Ex Parte YU

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 14, 2018

14154606 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 14, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/154,606 01/14/2014
28395 7590 06/18/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Hai YU
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83395613 9126
EXAMINER
NOLAN, PETER D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3661
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/18/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte HAI YU
Appeal2017-008307
Application 14/154,606
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. PETTING, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.
MURPHY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner's
rejections of claims 1, 2, 4--7, 9-11, and 14--21. We have jurisdiction over
this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 "The real party in interest is Ford Global Technologies, LLC." (Appeal
Br. 2.)
Appeal2017-008307
Application 14/154,606
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant's disclosure "relates to hybrid vehicles with engine
stop-start logic and to modifying stop-start logic in response to a vehicle
location being in a green zone." (Spec. ,r 1.)
Illustrative Claim 2
1. A method of controlling a hybrid electric vehicle
compnsmg:
issuing an engine start command in response to a traction
battery state of charge (SOC) falling below a first threshold
when the engine is off and the vehicle is outside a designated
geographical region;
inhibiting engine start commands in response to the SOC
being below the first threshold when the engine is off and the
vehicle being within the designated geographical region; and
starting the engine based on whether a calculated travel
distance to exit the designated geographical region is greater
than a calculated travel distance corresponding with the SOC
decreasing to a second threshold that is less than the first
threshold.
Anderson
Tate
Siy
References3
US 2006/0173593 Al
US 2010/0280687 Al
US 2012/0109408 Al
Aug.3,2006
Nov. 4, 2010
May 3, 2012
2 The Appellant filed an Appeal Brief on September 27, 2016; a corrected
Appeal Brief on November 4, 2016; and a corrected Claims Appendix for
the Appeal Brief on December 2, 2016. Our quotations from, and cites to,
the Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.") correspond to the corrected Appeal Brief
filed on November 4, 2016. Our quotations from, and cites to, the Claims
Appendix ("Claims App.") correspond to the corrected appendix filed on
December 2, 2016.
3 Our quotations from these documents omit, where applicable, bolding
and/ or italicization of reference numerals.
2
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Application 14/154,606
Rejections
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4--7, 9-11, 14, 15, 17, 19, and 21
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Anderson and Tate. (Final
Action 4.)
The Examiner rejects claims 16, 18, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Anderson, Tate, and Siy. (Final Action 10.)
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 6, and 11 are the independent claims on appeal, with the rest
of the claims on appeal (i.e., claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 14--21) depending
therefrom. (See Claims App.) Independent claims 1 and 11 recite a
"method of controlling a hybrid electric vehicle" and independent claim 6
recites a "hybrid electric vehicle." (Id.)
As explained by the Appellant, a hybrid electric vehicle includes an
engine "that may be stopped and started while the vehicle is in motion."
(Spec. ,r 2.) The Appellant's disclosed hybrid electric vehicle 10 can operate
in an electric-only mode in which "the engine 12 is stopped" and torque is
provided "using stored electric energy from the traction battery 16." (Id.
,r 18.) Thus, when the vehicle 10 is operating in an electric-only mode, the
state of charge (SOC) of the battery decreases as electric energy is depleted
therefrom.
When the Appellant's vehicle 10 is operating in the electric-only
mode, the engine 12 is automatically started to avoid "over-depleting" the
battery 16. (Spec. ,r 18.) Specifically, the engine 12 is started "in response
to a command from [a] controller 20." (Id.) Put another way, in the
Appellant's vehicle 10, the engine 12 is started when the controller 20
conveys an engine-start command thereto.
3
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Application 14/154,606
The limitations at issue in this appeal concern the logic that the
controller 20 follows when determining whether to convey an engine-start
command to the engine 12. This logic is diagrammed in a flowchart shown
in the Appellant's Figure 3, reproduced below.
SOC <~ SOC ~s,
ENGINE START REQUEST
1NH!B!T HJGINE ST.~RT
REQUEST
NO
NO
START ENG1NE
The logic diagrammed in the Appellant's flowchart indicates that, at
block 44, "the engine is started." (Spec. ,r 22.) In other words, block 44
corresponds to the processing activity of the Appellant's controller 20 which
causes an engine-start command to be conveyed to the engine 12.
4
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Application 14/154,606
The prior art references of record likewise disclose flowcharts
diagramming the logic followed by a controller, or a comparable processing
component, when determining whether to convey an engine-start command
to the engine of a hybrid electric vehicle. Anderson discloses a flowchart
diagramming that, at block S 108, the engine is started (see Anderson,
Fig. 3), and Anderson explains that this happens when a processor
"commands" a vehicle controller "to operate the vehicle in the charging
mode." (Id. ,r 35.)4 Tate discloses a flowchart diagramming that, at
block 414, the engine is started (see Tate, Fig. 5), and Tate explains that this
happens when a processor "sends electrical signals" instructing a control
module "to start the engine." (Tate ,r 19.)
The logic diagrammed in the Appellant's flowchart reflects a
preference "for the vehicle to remain in electric only mode for as long as
possible" when it is within a defined geographic region. (Spec. ,r 19.) The
logic diagramed in the prior art flowcharts likewise reflects a preference for
the vehicle to remain in electric-only mode in certain geographic
circumstances. Anderson's flowchart reflects a preference for a vehicle to
remain in an electric-only mode while in a quiet zone (see Anderson ,r 33,
Fig. 3); and Tate's flowchart reflects a preference for a vehicle to remain in
an electric-only mode when it is within a distance D 1 of a battery-charging
destination (see Tate ,r 26, Fig. 5).
The Examiner's determination of obviousness is premised upon the
logic diagrammed in the Appellant's flowchart being obvious over Anderson
4 "In [Anderson's] charging mode, the internal combustion engine 34 is on
and may be running at any suitable level for charging of the energy storage
device." (Anderson ,r 26.)
5
Appeal2017-008307
Application 14/154,606
and Tate. (See Final Action 4.) According to the Appellant, "[t]he
foundational issue of this appeal is whether or not certain claim elements are
even in the prior art references cited by the Examiner." (Appeal Br. 4.) As
discussed below, the record supports a determination that the combined
teachings of Anderson and Tate would have inspired one of ordinary skill to
implement the logic diagrammed in the Appellant's flowchart in an electric
hybrid vehicle. 5
Independent Claim 1
Independent claim recites the step of "starting the engine based on
whether a calculated travel distance to exit the designated geographical
region is greater than a calculated travel distance corresponding with the
SOC decreasing to a second threshold that is less than [a] first threshold."
(Claims App.)
Tate's flowchart diagrams a logic path (block 406 to block 408 to
block 414) in which the engine is started when the travel distance to a
battery-charging destination is greater than a distance D 1. (See Tate ,r 26,
Fig. 5.) And the Examiner finds that Tate's distance DI is a value
corresponding to the battery SOC decreasing from a first threshold SOC 1 to
a second threshold SOC 2. (See Answer 6-7.)
The Appellant argues that Tate fails to teach "a travel distance to exit a
designated geographical region" as required by independent claim 1. (Appeal
Br. 9.) We are not persuaded by this argument because Anderson teaches that
the engine should be started to recharge the battery when the vehicle leaves a
5 The Appellant does not challenge the Examiner's articulated reason as to
why it would have been obvious to combine the teachings of Anderson and
Tate (see Final Action 6, see Appeal Br. 6-12.
6
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Application 14/154,606
quiet zone (see Anderson ,r 38); and Tate teaches determining the vehicle's
travel distance to a battery-recharging destination (see Tate ,r 26). Thus, the
prior art imparts that an exit from a geographic region ( e.g., a quiet zone) can
be equated to a battery-recharging destination.
The Appellant also argues that Tate "fails to disclose any particular
relationship between the distance D 1 and any state of charge threshold."
(Appeal Br. 9.) We are not persuaded by this argument because we agree
with the Examiner that Tate "makes it abundantly clear that the distance D 1
is related to the distance the vehicle can drive before the SOC reaches
SOC2." (Answer 6.) For example, in trip 214 graphed in Tate's Figure 4,
distance D 1 corresponds to battery decreasing from the first threshold SOC 1
(at time T3), to "just before the battery SOC reaches the second
predetermined state of charge SOC2." (Tate ,r 26.)
The Appellant further argues that Tate's distance DI is "one-size-fits-
all predetermined value," and, therefore, cannot constitute the "calculated"
value required by independent claim 1. (Reply Br. 2.) The Appellant
contends that "[t]he range the vehicle can drive before reaching a lower
battery SOC threshold" will vary "depending upon the terrain, traffic levels,
and many other factors that vary with time." (Appeal Br. 10.) However,
claim 1 does not recite a calculating step, much less a calculating step that
must take the above-mentioned factors into consideration. As such, the
"calculated" value recited in claim 1 would read on a previously calculated
(i.e., predetermined or predefined) value such as Tate's distance DI.
