FAIRSHARE, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 11, 2020

14536577 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 11, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/536,577 11/07/2014 Richard Agee 1480-001 2061
88360 7590 05/11/2020
Richards Patent Law P.C.
20 N Clark Street
Suite 3300
Chicago, IL 60602
EXAMINER
MASUD, ROKIB
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/11/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@richardspatentlaw.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
robin@richardspatentlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RICHARD AGEE, CAROLYN M. PONDER,
ARTHUR D. STARBUCK, and CLARK L. BALLANTYNE
____________

Appeal 2017-008745
Application 14/536,577
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. FETTING, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–28. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Our Decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,”
filed August 22, 2016) and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed January
4, 2017), and Non-Final Office Action (“Non-Final Act.,” mailed April 18,
2016). Appellant identifies “Fairshare, LLC” as the real party in interest
(Appeal Br. 3).
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We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s claims relate “to a system and method for rapid collection
and distribution of taxes from transactions” (Spec. ¶ 5).
Claims 1, 10, and 19 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below
with bracketed notations added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for collection and distribution of taxes comprising:
[a] a third-party service provider computer in
communication with:
[a1] a third-party service provider bank computer;
[a2] a merchant computer in connection with one or
more issuer bank computers;
[a3] a merchant bank computer; and
[a4] one or more taxing entity bank computers, each
associated with a taxing entity;
[b] wherein the third-party service provider computer
receives transaction information from the merchant computer,
wherein the transaction information includes a sales amount and
location information;
[c] in response to the receipt of the transaction information
from the merchant computer, the third-party service provider
computer calculates the tax liability owed to each taxing entity
based, at least in part, on the location information;
[d] after calculating the tax liability, the third-party service
provider computer communicates the tax liability owed to each
taxing entity to the merchant computer;
[e] after receiving the tax liability owed to each taxing
entity, the merchant computer requests one or more fund
transfers corresponding to the sales amount and the tax liability
owed to each taxing entity from the one or more issuer bank
computers connected directly or indirectly to the merchant bank
computer;
[f] the third-party service provider computer coordinates a
fund transfer corresponding to the tax liability owed to each
taxing entity between the third-party service provider bank
computer and the merchant bank computer; and
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[g] the third-party service provider computer further
coordinates one or more fund transfers corresponding to the tax
liability owed to each taxing entity between the third-party
service provider bank computer and the one or more taxing entity
bank computers.
Appeal Br. 17–18 (Claims Appendix).

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more.
2. Claims 1–19 and 22–28 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Sullivan (US 2003/0093320 A1, pub. May 15,
2003) and Gryglewicz (US 6,993,502 B1, iss. Jan. 31, 2006).2
3. Claims 20 and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Sullivan, Gryglewicz, and Francisco (US 8,249,936
B1, iss. Aug. 21, 2012).

ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Appellant argues claims 1–28 as a group. Appeal Br. 7–11. We
select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or
fall with independent claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

2 The Examiner’s exclusion of claim 28 in the statement of this rejection on
page 8 of the Non-Final Office Action is presumed to be an inadvertent
error, as this claim is rejected over Sullivan and Gryglewicz on pages 13–14
of the Non-Final Office Action.
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A. Section 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making waterproof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that
an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
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B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).3 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of
internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51;
see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed.
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).4
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56.
Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework
With regard to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework and
Step 2A, Prong One of the 2019 Revised Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54, the
Examiner determines that exemplary independent claim 1 broadly recites a
“fundamental economic principle of tax collection and calculation.” Non-
Final Act. 5.
In response, Appellant argues that the claims are directed to patent-
eligible subject matter. Appeal Br. 7–11. More particularly, Appellant
argues that independent claim 1 qualifies as eligible subject matter because it
“add[s] unconventional steps that confine the claim to a particular useful
application,” and as such, “qualif[ies] as ‘something more’ when recited in a
claim with a judicial exception.” Appeal Br. 8.
Under the first prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised Guidance, we
first determine if the claims recite an abstract idea. In this regard, we note
that the Specification is titled “RAPID TAX COLLECTION SYSTEM
AND METHOD.” The Specification discloses that the present invention
“relates to a system and method for rapid collection and distribution of taxes
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from transactions.” Spec. ¶ 5. According to the Specification,
[t]o meet taxing authority requirements, currently a typical
merchant and/or other entity must calculate the sales tax for each
customer transaction, add the calculated sum to the invoice or
bill subtotal presented to the customer for the goods sold, collect
the sales tax from the customer with the purchase sum, deposit
for safe keeping the collected taxes and finally remit and account
for the collected taxes to the appropriate taxing authorities on a
periodic basis, which is typically on a quarterly basis, and/or
other.
Id. ¶ 10. The Specification identifies that “[a]dditional problems related to
the collection of sales tax on a large-scale basis are created with the
explosion of e-commerce transactions.” Id. ¶ 16. For example, Internet
transactions
may involve a consumer in one state, a merchant’s place of
business in another state, warehousing in a third state, billing or
processing in a fourth state, and a fulfillment center in a fifth
state. Each of the five states involved may have different taxing
rules. For example, a state may require tax on a transaction if the
consumer is in that state, or the state may require tax if the
merchant is in that state. Thus, a merchant may be required to
distribute taxes to a large number of taxing authorities.
Id. To address these problems, “[t]he present invention provides a system
and a method for the effective collection and distribution of sales taxes from
credit-card and/or other transaction types without imposing an undue burden
upon individual merchants or individual taxing authorities.” Id. ¶ 18.
Consistent with this description, independent claim 1 recites broadly
“[a] system for collection and distribution of taxes” comprising “a third-
party service provider computer,” “a third-party service provider bank
computer,” “a merchant computer in connection with one or more issuer
bank computers,” “a merchant bank computer,” and “one or more taxing
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entity bank computers.” The system includes processes wherein “the third-
party service provider computer” “receives transaction information [i.e., a
sales amount and location] from the merchant computer,” “calculates the tax
liability owed to each taxing entity based, at least in part, on the location
information,” and “communicates the tax liability owed to each taxing
entity.” Subsequently, “the merchant computer” “requests one or more fund
transfers corresponding to the sales amount and the tax liability owed to
each taxing entity,” and “the third-party service provider” “coordinates a
fund transfer corresponding to the tax liability owed to each taxing entity
between the third-party service provider bank computer and the merchant
bank computer,” and “further coordinates one or more fund transfers
corresponding to the tax liability owed to each taxing entity between the
third-party service provider bank computer and the one or more taxing entity
bank computers.”
Upon reviewing the Specification and the claim as whole, as
summarized above, we agree with the Examiner that exemplary independent
claim 1 at least recites one of the ineligible “[c]ertain methods of organizing
human activity” that include “fundamental economic principles or
practices,” and thus an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51–52. Here, independent claim 1 “receives transaction information
[i.e., a sales amount and location] from the merchant computer” (limitation
[b]), “calculates the tax liability owed to each taxing entity based, at least in
part, on the location information” (limitation [c]), “communicates the tax
liability owed to each taxing entity” (limitation [d]), “requests one or more
fund transfers corresponding to the sales amount and the tax liability owed
to each taxing entity” (limitation [e]), “coordinates a fund transfer
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corresponding to the tax liability owed to each taxing entity between the
third-party service provider bank computer and the merchant bank
computer” (limitation [f]), and “coordinates one or more fund transfers
corresponding to the tax liability owed to each taxing entity between the
third-party service provider bank computer and the one or more taxing entity
bank computers” (limitation [g]). In other words, independent claim 1
broadly recites a system for the collection and distribution of taxes that
receives, calculates, communicates, requests, coordinates, and coordinates
information.
Thus, it is clear that independent claim 1 recites a form of financial
transaction that, under the 2019 Revised Guidance, falls under the category
of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” and more specifically
“fundamental economic principles or practices . . . commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; . . . sales activities or behaviors; business relations).”
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, independent
claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Cf. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1366–68 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (claim for
standardizing data to be conveyed to a bedside device for graphical display
was directed to the abstract idea of “collecting, analyzing, manipulating, and
displaying data”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.,
850 F.3d 1332, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claim for manipulating XML
documents by organizing, identifying, mapping, defining, and modifying
data was directed to the abstract idea of “collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data”); and Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d
1350, 1351–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claim for detecting events by receiving,
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detecting, analyzing, displaying, accumulating, and updating data, and
deriving a composite indicator from that data was directed to the abstract
idea of “collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of
the collection and analysis”).
Having concluded that claim 1 recites a judicial exception, i.e., an
abstract idea, we turn to the second prong of step 2A of the 2019 Revised
Guidance and determine whether the claims recite a practical application of
the recited judicial exception. Here we look to see if, for example, (i) any
additional elements of the claims reflects an improvement in the functioning
of a computer or to another technological field, (ii) an application of the
judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular machine, (iii) a
transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing
(iv) or a use of the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond
generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55;
see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Appellant argues that independent claim 1 qualifies as eligible subject
matter because it “add[s] unconventional steps that confine the claim to a
particular useful application.” Appeal Br. 8. Appellant also argues that
independent claim 1
address[es] an Internet-centric challenge of managing and
addressing complex and rapidly changing tax liabilities resulting
from Internet sales transactions. These are meaningful
limitations that solve an Internet-centric problem with a claimed
solution that is rooted in computer technology. The solution
requires the unique claimed structure of elements in order to
increase the efficiency and accuracy of online commerce to
maintain the positive user experience while meeting the ever-
changing regulations affecting online transactions.
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Id. at 10–11. However, we agree with the Examiner that automating current
tax law processes using fundamental computer technology amounts to no
more than “mere instructions to implement the concept on a computer, or [a]
recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic
computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the pertinent industry.” Ans. 3. In this
regard, we find no indication in the Specification that the present invention
improves a computer or other technology, invokes any assertedly inventive
programming, requires any specialized computer hardware or other
inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine, or that the
claimed invention is implemented using other than generic computer
components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR Holdings,
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[A]fter
Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations
does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Here, the Specification discloses that the present invention provides
“[a]n automated and centralized distribution feature utilizing available
transactional infrastructure would allow the merchants banks, financial
accounts or other, and the taxing authorities banks, financial accounts or
other, to each communicate with a single or relatively few entities in
transferring the funds.” Spec. ¶ 39. Appellant argues that independent
claim 1 “solve[s] an Internet-centric problem with a claimed solution that is
rooted in computer technology.” Appeal Br. 10. However, the present
claims do not address a problem unique to the Internet or computer
networks. Cf. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792
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F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that the claims there “do not
address problems unique to the Internet, so DDR has no applicability”).
Although the Specification does provide an Internet or e-commerce-
based example, the Specification also discloses that interactions may occur
by means “such as a public and/or private, direct and/or indirect means of
transaction communication, including, but not limited to a public switched
telephone network (PSTN), the Internet, cable, T-1, fiber optic, satellite,
cellular or other wireless, face-to-face, mail or other.” Spec. ¶ 41; see also
Abstract. Moreover, simply reducing “an undue burden upon individual
merchants or individual taxing authorities” (Spec. ¶ 18) is a solution to a
business problem as opposed to an improvement to a technological or
technical field (see OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[R]elying on a computer to perform routine tasks
more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent
eligible.”).
We also find no indication in the Specification that the claimed
invention effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing. Nor do we find anything of record, short of attorney
argument, that attributes any improvement in computer technology and/or
functionality to the claimed invention or that otherwise indicates that the
claimed invention “appl[ies], rel[ies] on, or us[es] the judicial exception in a
manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that
the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.” See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Having determined under step one of the Mayo/Alice framework that
claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next consider under Step 2B of the
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2019 Revised Guidance, the second step of the Mayo/Alice framework,
whether claim 1 includes additional elements or a combination of elements
that provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the additional elements
amount to “significantly more” than the judicial exception itself.
2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With respect to the second step of the Alice framework, the Examiner
determines that claim 1 does not recite elements sufficient to amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea because the additional limitations,
i.e., “bank computers,” “service provider computers,” “merchant
computers,” and “various . . . functions of those computers” do not add a
meaningful limitation to the abstract idea because “[n]one of these elements
considered alone or in combination amount to computer related hardware or
functions that were not notoriously known in the relevant field of art nor
produced unconventional results.” Ans. 2–3; see also Non-Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that independent claim 1 qualifies as eligible subject
matter because it “add[s] unconventional steps that confine the claim to a
particular useful application,” and as such, “qualif[ies] as ‘something more’
when recited in a claim with a judicial exception.” Appeal Br. 8. To
support its argument, Appellant argues that independent claim 1 is analogous
to claim 2 of Example 21 of the July 2015 Update. Appeal Br. 7–11. We do
not agree.
Claim 1 of Example 21 was considered ineligible and claim 2, which
addressed “the Internet‐centric challenge of alerting a subscriber with time
sensitive information when the subscriber’s computer is offline” by a
transmission of an alert to an application that “cause[d] the alert to display
and enable[d] the connection of the remote subscriber computer to the data
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source over the Internet when the remote subscriber computer comes
online,” was considered eligible. See July 2015 Update Appendix 1. Thus,
claim 2 was similar to DDR Holdings in solving an Internet-centric problem
with a solution necessarily rooted in computer technology. Id. Here,
independent claim 1 contains no comparable limitation, and, as discussed
above, Appellant’s independent claim 1 does not solve a problem
specifically arising in the realm of computer networks with a solution
necessarily rooted in computer technology.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101 of independent claim 1, and claims 2–28, which fall with
independent claim 1.
Obviousness
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
because the combination of Sullivan and Gryglewicz fails to disclose or
suggest:
a tax collection system where the third-party service provider
computer coordinates (1) a fund transfer corresponding to the tax
liability owed to each taxing entity between the third-party
service provider bank computer and the merchant bank computer
and (2) one or more fund transfers corresponding to the tax
liability owed to each taxing entity between the third-party
service provider bank computer and the one or more taxing entity
bank computers.
Appeal Br. 13. Appellant makes a similar argument with respect to
independent claim 19. Id. More particularly, Appellant argues that “the
gateway computer of Gryglewicz debits the merchant bank account through
an ACH debit procedure, requiring the tax authorities to be associated with a
bank authorized [to] receive ACH credit.” Id. at 15.
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However, we agree with, and adopt, the Examiner’s findings and
rationales as our own. Non-Final Act. 8–11; Ans. 4–5. In making this
determination, we initially note that Appellant’s arguments fail to address
the Examiner’s findings regarding the Gryglewicz reference. See Non-Final
Act. 10–11 (citing Gryglewicz col. 8, ll. 44–53). Here, as the Examiner
points out, Gryglewicz
teaches the feature where the ability to transfer funds based on a
calculated tax liability from a merchant bank to an escrow
account that is maintained in a bank computer which Examiner
has found to be functionally the same as a third party service
provider bank computer and column 8 lines 44–53 of Gryglewicz
states that “the main controller 40 (alternatively, each of the
controllers 34 individually) may periodically request funds from
the merchant bank of each merchant affiliated with the present
invention for collecting taxes owed, and, such collected tax funds
are either deposited in an escrow account from which funds are
subsequently disbursed to the tax authorities (e.g., tax authorities
having network 46 access via tax authority network nodes 60),
or the collected tax funds may be substantially immediately
disbursed to the tax authorities.”
Ans. 4–5. Appellant has presented no persuasive argument or technical
reasoning to demonstrate that the Examiner’s finding is unreasonable or
unsupported.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claims 1, 10, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same
reasons, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of dependent claims 2–9,
11–18, and 20–28, which are not argued separately.
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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–28 101 Eligibility 1–28
1–19, 22–27 103 Sullivan,
Gryglewicz
1–19, 22–27
20, 21 103 Sullivan,
Gryglewicz,
Francisco
20, 21
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED