Ex Parte Wegner et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 8, 2017

13623862 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 8, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/623,862 09/20/2012 Goetz-Philipp Wegner 83255373;67186-013PUS1 1019
46442 7590 09/12/2017
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
FLUHART, STACEY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3655
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/12/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GOETZ-PHILIPP WEGNER, URS CHRISTEN,
RAINER BUSCH, and FREDERIC STEFAN
(Applicant: Ford Global Technologies LLC)
Appeal 2017-004501
Application 13/623,8621
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, LARRY J. HUME, and JOYCE CRAIG,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HUME, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, and 19-23, which are all pending
claims in the application. Appellants canceled claims 6, 12, and 18 in an
amendment filed October 16, 2015. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2017-004501
Application 13/623,862
STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
The Invention
Appellants' disclosed embodiments and claimed invention "relate[] to
a method and a device for automatically activating or deactivating a coasting
operating mode in a motor vehicle with an internal combustion engine as a
function of propulsion requests or braking requests of a driver of the motor
vehicle. Spec. ^ 2 ("Technical Field").
Exemplary Claims
Claims 1,3,7, and 20, reproduced below, are representative of the
subject matter on appeal (emphases added to contested limitations):
1. A method for automatically deactivating a coasting
operating mode in a motor vehicle with an internal combustion
engine, comprising:
deactivating a coasting operating mode if a current
vehicle speed exceeds a threshold value;
wherein the threshold value is set as a sum of a minimum
vehicle speed and a maximum permissible increase in speed.
3. [2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein
the minimum vehicle speed is defined as a minimum vehicle
speed measured in a time interval directly preceding
deactivation of the coasting operating mode.] The method as
claimed in claim 2, wherein the time interval is a time interval
2 Our Decision relies upon Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
July 11, 2016); Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Jan. 17, 2017); Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed Nov. 17, 2016); Final Office Action ("Final Act.,"
mailed Feb. 1, 2016); and the original Specification ("Spec.," filed
Sept. 20, 2012).
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Application 13/623,862
equal to an entire duration of the coasting operating mode
activation.
7. A device for automatically deactivating a coasting
operating mode in a motor vehicle with an internal combustion
engine (ICE) as a function of propulsion requests or braking
requests of a driver of the motor vehicle, wherein the device is
designed to deactivate a coasting operating mode if a vehicle
speed exceeds a threshold value;
wherein the threshold value is set as the sum of a
minimum vehicle speed and a maximum permissible increase in
speed, and the maximum permissible increase in speed is a non-
fixed value dependent on a current vehicle speed.
20. The method of claim 1, comprising:
setting a coasting prohibition marker for temporarily
preventing operation in the coasting operating mode.
Prior Art
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Ohkumo et al. ("Ohkumo") US 4,911,275 Mar. 27, 1990
Stempnik et al. ("Stempnik") US 2009/0234534 Al Sept. 17, 2009
Taguchi ("Taguchi Translation") US 2013/0013164 Al Jan. 10, 2013
Taguchi WO 2011/101949 Al Aug. 25, 2011
Rejections on Appeal
Rl. Claims 1-3, 5, 19, and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ohkumo. Final Act. 2; see also
Ans. 2.
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R2. Claim 4 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of Ohkumo and Taguchi. Final
Act. 5; see also Ans. 2.
R3. Claims 7-11, 13-15, 17, and 21-23 stand rejected under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of
Ohkumo and Stempnik. Final Act. 6; see also Ans. 2.
R4. Claims 10 and 16 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Ohkumo, Stempnik,
and Taguchi. Final Act. 12; see also Ans. 2.
CLAIM GROUPING
Based on Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 3-7), we decide the appeal
of anticipation Rejection R1 of claims 1, 2, 5, and 19 on the basis of
representative claim 1; and we decide the appeal of anticipation Rejection
R1 of each of separately argued claims 3 and 20, infra. We decide the
appeal of obviousness Rejection R3 of claims 7-11, 13-15, 17, and 21-23
on the basis of representative claim 7.
Remaining claims 4, 10, and 16 in Rejections R2 and R4, not argued
separately or with specificity, stand or fall with the respective independent
claim from which they depend.3
3 "Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of
appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together
shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the
patentability of any grouped claim separately." 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In addition, when Appellants do not separately argue the patentability of
dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they
depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all
arguments actually made by Appellants. We do not consider arguments
Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs, and we
deem any such arguments waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
We agree with particular arguments advanced by Appellants with
respect to claim 20 for the specific reasons discussed below. However, we
disagree with Appellants' arguments with respect to claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-
17, 19, and 21-23 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference
herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the reasons
and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants'
arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments
regarding claims 1,3,7, and 20 for emphasis as follows.
1. $ 102(b) Rejection R1 of Claims E 2, 5, and 19
Issue 1
Appellants argue (App. Br. 3—4; Reply Br. 2) the Examiner's rejection
of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ohkumo is in
error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses a method
for automatically deactivating a coasting operating mode in a motor vehicle
with an internal combustion engine wherein, inter alia, "[a] threshold value
is set as a sum of a minimum vehicle speed and a maximum permissible
increase in speed," as recited in claim 1?
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Analysis
Appellants contend:
The present speed Va of Ohkumo is not compared with a
minimum speed that is summed with a maximum permissible
increase in speed. Instead, an increment AV of vehicle speed is
first compared to a predetermined increment value AVS. The
present speed Va is then compared to a predetermined vehicle
speed Vs only if the speed increment AV has already been
determined to exceed the predetermined increment value AVS.
See, e.g., Figure 5 and column 4, lines 29-64.
Thus, to summarize the teachings of Ohkumo, the system
compares a vehicle speed increment AV with a predetermined
vehicle speed increment AVS and then separately compares a
present vehicle speed Va with a predetermined vehicle speed
AVS. The present vehicle speed Va, however, is never compared
with any "sum" of other speed values. Stated another way,
Ohkumo does not analyze a current vehicle speed to see if it
exceeds a minimum vehicle speed summed with a maximum
permissible increase in speed. The speed comparisons of
Ohkumo are thus fundamentally different from the claimed
method, and none of the claims are anticipated.
.... Appellant agrees that Va of Ohkumo is the current
vehicle speed; however, Ohkumo does not provide any support
for interpreting the threshold value as "Vc+deltaVs." The sum
of the value Vc, which is referred to as an acceleration start
speed, and the value delta Vs, which is referred to as the
predetermined vehicle speed increment value, is not compared
to the current vehicle speed Va in the Ohkumo method. In fact,
Ohkumo never once discusses summing the values Vc and delta
Vs together. There is simply no support for the manner in
which Ohkumo has been applied against the claims.
App. Br. 3—4 (emphasis omitted).
In response, the Examiner finds, and we agree, Figure 5 of Ohkumo
discloses the claimed comparison, albeit using different terminology for the
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variables and differently arranged equations, and also finds, "mathematically
Ohkumo compares the same values as the present invention." Ans. 3.
The Examiner provides a detailed mapping and analysis of the
claimed and contested comparison to Ohkumo's disclosure (see Fig. 5,
steps 4 and 5) in the Answer (4-5), which we adopt as our own and
incorporate herein by reference.4
In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue "the Ohkumo method does not
deactivate the coasting operating mode if a current vehicle speed exceeds a
sum of a minimum vehicle speed and a maximum permissible increase in
speed." Reply Br. 2. Appellants further allege:
[I]n rearranging the various equations of Ohkumo, the
Examiner assumes that the Vc value of Ohkumo is a "minimum
vehicle speed." However, the disclosure of Ohkumo teaches
otherwise. The value Vc is defined as the speed at which the
vehicle begins to accelerate. See column 4, lines 37-57. This
value is different from a "minimum vehicle speed," which is
defined in paragraph [00031] of the subject application as the
lowest vehicle speed measured during the coasting operating
mode. The speed at which the vehicle begins to accelerate is not
the same as the lowest vehicle speed measured during the
coasting operating mode. For at least these reasons, Appellant
continues to assert that the claims are not anticipated.
Id. (emphasis added).
4 The Examiner finds,
On pages 3—4 of the Appeal Brief, Applicant correctly describes
the mathematical comparison of Ohkumo as it is described in
FIG. 5. However, since step 4 of Ohkumo is written as a
subtraction, Applicant does not recognize that the comparison
performed in Ohkumo is a comparison of a sum of two
variables. This is in error for the reasons described below.
Ans. 3.
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The portion of Appellants' Specification relied upon by Appellants as
providing a definition of "minimum vehicle speed," reads as follows:
What has been stated above means that an activated
coasting operating mode is deactivated if the current vehicle
speed exceeds a threshold value which is set as the sum of a
minimum vehicle speed and a maximum permissible increase in
speed, the minimum vehicle speed is the lowest vehicle speed
measured during the coasting operating mode.
Spec. ^ 31 (emphasis added).
Even if we accept the above quoted definition of "minimum vehicle
speed," we disagree with Appellants' contentions alleging that the recited
"minimum vehicle speed" (during the coasting operating mode) does not
read on Ohkumo's disclosed Vc. In particular, as cited by the Examiner, we
note Ohkumo discloses:
Describing the operation of the system with reference to
FIG. 5, the program is repeated at regular intervals. At a step
S1, it is detected whether the accelerator pedal is released. If it
is detected at the step S1 that the accelerator pedal is depressed,
the present speed Va is set as an acceleration start vehicle speed
Vc at a step S8 for the next cycle of the program and the
decision of the downhill acceleration state is cancelled if any at
step S9. If the accelerator pedal is released, a present vehicle
speed Va and a vehicle speed Vb at the last program are
compared with each other at a step S2. When the present vehicle
speed Va is lower than the previous speed Vb, the present speed
Va is set as acceleration start vehicle speed Vc at a step S3 for
the next cycle of the program. When the present speed Va is
higher, the program directly advances to a step S4, where the
increment AV of vehicle speeds is calculated from the formula
AV=Va - Vc (Vc is the acceleration start vehicle [speed] set at
the last cycle of the program). At a step S5, the increment AV is
compared with the predetermined value AVs. If AV is larger
than the AVs, the present vehicle speed Va is compared with
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the predetermined speed Vs. When the present speed is higher
(Va ^Vs), it is determined that the vehicle is in the downhill
acceleration state at a step S7. Thus, the clutch is locked up, so
that the engine braking is effected. At a step S10, the present
vehicle speed Va is set as the last vehicle speed Vb for the next
cycle of the program.
Ohkumo col. 4,11. 37-64 (emphasis added).
Thus, we agree with the Examiner and find the recited "minimum
vehicle speed" (claim 1) broadly but reasonably reads on Ohkumo's lowest
vehicle speed measured during the last cycle of the program, i.e., Vc.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the disclosure of the cited
prior art to disclose the disputed limitation of claim 1, nor do we find error
in the Examiner's resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's anticipation rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped
claims 2, 5, and 19 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
2. $ 102(b) Rejection R1 of Claim 3
Issue 2
Appellants argue (App. Br. 4; Reply Br. 2-3) the Examiner's rejection
of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ohkumo is in
error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses the
method of claim 2, "wherein the time interval is a time interval equal to an
entire duration of the coasting operating mode activation," as recited in
claim 3?
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Analysis
Appellants contend:
The Examiner cites to Figure 5 of Ohkumo as allegedly
teaching these features. But these features are not shown by
Figure 5, which contemplates situations in which the
accelerator pedal is not released and thus the vehicle is not
coasting. See, for example, Steps SI, S8 and S9 of Figure 5.
Thus, for at least these additional reasons, claim 3 is not
anticipated.
App. Br. 4 (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner finds, and we agree,
As explained in the final Office Action . . . the minimum
speed is Vc. The minimum speed is measured during the
previous iteration of steps S2-S7 as is shown in FIG. 5. This
time period is during coasting. The path the Applicant
describes, steps SI, S8, and S9, does not occur at the same time
as the claimed method, but instead constitutes an alternative
path. The claimed time period occurs while the method of
Ohkumo is being performed prior to the deactivation of the
coasting operating mode at step S8, as noted in the rejection of
claim 2 from which claim 3 depends.
Ans. 6.
We agree with the Examiner because the claimed time period is the
time period covering the entire duration of the coasting operating mode
activation, and this is the same time period disclosed by Ohkumo, i.e., the
time period prior to Ohkumo's deactivation of the coasting mode at steps S8
and S9. See Ohkumo Fig. 5.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the disclosure of the cited
prior art to disclose the disputed limitation of claim 3, nor do we find error
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in the Examiner's resulting finding of anticipation. Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner's anticipation rejection of dependent claim 3.
3. $ 102(b) Rejection R1 of Claim 20
Issue 3
Appellants argue (App. Br. 5; Reply Br. 3) the Examiner's rejection of
claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Ohkumo is in
error. These contentions present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art discloses the
method of claim 1, that includes the step of "setting a coasting prohibition
marker for temporarily preventing operation in the coasting operating
mode," as recited in claim 20?
Analysis
Appellants contend the Examiner's reliance upon Ohkumo's signals
asserted as being provided by sections 27, 35, 36, and 37 as markers that are
set to prohibit coasting is in error because none of the cited signals are
"coasting prohibition" markers. App. Br. 5.
The Examiner responds by finding:
[T]he outputs of all of 35, 36, and 27 are sent to the output
deciding section 33 in order to control the clutch according to
the operating mode (see e.g., column 3, lines 57-63). These
signals are used when after step 1 in FIG. 5 is determined to be
"no" the coasting is revoked at step S9. Thus, these signals
prevent operation of the coasting mode by revoking the
coasting mode.
Ans. 6.
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We disagree with the Examiner's finding that Ohkumo discloses the
recited "coasting prohibition marker." Final Act. 4-5; see also Ans. 6.
We disagree because we find the Examiner's mapping is not sufficient
to establish anticipation.5 We first note element 27 is an accelerator pedal
(see Ohkumo col. 2,11. 67-68) and, lacking any pinpoint citation to Ohkumo
or analysis by the Examiner, we would necessarily be required to resort to
speculation as to how Ohkumo's discussion of "accelerator pedal 27," "start
mode providing section 35," "drag mode providing section 36," and "lock-up
engage mode providing section 37" disclose the contested "coasting
prohibition marker" limitation of claim 20.6
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, and for
essentially the same reasons argued by Appellants, we are persuaded of at
5 Anticipation of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102 occurs when each claimed
element and the claimed arrangement or combination of those elements is
disclosed, inherently or expressly, by a single prior art reference.
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2010). The Examiner merely cites to "[t]he signals by section 37, 35, 36,
and 27 are the markers which are set" (Final Act. 5), without reference to
any drawing figure or any specific discussion in Ohkumo.
6 We are left to speculate as to how the contested claim limitation of
claim 20 is disclosed by Ohkumo. Such conjecture on our part as to how
Ohkumo is applied in the rejection would impermissibly require us to resort
to speculation, unfounded assumptions, or hindsight reconstruction. See In
re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017 (CCPA 1967). "The review authorized by
35 U.S.C. Section 134 is not a process whereby the examiner . . . invite[s]
the [Bjoard to examine the application and resolve patentability in the first
instance." Ex parte Braeken, 54 USPQ2d 1110, 1112 (BPAI 1999). We
decline to engage in such speculation, unfounded assumptions, or hindsight
reconstruction to make up for the deficiency in the Examiner's anticipation
rejection which fails to set forth a prima facie case for claim 20 pursuant to
the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132.
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least one error in the Examiner's reliance on the cited prior art to disclose the
disputed limitation of claim 20, such that we do not sustain the Examiner's
finding of anticipation.
4. $ 103(a) Rejection R3 of Claims 7-11, 13-15, 17, and 21-23
Issue 4
Appellants argue (App. Br. 5-6; Reply Br. 3—4) the Examiner's
rejection of claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the
combination of Ohkumo and Stempnik is in error. These contentions
present us with the following issue:
Did the Examiner err in finding the cited prior art combination teaches
or suggests:
A device for automatically deactivating a coasting
operating mode in a motor vehicle with an internal combustion
engine (ICE) as a function of propulsion requests or braking
requests of a driver of the motor vehicle, wherein the device is
designed to deactivate a coasting operating mode if a vehicle
speed exceeds a threshold value;
wherein the threshold value is set as the sum of a
minimum vehicle speed and a maximum permissible increase in
speed, and the maximum permissible increase in speed is a non-
fixed value dependent on a current vehicle speed[J
as recited in claim 7 (emphasis added)?
Analysis
Similar to Rejection R1 of claim 1, Appellants contend "Ohkumo fails
to teach or suggest deactivating a coasting operating mode if a vehicle speed
exceeds a threshold value which is 'set as the sum of a minimum vehicle
speed and a maximum permissible increase in speed.'" App. Br. 5. Further,
Appellants allege "[t]he teachings of Stempnik; however, have nothing to do
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with establishing a threshold value set as the sum of a minimum vehicle
speed and a maximum permissible increase in speed for determining when to
deactivate a coasting operating mode of a vehicle." (Emphasis omitted).
App. Br. 6. Appellants also contend the Examiner has failed to provide a
rational underpinning for combining Ohkumo and Stempnik as required by
KSR.7 App. Br. 6.
We find Appellants' argument is not persuasive of Examiner error
because it is not responsive to the rejection as articulated by the Examiner.
Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually
where, as here, the ground of unpatentability is based upon the teachings of a
combination of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
Here, as with Rejection R1 of claim 1 in Issue 1, supra, the Examiner
relies on Ohkumo for teaching "the threshold value is set as the sum of a
minimum vehicle speed and a maximum permissible increase in speed"
(Final Act. 6, (citing Ohkumo Abstract, col. 4,11. 22-64)), and relies upon
Stempnik for teaching or suggesting "the maximum permissible increase in
speed is a non-fixed value dependent on a current vehicle speed." Final
Act. 7 (citing Stempnik ^ 54).8 Thus, we find the Examiner relies on the
combined teachings of, Ohkumo and Stempnik to teach the contested
limitations of claim 7.
7 KSRInt'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
8 "Stempnik was only relied upon for the setting of a vehicle increment
based on vehicle speed. Stempnik discloses using the prior vehicle speed
plus an increment, as in the primary reference Ohkumo, but for a different
method. Both Stempnik and Ohkumo use this increment to avoid drastic
increases during an iterative process." Ans. 7.
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As for Appellants' contention that the Examiner has not met the
burden under KSR, we disagree. We disagree because in KSR, the Court
stated "[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods
is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results."
KSR, 550 U.S. at 416.
When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it,
either in the same field or a different one. If a person of
ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103
likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique
has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar
devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless
its actual application is beyond his or her skill .... [A] court
must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable
use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.
Id. at 417.
Therefore, based upon the findings above, on this record, we are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner's reliance on the cited prior art
combination to teach or suggest the disputed limitation of claim 7, nor do we
find error in the Examiner's resulting legal conclusion of obviousness.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of independent
claim 7, and grouped claims 8-11, 13-15, 17, and 21-23 which fall
therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra.
5. Rejections R2 and R4 of Claims 4, 10, and 16
In view of the lack of any substantive or separate arguments directed
to obviousness Rejections R2 and R4 of claims 4, 10, and 16 under § 103(a)
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(see App. Br. 5 and 7), we sustain the Examiner's rejection of these claims.
Arguments not made are waived.9
REPLY BRIEF
To the extent Appellants may advance new arguments in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 2—4) not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in
the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised
in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the
Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37
C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellants have not shown.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) The Examiner did not err with respect to anticipation Rejection
R1 of claims 1-3, 5, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over the cited prior art
of record, and we sustain the rejection.
(2) The Examiner erred with respect to anticipation Rejection R1 of
claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over the cited prior art of record, and we
do not sustain the rejection.
(3) The Examiner did not err with respect to obviousness
Rejections R2 through R4 of claims 4, 7-11, 13-17, and 21-23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over the cited prior art combinations of record, and we
sustain the rejections.
9 Appellants merely argue these dependent claims are allowable by virtue of
their dependency on their parent independent claims. App. Br. 5, 7.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-17,
19, and 21-23, and we reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting claim 20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. §41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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