Moreover, prior art of record evidences that it would have been known to one
of ordinary skill in the art to "calculate the estimated remaining distance"
that a vehicle "can travel on the available battery power." (Siy ,r 12.)
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Application 14/154,606
Accordingly, the Appellant fails to establish that the Examiner errs in
determining that the method recited in independent claim 1 would have been
obvious over Anderson and Tate. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection
of independent claim 1.
Independent Claim 6
Independent claim 6 recites a controller configured to "start the engine
based on a determination of whether a travel distance to exit the designated
geographical region is greater than a travel distance corresponding with the
SOC decreasing to a second threshold less than the first threshold." (Claims
App.) The Appellant does not present arguments beyond the unpersuasive
ones discussed above in connection with independent claim 1. (See Appeal
Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 2.)
Accordingly, the Appellant fails to establish that the Examiner errs in
determining that the vehicle recited in independent claim 6 would have been
obvious over Anderson and Tate. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection
of independent claim 6.
Independent Claim 11
Independent claim 11 recites the step of "inhibiting engine start
commands, issued in response to a battery state of charge being below a first
threshold," in response to the vehicle being in a predefined geographic
location "and a travel distance to exit the predefined geographic location
being less than a calculated allowable electric range of the vehicle."
(Claims App.)
As discussed above, Tate's flowchart diagrams a logic path
(block 406 to block 408 to block 414) in which the engine is started when
the travel distance to a battery-charging destination is greater than a
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Application 14/154,606
distance DI. (See Tate ,r 26, Fig. 5.) With this logic path, the engine is
started when the battery SOC drops below a threshold SOC 1. (Id.) The
Examiner finds that, when this logic path is followed, Tate "issues" engine
start commands. (See Answer 12.)
Tate's flowchart also diagrams a logic path (block 406 to block 408 to
block 413 to block 412) in which the vehicle remains in electric mode when
the travel distance to a battery-charging destination is less than a
distance DI. (See Tate ,r 26, Fig. 5.) With this logic path, the engine is not
started unless or until the battery SOC drops below a lower threshold SOC2.
(Id.) The Examiner finds that, when this logic path is followed, Tate
"inhibits" engine start commands. (See Answer 12-13.)
The Appellant seems to argue that, in their flowchart, an engine start
command is "generated" at a certain block 40, and/or "inhibited" at a certain
block 48, but the same does not occur at blocks in Tate's flowchart with the
same logical connotation. (See Appeal Br. 13-15; see also Reply Br. 2--4.)
The problem with this argument is that a flowchart is nothing more than a
diagram of the logic followed during the processing of information. As
discussed above, in the Appellant's vehicle 11, the engine 12 is started when
the controller 20 conveys an engine-start command, which would
correspond to the logic denoted by block 44 in the Appellant's flowchart.
(See Spec. ,r,r 18, 22.) As also discussed above, the same is true in Tate, as
the engine is started when the processor sends electrical instruction signals,
which would correspond to the logic denoted by block 414 in Tate's
flowchart. (Tate ,r 19; see also id. ,r 26.) Insofar as something mechanically
or electrically significant happens in the Appellant's vehicle 10 when the
processing activity of the controller 20 corresponds to flowchart block 40
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Application 14/154,606
and/or flowchart block 48, we see no discussion of this in the Specification.
(See, e.g., Spec. ,r,r 22, 27.)
Accordingly, the Appellant fails to establish that the Examiner errs in
determining that the method recited in independent claim 6 would have been
obvious over Anderson and Tate. Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejection
of independent claim 11.
Dependent Claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 14-21
The Appellant does not argue the dependent claims separately from
the independent claims (see Appeal Br. 15), and so they fall therewith.
Thus, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of dependent claims 2, 4, 5, 7,
9, 10, and 14--21.6
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner's rejections of claims 1, 2, 4--7, 9-11,
and 14--21.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
6 With particular reference to dependent claims 16, 18, and 20, as noted
above, Siy shows that it is known to "calculate the estimated remaining
distance" that a vehicle "can travel on the available battery power."
(Siy ,r 12.)
10