
(c) Telling employees that they would never be reinstated to
their former or substantially equivalent positions.
(d) Threatening to discharge striking employees unless they
accepted reinstatement to jobs that were not their former jobs or
substantially equivalent positions.
(e) Confiscating picket signs from strikers and destroying
them in the presence of employees.
7. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by engag-
ing in the following conduct.
(a) Discharging Curtis Walker on August 19, James Walker
on August 22, 1998, and William Carter on September 4, 1998,
because they ceased work concertedly and engaged in the
strike, and Joseph Almond on November 10, 1998, because he
joined the strike and refused to be reinstated to a job which was
not his former or a substantially equivalent job.
(b) Failing to reinstate timely to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, William Carter, Randolph Cooke, Mat-
thew Couitcher, Dwayne Cuthbert, Glenn Gray, Gladys Jack-
son, Vandell Johnson, Lau Letioa, Edward Norman, Raymond
Proctor, Theron Ring, Curtis Walker, and James Walker.60
(c) Delaying the timely reinstatement of John Wheeler, Roy
Crumpler, Charles Whitley, Rodney Jefferson, Larry Hudson,
George Turner, Keith Avinger, Calvin Wissentanner, Charles
Pettyjohn, Ray Lewis, Randy Nelson, Eulie Johnson, and
Myron Kelly.
8. The unfair labor practices described above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 3(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, it is recommended that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.

60 The inclusion of William Carter, Curtis Walker, and James Walker
is not redundant. The evidence in compliance proceedings may show
that Respondent should have reinstated them prior to its unlawful dis-
charges of them.
I have found that Respondent unlawfully discharged 4 strik-
ers. Curtis Walker was discharged on August 23, 1998. Al-
though Coffman in January 1999, offered him the same job
(wiredrawing) he had before the strike, it is unclear whether
this was the dayshift (which Walker had before the strike), and
whether all his rights, departmental seniority in particular, were
resorted. It is also unclear whether he should have been rein-
stated prior to his discharge. To delay his entitlement to back-
pay until this has been ascertained in compliance proceedings
would be an unwarranted deprivation of Walker’s rights. Ac-
cordingly, I shall recommend that the beginning period for
Walker’s backpay start on August 23, 1998, and that the
amount found to be due using this date, be increased, or that he
later receive a supplemental amount, in the event that the evi-
dence in compliance proceedings shows that Respondent
should have reinstated him on an earlier date. I shall therefore
recommend that Respondent be required to offer him immedi-
ate reinstatement to his former position to the extent it has not
already done so, including an assignment to the dayshift, and
all his rights and privileges including plant and departmental
seniority. In addition, Respondent should be required to make
Walker whole for any loss of earnings which can currently be
ascertained by paying him a sum of money equal to the amount
he would have earned from the time of his discharge to the date
of full reinstatement, less net earnings during such period to be
computed in the manner established by the Board in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).61 I shall also recommend an expunction order.
James E. Walker was discharged on August 26, 1998, later
accepted a nonequivalent job, and still later was returned to his
prior job as a storeroom clerk. It is unclear whether he was
returned to the same shift, and whether his plant and depart-
mental seniority were restored. Respondent should be required
to offer him his old job on the same shift, with all benefits in-
cluding this previous plant and departmental seniority. The
Company should also be required to make him whole in the
same manner as described above in the case of Curtis Walker,
with James E. Walker’s backpay period beginning either on
August 26, 1998, or on an earlier date if the evidence elicited in
compliance proceedings shows that this is warranted.
William F. Carter was discharged on September 5, 1998, and
was returned to his former job on July 23, 1999, although it is
unclear whether he went back to his old shift, and whether his
plant and departmental seniority were restored. The Company
should be required to offer him full reinstatement to the extent
that it has not already done so, including plant and departmental
seniority, and backpay beginning either on September 5, 1998,
or an earlier date if evidence elicited during compliance pro-
ceedings shows that this is warranted, in the same manner as
that described in the case of Curtis Walker.
61 Under New Horizons, interest if computed at the “short term Fed-
eral rate” for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend-
ment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Interest accrued before January 1, 1987 (the
effective date of the amendment), shall be computed as in Florida Steel
Corp., 281 NLRB 651 (1977).

392 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Joseph C. Almond was discharged on November 10, 1998,
and was later returned to a nonequivalent job, but has not been
reinstated. Respondent should be required to offer him full
reinstatement, including all his seniority rights, and backpay
beginning November 30, 1998. Although the General Counsel
moved to amend the complaint to add an allegation that Al-
mond had been unlawfully discharged, the second motion alleg-
ing “late” reinstatement of employees did not include Almond’s
name. Therefore, an earlier backpay date would not be avail-
able for Almond.
A determination of the proper remedy for the 13 strikers
listed in Conclusion of the Law 7(b) requires evidence of their
prestrike departmental seniority dates. Although the Company
submitted a purported list of plant and seniority dates, most of
the dates are in 1998 and the list is obviously incomplete.62
From the plethora of records which Respondent produced, it is
inconceivable that it does not have prestrike records showing
the date when each striker began to work in a particular de-
partment, and some evidence may be available from the testi-
mony of witnesses.
The Company’s combine four departments into one called
“core processes.” The four departments were wiredrawing,
stranding, stress relief, and house cleaning. There is some evi-
dence suggesting that the employees were also required to work
at different jobs. Coffman’s testimony and the testimony of the
employees about the jobs they had prior to the strike warrant a
conclusion that “core processes” was formed after the strike
began. This action affected the reinstatement rights of the
strikers and took place during Respondent’s unlawful conduct.
I conclude that Respondent is not entitled to alter obligations
created by that conduct. The strikers are entitled to their former
or substantially equivalent jobs.
Respondent should be ordered to give full reinstatement, in-
cluding all rights and benefits, to the employees listed in Con-
clusion of Law 7(b) to the extent that it has not yet made such
reinstatement. The Company should be required to make them
whole in the manner described above in the case of Curtis
Walker. Their backpay dates from the date that there was an
opening for their prestrike job, and their place on the prestrike
department as seniority list. The backpay period ends when
they have received full reinstatement. Employees who accepted
jobs which were not equivalent received wages—usually less
than their presrike wage—and these amounts should be consid-
ered as interim earnings to be deducted from gross backpay
due.
The strikers listed in Conclusion of Law 7(c), whom Re-
spondent delayed in reinstating, are entitled to be made whole
for their loss of earnings from the time they are determined in
compliance proceedings to have been entitled to reinstatement
to the time of actual reinstatement. Backpay is to be computed
in the manner described above in the case of Curtis Walker.
Upon these findings of fact and conclusions of law I issue
the following recommended63

62 R. Exh. 3.
63 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
ORDER
The Respondent, Florida Wire & Cable Inc., Jacksonville,
Florida, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Soliciting employees to resign from the Union.
(b) Telling employees that they have to resign from the Un-
ion in order to work past the expiration of a current collective
bargaining agreement.
(c) Telling employees that they would never be reinstated to
their former or substantially equivalent positions.
(d) Threatening to discharge striking employees unless they
accept reinstatement to jobs that are not their former jobs or
substantially equivalent positions.
(e) Discharging employees because they ceased work con-
certedly and engaged in a strike.
(f) Failing to reinstate timely to their former or substantially
equivalent positions employees who engaged in a strike and
made unconditional applications for reinstatement.
(g) Delaying the reinstatement of employees who engaged in
a strike and made unconditional applications for reinstatement.
(h) Confiscating picket signs from strikers and destroying
them in the presence of employees.
(i) In any other like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, to the extent
it has to already done so, reinstate the employees listed in Con-
clusions of Law 7(a) and (b) to the positions and shifts which
they had before the strike, including all benefits and privileges
and plant and departmental seniority, and make them whole
subsequent to a compliance proceeding in the manner set forth
in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Subsequent to a compliance proceeding, make whole the
employees listed in Conclusion of Law 7(c) in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, expunge from
its records all reference to the discharges of Curtis Walker,
James Walker, William Carter, and Joseph Almond, and inform
each of them in writing that this has been done, and that the
aforesaid actions will not be used as the basis of any future
discipline of any of them.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, personnel
records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Jacksonville, Florida facility, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”64 Copies of the notice, on forms pro-

64 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-

FLORIDA WIRE & CABLE 393
vided by the Regional Director for Region 12, after being
signed by Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by Re-
spondent since April 30, 1998.

ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”

(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.