Facebook, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 4, 2020

2019005502 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 4, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/687,068 11/28/2012 Dale W. Malik 19487.370.3.1 4935
107193 7590 06/04/2020
Keller Jolley Preece/Facebook
1010 North 500 East
Suite 210
North Salt Lake, UT 84054
EXAMINER
SCHMUCKER, MICHAEL W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3681
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/04/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@kjpip.com
gjolley@kjpip.com
ljohnson@kjpip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DALE W. MALIK and RICHARD A. ANDERSON
Appeal 2019-005502
Application 13/687,068
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and JOHN D. HAMANN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject Claims 1–23. Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42 (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Facebook,
Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to facilitating a communication between users.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
identifying a communication that utilizes a
communication path between an origination device and a
destination device;
determining an origination device descriptor and a
destination device descriptor;
determining that an alternative communication path is
available for use between the origination device and the
destination device based on a comparison between the
origination device descriptor and the destination device
descriptor;
in response to determining the alternative
communication path is available for use between the
origination device and the destination device, providing a
selectable communication option corresponding to the
alternative communication path on the destination device; and
initiating communication between the destination device
and the origination device using the alternative communication
path in response to detecting a selection of the selectable
communication option corresponding to the alternative
communication path.

Claim 1 (emphases added).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Bado et al. US 4,703,423 Oct. 27, 1987
(“Bado”)
Hidary US 5,852,775 Dec. 22, 1998
Meier et al. US 2001/0027478 A1 Oct. 4, 2001
(“Meier”)
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Claims 1–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hidary in view of Bado in further view of Meier.
OPINION
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101
a. Legal Principles
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, under Step 2A, we first determine what concept the claim is
“directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before
us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a
third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
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Concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If, under Step 2A, the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, then,
under Step 2B, “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine
whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must
include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
On January 7, 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised patent subject matter eligibility guidance. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,
2019 (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, Step 2A of the
Alice two-step framework is divided in two prongs. For Step 2A, Prong 1,
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we look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions falling into
certain groupings of abstract ideas (e.g., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes). For Step 2A, Prong 2, if the claim recites
such a judicial exception, we look to whether the claim recites any additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).
Only if a claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then determine, under Step 2B
of the Alice two-step framework, whether the claim adds a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
b. Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions2
In the Final Action, for Step 2A of the Alice two-step framework, the
Examiner finds that “Claims 1–23 are directed to sending and receiving data

2 We note that the Final Action was mailed before the USPTO published the
Revised Guidelines and, therefore, does not rely on the Revised Guidelines.
However, Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal and Reply Briefs and the
Examiner’s conclusions in the Examiner’s Answer indeed rely on the
Revised Guidelines. While recognizing the Examiner’s conclusions in the
Final Action, our analysis is based on the Revised Guidelines. Patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is reviewable de
novo. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

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to select and send targeted advertising.” Final Act. 3. The Examiner
maintains that the “determining that an alternative communication path”
limitation of Claim 1 (and similar limitations of Claims 8 and 15) is akin to
the information management features found abstract in Classen and Electric
Power Group and the organizing human activity features found abstract in
Intellectual Ventures.3 Final Act. 4. The Examiner further maintains that
“Appellant’s claims are following rules to select a communication path,”
which is distinguished from Core Wireless because the claims “[do] NOT
change the operation of the mobile device/system.”4 Ans. 10, 11.
In the Answer, for Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidelines, the
Examiner maintains that certain limitations of Claim 1 recite concepts that
fall “within the Methods of Organizing Human Activity grouping” of the
Revised Guidelines. Ans. 8. Thus, the Examiner maintains Claim 1 recites
an abstract idea. Ans. 8.
Also, in the Answer, for Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidelines,
the Examiner maintains that Claim 1 requires additional elements, but that
those additional elements are simply elements of a computer. Ans. 8.
Relying on Appellant’s Specification, the Examiner, however, finds that the
recited computer components are generic and simply result in the abstract
idea being implemented on a generic computer. Ans. 8. The Examiner
further maintains that Claim 1 also requires elements that “simply generally

3 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp., 850 F.3d
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
4 Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2018)
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link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological
environment.” Ans. 8, 9. Thus, the Examiner maintains that Claim 1 does
not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application and, therefore, is
directed to an abstract idea. Ans. 9.
For Step 2B of the Alice two-step framework, the Examiner maintains
that the remaining limitations of Claim 1 correspond to “functions the courts
have recognized to be well-understood, routine, conventional, and normal
computer operation.” Final Act. 5. Relying on Appellant’s Specification,
Symantec and Versata, the Examiner finds that the additional elements of
Claim 1, when viewed individually and in an ordered combination,
correspond to “conventional computer functions” and “generic computer
structure” that “do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract idea
because they would be routine in any computer implementation.”5 Final
Act. 6; see also Ans. 9. The Examiner also maintains that the elements of
Claim 1 do not improve the functioning of a computer or any other
technology. Final Act. 6. Thus, the Examiner maintains that Claim 1 is
directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. Final Act. 7; Ans. 9,
10.
Finally, the Examiner maintains that even though dependent Claims
2–7, 9–14, and 16–23 recite additional limitations, these additional
limitations do not add significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 6;
see also Ans. 10.

5 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2016); Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015).
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c. Appellant’s Arguments
For Step 2A of the Alice two-step framework, and Prong 1 of the
Revised Guidelines, Appellant contends that “the claims are directed toward
removing the number of steps needed to access data or functionality
compared to conventional systems — similar to the claims determined not to
be an abstract idea in Core Wireless.” Appeal Br. 17 (emphasis maintained).
Specifically, Appellant contends, “[s]imilar to the user interface in Core
Wireless, the current independent claims recite a user interface that improves
the functioning of a computer by reducing the number of steps a user needs
to access data or functionality compared to conventional user interfaces.”
Appeal Br. 19 (emphasis maintained); see also Reply Br. 9. Appellant
further contends “the independent claims recite limitations that enable a user
to reach data and/or functionality (e.g., initiate communication between the
destination device and the origination device using the alternative
communication path) with fewer steps,” and are thereby not directed to an
abstract idea. Appeal Br. 20. For Prong 2 of the Revised Guidelines,
Appellant contends, arguendo, that should the limitations of the pending
independent claims recite an abstract idea,
the pending independent claims integrate any alleged abstract
idea into a graphical user interface that determines an alternative
communication path between two specific devices and facilitates
initiating that alternative communication path via a selectable
option, presented to the user, to initiate the alternative
communication path between the two specific devices
(i.e., a practical application). Appeal Br. 22; see also Reply Br. 12.
For Step 2B of the Alice two-step framework, Appellant contends that
“[e]ven if the pending independent claims were directed to an abstract idea
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under step one, arguendo, the claims are still patentable because the claim
limitations set forth an ‘ordered combination’ that amount to significantly
more than the concept articulated by the Office Action.” Appeal Br. 24.
Citing BASCOM, Appellant contends, “it is the ‘ordered combination’ of all
elements that comprise a unique way of initiating communication between a
destination device and an origination device using an alternative
communication path that transform the abstract idea alleged in the Office
Action into a ‘particular, practical application.’”6 Appeal Br. 25; see also
Reply Br. 14.
d. Discussion
Appellant argues Claims 1–23 as a group. Appeal Br. 26. We select
Claim 1 to represent the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
i. Step 2A, Prongs 1 and 2
For Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Revised Guidance, we find that the
emphasized portions of Claim 1, reproduced above (see supra at 2), recite
elements that fall within the abstract idea grouping of mental processes. The
Revised Guidance requires us to evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial
exception (e.g., an abstract idea). According to the Revised Guidance, to
determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea, we must identify
limitations that fall within one or more of the designated subject matter
groupings of abstract ideas. According to the October 2019 Patent
Eligibility Guidance Update produced by the USPTO, “a claim recites a
judicial exception when the judicial exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in
the claim.” See October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update Revised

6 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df (“October Update”). The Revised Guidance lists mental processes as one
such grouping and characterizes mental processes as including, inter alia,
“concepts performed in the human mind (including observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion).” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We find that the elements of
Claim 1 describe this judicial exception.
Specifically, we find that the emphasized portions of Claim 1 (see
supra at 2) set forth the basic mental steps a human would take when
desiring to communicate with another person. For example, suppose two
individuals are attending a large gathering (e.g., wedding reception) and one
of them wants to initiate communication with the other. The initiating party
would, in their mind, identify a communication path between themselves
and the other party, determine features of themselves and the other party that
may or may not facilitate the anticipated communication, determine a
suitable alternative communication paths (e.g., talking loudly across the
room or placing themselves closer to the other party) based on the
determined features, decide which of those alternative communication paths
are feasible (i.e., selectable), select a feasible communication path (e.g.,
deciding to talk loudly across the room because the room is too crowded to
place themselves closer and the other party is not particularly mobile), and
initiate communication. We find that the limitations of Claim 1 essentially
describe a mental process.
We acknowledge that Claim 1 specifies that the communication path
is between an origination device and a destination device. However, these
additional device elements do not further define or otherwise limit these
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additional device elements to any particular thing or environment, such as
the environment of “targeted contextual advertisement or communication
devices and services.” Spec. 4. Even if these additional device elements
were construed to correspond to a targeted contextual advertising
environment, a corporate marketer, for example, would brainstorm, using a
mental process, various communication paths to reach their target audience
prior to actually implementing a desired communication path. Thus, we find
Claim 1 recites elements that fall within the abstract idea grouping of mental
processes.
For Step 2A, Prong 2, of the Revised Guidance, we find that Claim 1,
as a whole, does not integrate the recited mental process into a practical
application of the abstract idea. The Revised Guidance states that “[a] claim
that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful
limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
The Revised Guidance further states that integration should be evaluated by
“[i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s)” and, based on certain considerations,
“evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.”
84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. The Revised Guidance identifies considerations such
as whether additional elements yield an improvement to a particular
technology or a computer itself, correspond to the implementation of the
judicial exception with a particular machine, and/or apply the judicial
exception in some way beyond simply linking the judicial exception to a
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particular technological environment. See MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, as discussed above, Claim 1 incorporates additional device
elements. However, we find that these additional device elements do not
integrate the mental process of Claim 1 into a practical application. For
instance, we do not find that these additional device elements yield an
improvement in the functioning of a computer itself or to the particular
technology of target contextual advertising, neither do we find that these
additional device elements are any particular machine that is necessary to
implement the judicial exception or transform something to a different state.
Additionally, we do not find that these additional device elements apply the
abstract idea in a meaningful way to any particular technological
environment. We agree with the Examiner’s finding for Step 2B of the Alice
two-step framework that these additional device elements, as claimed,
correspond at most to a generic computing structure. See Final Act. 6; see
also Ans. 9. Thus, we find that Claim 1, as a whole, does not integrate the
recited mental process into a practical application of the abstract idea.
Additionally, we do not find Appellant’s argument that Claim 1
“improves the functioning of a computer by reducing the number of steps a
user needs to access data or functionality compared to conventional user
interfaces” persuasive. See Appeal Br. 19; see also Reply Br. 9.
Additionally, we do not find Appellant’s argument that Claim 1 “enable[s] a
user to reach data and/or functionality (e.g., initiate communication between
the destination device and the origination device using the alternative
communication path) with fewer steps” persuasive. See Appeal Br. 20.
First, and notably, Claim 1 does not recite these argued features. Second,
Appellant’s Specification is directed towards the targeted advertising of
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communication devices and services. Spec. 4. We find that Appellant’s
invention is implemented, in part, with a communications and information
resource (CIR) manager, which is a software program running on any
computing device having a memory for software storage and a processor.
Spec. 6, 7. Furthermore, we find that, in one particular embodiment, that
contextual information is provided to a user when a communication is
initiated with the user and that such contextual information provides the user
“with an option(s) of responding to or returning the call or communication
by communication paths that are selected based on the data about the call.”
Spec. 13–14. However, this particular embodiment suggests an increase in
the number of steps to facilitate a communication between users and,
certainly, does not suggest reducing the numbers of steps to “reach data,” as
Appellant contends.
Therefore, based on our analysis under the Revised Guidance, we
agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
However, we find that Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of mental
processes. As result, we focus our attention on Step 2B of the Alice two-step
framework.
ii. Step 2B
For Step 2B, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that
Claim 1 recites significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Step 2B of
the Alice two-step framework requires us to determine whether any element,
or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient to ensure that the claim
amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at
221. As discussed in the previous section, we agree with the Examiner’s
findings that the additional device elements, when considered individually
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and in an ordered combination, correspond to nothing more than a generic
computing structure used to implement the mental process. In other words,
these components, as claimed, are well-understood, routine, and
conventional and “behave exactly as expected according to their ordinary
use.” See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). As discussed in the previous section, Appellant’s Specification
describes the computing environment in which the invention is performed.
Spec. 7, 8. However, Appellant’s Specification gives no indication that such
a computing environment is anything other than a well-understood, routine,
and conventional computing environment. Thus, implementing the abstract
idea with these generic computer components “fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 does not provide
significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
iii. Conclusion
Therefore, because Claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of mental
processes and does not provide significantly more than the abstract idea
itself, we agree with the Examiner that Claim 1 is ineligible for patenting
and affirm the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 1–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

2. 35 U.S.C. § 103
a. Claims 1, 8, 15
Appellant argues independent Claims 1, 8, and 15 as a group. Appeal
Br. 6. We select Claim 1 to represent the group. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Appellant argues that Hidary “relates to providing an ad to a
subscriber before, during, or after a phone call based on a user profile of a
subscriber,” and does not teach or suggest “determining an alternative
communication path between two specific devices and presenting a
selectable option to initiate the alternative communication path between the
two specific devices.” Appeal Br. 6, 7. Appellant contends that Hidary
teaches that an advertising subscriber can have an identifier, their location
known, and participate in phone calls with non-subscribers, but that Hidary
does not teach or suggest “determining an alternative communication path”
between the subscribers or between subscribers and non-subscribers.
Appeal Br. 7. Appellant additionally argues that Bado and Meier do not
compensate for the deficiencies of Hidary. Appeal Br. 8, 10.
Moreover, Appellant argues that the Final Action does not address the
“determining that an alternative communication path” limitation of Claim 1
“with respect to Hidary.” Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis omitted). Appellant also
contends that the Final Action relies on Bado to teach “‘a descriptor of
device’” and relies on Meier, without context, to simply teach, “an
alternative communication path.” Appeal Br. 12. Appellant further
contends, “simply considering whether Meier teaches the existence of an
alternative communication path is not close to considering the claim as a
whole that includes the” above-recited claim limitation. Appeal Br. 13
(emphasis omitted). As a result, Appellant argues,
nowhere does the Office Action address the actual claim
language of ‘determining that an alternative communication path
is available for use between the origination device and the
destination device based on a comparison between the
origination device descriptor and the destination device
descriptor,’ as recited in the independent claim 1.
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Appeal Br. 13.
In response, the Examiner maintains that “the Specification is silent
on ‘communication path’ . . . and Hidary teaches a selectable option of
communication and Meier teaches an automatic selection of a
communication path based upon user set rules, hence the combination
teaches the limitation.” Ans. 5. Specifically, the Examiner finds in Hidary,
namely in column 3, lines 55–61, that when “[a] subscriber calls a
nonsubscriber and an advertisement message is presented after the phones
are connected, further the communication option during a phone call is the
user may answer or not based on the caller ID.” Final Act. 10. The
Examiner further finds that Meier teaches, in paragraphs 67–70, alternative
communication paths. Final Act. 12.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. First, we agree with
Appellant’s contention regarding the Final Action; namely we find that the
Final Action does not address the “determining that an alternative
communication path” limitation recited in Claim 1. Second, we agree with
Appellant’s contention that Hidary does not teach or suggest determining an
alternative communication path between the subscribers or between
subscribers and non-subscribers. Based on our review of Hidary, Hidary
teaches a communication path between an advertising subscriber and a non-
advertising subscriber. Hidary, column 2, lines 51–53. During a phone call,
the advertising subscriber of the call is given the option to receive
advertisements or not receive advertisements. Hidary, column 2, lines 63–
67, column 3, lines 1–3. When the advertising subscriber elects to receive
advertisements, advertisements are delivered to the subscriber during the
call. Hidary, column 3, lines 24–45. The advertisements provided to the
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subscriber are targeted to the subscriber based on a profile of the subscriber.
Hidary, column 3, lines 24–45. Based on our review, the Examiner has not
identified how Hidary teaches or suggests “determining that an alternative
communication path is available for use between the origination device and
the destination device based on a comparison between the origination device
descriptor and the destination device descriptor,” as is required by Claim 1.
Moreover, we are persuaded by Appellant’s contention that the Examiner
has not identified how the teachings of Bado or Meier remedy Hidary’s
deficiency. Therefore, we reverse the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 1, 8,
and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Hidary, Bado, and Meier.

b. Claims 2–7, 9–14, and 16–23
Appellant argues Claims 2–7, 9–14, and 16–23 on the same basis as
Appellant’s arguments for Claims 1, 8, and 15. Appeal Br. 16. Therefore,
based on the same reasoning set forth for Claims 1, 8, and 15 in the
preceding section, we reverse the Examiner’s rejections of Claims 2–7, 9–
14, and 16–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of Hidary, Bado, and Meier.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–23 101 Eligibility 1–23
1–23 103(a) Hidary, Bado, Meier 1–23
Overall
Outcome
1–23
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED