Flinn, Steven Dennis. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 26, 2020

14497645 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/497,645 09/26/2014 Steven Dennis Flinn Many-11 9322
53928 7590 02/26/2020
MANYWORLDS, INC.
IP DEPARTMENT
5476 BRIDLE CREEK LANE
BRENHAM, TX 77833
EXAMINER
CHEN, YING YU
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2125
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/26/2020 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEVEN DENNIS FLINN and
NAOMI FELINA MONEYPENNY
Appeal 2019-001219
Application 14/497,645
Technology Center 2100
Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–3, 5–11, and 14–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellant identifies the real party in interest as ManyWorlds, Inc. Appeal
Brief 3, filed June 27, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”).
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BACKGROUND
This patent application discloses “a system and method for adaptive
probabilistic semantic-based applications implemented on a processor-based
device.” Specification 1:16–18, filed September 26, 2014 (“Spec.”). Claim 1
illustrates the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
accessing automatically a first behavioral chain
comprising a representation of a first user of a computer-
implemented system, a first predicate, and a first object of the
first predicate;
accessing automatically a first semantic chain comprising
a first subject, a second predicate, a second object of the second
predicate, and a first semantic chain weighting associated with
the first semantic chain, wherein the first subject corresponds to
the first object of the first predicate;
accessing automatically the first semantic chain weighting
that is associated with the first semantic chain, wherein the first
semantic chain weighting is automatically generated by a
processor-based device from a statistical analysis of computer-
implemented content;
linking automatically the first semantic chain and the first
behavioral chain;
inferring automatically a preference of the first user of the
computer-implemented system based, at least in part, on the
linked first semantic chain and first behavioral chain and the first
semantic chain weighting; and
selecting automatically a recommendation for delivery to
the first user of the computer-implemented system, wherein the
recommendation is selected based, at least in part, on the inferred
preference.
Appeal Br. 72.

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REJECTIONS
Claims 35 U.S.C. § References
1–3, 5–11, 14–20 101
1–3, 5–11, 14, 15 102 Mohammed2
16–20 103 Mohammed, Berner3
DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and Appellant’s
arguments. We disagree with Appellant that the Examiner erroneously
rejected claims 1–3, 5–11, and 14–20 under § 101. For this rejection, to the
extent consistent with the analysis below, we adopt the Examiner’s
reasoning, findings, and conclusions on pages 3–13 and 55–61 of the Final
Office Action mailed April 30, 2018 (“Final Act.”) and pages 3–13 and 50–
71 of the Examiner’s Answer mailed September 18, 2018 (“Ans.”). We
agree with Appellant the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–3, 5–11, 14,
and 15 under § 102 and claims 16–20 under § 103. We address these
rejections in turn.
Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).

