Ex Parte Yamazaki et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 27, 2018

14499476 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 27, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/499,476 09/29/2014
46442 7590 05/01/2018
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mark Steven Yamazaki
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83472530;67186-129
PUSl
6967
EXAMINER
MOTT,ADAMR
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3669
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/01/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MARK STEVEN YAMAZAKI, HAI YU,
RAJIT JOHRI, and WEI LIANG 1
Appeal2017-007633
Application 14/499,476
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN C. KERINS, EDWARD A. BROWN, and
LYNNE H. BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judges.
BROWNE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mark Steven Yamazaki et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134 from the rejection of claims 1---6 and 9-21. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART and enter a NEW GROUND OF
REJECTION pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b ).
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. See Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal2017-007633
Application 14/499,476
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 16, and 21 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
deriving a first torque compensation value from a road
grade estimate;
deriving a second torque compensation value from a
vehicle mass estimate; and
controlling a torque output of an electric machine of an
electrified vehicle during a vehicle creep condition, the torque
output calculated based at least on the first torque compensation
value and the second torque compensation value.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Aoki
Leminoux
Heap
Yamamoto
Kwon
Marcus
Yamazaki
Nefcy
Hoshiba
US 2006/0137920 Al
US 2007 /0038357 Al
US 2009/0118883 Al
US 2009/0149295 Al
US 2011/0029172 Al
US 2011/0184615 Al
US 2013/0179014 Al
US 2013/0244829 Al
US 2015/0065297 Al
2
June 29, 2006
Feb. 15,2007
May 7, 2009
June 11, 2009
Feb. 3, 2011
July 28, 2011
July 11, 2013
Sept. 19, 2013
Mar. 5, 2015
Appeal2017-007633
Application 14/499,476
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 2, 4, and 62 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)
as anticipated by Kwon.
II. Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kwon and Heap.
III. Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kwon and Hoshiba.
IV. Claims 9-11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kwon and Nefcy.
V. Claims 12-14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kwon and Yamamoto.
VI. Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kwon, Marcus, and Yamazaki.
VII. Claims 16, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kwon and Leminoux.
VIII. Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kwon, Leminoux, 3 and Nefcy.
2 Although the statement of this rejection includes claim 5, the explanation
of the rejection does not address claim 5. See Final Act. 4--5. Furthermore,
claim 5 stands rejected as unpatentable over Kwon and Hoshiba. Final Act.
6-7. Thus, the inclusion of claim 5 in the statement of this rejection is
understood to be a typographical error.
3 Although the statement of this rejection does not include Leminoux, it
refers to the rejection of claim 16 which is based on the combined teachings
of Kwon and Leminoux. Accordingly, we understand the omission of
Leminoux from the statement of this rejection to be a typographical error.
3
Appeal2017-007633
Application 14/499,476
IX. Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kwon, Leminoux, 4 and Aoki.
X. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Kwon, Nefcy, and Yamamoto. 5
DISCUSSION
New Ground of Re} ection- 3 5 US. C. § 101
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-
patent-eligible subject matter.
The Supreme Court has set forth "a framework for distinguishing
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas
from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1296-1297
(2012)). According to the Supreme Court's framework, we must first
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those concepts
(i.e., laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas). Id. If so, we
must secondly "consider the elements of each claim both individually and
'as an ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements
'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Id.
The Supreme Court characterizes the second step of the analysis as "a search
4 See note 3.
5 Although the statement of this rejection includes claim 22, the explanation
of the rejection addresses claim 21. See Final Act. 14--15. Furthermore,
there is no claim 22. Thus, the listing of claim 22 instead of claim 21 in the
statement of this rejection is a typographical error.
4
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Application 14/499,476
for an 'inventive concept' - i.e., an element or combination of elements
that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Id.
(alteration in the original) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).
For the first step of Alice, we observe that claim 1 recites "deriving a
first torque compensation value from a road grade estimate," "deriving a
second torque compensation value from a vehicle mass estimate," and "the
torque output calculated based at least on the first torque compensation
value and the second torque compensation value." Appeal Br. 9 (Claims
App.) (emphasis added). As described in the Specification, the claimed first
torque compensation value "represents the amount of torque the electric
machine 66 must additionally output to compensate for the road grade
estimate during the vehicle creep condition," and the claimed second torque
compensation value "represents the amount of torque the electric machine
66 must additionally output to compensate for the vehicle mass estimate
during the vehicle creep condition." Spec. i-fi-167---68. The Specification
discloses that the vehicle system 60 determines the first and second torque
compensation values. Id. at i-fi-1 67---68, 71. The Specification further
discloses that "[a] control unit 64 of the vehicle system 60 may be
programmed with one or more algorithms adapted to execute the vehicle
control strategy 100, or any other control strategy." Id. at i164 (emphasis
added). Considering claim 1 in its entirety, including the limitations noted
above, and in light of Appellants' disclosure, we find that the claimed
subject matter is directed to the concept of gathering data and manipulating
data for controlling a vehicle.
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Application 14/499,476
Similar data gathering and data manipulating steps as those in claim 1
have been held ineligible under § 101. See Content Extraction and
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding the concept of "1) collecting data, 2)
recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that
recognized data in a memory" abstract); see also Intellectual Ventures ILLC
v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(concluding that customizing information and presenting it to users based on
particular characteristics is abstract as well); Electric Power Group, LLC v.
Alstom S.A, 830 F.3d 1353-1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that an
invention directed to the collection, manipulation, and display of data is an
abstract process). Accordingly, we determine that claim 1 is directed to an
abstract idea.
Having determined that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we
must determine whether the additional elements of the claim transform it
into patent-eligible subject matter, according to the second step of Alice.
Although claim 1 sets forth that certain data is collected by being estimated
and derived or calculated (e.g., a road grade estimate, a vehicle mass
estimate, a first torque compensation value, a second torque compensation
value, and a torque output), it does not specify how the estimation is
accomplished nor indicate how the torque compensation values are derived
from the estimates. Even if claim 1 implies that an algorithm may be used to
collect or manipulate data (e.g., by a system comprising a controller
programmed with one or more algorithms as disclosed by the Specification),
and that the results of the application of this algorithm are to be
communicated to a vehicle, claim 1 at best, merely requires using
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Application 14/499,476
"mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate
additional information." See Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs.for
Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). On this record, we do
not find that claim 1 is narrowly directed to application of particular rules for
achieving an improved technological result. Cf McRO, Inc. v. Bandai
Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Claim 1 further recites "controlling a torque output of an electric
machine of an electrified vehicle during a vehicle creep condition." This
step is merely a post-solution activity. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
590 (1978) ("The notion that post-solution activity, no matter how
conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle
into a patentable process exalts form over substance."). Thus, these
limitations of claim 1 do not transform the abstract idea embodied in the
claim. Rather, they simply implement that idea.
Futhermore, the elements of claim 1, when considered individually
and as an ordered combination, are well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan. Regarding the limitation "deriving a first
torque compensation value from a road grade estimate," the Specification
discloses that
[ t ]he road grade estimate may be part of the load present during
a vehicle creep conditions [sic] and may be estimated using any
known road grade estimation technique. In one non-limiting
embodiment, the road grade estimate may be calculated based on
the relationship between one or more of vehicle speed, vehicle
acceleration, yaw rate, wheel torques, vehicle mass, drag forces,
etc.
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Spec. i-f 67 (emphasis added). Regarding the limitation "deriving a second
torque compensation value from a vehicle mass estimate," the Specification
discloses that
[t]he vehicle mass estimate is another portion of the load that
may be present during a vehicle creep condition and may be
estimated using any known vehicle mass estimation technique.
In one non-limiting embodiment, the vehicle mass estimate may
be calculated based on the relationship between one or more of
longitudinal acceleration, wheel torques, vehicle speed, yaw rate,
longitudinal acceleration, etc.
Spec. i-f 68 (emphasis added). Regarding the limitation "the torque output
calculated based at least on the first torque compensation value and the
second torque compensation value," the Specification discloses that an
output torque such as a feed-forward torque, Tpp, can be calculated by
simply adding torque values such as the first torque compensation value
derived from the road grade estimate, Ta, and the second torque
compensation value derived from the vehicle mass estimate, TM, along with
other torque values. Spec. i-f 73.
Regarding the steps involving "deriving" and calculating" of values,
which includes merely adding the values, such data gathering and
manipulation are recognized as being well-understood, routine, and
conventional to a skilled artisan. See Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348-
1349; Intellectual Ventures ILLC, 792 F.3d at 1368; and Electric Power
Group, LLC, 830 F.3d at 1355. We further note that the Specification
merely discloses that a control unit 64 may be programmed with one or more
algorithms to execute a vehicle control strategy (Spec. i-f 64), that the control
unit 64 commands a torque output to the electric machine 66 (id. at 74), and
that the electric machine 66 adjusts the torque output (id. at 64). Thus, the
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Application 14/499,476
elements of claim 1, when considered individually and as an ordered
combination, are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities or
components to a skilled artisan. Thus, they amount to nothing more than an
attempt to patent the abstract idea embodied in the steps of this claim. See
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). Accordingly,
the limitations of claim 1 fail to transform the nature of this claim into
patent-eligible subject matter. See id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297,
1298). 6
Rejection I
The Examiner finds that Kwon discloses a method comprising
deriving a first torque compensation value from a road grade estimate and
deriving a second torque compensation value from a vehicle mass estimate.
Final Act. 4 (citing Kwon i-fi-f 113, 117). The Examiner explains that "two
values which have a compensation effect on a torque value read on the claim
language (i.e. mg and sin(8) of Kwon)." Ans. 4.
Appellants contend that "Kwon fails to teach or suggest controlling a
torque output of an electric machine based on a 'torque compensation value'
that is derived from a vehicle mass estimate." Appeal Br. 3. In support of
this contention, Appellants note that "there is only one torque compensation
value disclosed by Kwon - the slope load value" and that "separate torque
6 Having determined that claim 1 is directed to non-patent-eligible subject
matter, we leave it to the Examiner to determine if the claims that depend
from claim 1 are also directed to non-eligible subject matter, should there be
further prosecution of these claims. Our decision not to address the claims
that depend from claim 1 should not be construed as a determination that the
dependent claims are or are not patent-eligible.
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Application 14/499,476
compensation values are not calculated from each of 1) a road grade
estimate; and 2) a vehicle mass estimate." Id. (citing Kwon i-fi-f 113-117).
Appellants further note that "Kwon specifically states that it does not
actively detect changes in vehicle weight." Id. at 3--4 (citing Kwon i-f 117).
Kwon discloses "a process of applying a final motor torque, obtained
by adding the calculated motor torque and a torque corresponding to a slope
load value (mgsin8) detected by the slope angle sensor and provided as a
feedforward input to the motor." Kwon i-f 133. Thus, Kwon discloses that
mgsin8 is a slope load value that corresponds to a torque (i.e., a single
torque). The Examiner's finding that the mgsin8 value described in Kwon
corresponds to both a first torque compensation value from a road grade
estimate and a second torque compensation value from a vehicle mass
estimate, is not supported by Kwon's Specification. Thus, the Examiner's
finding is in error.
Accordingly, the rejection of claim 1, and of claims 2, 4, and 6
depending therefrom, is not sustained.
Rejections II-VI
Rejections II-VI rely on the same erroneous finding with regard to
Kwon as Rejection I. Final Act. 5-11. Heap, Hoshiba, Nefcy, Yamamoto,
Marcus, and Yamazaki are not applied in a manner that cures the
deficiencies of this finding. Accordingly, we do not sustain Rejections II-VI
for the reasons discussed supra.
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Appeal2017-007633
Application 14/499,476
Re} ection VII
The Examiner finds that Kwon discloses a vehicle system comprising
a control unit in communication with an electric machine and configured to
estimate a road grade and modify a torque output of the electric machine to
compensate for variations in the road grade and the vehicle mass during
vehicle creep conditions. Final Act. 11 (citing Kwon, Figs. 7, 9--11; i-fi-1 6,
22, 23, 27, 28, 52, 79, 81, 90, 110-113, 117, 143, 161).
Appellants contend that Kwon does not "modify the torque output
based on variations of the vehicle mass." Appeal Br. 6.
As discussed above, Kwon is concerned with a slope load value,
mgsin8, which corresponds to a single torque. Kwon further discloses that
"[a]lthough the slope angle is continuously measured and a change in weight
is not suitably detected, the change in weight, such as a change in the
number of passengers, can be sufficiently compensated by a motor position
feedback control." Kwon, i-f 117. Thus, Kwon does not modify a torque
output of an electric machine to compensate for variations in the vehicle
mass during vehicle creep conditions, as claimed. Accordingly, the
Examiner's finding is in error. The Examiner's reliance on Leminoux does
not cure the deficiency of this finding.
Accordingly, the rejection of claim 16, and of claims 19 and 20
depending therefrom, is not sustained.
Re} ections VIII-IX
Rejections VIII-IX rely on the same erroneous finding as Rejection
VII. Final Act. 12-14. Nefcy and Aoki are not applied in a manner that
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Application 14/499,476
cures the deficiencies of this finding. Accordingly, we do not sustain
Rejections VIII-IX for the reasons discussed supra.
RejectionX
The Examiner finds that Kwon, Nefcy, and Yamamota disclose or
suggest all of the limitations of claim 21. See Final Act. 15. Particularly,
the Examiner finds that "it was old and well known in the art to take into
account inertia of drive line components when conducting a torque control
calculation and that inertia torque is required to spin up a drive line
component and generated when a drive line component is spinning." Id. at
14 (citingYamamotaFigs. 12-17, i-fi-f 7, 18-21, 74, 151, 155-157, 173-180).
The Examiner further finds that "it was also known in the art to take into
account drive line losses when calculating a control torque for a vehicle
including spin losses and many other factors and dynamic inertia losses."
Id. at 15 (citing Nefcy i1i131, 40-50, 69).
Appellants argue that "none of the asserted prior art teaches or
suggests commanding different torque outputs during vehicle creep
conditions depending on whether or not the input shaft of a transmission
gearbox is spinning." Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis added); see also Reply Br. 5.
Claim 21, however, does not specify that the first and second torque outputs
are different. See id. at 11 (Claims App.).
Appellants further assert that, in Nefcy, "spin losses have nothing to
do with commanding torque outputs based on whether or not the input shaft
is spinning in the first place" and that "Y amamota also lacks any discussion
of torque output based on the spin status of the transmission input shaft." Id.
at 7-8.
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Application 14/499,476
Responding to these arguments, the Examiner explains that "one of
ordinary skill in the art would recognize that when the references speak of
inertia, this applies to both claimed limitations" at issue. Id. The Examiner
further explains that "[ t ]he inertia of a body can be measured by its mass,
which governs its resistance to the action of a force, or by its moment of
inertia about a specified axis, which measures its resistance to the action of a
torque about the same axis." Id. (citing Merriam-webster.com,
l1tt1) :/!\\l\\t\~f ~ rnerri a.rn u V·/e-t;sS:er~ C{)111 .. l{}i c-S:ic}11a.r~y/i11erS:ia).
Turning to Appellants specific assertions, the Examiner finds that
"Nefcy is not just directed at spin losses." Ans. 11. Rather, the Examiner
finds that "N efcy teaches taking into account inefficiencies and losses,
including spin losses, proportional losses which are dependent on speed, and
dynamic inertial losses." Id. (citing Nefcy i1i131, 40-50, 69). The Examiner
further finds that "N efcy clearly teaches that the input speed of the
transmission affects losses and that there are dynamic inertia losses in the
system and that these losses should be accounted for when controlling a
transmission to achieve a desired outcome." Id. at 11-12 (citing Nefcy
i1i140-50 and 69). In support of this finding, the Examiner provides an
example demonstrating that "Nefcy clearly teaches taking into account the
spinning state of an input to a transmission when determining a torque to
command and adjusting the torque accordingly based on the spinning
state/ speed." Id. at 12.
Regarding Yamamoto, the Examiner explains that Yamamoto furthers
Nefcy's teachings by "illustrat[ing] that it is already known in the art to take
into account the inertial torque, specifically of the input shaft of the
transmission." Ans. 13-14.
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In response, Appellants do not contest the Examiners further
explanation and findings. See Reply Br. 5. Rather, Appellants argue that
Nefcy and Yamamoto are directed to torque inputs received by the motor
rather than torque outputs from an electric machine, as claimed. See id ..
This argument is raised for the first time in the Reply Brief and does not
appear to be raised in response an argument in the Answer. See generally
Ans. In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.41 (b)(2), lacking a showing of
good cause, we do not consider the untimely arguments raised for the first
time in the Reply Brief that are not responsive to an argument raised in the
Answer.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner's decision rejecting claim
21.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1---6 and 9--20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 are REVERSED.
The Examiner's rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
AFFIRMED.
We enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION for claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
FINALITY OF DECISION
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b ). Section 41.50(b) provides "[a] new ground of rejection pursuant
to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review." Section
41.50(b) also provides:
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Application 14/499,476
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the Appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is
binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion
of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims,
appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under§ 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure§ 1214.01.
AFFIRMED-IN-PART; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
15