0720060014
11-15-2007
Felipe San Diego, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.
Felipe San Diego,
Complainant,
v.
R. James Nicholson,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 07200600141
Hearing No. 210-2004-00246X
Agency No. 200K05372004100
DECISION
Following its October 25, 2005 final order, the agency filed a timely
appeal, and complainant filed a cross appeal. The agency requests that
the Commission affirm its rejection of an EEOC Administrative Judge's
(AJ) finding of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
The agency also requests that the Commission affirm its rejection of
the relief ordered by the AJ. Complainant requests that the Commission
affirm the AJ's decision and expanded the award of relief. The Commission
finds these appeals to be timely and decides the matter pursuant to 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented herein are whether the AJ's factual findings
are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether his
conclusions of law are correct.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked
as a Respiratory Therapist at the West Side Medical Center, in Chicago,
Illinois.
In relevant part, the record reveals that in 2000, complainant filed
an EEO complaint alleging that the agency discriminated against him
on the bases of age, national origin and retaliation relative to the
case assignment practices of supervisors in the Respiratory Therapy
Department. Complainant named a coworker, Lead Therapist (RK) and
his immediate supervisor (S1) as the responsible management officials.
The complaint was ultimately resolved through a settlement agreement on
January 25, 2001. The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part,
that the agency would observe the "Point System" in order to ensure
equality of assignments among Respiratory Therapists in the department.
S1 was required to record and maintain the total points attributable
to each therapist on a daily basis and the record of such assignments
would be maintained and made available for inspection by therapists on
a monthly basis.
On April 30, 2001, complainant filed a second complaint, alleging that he
was subjected to discrimination and harassment by management and coworkers
based on his age (65), national origin (Philippine), and in reprisal for
prior EEO activity. Complainant again named RK and S1, as the responsible
management officials. On July 16, 2003, the agency issued an FAD finding
no discrimination on that complaint which complainant did not appeal.
On December 5, 2003, complainant filed the instant EEO complaint alleging
that he was discriminated against and subjected to continuing harassment
in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:
1. on October 21, 2003, RK verbally attacked him and falsely accused
him of violating the privacy rights of therapists in the department.
2. on November 2, 2003, S1 refused to investigate the above incident;
3. on November 5, 2003, he was issued a Memorandum of counseling; and
4. on November 11, 2003, he was asked to sign a memorandum that he
would not exercise his right to inspect case assignment files under the
point system, as provided in an earlier EEO settlement agreement that
he had signed.
Complainant alleged that the "escalating retaliatory conduct" on
the part of RK created a hostile work environment. Complainant also
stated that RK's conduct interfered with his ability to perform his job
responsibilities and caused him to suffer extreme anxiety and emotional
distress. Complainant further alleged that management officials have
failed to take appropriate remedial actions to stop the harassment
directed toward him by RK.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing. The AJ held a hearing on November 16, 2004, and
issued a decision on September 29, 2005. The agency subsequently issued
a final order rejecting the AJ's finding that complainant proved that
he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.
In his decision, the AJ concluded that complainant established a prima
facie case of retaliation. The AJ noted that complainant engaged in
protected activity in 2000 and 2001. Complainant's EEO activities were
known to S1 and RK, who were responsible for the challenged actions
in this case. The AJ also found that complainant suffered adverse
treatment when he was subjected to harassment so severe and pervasive
that it created an objectively hostile work environment.2 The AJ further
found that the causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse actions was sufficient to support an inference of retaliation.
The AJ then found that the agency failed to meet its burden of
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
The AJ noted that according to the settlement agreement dated January 25,
2001, management was required to "record and maintain" the total points
associated with each therapist's assignments to determine the equality of
assignments made by RK. The AJ found that the agency failed to do so, and
complainant took it upon himself to determine the number of assignments
for each therapist by copying the work assignments of all the therapists.
The AJ also found that RK objected to complainant copying this information
and continually harassed complainant. The AJ further found that the
evidence establishes that RK was upset and angry that complainant had
identified him as a responsible management official in his previous EEO
complaints. The AJ also found that RK yelled at complainant and called
him "brain dead" because of the point system implemented under the EEO
settlement agreement dated January 25, 2001. Moreover, the AJ noted
that during the hearing complainant's coworker (EA) testified that RK
"held a grudge" against complainant after he filed his initial complaint.
Accordingly, the AJ concluded that complainant has established that he
was subjected to unlawful retaliatory harassment by RK.
Although RK was not officially designated as a supervisor, the AJ
found that employees viewed him as such when S1 was absent. RK made
assignments on a routine basis and granted leave and was "in charge" when
S1 was absent. The AJ concluded that he was a "de facto" supervisor and
there is basis for imputing liability to the agency. Specifically, the
AJ found that management (S1 and the Chief, Respiratory Care) knew about
the situation between complainant and RK, but no action was undertaken
to end the harassment and prevent its recurrence.
In addition, the AJ found the testimony of S1 neither credible nor
direct and found that RK was evasive in his testimony. The AJ noted that
neither one of these individuals was honest or direct. Therefore, the AJ
concluded that because RK and S1 lacked credibility in their testimony,
the agency failed to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
for its actions.
As relief, the AJ found complainant was only entitled to attorney's fees
for the amount of $10,050.00, for 50.25 work hours at an hourly rate
of $200.00. However, the AJ found that complainant was not entitled to
compensatory damages because he never raised the issue of compensatory
damages during the hearing.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, the agency argues that the AJ lacked jurisdiction over the
instant case. The agency contends that complainant filed the instant
complaint alleging harassment in an attempt to enforce the settlement
agreement of 2001. The agency argues that the AJ had no authority
to exercise jurisdiction over a complaint regarding enforcement of a
prior settlement agreement, even if that agreement had actually been
breached.
The agency further argues that the AJ erred when concluding that RK, a
coworker of complainant, was a "de facto supervisor." In that regard,
the agency maintained that RK had no supervisory authority, so there
is no basis for imputing liability to the agency upon a finding of
discrimination. The agency further alleged that management articulated
legitimate reasons for its actions. As for the attorney's fee award,
the agency maintains that complainant is not a prevailing party, because
he failed to prove compensatory damages during the hearing. Furthermore,
the agency contends that complainant was not successful on any of the
accepted issues in the case.
Complainant replies by arguing that his claim concerned whether or not he
was subjected to "continuing harassment" for engaging in protected EEO
activity, which had nothing to do with enforcement of the settlement
agreement dated January 25, 2001. Complainant also argues that
there is ample evidence in support of RK's status as a "supervisor."
Complainant further argues that he is a prevailing party because he has
achieved some sort of benefit sought in the complaint.
Complainant also files his own appeal challenging the AJ's decision to
the extent the AJ found that he "failed to allege or prove compensatory
damages in this case." In that regard, complainant contends that in
his formal complaint, he specifically requested compensatory damages.
Complainant further contends that in his Prehearing Submission filed on
September 2, 2005, he specifically requested "An award of compensatory
damages for pain, suffering and emotional distress in the amount of
$10,000.00."
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by
an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal
Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)
(citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory
intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a
de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held.
An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or
on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or
other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so
lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it.
See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.B. (November 9, 1999).
To establish a prima facie case of harassment, a complainant must show
that: (1) complainant belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2)
complainant was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal
or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on the statutorily protected class; and (4)
the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment
and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;
and (5) some basis exists to impute liability to the employer, i.e.,
supervisory employees knew or should have known of the conduct but failed
to take corrective action. See Fox v. General Motors, 247 F. 3d 169
(4th Cir. 2001); McLeod v. Social Security Administration, EEOC Appeal
No. 01963810 (August 5, 1999).
Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's
race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or in
reprisal is unlawful. A single incident or group of isolated incidents
will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment unless the conduct
is severe. See Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
To determine whether a work environment is objectively hostile or
abusive, the trier of fact must consider all of the circumstances,
including the following: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 23 (1993); Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994) at 3, 6. Accordingly,
harassment is actionable only if the harassment to which the complainant
has been subjected to was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of complainant's employment.
A complainant may establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing
that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the agency was
aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he or she was subjected
to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the
protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Department
of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000).
As an initial matter, the Commission notes that in the instant case
complainant alleged a claim of hostile work environment by RK based
on reprisal for his prior EEO activities. We find that complainant's
claim constitutes a claim of discrimination, rather than a claim of
noncompliance with a settlement agreement. As such, we find that the EEOC
AJ had jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109.
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of
all statements submitted by the agency, including those not specifically
addressed, it is the decision of the Commission to affirm the AJ's finding
that the agency discriminated against complainant based on reprisal.
The AJ's decision correctly states the facts, applies the pertinent
principles of law, and is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
We find that complainant has alleged events which, taken as a whole,
are sufficiently severe to constitute retaliatory harassment. The record
shows that RK was upset and angry that complainant had identified him as a
responsible management official in his prior EEO complaints. The record
also supports the AJ conclusion that RK was uncomfortable and upset
with the point system implemented under the EEO settlement agreement.
As such, we conclude that the environment, created by RK and maintained
by the agency, was a retaliatory one.
Finally, in addition to our finding that complainant was subjected to a
hostile work environment, we must, nevertheless, consider whether there
is a basis upon which to impute liability to the agency. In this regard,
we agree with the AJ that the agency is liable for the harassment by RK.
The Commission first determines that, contrary to the agency's assertion
on appeal, the facts support that RK had supervisory authority over
complainant. The Commission has held that a determination as to whether
a harasser had supervisory authority is based on his or her job function
rather than job title (e.g., "team leader") and must be based on the
specific facts. An individual qualifies as an employee's "supervisor"
if the individual: (1) has authority to undertake or recommend tangible
employment decisions affecting the employee (even if the individual
does not have the final say); or (2) has authority to direct the
employee's daily work activities. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance:
Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice
No. 915.002 (rev. October 17, 2002). The record reveals that RK was the
Lead Respiratory Technician and his responsibilities included scheduling
work assignments for the therapists, directing employees, granting
their leave requests, assisting them when they needed advice/guidance,
and receiving their reports of patient complications/injuries. In all
respects, RK was "in charge" when S1 was absent. Moreover, the employees
viewed him as a supervisor. Therefore, we conclude that RK had authority
to direct complainant's daily work assignments, and as such, he qualifies
as complainant's supervisor.
Where the harasser is a management official and the harassment does not
result in a tangible employment action being taken against an employee,
the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability. Burlington
Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 at 765 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). The agency can establish this
defense, which is subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
by demonstrating: (a) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (b) that complainant
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the agency or to avoid harm otherwise.
We find that the agency failed to take immediate and appropriate
corrective action. The record reveals that management attempted
to rescind the basis of the settlement agreement as related to the
point system, to avoid confrontations between complainant and RK.
The record further reveals that management called a meeting between RK
and complainant in an attempt to resolve their differences. However,
these actions did not stop or prevent further harassment by RK toward
complainant. Accordingly, we conclude that management's actions were
not sufficient corrective action to stop RK's conduct.
With respect to (b), we find that complainant acted reasonably.
Complainant contacted S1 on at least two occasions to report RK's
behavior, but S1 failed to act to correct the conditions. Also,
the Chief of Respiratory Care was informed but failed to take prompt
corrective action.
For these reasons we find that the agency is liable for maintaining a
hostile work environment toward complainant from October through November,
2003.
Compensatory Damages
Having found that the agency is liable for subjecting complainant to
a hostile work environment, we now turn to the issue of complainant's
entitlement to compensatory damages. We find that the AJ erred in
concluding that complainant was not entitled to compensatory damages
because he never raised the issues of compensatory damages during the
hearing. The record reveals that in his formal complaint, complainant
requested compensatory damages, and also in his Prehearing Submission.
Specifically, complainant requested an award of compensatory damages
for pain, suffering and emotional distress in the amount of $10,000.00.
We find that the AJ erred in denying complainant compensatory damages
without allowing him an opportunity to submit evidence of such damages
after liability was determined. Therefore, we remand this complaint to
the Administrative Judge for a determination on compensatory damages.
Section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorizes the Commission
to award compensatory damages as part of make-whole relief for intentional
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. � 1981a; West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212,
217 (1999). To receive an award of compensatory damages, complainant
must demonstrate that he/she has been harmed as a result of the agency's
discriminatory actions, as well as the extent, nature, severity, and
duration of that harm. Compensatory and Punitive Damages Available Under
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July
14, 1992), at 8, 11-12, 14. Complainant must present objective evidence
that the agency's harassment from October 21, 2003 thorough November 18,
2003, caused him to suffer the harm complained. Evidence establishing
a causal connection may include statements from petitioner and others,
including family members, friends, and health care providers, concerning
any non-pecuniary losses that are incurred as a result of the harassment.
See generally Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01922369
(Jan. 5, 1993). On remand, the Administrative Judge must determine
whether complainant was harmed as a result of the harassment, as well
as the extent, nature, severity and duration of the harm.
Attorney's fees
The Commission, an agency or an AJ may award complainant reasonable
attorney's fees and other costs incurred in the processing of a
complainant regarding allegations of discrimination in violation of
Title VII. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). A finding of discrimination raises a
presumption of entitlement to an award of attorney's fees. Id. Attorney's
fees shall be paid for services performed by an attorney after the filing
of a written complaint. Id. An award of attorney fees is determined by
calculating the lodestar, i.e., by multiplying a reasonable hourly fee
times a reasonable number of hours expended. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424 (1983); 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B). "There is a strong
presumption that this amount represents the reasonable fee." 29 C.F.R. �
1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B). A reasonable hourly fee is the prevailing market
rate in the relevant community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
A petition for fees and costs must take the form of the verified
statement required by the Commission's regulations at 29 C.F.R. �
1614.501(e)(2)(i).
In this case, the AJ awarded $10,050.00 in attorney fees. The agency
does not challenge the attorney's hourly rate, or the amount of
attorney's fees. Its only argument is that complainant is not entitled
to attorney's fees because he is not a prevailing party. Because we
find that complainant is a prevailing party, we conclude that the AJ
properly awarded complainant $10,050.00 in attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
We find that there is substantial evidence to support the AJ conclusion
that the agency is liable for retaliatory harassment. Accordingly,
the Commission reverses the final agency decision issued on October 25,
2005, and remands this matter for further processing consistent with
this decision and the Order below.
ORDER
The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:
1. The agency shall forward the case to the Hearings Unit of the Chicago
District Office for assignment of an Administrative Judge to render a
determination on the issue of compensatory damages. Thereafter, the
Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on this issue in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109, and the agency shall issue a final action in
accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110 within forty (40) days of receipt
of the Administrative Judge's decision. The agency shall submit copies
of the Administrative Judge's decision and the final agency action to
the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below.
2. The agency shall pay complainant attorney's fees for the amount of
$10,050.00, within (30) days from the date this finding of discrimination
becomes final.
3. The agency shall provide training to managers responsible for the
agency's actions in this matter, regarding their obligations and duties
imposed by the anti-retaliation regulations.
4. The agency shall take all appropriate corrective, curative or
preventive action to ensure that such harassment by all relevant
agency officials does not recur. Such corrective steps shall include
reviewing and revising agency policies and procedures relating to the
investigation and prevention of harassment so as to provide prompt and
thorough investigation of such complaints, and appropriate and effective
remedial corrective actions in response to such complaints. The agency
shall also review the matters giving rise to the instant complaint to
determine the appropriateness of disciplinary actions against agency
officials involved and responsible. The agency shall record its basis
for deciding whether or not to take disciplinary action, submit such
records to the EEOC pursuant to paragraph four (4) below, and maintain
such records for a period of no less than five (5) years from the date
this finding of discrimination becomes final.
5. The agency shall post at its Chicago VA Health Care West Side Division,
in Chicago, Illinois, copies of the attached notice. Copies of the
notice, after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative,
shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the
date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty
(60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take
reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be
submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph
entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)
calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
6. The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commissions'
Decision. " The report shall include supporting evidence that the
corrective action has been implemented.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0900)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29
C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the
agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the
agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of
Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision
becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's
fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the
right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tends to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant
in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 15, 2007
__________________
Date
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
This Notice is posted pursuant to an order by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission dated _____________ which found that
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. has occurred at the Chicago VA
Health Care West Side Division (hereinafter this facility).
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any employee
or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE, COLOR, RELIGION,
SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing,
promotion, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.
This facility was found to have violated Title VII when it retaliated
against an individual for engaging in protected EEO activity. To remedy
the discrimination, the Commission has ordered the facility to pay proven
compensatory damages, to pay attorney's fees, and to provide training
for and consider disciplinary action against the responsible managerial
and supervisory employees on their responsibilities and obligations under
the federal anti-discrimination statutes. This facility will ensure that
supervisors and management officials will abide by the requirements of
all federal equal employment opportunity laws and will not retaliate
against employees.
This facility will comply with federal law and will not in any manner
restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who
exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or
who participates in proceedings pursuant to, federal equal employment
opportunity law.
29 C.F.R. Part 1614
Date Posted: ______________
Posting Expires: ____________
29 C.F.R. Part 1614
1 Due to a new data system, this appeal has been redesignated with the
above-referenced appeal number.
2 The Commission notes that the AJ inadvertently stated in page 6 of his
decision, "Complainant, however, failed to provide sufficient evidence
to establish that the agency subjected him to harassment so severe
and pervasive that it created an objective hostile work environment."
However, in his conclusion, he concluded that "the agency discriminated
against complainant on the basis of reprisal by subjecting him to
harassment sufficiently severe as to alter his working conditions."
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0720060014
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036
11
0720060014
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036