Fariborz Derakhshan et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 11, 2020

14410338 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/410,338 12/22/2014 Fariborz Derakhshan LUTZ 201947US01 6091
48116 7590 02/11/2020
FAY SHARPE/NOKIA
1228 Euclid Avenue, 5th Floor
The Halle Building
Cleveland, OH 44115-1843
EXAMINER
KHAN, ATTA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2449
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
docketing@faysharpe.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte FARIBORZ DERAKHSHAN and HEIDRUN GROB-LIPSKI
____________________

Appeal 2018-006699
Application 14/410,338
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word “Appellant” to refer to
“applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies
Alcatel Lucent as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention generally relates to “an
enhanced publish-subscribe concept for events in a communication
network.” Spec. 1:5–6. According to the Specification, rather than
publishing nodes (i.e., network entities) merely broadcasting events of
predefined classes to unknown event subscribing nodes (i.e., network
entities) as in conventional approaches, Appellant’s disclosed embodiment
allows subscribing nodes to configure configurable events at the publishing
node. Spec. 2:23–3:3. In addition, according to the Specification, this
approach provides advantages over conventional polling, pushing, or pulling
approaches by minimizing the required computation effort and required
signaling. Spec. 3:12–16.
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below with the disputed limitation emphasized in italics:
1. An event subscribing network entity for use in a
communication network, the event subscribing network entity
comprising:
at least one processor and associated memory;
an output interface configured to send communications via
a communication network, the communication network
including a plurality of network entities, the plurality of network
entities including an event publishing network entity; and
an input interface configured to receive communications
via the communication network;
wherein the at least one processor is configured to send an
event subscription message to the event publishing network
entity via the output interface, wherein the event subscription
message includes information identifying said event subscribing
network entity and configuration rules for configuring a
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configurable event of interest at the event publishing network
entity;
wherein the event publishing network entity is configured
to report the configurable event of interest to said event
subscribing network entity in an event notification message;
wherein the at least one processor is configured to receive
the event notification message from the event publishing
network entity via the input interface.

The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 5–9.
2. Claims 1–13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite. Final Act. 9–11.
3. Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Wang et al. (US 2007/0168550 A1; July 19, 2007)
(“Wang”) and Flammer, III et al. (US 2009/0034419 A1; Feb. 5, 2009)
(“Flammer”). Final Act. 12–27.

ANALYSIS2
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant disputes the Examiner’s conclusion that the pending claims
are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 6–17; Reply
Br. 2–15. In particular, Appellant argues the Examiner erred in concluding

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
December 13, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed June 13, 2018
(“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed April 19, 2018 (“Ans.”); and
the Final Office Action, mailed June 16, 2017 (“Final Act.”), from which
this Appeal is taken.
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the claims are directed to the abstract ideas of using categories to organize,
store, and transmit information, or, alternatively, subscription for updates.
Appeal Br. 8–11; see also Final Act. 6–7. Moreover, Appellant asserts the
claims recite significantly more than the alleged abstract idea(s). Appeal
Br. 7–8, 15–16; Reply Br. 4–6.
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework guides our analysis of
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office has published revised guidance
for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically
with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Office
Guidance”). If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent
eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter)
then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially
recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an
abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must “look
at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the
claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Per Office Guidance, this first inquiry has two prongs of
analysis: (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea),
and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application.
84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Under the Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is
integrated into a practical application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible
under § 101. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. If the claims are not directed to an
abstract idea, the inquiry ends. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
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Am., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016). However, if the claim is
directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not
integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step is to
determine whether any element, or combination of elements, amounts to
significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; 84
Fed. Reg. at 56.
In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner
concludes the claims are directed to the abstract idea of using categories to
organize, store, and transmit information. Final Act. 6; Ans. 31. Moreover,
the Examiner concludes the claims do not recite significantly more than the
underlying abstract ideas to confer patent eligibility. Final Act. 6. In
particular, the Examiner states “the claim does not affect an improvement to
another technology or technical field; the claim does not amount to an
improvement to the functioning of a computer itself; and the claim does not
move beyond a general link of the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment.” Final Act. 6.
