Ex Parte Zeng

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 24, 2014

11758180 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/758,180 06/05/2007 Shuqing Zeng GP-309191-RD-JMC 4003
65798 7590 03/24/2014
MILLER IP GROUP, PLC
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
42690 WOODWARD AVENUE
SUITE 300
BLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI 48304
EXAMINER
KONG, SZE-HON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3661
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/24/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SHUQING ZENG
____________________

Appeal 2012-000347
Application 11/758,180
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before EDWARD A. BROWN, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and
BART A. GERSTENBLITH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
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Application 11/758,180

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Shuqing Zeng (Appellant) appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-14 and 16-20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 12, and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the claimed
subject matter and reads:
1. A system for estimating vehicle dynamics in a
vehicle, said system comprising:
an object detection sensor for detecting stationary
objects relative to vehicle motion, said object detection
sensor providing object detection signals for tracking the
objects;
a plurality of in-vehicle sensors providing sensor
signals representative of the vehicle motion;
an association processor responsive to the object
detection signals, said association processor matching the
object detection signals of consecutive views to track the
objects, and providing object tracking signals;
a longitudinal state estimation processor
responsive to the object tracking signals and the sensor
signals, and providing an estimation of vehicle speed in a
forward direction relative to the vehicle motion; and
a lateral state estimation processor responsive to
the object tracking signals and the sensor signals, said
lateral state estimation processor estimating vehicle
speed in a lateral direction relative to the vehicle motion.

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REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 2, 5, 10, 16, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Ravani (US 5,979,581; iss. Nov. 9, 1999) and Knoop (US
6,940,448 B2; iss. Sep. 6, 2005).
II. Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ravani, Knoop, and Joh (US 2008/0172156 A1; pub. Jul. 17,
2008).
III. Claims 6 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Ravani, Knoop, and Yasuno (US 5,428,532; iss. Jun. 27, 1995).
IV. Claims 7-9, 12-14, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Ravani, Knoop, and Fayyad (US 2008/0082245 A1; pub. Apr.
3, 2008). 1
V. Claim 11 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Ravani, Knoop, and Chowdhary (US 2008/0234933 A1; pub. Sep. 25, 2008).

ANALYSIS
Rejection I
Regarding claim 1, the Examiner found that Ravani does not specifically
disclose a plurality of in-vehicle sensors that provide sensor signals representative
of the vehicle motion, and a longitudinal state estimation processor. Ans. 5. The
Examiner also found that it is well known in the art to provide in-vehicle sensors to
detect vehicle motion, and relies on Knoop for disclosing in-vehicle sensors. Id.
(citing Knoop, col. 1, ll. 61-65). The Examiner further found that Knoop also
discloses a longitudinal state estimation processor, and concluded that it would

1 The Examiner also rejected claim 15 under this ground of rejection. Ans. 7-8.
However, claim 15 was previously cancelled. App. Br. 24.
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have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify Ravani to include
the teachings of Knoop. Id. at 5-6.
Appellant contends that Ravani’s processor is not responsive to in-vehicle
sensor signals because Ravani does not disclose in-vehicle sensors. App. Br. 12.
Appellant also contends that Knoop does not disclose a plurality of in-vehicle
sensors because the only sensors that Knoop discloses are radar, lidar, and video
sensors that “detect the vehicle surroundings at various distances and in view of
different types of objects.” Id. at 14 (citing Knoop, col. 6, ll. 9-12). Appellant
contends that Knoop discloses that certain vehicle and object variables are
ascertained by suitable sensors, but that the Examiner’s finding that such suitable
sensors are known sensors, such as GPS, inertial sensors, velocity sensors, and
acceleration sensors, is unsupported by facts. Id. at 14-15. Appellant also
contends that because Knoop does not disclose in-vehicle sensors, Knoop does not
disclose estimating vehicle speed based on both signals from both an object
detection sensor and in-vehicle sensors. Id. at 14.
Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive. As noted by the Examiner,
Knoop teaches using “suitable sensors” for detecting instantaneous position,
instantaneous longitudinal velocity and lateral velocity, and orientation directions
of both the object and of the vehicle. Ans. 12 (citing Knoop, col. 1, l. 50 – col. 2,
l. 4). The Examiner also found that the radar, lidar, and video sensors disclosed by
Knoop can be “suitable sensors” used to detect vehicle motion, by detecting
movement of the wheel and steering column, for example. Id. at 13. Appellant
does not explain why these sensors disclosed by Knoop are not “in-vehicle sensors
providing sensor signals representative of the vehicle motion,” as recited in claim
1. In this regard, Appellant does not direct us to any definition of “in-vehicle
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sensors” in the Specification, or to any other disclosure therein, that would exclude
the radar, lidar, and video sensors disclosed by Knoop.
To the extent that Appellant is contending that radar, lidar, and video sensors
cannot be “in-vehicle sensors,” as claimed, because in-vehicle sensors can only be
the particular sensors described in paragraph [0014] of the Specification and
recited in claim 6, this argument is unpersuasive. App. Br. 12-14. Under the
doctrine of claim differentiation, because claim 6 depends from claim 1 and seeks
to further limit the scope of claim 1 by specifying a group of particular sensors
from which the in-vehicle sensors are selected, we construe “in-vehicle sensors” in
claim 1 as being sufficiently broad to encompass sensors in addition to those listed
in claim 6.2
Appellant also contends that the Examiner’s findings regarding Ravani’s use
of in-vehicle sensors and well-known sensors in the art are not supported by
evidence. Reply Br. 1-2. Appellant appears to be analyzing Ravani and Knoop
separately; however, non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking
references individually where, as here, the rejection is based upon the teachings of
a combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). As
discussed supra, the Examiner relied on Knoop for teaching the use of in-vehicle
sensors. Ans. 12-13. Appellant fails to sufficiently explain why the combination
of the teachings of Ravani and Knoop would not result in processors that estimate
vehicle speed in the forward and lateral directions based on signals from both an
object detection sensor and in-vehicle sensors.

2 The doctrine of claim differentiation creates a presumption that claim 1 does not
contain the limitation of claim 6, as “‘the presence of a dependent claim that adds a
particular limitation raises a presumption that the limitation in question is not
found in the independent claim.’” Bancorp Serv. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687
F.3d 1266, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
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Finally, Appellant contends that Ravani does not teach an object detection
sensor because Ravani’s laser sensor 10 can only detect retroflective paint stripes,
making Ravani’s system non-functional for object detection of roadways without
retroflective stripes. App. Br. 15. However, the Examiner correctly noted that
claim 1 does not require an object detection sensor that functions on roadways
without retroflective stripes. Ans. 13. Rather, claim 1 merely recites “an object
detection sensor for detecting stationary objects relative to vehicle motion,” and
does not specify any particular “objects.” Thus, Appellant’s contention is not
persuasive.
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 over Ravani and
Knoop. Appellant does not separately argue dependent claims 2 and 5 (App. Br.
17), thus, we also sustain the rejection of these claims.
Appellant’s contentions (App. Br. 16-17) and the Examiner’s findings (Ans.
5-6, 14) regarding Ravani and Knoop in relation to independent claim 16 are
similar to those discussed supra regarding claim 1. Hence, we sustain the rejection
of claim 16. Appellant does not separately argue dependent claim 17 (App. Br.
18), thus, we also sustain the rejection of this claim.
Regarding claim 10, Appellant contends that Knoop does not disclose using
a monocular camera for object detection, and instead only contains a vague
reference to “video sensors.” App. Br. 17 (citing Knoop, col. 2, ll. 1-22 and col. 6,
ll. 6-12). The Examiner found that using a monocular camera is well known, and
that it is obvious the video sensors taught by Knoop perform the same function as a
monocular camera. Ans. 14. However, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner
did not provide adequate evidence to support the finding that Knoop’s disclosure
of “video sensors” is a disclosure of a monocular camera as claimed. The
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Examiner’s application of Ravani does not cure the deficiency of Knoop. Id. at 5.
Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 10.
Rejection II
Claim 3 depends from claim 1, and Appellant relies on the same contentions
discussed supra regarding claim 1 for patentability of claim 3. App. Br. 19. For
the reasons discussed supra regarding claim 1, we find these contentions
unpersuasive and sustain the rejection of claim 3.
Regarding claim 4, Appellant contends that the Examiner did not address the
limitation that the long range radar sensor be mounted at the center of gravity of
the vehicle. App. Br. 19. The Examiner, however, did address this limitation of
claim 4. Ans. 6. The Examiner reiterated as much in response to Appellant’s
argument, explaining that Ravani was relied on for disclosing that an object
detection sensor is mounted at the center of gravity of the vehicle, and Joh was
relied on for suggesting a long range radar sensor as an object detection sensor. Id.
at 15. Because Appellant’s argument is solely that the Examiner did not address
the claim limitation, and the record reflects that the Examiner in fact did, Appellant
has not apprised us of any error in these findings by the Examiner. Thus, we find
Appellant’s contention unpersuasive, and sustain the rejection of claim 4.
Rejection III
Claim 6 depends from claim 1, and recites “the in-vehicle sensors are
selected from the group consisting of” five different sensors. Appellant contends
that Yasuno fails to disclose two of these five sensors; namely, a yaw rate sensor
and a lateral acceleration sensor. App. Br. 21. However, claim 6 is written in
Markush form, and, as such, “the entire element is disclosed by the prior art if one
alternative in the Markush group is in the prior art.” Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter
Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted; emphasis
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added). Thus, Appellant’s contention that Yasuno must disclose all five of the
sensors of the Markush group to meet this claim limitation is incorrect, and we
sustain the rejection of claim 6.
Claim 18 depends from claim 16, and recites “measuring the various vehicle
states using . . . steering wheel angle sensors, yaw rate sensors, longitudinal speed
sensors, longitudinal acceleration sensors and lateral acceleration sensors.”
Emphasis added. Appellant contends that Yasuno fails to disclose a yaw rate
sensor and a lateral acceleration sensor. App. Br. 21. In response, the Examiner
determined that claim 18 only requires the selection of one sensor from the recited
group of sensors. Ans. 15. However, unlike claim 6 discussed supra, claim 18 is
not written in Marskush form. Rather, we construe claim 18 as requiring using all
five of the recited sensors.
The Examiner also found that all of the recited sensors “are well known in
the art,” and relies on Appellant’s Specification as support for this finding. Ans.
15-16 (citing to Spec., para. [0014]). Though Appellant’s Specification states that
the sensors recited in claim 18 are well-known as part of various vehicle stability
control and driver assist systems, it does not disclose using all of the sensors
recited in claim 18 together in a single system. Spec., para. [0014]. In addition,
the Examiner did not state a rationale for why it would have been obvious to use
all of the sensors recited in claim 18 in the system of Ravani and Knoop. Ans. 7.
Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 18.
Rejection IV
Claims 7-9 depend from claim 1, and claims 19 and 20 depend from claim
16. Appellant relies on the contentions discussed supra regarding claims 1 and 16
for the patentability of these dependent claims. App. Br. 24-26. For the same
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reasons discussed supra regarding claims 1 and 16, we find these contentions
unpersuasive, and sustain the rejections of claim 7-9, 19, and 20.
Appellant’s contentions (App. Br. 23) and the Examiner’s findings (Ans.
7-8, 16) regarding independent claim 12 are similar to those discussed supra for
claim 1. Hence, we sustain the rejection of claim 12 over Ravani, Knoop, and
Fayyad. Appellant does not separately argue dependent claims 13-15 (App. Br.
24-25), thus, we also sustain the rejection of these claims.
Rejection V
Claim 11 depends from claim 1. Appellant relies on the contentions
discussed supra regarding claim 1 for the patentability of claim 11. App. Br.
26-27. For the same reasons discussed supra regarding claim 1, we find these
contentions unpersuasive, and sustain the rejection of claim 11.

DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejections of claims 1-9, 11-14, 16, 17, 19, and 20, and
REVERSE the rejections of claims 10 and 18.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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