2 Mohammed et al. (US 2014/0025660 A1; January 23, 2014).
3 Berner et al. (US 2013/0024464 A1; January 24, 2013).
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To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has revised its guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites subject matter that falls within one of the abstract idea
groupings listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we
then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised
Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
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routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the § 101 rejection.
Claim 1
Abstract Idea
The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
includes “mental processes,” that is, acts that people can perform in their
minds or using pen and paper. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 &
nn.14–15. The Examiner determined that claim 1 recites subject matter that
falls within this abstract idea grouping. See, e.g., Final Act. 3–5 (comparing
claim 1 to the patent-ineligible claims in Electric Power Group, LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); Ans. 50–53 (same); see also
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility at 7,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update
.pdf (“October SME Update”) (explaining that the patent-ineligible claims in
Electric Power Group are an example of claims that recite mental
processes).
We agree. Claim 1 recites a method that includes (1) accessing a
behavioral chain, a semantic chain, and a semantic chain weighting; (2)
linking the behavioral and semantic chains; (3) inferring a user preference
based on the linked chain and the semantic chain weighting; and (4)
selecting a recommendation based on the inferred preference. See Appeal
Br. 72. These limitations recite a series of results without meaningfully
limiting how the method achieves the results. See Appeal Br. 72. These
limitations are thus so broadly written that they encompass acts that people
can perform in their minds or using pen and paper. See, e.g., CyberSource
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Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(determining that a claim limitation “is so broadly worded that it
encompasses literally any method for” performing the limitation, including
“logical reasoning that can be performed entirely in the human mind”). For
example, people can access a behavioral chain, a semantic chain, and a
semantic chain weighting by reading this information from a database. See,
e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372 (determining that a claim limitation that
“requires ‘obtaining information about other transactions that have utilized
an Internet address that is identified with the [ ] credit card transaction’—can
be performed by a human who simply reads records of Internet credit card
transactions from a preexisting database”). Even if these steps did not
encompass mental processes, the steps would not make claim 1 patent
eligible because they merely gather data. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at
1372 (“[E]ven if some physical steps are required to obtain information from
the database (e.g., entering a query via a keyboard, clicking a mouse), such
data-gathering steps cannot alone confer patentability.”).
People can also link behavioral and semantic chains in their minds or
using pen and paper. The written description indicates that linking
behavioral and semantic chains involves identifying an element shared by
the chains and using that element to link the chains. See, e.g., Spec. 56:24–
57:14, 58:20–59:26. For example, the written description discloses that the
behavioral chain “User-Predicate(1)-Object(1)” and the semantic chain
“Object(1)-Predicate(2)-Object(2)” both contain the “Object(1)” element.
The written description explains that using this common element to link the
chains results in the following composite chain: “User-Predicate(1)-
Object(1)-Predicate(2)-Object(2).” See Spec. 56:24–57:10. People can
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mentally recognize that a behavioral chain and a semantic chain share an
element and use that element to append one chain to the other.
Similarly, people can mentally infer a user preference based on the
linked chain and the semantic chain weighting. The written description
discloses, for instance, drawing a weak inference that User(1) has an interest
in Boston from the composite chain “User(1)-viewed-Object(1)-is about-Red
Sox-is located-Boston” and a low weighting associated with one of the
composite chain’s semantic chains. See Spec. 59:6–26. People can mentally
draw this conclusion from the composite chain and the associated semantic
chain weighting. Finally, people can mentally select a recommendation
based on the inferred preference. As written, this step encompasses, for
example, people choosing a recommendation from a list of
recommendations based on the inferred preference. See, e.g., CyberSource,
654 F.3d at 1373. This step thus also encompasses acts that people can
perform mentally.
Because the accessing, linking, inferring, and selecting limitations
discussed above encompass acts that people can perform in their minds or
using pen and paper, claim 1 recites mental processes. See CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1372 (determining that a claim is drawn to “unpatentable mental
processes” because the claim recites “steps [that] can be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper”); see also Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 & nn.14–15; October SME Update 7–9. Claim
1 recites mental processes even though the preamble of the claim recites that
the claimed method is “computer-implemented.” See, e.g., CyberSource, 654
F.3d at 1375 (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
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Gottschalk v. Benson.”); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Courts have examined claims that required the
use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible
invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.”); see
also Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its
broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for
the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental
processes category . . . .”). Claim 1 therefore recites an abstract idea.
Because we determine that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
consider whether claim 1 integrates the abstract idea into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we
evaluate the claim as a whole to determine whether the claim “integrate[s]
the [abstract idea] into a practical application, using one or more of the
considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; see also October SME Update 12
(discussing the practical application analysis). That is, we consider any
additional elements recited in the claim along with the limitations that recite
an abstract idea to determine whether the claim integrates the abstract idea
into a practical application. See October SME Update 12.
The Examiner determined that claim 1 recites two additional
elements: a “processor-based device” and that the method is “computer-
implemented.” See Final Act. 5. The Examiner determined that these
elements encompass “generic computer components” and that the claimed
method simply uses these generic computer components to implement the
abstract idea. See Final Act. 5.
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We agree. Other than the recited abstract idea, claim 1 recites a
“processor-based device” and that the method is “computer-implemented.”
See Appeal Br. 72. The written description makes clear that the computer
components used in the recited method are generic computer components.
See, e.g., Spec. 80:17–20 (explaining that the disclosed invention uses
“standard PC workstation 956 [that] is connected to the server in a
contemporary fashion, potentially through the Internet” and that “[i]t should
be understood that the workstation 956 can represent any processor-based
device, mobile or fixed, including a set-top box”), 80:23–26 (“The PC
workstation 956 or servers 950 may embody, or be connected to, a portable
processor-based device (not shown), such as a mobile telephony device,
which may be a mobile phone or a personal digital assistant (PDA), or a
wearable device such as a ‘smart watch.’”), Fig. 13 (showing computer
hardware and network topologies used by the disclosed invention). Using
generic computer components to implement an abstract idea generally does
not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See, e.g., Alice,
573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer implementation is not
generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that provides any ‘practical
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77)); see also Intellectual Ventures I
LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Steps that do nothing more than spell out what it means to ‘apply it on a
computer’ cannot confer patent-eligibility.”).
Thus, considering the additional elements along with the recited
abstract idea, both individually and as an ordered combination, we determine
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that claim 1 does not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea and does not integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. See
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us otherwise. Appellant
contends that the Examiner improperly characterized the abstract idea as
“collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis.” Appeal Br. 13. According to Appellant, this
characterization “represents the type of gross generalization that” the Federal
Circuit has “specifically cautioned against.” Appeal Br. 13.
We disagree. The Examiner determined that the recited accessing
steps correspond to collecting information, the recited linking and inferring
steps correspond to analyzing information, and the recited selecting step
correspond to displaying certain results of the collecting and analyzing. See
Final Act. 4–5. Given the broad wording of these steps and their functional,
result-oriented nature, see Appeal Br. 72, we see no reversible error in the
Examiner’s characterization of these steps. Although Appellant asserts that
certain steps involve “much more” than the Examiner’s characterization of
the steps, Appeal Br. 13, Appellant has not provided persuasive reasoning to
support this assertion.
In any event, “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at
different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229,
1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Selecting one level of abstraction over another does
not necessarily affect the patentability analysis. Cf. Apple, 842 F.3d at 1240–
41 (“As the Board has done, the claimed abstract idea could be described as
generating menus on a computer, or generating a second menu from a first
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menu and sending the second menu to another location. It could be described
in other ways . . . . The Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
does not impact the patentability analysis.”). That is the case here.
Regardless of the level of abstraction used to describe the abstract idea
recited in claim 1, the result is the same—claim 1 recites mental processes.
Cf. Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d
1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Although not as broad as the district court’s
abstract idea of organizing data, it is nonetheless an abstract concept.”).
Appellant also argues that claim 1 is patent eligible because the claim
is allegedly analogous to the patent-eligible claims in the McRO,4 Core
Wireless,5 Enfish,6 and Finjan7 decisions. See Appeal Br. 15–19. According
to Appellant, like the claims in these decisions, claim 1 recites an
improvement to a technological process and an improvement to computer
technology. See Appeal Br. 15–19.
We disagree. In McRO, the claims incorporated “specific,” “limited”
rules that improved computer animation. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–16. And
in Core Wireless, the claims were “directed to a particular manner of
summarizing and presenting information in electronic devices” and
“disclose[d] a specific manner of displaying a limited set of information to
the user.” Core Wireless, 880 F.3d at 1362, 1363. Here, instead of
incorporating specific, limited rules or reciting particular, specific ways of

4 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
5 Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2018).
6 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
7 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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displaying information, claim 1 recites a series of broadly worded, result-
oriented functions without meaningfully limiting how the claimed invention
performs those functions. See Appeal Br. 72. As for Enfish and Finjan, in
Enfish the claims were “directed to a specific improvement to the way
computers operate, embodied in [a] self-referential table.” Enfish, 822 F.3d
at 1336. Similarly, in Finjan, the claims employed “a new kind of file that
enable[d] a computer security system to do things it could not do before.”
Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1305. Here, Appellant has not shown that the claimed
invention changes the way computers operate, much less improves the way
computers operate or creates a new file that it enables computers to do things
that they could not do before. We therefore find Appellant’s comparison of
claim 1 to the claims in these cases unpersuasive.
Appellant next contends that the invention recited in claim 1 does not
preempt the abstract idea identified by the Examiner. See Appeal Br. 22.
Even if this is true, that does not show that claim 1 is patent eligible. “While
preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We thus find this argument unpersuasive.
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). This requires us to evaluate whether the
additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or combination of
limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the
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field” or “simply append[] well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality.”
Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
As discussed above, the additional elements recited in claim 1 include
a “processor-based device” and that the method is “computer-implemented.”
See Appeal Br. 72. The written description indicates that the computer
components used by the method recited in claim 1 are conventional
computer components. See, e.g., Spec. 80:17–20, 80:23–26, Fig. 13.
Whether we consider these additional elements individually or as an ordered
combination, these elements do not transform the nature of claim 1 into a
patent-eligible application. These elements are recited at a high level of
generality, and there is no indication that these elements override the
conventional use of known features or involve an unconventional
arrangement or combination of elements. At bottom, claim 1 recites
conventional computer components employed in a customary manner, which
is not enough to provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he
mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to provide evidence that the
features recited in the accessing, linking, and inferring limitations are well
understood, routine, and conventional as required by Berkheimer8 and a
Patent Office memorandum9 addressing Berkheimer. See Appeal Br. 13–15,
20–22.

8 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
9 USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining
to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision
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We disagree. For the reasons discussed above, the accessing, linking,
and inferring limitations form part of the abstract idea. The relevant question
is not whether the abstract idea involves well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities, but rather whether the additional elements do. See,
e.g., Bridge & Post, Inc. v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 778 F. App’x 882, 892
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (“At Alice step two we assess ‘whether the claim limitations
other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was
directed were well-understood, routine, and conventional.’” (quoting BSG
Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); BSG
Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290 (“[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the claimed
invention as a whole is unconventional or non-routine. . . . It has been clear
since Alice that a claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which
it is directed cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention
‘significantly more’ than that ineligible concept.” (first emphasis added)).
Because the accessing, linking, and inferring limitations form part of the
abstract idea, the Examiner was not required to show that these limitations
are well understood, routine, and conventional.
Conclusion
We have reviewed Appellant’s remaining arguments and have found
them unpersuasive. For at least the above reasons, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea and lacks an inventive
concept. We thus sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under § 101.

(Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF.
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Claims 2, 3, 5–11, and 14–20
For claims 2, 3, 5–11, and 14–20, Appellant reproduces the claims
(including the limitations included in any parent claims) and contends that
the claims are patent eligible for largely the same reasons Appellant asserts
that claim 1 is patent eligible. See Appeal Br. 22–45. Of note, Appellant
argues that limitations recited in these claims include more than the abstract
idea identified by the Examiner and thus the Examiner should have provided
evidence that these limitations involve well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities as required Berkheimer and a related Patent Office
memorandum. See Appeal Br. 22–45.
We disagree. Like claim 1, independent claims 8 and 16 recite broad,
result-oriented limitations that lack any meaningfully limits on how they are
performed. See Appeal Br. 73–75. These limitations therefore also
encompass mental processes. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373.10
The same is true of the limitations recited in dependent claims 2, 3, 5–7, 9–
11, 14, 15, and 17–20. See Appeal Br. 72–76. Indeed, the limitations recited
in these dependent claims simply narrow the abstract idea recited in the
independent claims. See Appeal Br. 72–76. This is not enough to make the
dependent claims patent eligible. See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC,
898 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (determining that the dependent claims
at issue add limitations that “simply provide further narrowing of what are
still mathematical operations” and thus “add nothing outside the abstract
realm”). As a result, contrary to Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner was

10 In addition, the “access” limitations recited in these claims simply gather
data. See Appeal Br. 73–75. Gathering data generally does not make a claim
patent eligible. See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1372.
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not required to provide evidence that these limitations involve well-
understood, routine, and conventional activities. See, e.g., Bridge & Post,
778 F. App’x at 892; BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290. For these reasons, and the
reasons discussed above for claim 1, we find Appellant’s arguments
unpersuasive and thus sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 3, 5–11,
and 14–20 under § 101.
Section 102 Rejection
Claim 1
Claim 1 recites “accessing automatically the first semantic chain
weighting that is associated with the first semantic chain, wherein the first
semantic chain weighting is automatically generated by a processor-based
device from a statistical analysis of computer-implemented content.” Appeal
Br. 72. Appellant contends that the Examiner has not shown that
Mohammed discloses this limitation because the parts of Mohammed cited
by the Examiner do not disclose automatically generating the first semantic
chain weighing “from a statistical analysis of computer-implemented
content.” See Appeal Br. 47–48. Appellant argues that the cited parts of
Mohammed “only teach[] statistics with respect to user behaviors related to
content, but not to a statistical application to the content itself,” Appeal Br.
49, and the written description distinguishes user behaviors from content,
see Appeal Br. 47–48.
We agree with Appellant. The Examiner found that Mohammed
discloses the disputed limitation because Mohammed describes using
various information to generate an ontology graph that has scores and
weights supposedly equivalent to the recited semantic chain weightings. See
Final Act. 16. The Examiner found that Mohammed discloses that the
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information used to generate the ontology graph includes application data
that contains “statistical data about application usage,” Final Act. 17, and
that “[u]sage data may include information regarding the types of content a
user consumes,” Ans. 74 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mohammed ¶ 48).
First, the Examiner has not shown that Mohammed discloses using
application data (and its accompanying statistical data regarding application
usage) to generate semantic chain weightings. Although the cited parts of
Mohammed generally disclose generating an ontology graph using
information that includes application data, see Mohammed ¶ 92, the
Examiner has not shown that Mohammed discloses using the application
data itself to generate the semantic chain weightings included in the
ontology graph, see Final Act. 16–17. The Examiner has thus not shown that
the cited parts of Mohammed disclose “wherein the first semantic chain
weighting is automatically generated by a processor-based device from a
statistical analysis of computer-implemented content.”
Second, even if the Examiner had shown that Mohammed discloses
using application data to generate semantic chain weightings, claim 1
requires generating these weightings from statistical analysis of computer-
implemented content. The cited parts of Mohammed disclose that
application data includes statistical analysis of application usage, see
Mohammed ¶ 89, and the written description distinguishes user behaviors
such as application usage from content, see, e.g., Spec. 5:26–7:10. The
Examiner’s reliance on Mohammed’s disclosure that “usage data” includes
“information regarding the types of content a user consumes” does not
remedy this deficiency because Mohammed discloses that application data is
a type of “usage data,” not that application data includes “information
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regarding the types of content a user consumes.” See Mohammed ¶ 48. We
therefore agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown that
Mohammed discloses the disputed limitation.
For the above reasons, on this record, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 1 and claims 2, 3, and 5–7, which
depend from claim 1.
Claim 8
Claim 8 recites “access the first semantic chain weighting associated
with the first semantic chain, wherein the first semantic chain weighting
associated with the first semantic chain comprises a probability that the first
semantic chain is applicable for interpreting specified content.” Appeal Br.
73. Appellant contends that the Examiner has not shown that Mohammed
discloses this limitation because the parts of Mohammed relied on by the
Examiner disclose scores and weights, not a probability that first semantic
chain is applicable for interpreting content. See Appeal Br. 57–58.
We agree with Appellant. The Examiner found that Mohammed
discloses the recited probability because Mohammed discloses scores and
weights that can depend on “confidence in reliability of [a] data source” and
may be associated with nodes in an ontology graph. See Ans. 81–82. But the
cited parts of Mohammed disclose that these scores and weights “reflect[] a
strength of an association between nodes” and make no mention of using the
scores and weights as probabilities for interpreting specified content. See
Mohammed ¶¶ 73–74. We thus agree with Appellant that the Examiner has
not shown that Mohammed discloses this limitation.
Appeal 2019-001219
Application 14/497,645

19
For the above reasons, on this record, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 8 and claims 9–11, 14, and 15,
which depend from claim 8.
Section 103 Rejection
The Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 16 suffers from the
same flaws as the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 8. We therefore
do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claim 16 and its
dependent claims, claims 17–20.
CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5–11,
14–20 101
1–3, 5–11,
14–20
1–3, 5–11,
14, 15 102 Mohammed
1–3, 5–11,
14, 15
16–20 103 Mohammed, Berner 16–20
Overall
Outcome
1–3, 5–11,
14–20

Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection for each claim on
appeal, we affirm the Examiner’s decision. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No
period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may
be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED