Ex Parte WooDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJun 26, 200910637377 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 26, 2009) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________________ Ex parte MARK WOO ____________________ Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 Technology Center 2100 ____________________ Decided: June 26, 20091 ____________________ Before HOWARD B. BLANKENSHIP, THU A. DANG, and STEPHEN C. SIU, Administrative Patent Judges. DANG, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 CFR § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Data (electronic delivery). Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 2 I. STATEMENT OF CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-16 and 22-35. Claims 17-21 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. A. INVENTION According to Appellant, the invention relates to a method of searching for a song and, more particularly, to a simplified search method adapted for use on a computer (Spec. 1, ll. 14-16). B. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIMS Claim 1 is exemplary and is reproduced below: 1. A music search method for finding a desired song in a song database, the method comprising the steps of: a) generating a difference sequence for each of a plurality of songs in the song database by determining relative difference values between adjacent notes of the corresponding song; b) choosing a note sequence for the desired song to be found within the song database; c) generating an input difference argument for the note sequence by determining a relative difference values between adjacent notes of the note sequence; Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 3 d) comparing the input difference argument to the difference sequence for each song in the song database; and e) determining a match has occurred between the note sequence and a matching song in the song database when the input difference argument corresponds to at least a portion of the difference sequence for the matching song. C. REJECTIONS The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Lui US 5,146,833 Sep. 15, 1992 Ghias, “Query for Humming – Musical Information Retrieval in an Audio Database,” ACM 1995. McNab, “Towards the Digital Music Library: Tune Retrieval from Acoustic Input,” ACM 1996. Claims 1-12, 22-24, and 26-35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the teachings of Ghias in view of McNab. Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the teachings of Ghias in view of McNab and Lui. Claims 13-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the teachings of Ghias in view of Lui. Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 4 II. ISSUE The issue is whether Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in determining that the combination of Ghias and McNab teaches and/or would have suggested “generating a difference sequence for each of a plurality of songs in the song database by determining relative difference values between adjacent notes of the corresponding song” (claim 1). III. FINDINGS OF FACT The following Findings of Fact (FF) are shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Appellant’s Invention 1. In Appellant’s invention, the desired song is found if the difference argument for the note sequence corresponds to a portion of the difference sequence for the desired song (Spec. 4, ll. 9-11). 2. A “difference sequence” may be applied to relative changes in note duration (rhythm) as well as frequency (Spec. 5, ll. 13-16). Ghias 3. Ghias discloses using approximate pattern matching, wherein the sequence of relative differences in pitch between successive notes can be used to discriminate between melodies (Ghias 1, right column). 4. Relations between pitches (‘U’, ‘D’, and ‘S’) represent situations where a note is above, below or the same as the previous note (id.). Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 5 McNab 5. McNab discloses retrieving and displaying melodies containing a sequence of notes sung by a user, wherein the music databases are searched and items are retrieved in which a given theme or sequence of notes occurs (McNab 11, right column). 6. The frequency of each note is identified and each note is labeled with a musical pitch name and rhythmic value (id. at 12, right column). 7. By regarding a melody as a sequence of notes, each with an associated pitch and rhythm, a distance metric between notes can be constructed by defining the distance between two pitches, and between two rhythms (id. at 14, right column). 8. Scale degrees (do=1, re=2, and so forth) are used to allow melodies in minor keys to be mapped to ones in major keys (id.) IV. PRINCIPLES OF LAW "[T]he PTO gives claims their 'broadest reasonable interpretation.'" In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). "Moreover, limitations are not to be read into the claims from the specification." In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). Our reviewing court has repeatedly warned against confining the claims to specific embodiments described in the specification. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 6 One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The Supreme Court emphasized “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art,” and discussed circumstances in which a patent might be determined to be obvious. Id. at 415 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966)). The Court reaffirmed principles based on its precedent that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” Id. at 416. We must determine whether or not the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406. Obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid formula, and we will consider the facts of a case and the common sense of those skilled in the art. Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007). That is, the test for obviousness is rather Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 7 what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir. 1991). V. ANALYSIS Claims 1, 2, and 12 Though Appellant admits that “McNab discloses ‘A distance metric between notes can be constructed by defining the distance between two pitches and between two rhythms’” (App. Br. 6), Appellant argues that “McNab does not specifically teach whether the distance is constructed between two successive notes of the same melody or not” (id). Appellant then contends that, “after studying both the cited references Wagner and Fisher, and Lowrance and Wagner [referenced by McNab], it is understood that the distance metric is constructed… between two different strings of notes” (id.). However, the Examiner responds that “McNab describes quantizing pitches by the twelve semitones of an octave” (Ans. 14), and thus, “the pitch ratios or musical intervals taught in McNab are clearly between notes of the same string” (id.). By arguing that McNab does not teach a distance constructed between two successive notes (App. Br. 6), Appellant appears to be arguing that McNab alone fails to disclose or suggest the claim limitations. However, the Examiner has rejected the claims based on the combination of Ghias and Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 8 McNab, and nonobviousness cannot be shown by attacking the references individually. See In re Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097. Thus, the issue we address on appeal is whether the combination of Ghias and McNab teaches and/or would have suggested “generating a difference sequence for each of a plurality of songs in the song database by determining relative difference values between adjacent notes of the corresponding song,” as claimed in claim 1. Ghias discloses using approximate pattern matching, wherein the sequence of relative differences in pitch between successive notes can be used to discriminate between melodies (FF 3). An artisan would have understood such a step of discriminating between melodies using differences in pitch between successive notes to be a step of “determining relative difference values between adjacent notes” (claim 1). Furthermore, McNab discloses searching music databases and retrieving items in which a sequence of notes occurs (FF 5). In particular, the frequency of each note is identified (FF 6), and by regarding a melody as a sequence of notes, each with an associated pitch and rhythm, a distance metric between notes can be constructed by defining the distance between two pitches, and between two rhythms (FF 7). As the Examiner finds, “McNab describes quantizing pitches by the twelve semitones of an octave” (Ans. 14). An artisan would have understood such defining the distance metric between notes in the sequence of notes to be a step of “determining relative difference values between adjacent notes” (claim 1). Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 9 Thus, we find an artisan would have understood Ghias in view of McNab would teach or at least suggest “generating a difference sequence for each of a plurality of songs in the song database by determining relative difference values between adjacent notes of the corresponding song” (claim 1). Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Because Appellant does not provide separate arguments with respect to claim 2 depending from claim 1, claim 2 falls with claim 1. Claim 12 depends from claim 1 and is rejected by the Examiner for similar reasons. Appellant does not provide arguments for claim 12. Thus, we conclude that the Appellant also has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 3-5 As to claims 3-5, Appellant argues that “Ghias et al. fails to teach every element as claimed” and that “there is no suggestion or motivation for modifying Ghias by incorporating the step of assigning scale index of the notes” (App. Br. 10). As to Appellant’s contention that Ghias does not disclose the claimed invention, Appellant appears to be repeating the argument that Ghias alone fails to disclose or suggest the claim limitations when the Examiner has rejected the claims based on the combination of Ghias and McNab. Ghias discloses assigning values to each note to determine the relationship between adjacent notes (FF 4). McNab discloses assigning Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 10 scale values to each note (FF 8). Appellant has presented no evidence that adding the teachings of McNab of assigning scale values to a note to the teachings of Ghias of assigning values to a note "was uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" (see Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162), nor has Appellant presented evidence that these "represented an unobvious step over the prior art" (id.). Rather, Appellant’s’ invention is simply an arrangement of the well-known teachings of using scale values with the well-known teaching of using assigned values to determine the relationship between adjacent notes. The combined teachings of the references represent merely a combination of familiar elements according to known methods and do no more than yield predictable results. See KSR, at 416. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 3-5 over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 6 As to claim 6, Appellant argues that “Applicant does not understand why the mere teaching of ‘conducting search on the basis of pitch ratio or musical interval [as taught by McNab]’ may be expanded as the teaching of subtracting the prescribed scale value of the precedent note from that of the subsequent note [as recited in claim 6]” (App. Br. 11). However, the Examiner interprets the subtracting step to be using an “exact difference in scale values to determine the difference value between adjacent notes” (Ans. Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 11 5), and that “[p]itch ratios and musical intervals [in the combined teachings] clearly imply differences in value between adjacent notes” (Ans. 15). Appellant provides no argument to dispute that the Examiner has correctly shown that this claimed limitation is taught and suggested in Ghias and McNab. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 6 over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 7-8 As to claims 7-8, Appellant argues that “Ghias teaches away from the teaching ‘when the input difference argument varies from the difference sequence for that song by a prescribed variance’” (App. Br. 11). However, the Examiner finds that “[t]he claimed variance prescribed by the user is met by the fact that Ghias takes into consideration inaccuracies caused by humming errors of each person” (Ans. 16). Appellant provides no argument to dispute that the Examiner has correctly shown that this claimed limitation is taught and suggested in Ghias and McNab. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 7-8 over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 9-11 As to claims 9-11, Appellant argues that Ghias does not teach “to ‘filter the string converted from the melody pre-stored in the database’” and Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 12 that “such filtering step is not performed prior to ‘determining a near match’” (App. Br. 12). However, the Examiner finds that Ghias discloses such teachings because Ghias “shows cutting down on irrelevant information” and thus, “clearly suggests filtering the input difference argument and the difference sequence prior to determining a near match” (Ans. 16). Appellant provides no argument to dispute that the Examiner has correctly shown that this claimed limitation is taught and suggested in Ghias and McNab. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 9-11 over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 22 As to claim 22, though Appellant admits that “McNab teaches ‘retrieve music, ranked by how closely it matches the input’… and “All exact-matching regimes require few notes,” Appellant argues that “Applicant cannot find any teaching [in McNab] that suggests performing a near match in the condition when no match is found” (App. Br. 12). However, the Examiner finds that “appellant seems to ignore the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art having both Ghias and McNab references as teaching” (Ans. 16), and that “[s]ince exact matching requires fewer notes as shown by Mcnab[sic], it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to perform a near match only when no exact match is found in order to save processing time” (id.). Appellant provides no argument to Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 13 dispute that the Examiner has correctly shown that this claimed limitation is suggested in Ghias and McNab. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 22 over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 23 and 24 As to claim 23, Appellant argues that “Claim 23… also includes the step of assigning the index values, the step of searching the difference sequence exactly matching the difference argument, the step of comparing the hit number of exact matches to a predetermined threshold number, and the step of performing a near search when the it number is smaller than the predetermined threshold number” (App. Br. 13). In particular, Appellant argues that “Ghias and McNab, individually or in combination, further fail to disclose the step of comparing the number of exact matches found in the search against a predetermined threshold” (id.). Though the Examiner responds with “[t]he examiner disagrees and maintains the rejection as discussed in the final office action” (Ans. 16), in the section relied by the Examiner in Ghias and McNab, there is no teaching of comparing the number of exact matches found in the search against a predetermined threshold. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 23 and claim 24 depending therefrom over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 14 Claim 26 As to claim 26, Appellant repeats that “McNab does not teach or suggest the pitch ratio or musical interval being the exact intervals between adjacent notes of the same melody” (App. Br. 14). As discussed above with respect to claim 1, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Ghias and McNab discloses and strongly suggests such claimed feature. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 26 and claims 27-29 depending therefrom over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 30-32 As to claim 30, Appellant argues that “McNab teaches transposing the input sequence… but not transposing the matching song” (App. Br. 15). However, the Examiner finds that “appellant seems to ignore the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art” (Ans. 17), and that “one of ordinary skill in the art certainly knows how to apply the transposition technique to either the input or the matching song depending on users applications” (id.). Appellant provides no argument to dispute that the Examiner has correctly shown that this claimed limitation is suggested in Ghias and McNab. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 30 and claims 31-32 falling therewith over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 15 Claims 33-35 As to claims 34-35, Appellant repeats that “McNab, as discussed above, did not disclose determining pitch ratio or musical interval between ‘successive notes’ of the same input sequence or the song” (App. Br. 15). As discussed above with respect to claims 1 and 2, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Ghias and McNab discloses and strongly suggests such claimed feature. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 34-35 over the combination of Ghias and Mcnab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 33 depends from claim 2 and is rejected by the Examiner for similar reasons. Appellant does not provide separate arguments for claim 33. Thus, we conclude that the Appellant also has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 33 over the combination of Ghias and McNab under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claim 25 As to claim 25, Appellants argue that “Ghias and McNab do not only fail to disclose the index value for each note includes a duration, but also fails to teach calculating a difference of durations” and that “nowhere does Lui teaches [sic] calculating the duration difference between successive notes” (App. Br. 16). Appellant appears to be repeating the argument of nonobviousness by attacking the references individually. Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 16 McNab discloses labeling each note with a rhythmic value (FF 6), wherein a distance metric between notes can be constructed by defining the distance between two rhythms (FF 7). An artisan would have understood such rhythm value for each note to be an index value which includes a duration, and would have understood such distance between two rhythms as the duration difference between successive notes. In fact, Appellant’s own specification defines “duration” as “rhythm” and describes “difference sequence” as “changes in note duration (rhythm)” (FF 1-2). However, as discussed above regarding claim 23 from which claim 25 depends, in the section relied by the Examiner in Ghias and McNab, there is no teaching of comparing the number of exact matches found in the search against a predetermined threshold as recited in claim 23. Lui also does not suggest such a teaching. Accordingly, we conclude that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 25 over the combination of Ghias, Mcnab and Lui under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 13-16 As to claims 13-16, Appellant argues that “[t]he Examiner, without any basis or support in the references, contended that Lui teaches the claimed element missing from Ghias” (App. Br. 18). However, the Examiner finds that “appellant again seems to ignore the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art” (Ans. 17), and that “Lui was cited merely to show that it is customary to take duration into consideration for sounds” (id.). Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 17 Appellant provides no argument to dispute that the Examiner has correctly shown that this claimed limitation is suggested in Ghias and Lui. In fact, Appellant has presented no evidence that adding the teachings of Lui to the teachings of Ghias "was uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" (see Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162), nor has Appellant presented evidence that these "represented an unobvious step over the prior art" (id.). Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 13-16 over the combination of Ghias and Lui under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). VI. CONCLUSION OF LAW (1) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that claims 1-12, 22, and 26-35 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the teachings of Ghias and McNab. (2) Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in finding that claims 23 and 24 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the teachings of Ghias and McNab. (3) Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in finding that claim 25 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the teachings of Ghias, McNab and Lui. Appeal 2009-005500 Application 10/637,377 18 (4) Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that claims 13-16 are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over the teachings of Ghias and Lui. (5) Claims 1-16, 22, and 26-35 are not patentable. VII. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1-16, 22, and 26-35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We reverse the Examiner’s rejections of claims 23-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED-IN-PART PEB Kit M. Stetina, Esq. STETINA BRUNDA GARRED & BRUCKER Suite 250 75 Enterprise Aliso Viejo, CA 92656 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation