Ex Parte Wild

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jun 30, 2009

10742996 (B.P.A.I. Jun. 30, 2009)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
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Ex parte ARTHUR WILD
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Appeal 2009-001,032
Application 10/742,996
Technology Center 2800
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Decided:1 July 1, 2009
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Before KENNETH W. HAIRSTON, JOSEPH F. RUGGIERO and
ROBERT E. NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil
action, as recited in 37 CFR § 1.304, begins to run from the decided date
shown on this page of the decision. The time period does not run from the
Mail Date (paper delivery) or Notification Date (electronic delivery).

Appeal 2009-001,032
Application 10/742,996

This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the final
rejection of claims 1-20.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of these claims.

INVENTION
The invention is directed to a shore power interface that accepts two
power sources. The power sources are electrically operated by two
contactors, wherein when one contactor is energized, the other is prevented
from being energized. See Spec. 1-2. Claim 1 is representative of the
invention and reproduced below:
1. A power circuit, comprising:
a first electrically-energizable contactor configured to
receive a first power input of 110-120 volts of alternating
current (VAC); and
a second electrically-energizable contactor configured to
receive a second power input of 220-240 VAC, the first and
second contactors being arranged such that when one of the first
and second contactors is energized by the corresponding power
input, the energized one of the first and second contactors
prevents the other one of the first and second contactors from
being energized, wherein the circuit is configured to distinguish
the type of power input.

2 Appellant cancelled claims 21-22 in an Amendment After Final, filed
January 18, 2007. Claim 23 has been indicated as containing allowable
subject matter.
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REFERENCES
Wood US 3,531,686 Sep. 29, 1970

Romatzick US 5,245,219 Sep. 14, 1993

Thrap US 6,614,671 B2 Sep. 2, 2003
(filed Nov. 9, 2001)

REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
The Examiner rejected claims 1-4, 8, 10-13, and 17 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by Thrap. Ans. 3-5.
The Examiner rejected claims 5, 6, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Thrap in view of Wood. Ans. 5.
The Examiner rejected claims 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Thrap in view of Romatzick. Ans. 6-8.

ISSUES
Rejection of claims 1-4, 8, 10-13, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by Thrap

Claims 1, 2-4, and 8
Appellant argues on pages 10-13 of the Appeal Brief that the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2-4 and 8
is in error. Appellant argues that Thrap does not teach distinguishing the
type of power input to the circuit. App. Br. 11. Appellant also argues that
Thrap teaches sensing the voltage levels at the output of the rectifiers and
not the input. App. Br. 12. Finally, Appellant argues that Thrap does not
teach electrically isolating the contactors. App. Br. 13.

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Thus, with respect to claims 1, 2-4, and 8 Appellant’s contention
presents us with issues: (1) Has Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in
finding that Thrap distinguishes between the types of power input to the
circuit? (2) Has Appellant shown that the Examiner erred in finding that
Thrap teaches electrically isolating the contactors?

Claims 10, 11-13, and 17
Appellant argues on pages 13-14 of the Appeal Brief that the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 10 and dependent claims 11-13
and 17 is in error. Appellant’s arguments rely upon the same reasoning as
asserted with respect to claim 1.
Thus, with respect to claims 10, 11-13, and 17, Appellant’s
contentions present us with the same issues as claim 1.
Rejection of claims 5, 6, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Thrap in view of Wood

Appellant argues on page 14 of the Appeal Brief that the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 5, 6, 14, and 15 is in error. Appellant’s arguments rely
upon the same reasoning as asserted with respect to claims 1 and 10.
Thus, with respect to claims 5, 6, 14, and 15, Appellant’s contentions
present us with the same issues as claims 1 and 10.

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Rejection of claims 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Thrap in view of Romatzick

Claims 7, 9, and 16

Appellant argues on pages 14-15 of the Appeal Brief that the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 9, and 16 is in error. Appellant’s
arguments rely upon the same reasoning as asserted with respect to claims 1
and 10.
Thus, with respect to claims 7, 9, and 16, Appellant’s contentions
present us with the same issues as claims 1 and 10.

Claims 18 and 19-20
Appellant argues on pages 15-16 of the Appeal Brief that the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 18-20 is in error. Appellant’s arguments rely
upon the same reasoning as asserted with respect to claims 1 and 10.
Thus, with respect to claims 18-20, Appellant’s contentions present us
with the same issues as claims 1 and 10.

FINDINGS OF FACT (FF)
1. Thrap teaches a system with dual isolated power inputs. Col. 3, ll.
15-18 and Fig. 1.
2. The system contains a first supply and a second supply wherein the
output of the system is an input to a power supply. Col. 3, ll. 35-40
and Fig. 1.
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3. The first supply and the second supply are electrically isolated from
one another so that, at any given time, only one supply is providing
power. Col. 3, ll. 40-43 and 63-67 and Fig. 1.
4. The first supply comprises a first power input, a first supply
rectifier, a voltage detector, a first supply switch, a first switch
actuator, a second supply inhibitor, a first supply inhibit line, and a
first supply output line. Col. 3, ll. 44-48 and Figs. 1 and 2.
5. The second supply comprises a second power input, a second supply
rectifier, a voltage detector, a second supply switch, a second switch
actuator, a first supply inhibitor, a second supply inhibit line, and a
second supply output line. Col. 3, ll. 49-53 and Figs. 1 and 2.
6. The power inputs, which may be alternating current (A.C.) or direct
current (D.C.), are fed into their respective supply rectifiers. Col. 4,
ll. 1-4 and 17-20 and Figs. 1 and 2.
7. The voltages at the outputs of the rectifiers are input to the voltage
detectors. Col. 4, ll. 36-40 and Figs. 1 and 2.
8. Each of the voltage detectors determines if the supply’s rectified
voltage is within a predetermined voltage window. Based upon this
determination, for each supply the voltage detector sends a voltage
confirmation signal to the supply switch, which closes if a supply
inhibit signal is not received from the supply inhibitor of the other
supply. These voltage detectors, inhibitors, and switches operate to
provide power to the output from only one of the two supplies
which has a rectified voltage that is within the window. Col. 4, ll.
44-col. 5, l. 57 and Figs. 1 and 2.
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PRINCIPLES OF LAW

Office personnel must rely on Appellants’ disclosure to properly
determine the meaning of the terms used in the claims. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
“[I]nterpreting what is meant by a word in a claim is not to be confused with
adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which is
improper.” In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation, 301 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis in
original).

ANALYSIS
Rejection of claims 1-4, 8, 10-13, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being
anticipated by Thrap

Claims 1, 2-4, and 8
Appellant’s contentions have not persuaded us that the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 2-4, and 8 is in error. Independent claim 1 recites
“the first and second contactors being arranged such that when one of the
first and second contactors is energized by the corresponding power input,
the energized one of the first and second contactors prevents the other one of
the first and second contactors from being energized, wherein the circuit is
configured to distinguish the type of power input.” Appellant first argues
that Thrap does not teach distinguishing the type of power input. App. Br.
11. Appellant argues that the term “type of power input” refers to 110-120
VAC or 220-240 VAC. App. Br. 11-12. The Examiner interprets the term
“type of power input” to mean whether the power is within a threshold range
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(non-failed) or whether the power is not within a threshold range (failed).
Ans. 10. Appellant’s Specification does not provide a specific definition for
the term “type of power input.” The Specification merely gives examples of
commonly used voltages. Spec: 7. As such, we consider the Examiner’s
interpretation to be reasonable.
Thrap teaches a system with two power inputs, which can be
alternating current (A.C.) or direct current (D.C.). FF 1, 6. The rectified
voltages of the inputs are provided to voltage detectors which determine if
the rectified voltages are within a predetermined voltage window. FF 8.
Thus we find ample evidence to support the Examiner’s finding that Thrap
teaches determining whether a supply voltage is within a threshold, the
claimed “type of power.”
Further, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Thrap
does not teach distinguishing the type of power input because the voltages
are sensed by the voltage detectors after the power input goes through a
supply rectifier. App. Br. 12. While we agree that the outputs of the
rectifiers are measured, we do not agree that Thrap is not distinguishing the
type of power input. As the Examiner notes, claim 1 does not require that
the power input be measured where it is brought into contact with the power
circuit. Ans. 10. Instead, the claim only requires distinguishing the type of
power input. As discussed above, distinguishing the “type of power input”
includes determining whether the voltage is within the predetermined
voltage window. Thrap teaches determining whether the power input is
within the predetermined voltage window after it has passed through a
supply rectifier. FF 6 and 8.
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We are similarly not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Thrap
does not disclose two contactors where only one contactor is energized at a
time. App. Br. 13. As discussed above, the first supply and the second
supply are electrically isolated from one another so that, at any given time,
only one supply is providing power. FF 3. The only way one of the two
supply switches is closed, thereby allowing the supply output line to supply
a rectified output, is if there is an absence of a signal from the supply
inhibitor of the non-closing switch. FF 8. The Examiner has found, and the
Appellant does not dispute, that the supply switches are equivalent to the
claimed contactors. Ans. 7. Therefore, since the second supply switch
cannot be closed when the first supply switch is closed, and vice versa,
Thrap does teach that only one contactor is energized at a time and
Appellant’s argument is not found to be persuasive.
Thus, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner
erred in finding that Thrap teaches distinguishing between the type of power
that is input to the circuit, and that only one contactor can be energized at a
time. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 as well as its dependent claims 2-4 and 8. .
Claims 10, 11-13, and 17
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 10, 11-13, and 17. Claim 10 contains similar
limitations to claim 1 and claims 11-13 and 17 are dependent upon claim 10.
Appellant’s arguments present the same issues discussed with respect to
claim 1. App. Br. 14-15. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 10, 11-13, and 17 for the reasons discussed supra with respect to
claim 1.
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Rejection of claims 5, 6, 14, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Thrap in view of Wood

Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 5, 6, 14, and 15. Claims 5 and 6 are
dependent upon claim 1 and claims 14 and 15 are dependent upon claim 10.
Appellant’s arguments present the same issues discussed with respect to
claims 1 and 10. App. Br. 14. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 5, 6, 14, and 15 for the reasons discussed supra with
respect to claims 1 and 10.

Rejection of claims 7, 9, 16, 18, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Thrap in view of Romatzick

Claims 7, 9, and 16
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 9, and 16. Claims 7 and 9 are dependent
upon claim 1 and claim 16 is dependent upon claim 10. Appellant’s
arguments present the same issues discussed with respect to claims 1 and 10.
App. Br. 14-15. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7,
9, and 16 for the reasons discussed supra with respect to claims 1 and 10.

Claims 18-20
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 18-20. Claim 18 contains similar limitations
to claims 1 and 10 and claims 19 and 20 are dependent upon claim 18.
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Appellant’s arguments present the same issues discussed with respect to
claims 1 and 10. App. Br. 14-15. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 18-20 for the reasons discussed supra with respect to
claims 1 and 10.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that Thrap
distinguishes between the types of power input to the circuit.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in finding that Thrap
teaches electrically isolating the contactors.

SUMMARY
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-20 is affirmed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection
with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

ELD

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