As discussed below, we disagree with the Examiner that the pending
claims are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In particular, we are mindful of
the Court’s caution expressed in Alice that “an invention is not rendered
ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept.” Alice,
573 U.S. at 217. Further, as the court discussed in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), claims that improve an existing
technology might not succumb to the abstract idea exception of patent
eligibility. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. In Enfish, the court framed the first
step of the Alice inquiry as whether the focus of the claims is on a specific
asserted improvement in computer capabilities or, instead on an abstract idea
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that merely uses a computer as a tool for carrying out the abstract idea.
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
Here, we conclude the claims are directed to a configurable publish-
subscribe communication mechanism wherein a subscribing node (i.e.,
network entity) is able to configure a configurable event of interest at a
publishing node. Thus, the focus of the claims is not on merely categorizing,
storing, and transmitting of information, as determined by the Examiner. As
described in the Specification, conventional publish-subscribe mechanisms
employed polling, pulling, or pushing of event status information between
subscribing and publishing nodes. See Spec. 1:18–32. According to the
Specification, such embodiments “lead[] to an inefficient use of the network
and a non-optimal routing and/or load distribution.” Spec. 2:10–11.
Moreover, according to the Specification, in convention publish-subscribe
systems, publishing nodes are not configured for specific subscribing nodes,
but rather publish (i.e., broadcast or transmit) event occurrences from
predefined categories. Spec. 2:24–28. In addition, subscribing nodes
typically subscribe to certain predefined classes, without knowledge of
particular publishing nodes. Spec. 2:28–30. By allowing the subscribing
nodes to configure configurable events at the publishing node, subscribing
nodes may, therefore, only receive information of interest (as opposed to
receiving broadcast indications from a publishing node). Spec. 3:1–3.
Appellant also sets forth in the Specification that by enabling subscribing
nodes to configure configurable events at publishing nodes, computation
efforts and required signaling may be minimized. Spec. 3:12–16.
Accordingly, we conclude that the focus of the claims (i.e., the
character of the claims as a whole) is more than merely organizing, storing,
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and transmitting information. Instead, we conclude the claims are directed
to a configurable publish-subscribe communication mechanism wherein a
subscribing node (i.e., network entity) is able to configure a configurable
event of interest at a publishing node—an improvement over conventional
techniques.
Further, we note that in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the court explained the claims “[did] not
merely recite the performance of some business practice known from the
pre-Internet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet.
Instead, the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in
order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. In distinguishing from claims that
simply use the Internet to perform an abstract business practice, the court
explained the claims “specify how interactions with the Internet are
manipulated to yield a desired result.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1258. Thus, when
the limitations are considered together as an ordered combination, the court
concluded the claims “recite an invention that is not merely the routine or
conventional use of the Internet.” DDR, 773 F.3d at 1259. Accordingly, the
court concluded the claims were patent eligible. DDR, 773 F.3d at 1259.
We find the court’s reasoning in DDR applicable here. Similar to the
claims at issue in DDR, the pending claims set forth a solution rooted in
computer technology to address a challenge specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks. Rather than merely using categories to organize,
store and transmit information, the recited steps of a subscribing network
entity configuring events at a publishing network entity address an issue
arising in the realm of computer networks, i.e., to transmit only events of
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interest (those configured by the subscribing network entities). See, e.g.,
Spec. 2:23–3:16. Accordingly, we conclude the claims are patent eligible
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Moreover, analysis under the Office Guidance does not alter our
conclusion. The Examiner finds the claims are directed to an abstract idea.
Final Act. 6; Ans. 31–34. In particular, the Examiner finds the claims are
directed to using categories to organize, store, and transmit information.
Final Act. 6; Ans. 31.
Claim 1 is reproduced below and includes the following claim
limitations that recite organizing, storing, and transmitting information, as
identified by the Examiner, emphasized in italics. See Ans. 31–34.
1. An event subscribing network entity for use in a
communication network, the event subscribing network entity
comprising:
at least one processor and associated memory;
an output interface configured to send communications via
a communication network, the communication network
including a plurality of network entities, the plurality of network
entities including an event publishing network entity; and
an input interface configured to receive communications
via the communication network;
wherein the at least one processor is configured to send an
event subscription message to the event publishing network
entity via the output interface, wherein the event subscription
message includes information identifying said event subscribing
network entity and configuration rules for configuring a
configurable event of interest at the event publishing network
entity;
wherein the event publishing network entity is configured
to report the configurable event of interest to said event
subscribing network entity in an event notification message;
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wherein the at least one processor is configured to receive
the event notification message from the event publishing
network entity via the input interface.
More particularly, the Examiner explains event subscribing and rules
for configuring a configurable event correspond to using categories to
organize information. Ans. 31. Additionally, the Examiner interprets
configuring (of configurable events) as storing information. Ans. 31.
Further, the Examiner explains reporting the configurable event of interest
corresponds to transmitting information. Ans. 31.
Accepting, arguendo, the claim recites an abstract idea, as identified
by the Examiner, we next determine whether the claim integrates the
abstract idea into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. To determine
whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we
identify whether there are “any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those elements to determine
whether they integrate the judicial exception into a recognized practical
application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added); see also Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.,
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018).
As discussed above, we find the additional limitations integrate the
abstract idea (as identified by the Examiner) into a practical application—
specifically improving conventional publish-subscribe communications by
providing a configurable publish-subscribe communication mechanism. See
Spec. 1:18–3:16; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are persuaded of Examiner error.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
The Examiner concludes certain terms recited in the claims invoke
35 U.S.C. § 112(f) as written in a means-plus-function manner, but lack
sufficient corresponding structure in the Specification. Final Act. 9–11. As
such, the Examiner concludes the claims fail under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) for
indefiniteness. Final Act. 9–11.
As an initial matter, we note that the identified terms do not explicitly
recite a “means for” performing a function. This is not necessary. See
Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696,
703–04 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Federal Circuit has established that use of the
word “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that the inventor intended to
invoke § 112(f), whereas failure to use the word “means” creates a
rebuttable presumption that the inventor did not intend the claims to be
governed by § 112(f). Personalized Media Commc’ns, 161 F.3d at 703–04.
However, the presumption that a limitation that does not recite a “means for”
or a “step for” and, therefore, is not subject to § 112, sixth paragraph is not a
strong one. Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (concluding “that such a heightened burden is unjustified and that
we should abandon characterizing as ‘strong’ the presumption that a
limitation lacking the word ‘means’ is not subject to § 112, para. 6”).
Rather, the Williamson Court explained:
The standard is whether the words of the claim are understood
by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently
definite meaning as the name for structure. When a claim term
lacks the word “means,” the presumption can be overcome and
§ 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the
claim term fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure” or else
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recites “function without reciting sufficient structure for
performing that function.”
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (internal citations omitted). “Structure
disclosed in the specification qualifies as ‘corresponding structure’ if the
intrinsic evidence clearly links or associates that structure to the function
recited in the claim.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.
For each of the following terms, Appellant disputes that the identified
terms invoke 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), but even if they did, the Specification sets
forth sufficient corresponding structure. Appeal Br. 17–20; Reply Br. 16–
26.
a. “output interface”
The Examiner explains the term “interface” is a generic placeholder,
is modified by functional language “to send,” and lacks sufficient structure
in the Specification. Ans. 39.
We disagree with the Examiner that 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) is invoked by
an “output interface.” Rather, consistent with the guidance from the
Williamson court, we determine that an ordinarily skilled artisan would
understand an output interface to have a “sufficiently definite meaning as the
name for structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) for this term.

b. “input interface”
Similar to the output interface, the Examiner explains the provisions
of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) are invoked and the Specification fails to provide
sufficient corresponding structure for the input interface. Ans. 39–40.
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We disagree with the Examiner that 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) is invoked by
an “input interface.” Rather, consistent with the guidance from the
Williamson court, we determine that an ordinarily skilled artisan would
understand an output interface to have a “sufficiently definite meaning as the
name for structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) for this term.

c. “event publishing network entity”
Similar to the output interface, the Examiner explains the provisions
of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) are invoked and the Specification fails to provide
sufficient corresponding structure for the event publishing network entity.
Ans. 40.
We disagree with the Examiner that a “network entity” as recited in
independent claims 1 and 13 invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). Rather, some
minimal structure is recited in the claims (e.g., a processor, memory, input
interface, and output interface). Moreover, we determine that an ordinarily
skilled artisan would understand a network entity to have a “sufficiently
definite meaning as the name for structure.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b) for this term. In addition, based on our reasoning and
determination regarding the “output interface” and “input interface,” we do
not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1 and 13 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(b). Further, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) of claims 2–6, 8, 9, and 12, which depend directly or indirectly
therefrom.
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d. “load control unit”
The Examiner explains the term “unit,” in the load control unit recited
in claim 7, is a generic placeholder and lacks sufficient structure in the
Specification. Ans. 40–41.
We agree with the Examiner that a “unit” is merely a nonce word that
can operate as a substitute for “means” in the context of a 35 U.S.C. § 112(f)
analysis and does not connote sufficiently definite structure. See
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Thus, we conclude that 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) is
invoked. Accordingly, we look to the Specification to determine if there is a
corresponding structure that clearly links or associates that structure to the
function recited in the claims. Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.
Although Appellant disputes that § 112(f) is invoked, Appellant
asserts the Specification sets forth a corresponding structure for distributing
the processing load among the plurality of network entities. Appeal Br. 18
(citing Spec. 20:25–31, Figs. 1a, 3, 4); Reply Br. 22–24. We disagree.
The cited portion of the Specification fails to provide a corresponding
structure for the claimed load control unit, but instead describes that some
embodiments (of a network entity) “may be used for processing capacity or
load management.” See Spec. 20:25–31. Further, the Specification
describes such embodiments may include a control unit comprising a load
controller operable to distribute a processing load among the plurality of
network entities. This does not, however, recite a sufficient structure or
algorithm of a load control unit to distribute a processing load among the
plurality of network entities. In addition, the identified Figures also fail to
provide a sufficient corresponding structure of the claimed load control unit.
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Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) of claim 7.

e. “neighbor provision unit”
The Examiner explains the term “unit,” in the neighbor provision unit
recited in claim 10 is a generic placeholder and lacks sufficient structure in
the Specification. Ans. 41.
As discussed above, we agree with the Examiner that a “unit” is
merely a nonce word that can operate as a substitute for “means” in the
context of a 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) analysis and does not connote sufficiently
definite structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1350. Thus, we conclude
that 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) is invoked. Accordingly, we look to the
Specification to determine if there is a corresponding structure that clearly
links or associates that structure to the function recited in the claims.
Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1352.
Although Appellant disputes that § 112(f) is invoked, Appellant
asserts the Specification sets forth a corresponding structure for providing
information on at least one second neighboring network entity. Appeal
Br. 18–19 (citing Spec. 21:27–22:11, Fig. 1a); Reply Br. 24–25. We
disagree.
The cited portion of the Specification fails to provide a corresponding
structure for the claimed neighbor provision unit, but instead describes that a
neighbor provision unit may be included in a network entity to provide the
claimed information. See Spec. 21:27–22:11. The Specification indicates
the neighbor provision unit may provide the claimed information based on
signal propagation delay measurements but does not provide a sufficient
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algorithm for performing this function (assuming it is done in software) or
structure of the neighbor provision unit. Further, Figure 1a is too generic to
provide the requisite corresponding structure.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(b) of claim 10. For similar reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 11, which depends from claim 10 and includes the same
deficiency.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner finds Wang teaches all of the
limitations of claim 1 but does not explicitly teach using configuration rules
to configure a configurable event, instead describing the use of filters. Final
Act. 12–14. The Examiner relies on Flammer to teach—explicitly—
configurations rules. Final Act. 13–14.
Appellant disputes that Wang, alone or in combination with Flammer,
teaches “wherein the event subscription message includes information
identifying said event subscribing network entity and configuration rules for
configuring a configurable event of interest at the event publishing network
entity,” as recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 20–24 (emphasis added); Reply
Br. 26–33. In particular, Appellant asserts that although Wang generally
discloses a publish-subscribe model within an event distribution network,
Wang describes using filters, rather than configuration rules, for configuring
a configurable event of interest at a publishing node. Appeal Br. 21–22;
Reply Br. 26–30. In addition, Appellant argues Flammer, as relied on by the
Examiner to teach configuration rules, does not teach configuration rules for
configuring a configurable event, but rather describes a route selection
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algorithm. Appeal Br. 23–24; Reply Br. 29–31. Moreover, Appellant
argues the Examiner’s proffered combination “would merely result in more
efficient routing of the Wang messages.” Reply Br. 31.
According to the Specification, “configuration rules may comprise
one or more configurable parameters for defining or re-defining the event of
interest at the event publishing network entity and/or for defining or re-
defining a related event report to the (subscribing) network entity.”
Spec. 4:4–6. In addition, a configurable parameter may be an event
threshold, an event hysteresis, or a notification content. Spec. 4:6–9.
Further a configuration rule “may comprise one or more configurable
parameters for defining or re-defining the event of interest . . . and/or for
defining or re-defining a related event report.” Spec. 15:6–10.
As identified by the Examiner (see Ans. 44), Wang describes a
“content-based publish/subscribe system [that] specifies an event schema for
a topic.” Wang ¶ 6. Wang further describes a subscription filter associated
with a subscription “may then be specified as a conjunction of predicates on
a subset of those attributes.” Wang ¶ 6. Wang provides an example of a
stock quote topic having an event schema comprising three attributes
(Symbol, Price, and Volume). Wang ¶ 6. Wang teaches that a subscription
filter may set the attributes for a particular stock symbol and range of stock
price. Wang ¶ 6.
Here, we find Wang’s subscription filters teach the claimed
configuration rules for configuring a configurable event. As described,
Wang teaches specifying a subscription filter as a conjunction of predicates
of certain attributes of an event. See Wang ¶ 6. In the disclosed example,
Wang teaches configuring an event for a particular stock symbol and when
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the price of the stock exceeds a defined threshold. See Wang ¶ 6. Thus,
Wang’s filter acts as a configuration rule for the topic (i.e., event).
Because we find Wang teaches all of the limitations of claim 1, we
need not rely on the other cited prior art reference (Flammer). See In re
Kronig, 539 F.2d 1300, 1302 (CCPA 1976) (explaining that limiting an
affirmance of obviousness rejection to less than all of the references cited by
the Examiner does not constitute a new ground of rejection); In re Bush, 296
F.2d 491, 495–96 (CCPA 1961); see also MPEP § 1207.03(a)(II).
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appellant advances similar arguments with
respect to independent claims 13 and 14. See Appeal Br. 24–27. Thus, for
similar reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 13 and 14. In addition, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
2–12 and 15–20, which depend directly or indirectly therefrom and were not
argued separately. See Appeal Br. 24, 27; see also 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–6, 8, 9, 12, and 13 as
being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 10, and 11 as being
indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
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We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 Eligibility 1–20
1–13 112(b) Indefiniteness 7, 10, 11 1–6, 8, 9,
12, 13
1–20 103 Wang 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED