Ex Parte Wihardja et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 28, 201612712108 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 28, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 121712,108 02/24/2010 27683 7590 06/30/2016 HA YNES AND BOONE, LLP IP Section 2323 Victory A venue Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75219 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR James Walter Wihardja UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 70548.24US01 2012 EXAMINER LAO,LUNSEE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2655 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/30/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): ipdocketing@haynesboone.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ExparteJAMES WALTER WIHARDJA, HARRYK. LAU, TRAUSTI THORMUNDSSON, and Y AIR KERNER Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 Technology Center 2600 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, TERRENCE W. McMILLIN, and KAMRAN JIVANI, Administrative Patent Judges. JIV ANI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's non-final decisions rejecting claims 1-21, which are all the claims pending in the present patent application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 Appellants identify Conexant Systems, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The present application relates to reducing distortion caused by speakers. Spec. i-f 2. Claim 1 is illustrative (disputed limitations emphasized): 1. A playback system comprising: an equalizer configured to selectively attenuate a vulnerable frequency band in an input audio signal; and a control module operable to adjust the attenuation of the equalizer when a signal intensity of the vulnerable frequency band in the input audio signal exceeds a predetermined distortion power threshold associated with the vulnerable frequency band. The Rejections 1. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. 2. Claims 1and9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Avayu (WO 2007 /07 6299 A2; July 5, 2007). 3. Claims 1, 5-9, and 12-15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Bayley (US 2006/0147049 Al; July 6, 2006). 4. Claim 16 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Shioda (JP 2007243804 A; Sept. 20, 2007). 5. Claims 2, 10, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bayley and Jaffe (US 4,061,876; Dec. 6, 1977). 6. Claims 3 and 4 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bayley and Yoshino (US 2004/0071299 Al; Apr. 15, 2004). 2 Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 7. Claims 16, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Shioda and Prakash (US 6,405,227 Bl; June 11, 2002). 8. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Bayley and Christoph (US 2008/0285775 Al; Nov. 20, 2008). 9. Claims 17 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Prakash, Shioda, and Bayley. ANALYSIS Rejection 1: Written Description Claims 16 recites in relevant part, "A playback system comprising: ... a control module operable to adjust the attenuation of the equalizer based on ... configuration parameters, and without receiving a signal from a microphone." The Examiner rejects claim 16 as failing to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Non-Final Act. 3. More particularly, the Examiner finds, "the specification does not clearly disclose the 'without receiving a signal from a microphone' (such as without receiving a[n] input signal from a microphone or without receiving a feedback signal from a microphone)." Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellants contend paragraphs 32 and 44 of the corresponding published patent application US 2010/0215193 Al, published on August 26, 2010, disclose the disputed claim limitation. We agree with the Examiner. We find Appellants' cited support does not identify a description of "a reason to exclude the relevant limitation." Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Negative claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes a reason to exclude the relevant limitation. Such 3 Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 written description support need not rise to the level of disclaimer. In fact, it is possible for the patentee to support both the inclusion and exclusion of the same material."). See also MPEP 2173.05(i) ("Any negative limitation or exclusionary proviso must have basis in the original disclosure . . . . The mere absence of a positive recitation is not basis for an exclusion."). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C § 112, first paragraph rejection for failing to comply with the written description requirement. Rejection 2: Anticipation over Avayu The Examiner rejects claim 1 as anticipated by Avayu. Non-Final Act. 4. Appellants contend, inter alia, Avayu fails to anticipate claim 1 because Avayu applies a gain to an entire input signal, rather than selectively attenuating a vulnerable frequency band in such an input signal, as claimed. App. Br. 6. The Examiner fails to respond to this argument. See generally, Ans. 3-1 7. A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference. Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil. Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The elements must be arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an ipsissimis verb is test, i.e., identity of terminology is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, on the record before us, we do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by Avayu. The Examiner rejects claim 9 as anticipated by Avayu. Non-Final Act. 4. Appellants contend, inter alia, Avayu fails to anticipate claim 9 because Avayu applies a gain to an entire input signal, rather than selectively attenuating a vulnerable frequency band in such an input signal, as claimed. 4 Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 App. Br. 6. The Examiner fails to respond to this argument. See generally, Ans. 3-1 7. A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claims is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference, and arranged as required by the claim. Verdegaal Bros., 814 F .2d at 631; Bond, 910 F .2d at 832. Accordingly, on the record before us, we do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection of claim 9 as anticipated by A vayu. Rejection 3: Anticipation over Bayley As alternative grounds from those discussed above, the Examiner rejects claim 1 as anticipated by Bayley. Non-Final Act. 4--5. Appellants "object to the use of multiple references to reject" claim 1. App. Br. 7. Appellants' objection is of no moment. The Examiner does not improperly combine multiple references in a single anticipation rejection, but rather separately rejects claim 1 first as fully-disclosed and thus anticipated by Avayu, and second as fully-disclosed and thus anticipated by Bayley. Non- Final Act. 4--5. Finding that multiple prior art references each contain an anticipatory disclosure of a single claim is not Examiner error. Appellants further contend the Examiner errs because in Bayley, "if a sound would 'startle' a listener, it is modified, regardless of whether the sound would cause distortion, and a distorted sound that does not 'startle' a listener would not be modified." App. Br. 8. Appellants elaborate, The Examiner's construction of the term startle as being a sudden noise or sharp movement is thus different from the definition for distortion that would be understood by one of ordinary skill, because a sudden noise is not an undesired change in a waveform, and because an undesired change in a waveform might be something other than a sudden noise. 5 Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 Reply Br. 2. Finally, Appellants contend, "there is no predetermined distortion power threshold associated with a vulnerable frequency band disclosed in Bayley, as shown in the figures of Bayley, because the amount of SPL increase in the various graphs could theoretically be infinite, assuming that it does not cross the 'startle' threshold." Reply Br. 3. See Verdegaal Bros., 814 F.2d at 631; Bond, 910 F.2d at 832. We agree with Appellants. The Examiner fails in the record before to identify with particularity Bayley's precise disclosure of a "predetermined distortion power threshold associated with a vulnerable frequency band," as claimed. 2 Further, we agree with Appellants that, contrary to the Examiner's findings (Ans. 5), the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed "distortion" does not necessarily encompass the "startle" described in Bayley. Although we agree with the Examiner the two terms may be correlated (i.e., sound distortion may startle the listener), we conclude the claim term "distortion" does not necessarily read on Bayley's "startle" sound (e.g., Fig. 9), because we find a sufficiently loud but undistorted sound would also startle a listener in Bayley.3 Thus, we find a high sound pressure level (SPL) sound in Bayley (e.g., Fig. 9) that "startles" is not inherently a distorted sound that "exceeds a predetermined distortion power 2 Appellants' Specification defines (1-2): "For the purposes of this disclosure, the distortion power threshold for a given frequency band is the amount of power in the given frequency band the speaker can tolerate before the distortion becomes unacceptable for a particular audio application." 3 "Inherency . . . may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient." In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, (Fed. Cir. 1999). 6 Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 threshold associated with the vulnerable frequency band," as claimed (Claim 1; see similar language claim 9). See n.3 supra. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejections of independent claims 1 and 9, nor associated dependent claims 5- 8 and 12-15, also rejected under §102 over Bayley. Rejection 4: Anticipation over Shioda The Examiner rejects claim 16 as anticipated by Shioda. Non-Final Act. 4. Appellants contend, inter alia, Shioda recites the presence of a microphone and thus fails to disclosure the claimed system including "a control module operable ... without receiving a signal from a microphone." We agree with Appellants that the embodiment of Shioda cited by the Examiner discloses a system including the receipt of signals from a microphone. Shioda, i-f 17. Thus the system of Shioda is not "arranged as in the claim under review." Bond, 910 F.2d at 832. Accordingly, on the record before us, we do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection of claim 16 as rejected by Shioda. Rejections 5-9: Obviousness Because the Examiner has not shown the additional cited secondary references overcome the aforementioned deficiencies regarding the base Bayley and Shioda references relied on to (separately) show anticipation of the aforementioned independent claims, we do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of the remaining dependent claims on appeal. . 7 Appeal2014-007080 Application 12/712, 108 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claim 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement. . We reverse the Examiner's decisions rejecting claims 1, 5-9, and 12- 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 102. We reverse the Examiner's decisions rejecting claims 2--4, 10, 11, and 16-21under35 U.S.C. § 103. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation