Ex Parte Zilliacus et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 20, 2016

10784450 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 20, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
10/784,450 02/23/2004
11764 7590
Ditthavong & Steiner, P.C.
44 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 322
Alexandria, VA 22314
06/22/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Martin Zilliacus
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
P4257USOO 8280
EXAMINER
JAKOVAC,RYANJ
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2445
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/22/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket@dcpatent.com
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MAR TIN ZILLIACUS and ARI KOLI
Appeal2014-009672
Application 10/784,450
Technology Center 2400
Before HUNG H. BUI, JON M. WRGOV AN, and ADAM J. PYONIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
JURGOVAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of a Final Rejection
of claims 1-3, 7-19, 22-27, 29-34, 36, 38, 39, 42--49, and 52-58.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm. 3
1 Appellants identify Nokia Corporation as the real party in interest. (App.
Br. 1.)
2 The rejection of claims 3, 25, and 29 was subsequently withdrawn by the
Examiner in the Answer. (See Ans. 4.)
3 Our Decision refers to the Specification (filed Feb. 23, 2004) ("Spec."), the
Final Office Action (mailed Jan. 13, 2014) ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief
(filed June 2, 2014) ("App. Br."), the Examiner's Answer (mailed July 16,
2014) ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief (filed Sept. 16, 2014) ("Reply Br.").
Appeal2014-009672
Application 10/784,450
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The claims are directed to dispatching and prioritizing communication
of generic-recipient messages to recipients. (Spec. Title, Abstract.) Claim
1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method comprising:
receiving a generic-recipient message by a network hub;
determining predefined attributes of the message, wherein
the predefined attributes comprise one or more of a sender of the
message, a subject of the message, or content of the message;
determining a type of communication medium of the
message;
determining one or more recipients for the message based,
at least in part, on the determined type and the predefined
attributes by comparing the predefined attributes of the message
with stored information related to potential recipients; and
causing, at least in part, a dispatch of the message to the
one or more determined recipients.
REJECTIONS
(1) Claims 1, 2, 9, 22, 26, 36, 38, and 44 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) based on RUSSELL BORLAND, RUNNING MICROSOFT OUTLOOK
97, 55, 86, 97, 100, 157-59 (Kim Fryer et al. eds., 1997) ("Outlook"), Ye
(US 7,171,190 B2, iss. Jan. 30, 1997), and Hardt (US 2005/0114453 Al,
publ. May 26, 2005). (Final Act. 4--11.)
(2) Claims 3, 25, and 39 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
based on Outlook, Ye, Hardt, and Stem (US 2002/0032740 Al, publ. Mar.
14, 2002). (Final Act. 12-13.) This rejection was withdrawn and is thus not
before us for consideration in this appeal. (Ans. 4.)
(3) Claims 10-19, 29-34, and 45--49 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Outlook, Ye, Kirkland (US 2005/0149622 Al,
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Appeal2014-009672
Application 10/784,450
publ. July 7, 2005), and Shavit (US 2002/0160757 Al, publ. Oct. 31, 2002).
(Final Act. 14--27.)
(4) Claim 42 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Outlook, Ye, Hardt, and Kirkland. (Final Act. 28.)
(5) Claim 43 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) based on
Outlook, Ye, Hardt, Kirkland, and Domnitz (US 6,912,398B1, iss. June 28,
2005). (Final Act. 28-29.)
(6) Claims 52, 54, 56, and 58 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (a) based on Outlook, Ye, Kirkland, Shavit, and Domnitz. (Final Act.
29-31.)
(7) Claims 7, 8, 23, 24, 27, 53, 55, and 57 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) based on Outlook, Ye, Hardt, and Domnitz. (Final Act. 31-
35.)
ANALYSIS
§ 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1, 2, 9, 22, 26, 36, 38, and 44
Appellants argue the combination of Outlook, Ye, and Hardt fails to
describe "determining one or more recipients for the message based, at least
in part, on the determined type [of the communication medium of the
message]," as recited in claim 1. (App. Br. 9-11.) Specifically, Appellants
argue the Examiner errs by improperly equating Ye's determining devices
based on the type of communication medium, to the claimed determining of
recipients based on the type of communication medium (App. Br. 8-11 ).
Claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent
with the Specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In this case, the Examiner finds there is no definition
or restrictive meaning of "recipient" in the Specification, and thus applies
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Appeal2014-009672
Application 10/784,450
the dictionary meaning of a "recipient" as "a person or thing that receives."
(Ans. 5.) Appellants do not argue the correctness of this definition. Instead,
Appellants argue the term "recipient," as it is used in the Specification and
in Ye, refers to a human user, whereas a "device" refers to a communication
device of some kind. (Reply Br. 3 (citing Spec. 14, 11. 23-25, 18, 11. 30-
31 ).)
We agree the Specification and Ye may be interpreted as teaching that
the "recipient" is a human user, and the "device" is a communication device.
(Final Act. 5 (citing Ye 1:50-53, 2:15-20, 5:4--40, 54---60, 6:34--36, Ans. 5-
6).) However, the exemplary usage of these terms in the Specification and
in Ye does not exclude the Examiner's broad but reasonable construction
that the "recipient" encompasses a computer or other device, and the argued
claims do not state that the claimed "recipient" is limited to a human user.
Thus, we find no error in the Examiner's interpretation of "recipient" to
include a device such as a communication device or computer, as well as a
human user.
Even assuming, arguendo, the claimed term "recipient" is restricted in
meaning to only a human, Ye describes the disclosed mail delivery system
may determine a "universal" recipient identifier that is linked to the
communication types (email, IM, SMS, and MMS) and any addresses
needed to communicate with the recipient through those communication
types. (Ye 4:33--45.) Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner errs
in the obviousness rejections.
Appellants also argue Outlook concerns only email communication
and, therefore, there is no need to determine which device to send a message
to, so one of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Outlook with
Ye. (App. Br. 11.) The Examiner correctly finds Outlook describes sending
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Application 10/784,450
messages by email or fax, which are associated with different devices.
(Final Act. 5 (citing Outlook pg. 86).) Thus, we do not find this argument
persuasive to show Examiner error.
Remaining Re} ections
Appellants argue the remaining rejections of claims 7, 8, 10-19, 23,
24, 27, 29-34, 42, 43, 45--49, and 52-58 on the same basis as the rejections
previously discussed. We find Appellants' arguments unpersuasive to show
Examiner error for the reasons stated.
CONCLUSION
An obviousness rejection under§ 103(a) requires that "there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations omitted)). On this record, we find the Examiner's
reasoning and underpinning adequate to support the conclusion of
obviousness.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1, 2, 7-19, 22-24, 26,
27, 29-34, 36, 38, 42--49, and 52-58 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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