Ex Parte Yu et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 12, 2017

13959689 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 12, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/959,689 08/05/2013 Fan Yu 1133-438US02 5586
98449 7590 10/16/2017
Shumaker & Sieffert, P.A.
1625 Radio Drive, Suite 100
Woodbury, MN 55125
EXAMINER
HO, RUAY L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2175
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/16/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pairdocketing @ ssiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte FAN YU and HUANJUN BAO
Appeal 2017-005900
Application 13/959,689
Technology Center 2100
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JUSTIN BUSCH, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final
rejection of claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—16, and 18—20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Invention
According to the Specification, the invention relates to “techniques for
facilitating text entry by a user interacting with a graphical keyboard
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Google Inc. App. Br. 3.
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Application 13/959,689
displayed at a presence-sensitive screen of a computing device,” including
“handheld mobile devices, such as tablets or smartphones.” Spec. 111.2
The Specification describes a computing device having a presence-sensitive
screen and a housing, with the housing having a plurality of touch sensors
for receiving touch input. Abstract. The Specification explains that the
“computing device determines a usage mode, based on the touch input” and
“displays, based on the usage mode, a graphical keyboard at the presence-
sensitive screen.” Id. The usage modes include “a single-handed usage
mode,” such as “a left-handed usage mode or a right-handed usage mode,”
and “a two-handed usage mode.” Spec. 123.
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as
follows:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, by a computing device, an indication of touch
input detected at one or more touch sensors of a plurality of
touch sensors included in a housing of the computing device;
determining, based at least in part on the indication of the
touch input and by the computing device, a usage mode;
receiving, by the computing device, indications of two or
more inputs detected at a presence-sensitive screen, each input
of the two or more inputs being detected at a respective location
of the presence-sensitive screen;
2 This decision uses the following abbreviations: “Spec.” for the
Specification, filed August 5, 2013; “Final Act.” for the Final Office Action,
mailed March 31, 2016; “App. Br.” for the Appeal Brief, filed October 11,
2016; “Ans.” for the Examiner’s Answer, mailed December 27, 2016; and
“Reply Br.” for the Reply Brief, filed February 20, 2017.
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Application 13/959,689
determining, by the computing device and based at least
in part on the respective locations of the presence-sensitive
screen and the usage mode, that one of the two or more inputs
is an unintentional input; and
discarding, based on the determination, the unintentional
input.
App. Br. 28 (Claims App.).
The Prior Art Supporting the Rejections on Appeal
As evidence of unpatentability, the Examiner relies on the following
prior art:
Ippel US 2010/0123675 A1 May 20,2010
Jellicoe et al. (“Jellicoe”) US 2010/0315348 A1 Dec. 16, 2010
Koch et al. (“Koch”) US 2012/0117506 Al May 10, 2012
The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1—3, 5,6, 11, 14—16, and 18—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Koch and Jellicoe. Final Act. 3—7.
Claims 7—9, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Koch, Jellicoe, and Ippel. Final Act. 7—10.
ANAFYSIS
We have reviewed the rejections of claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—16, and 18—
20 in light of Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred. Based on the
record before us and for the reasons explained below, we concur with
Appellants’ contention that the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under
§ 103(a).
The § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 1—3, 5, 6, 11, 14—16, and 18—20
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 because
the references do not teach or suggest “determining, by the computing
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Application 13/959,689
device and based at least in part on the respective locations of the presence-
sensitive screen and the usage mode, that one of the two or more inputs is an
unintentional input,” as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 5—8. More
specifically, Appellants assert that the cited portions of Koch disclose a split
keyboard for two-thumb typing and using a finger or thumb gesture to resize
a split keyboard portion. Id. at 6. Appellants also assert that “[t]he cited
portions of Koch are silent as to determining anything ‘based at least in part
on the respective locations of the presence-sensitive screen and the usage
mode,’ much less ‘that one of the two or more inputs is an unintentional
input.’” Id. at 6. Appellants further assert that Jellicoe discusses using
“popples” with actuators connected to a circuit board to alter sensitivity
states for accepting touch input. Id. at 7—8. Appellants then contend that
“[mjerely combining a teaching of changing the size of a keyboard in
response to input detected at a touch-sensitive input device and a teaching of
different sensitivity states for accepting touch input, does not result in” the
disputed “determining” step. Id. at 8.
In response, the Examiner notes that an “unintentional input”
determination according to claim 1 is “‘based at least in part on the
respective locations of the presence-sensitive screen’, not based on
respective locations of the inputs.” Ans. 11. The Examiner finds that
Jellicoe teaches that “extraneous and/or unintentional activations” of a
touch-screen interface “can be filtered.” Id. at 10-11 (citing Jellicoe 149).
The Examiner reasons that “[t]he ‘filtering’ functions like the
‘determination’ recited in claim 1.” Id. at 11.
Appellants argue that the Examiner relies on an incorrect claim
interpretation. See Reply Br. 9—11. Appellants explain that the “receiving”
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step immediately preceding the disputed “determining” step recites “each
input of the two [or] more inputs being detected at a respective location of
the presence-sensitive screen.” Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted). Appellants then
contend that “[w]hen considered as a whole, ‘the respective locations of the
presence-sensitive screen’ MUST refer to ‘a respective location of the
presence-sensitive screen’ at which ‘each of the two or more inputs [were]
detected’ otherwise, the ‘respective locations of the presence-sensitive
screen’ would not have proper antecedent basis.” Id. at 10.
Based on the record before us, we agree with Appellants that the
Examiner relies on an incorrect claim interpretation. We also agree with
Appellants that the Examiner has not adequately explained how the cited
portions of Koch and Jellicoe teach or suggest the disputed “determining”
step in claim 1 because Jellicoe’s filtering, which the Examiner relies on for
that step, does not determine an unintentional touch based on screen input
locations. Hence, we do not sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim 1.
Independent claims 14 and 19 include the limitation “determine, based
at least in part on the respective locations of the [touch inputs detected at
the] presence-sensitive screen and the usage mode, that one of the two or
more inputs is an unintentional input.” App. Br. 33, 36 (Claims App.). For
the reasons discussed regarding claim 1, we do not sustain the § 103(a)
rejection of claims 14 and 19.
Claims 2, 3, 5, 6, and 11 depend from claim 1; claims 15, 16, and 18
depend from claim 14; and claim 20 depends from claim 19. For the reasons
discussed regarding the independent claims, we do not sustain the § 103(a)
rejection of these dependent claims.
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The § 103(a) Rejection of Claims 7—9, 12, and 13
Claims 7—9, 12, and 13 depend from claim 1. Based on the record
before us, the Examiner has not shown how the additionally cited Ippel
reference overcomes the deficiency discussed above for claim 1.
Consequently, we do not sustain the § 103(a) rejection of these dependent
claims.
Other Issues Raised by Appellants
Because this determination resolves the appeal with respect to
claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—16, and 18—20, we need not address Appellants’ other
arguments regarding Examiner error. See, e.g., Beloit Corp. v. Valmet Oy,
742 F.2d 1421, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that an administrative
agency may render a decision based on “a single dispositive issue”).
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—3, 5—9, 11—16,
and 18—20.
REVERSED
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