Ex Parte Wasson et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 31, 2014

11554001 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/554,001 10/28/2006 Ryan J. Wasson GP-308137-OST-ALS 4715
60770 7590 03/31/2014
General Motors Corporation
c/o REISING ETHINGTON P.C.
P.O. BOX 4390
TROY, MI 48099-4390
EXAMINER
CHAWAN, VIJAY B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2658
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/31/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte RYAN J. WASSON, JOHN P. WESS, and
JASON W. CLARK
________________

Appeal 2011-009728
Application 11/554,001
Technology Center 2600
________________

Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, DENISE M. POTHIER, and
JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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SUMMARY
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-20, all of which stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Kanevsky (US 6,442,519 B1; issued Aug. 27,
2002).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We review the appealed
rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellants, and in
light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Cf. Ex parte Frye,
94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential) (citing In re Oetiker,
977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
We affirm.
Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2007), we
designate this rejection as constituting new grounds.

CLAIMS 1-9
Independent claim 1 is representative of claims 1-91:
1. A speech recognition method comprising the steps of:
(a) receiving input speech from a user;
(b) processing said input speech to obtain at least one
parameter value; and
(c) determining an experience level of the user using the at
least one parameter value.

1 Appellants argue claims 1-9 together as a group. See App. Br. 6-10.
Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as representative. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(2012).
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Contentions
The Examiner concludes that Kanevsky discloses all of the limitations
of claim 1. Ans. 4 (citing, without further clarification, Kanevsky, col. 3, l.
62 – col. 4, l. 60). Appellants initially presented three arguments with
respect to claim 1. App. Br. 7-9. First, Appellants argued that “Kanevsky
does not disclose that Kanevsky’s user characteristics are obtained from
processing input speech from a user.” App. Br. 7. Second, Appellants
argued that “Kanevsky does not disclose that Kanevsky’s user characteristics
include an experience level of a user.” App. Br. 7-9. Third, Appellants
argued that even “assuming arguendo that an educational level is somehow
the same as an experience level, Kanevsky does not disclose that the
educational level is determined from or using at least one parameter value
from user input speech.” App. Br. 9.
In response, the Examiner clarifies that the user characteristics of
Kanevsky being relied upon are “user characteristics to determine user’s
pitch and accent parameters which are derived from user input speech.”
Ans. 8 (newly citing Kanevsky, Fig. 5, step 188; col. 7, l. 18 – col. 8, l. 64).
The Examiner clarifies that the claimed experience is interpreted as
corresponding to Kanevsky’s disclosure of an education level of the user
whose input speech is being processed. Ans. 8. The Examiner further
reasons that Kanevsky does disclose the educational level being determined
from or using at least one parameter value from user input speech because
“Kanevsky does use user characteristics to determine user’s pitch and accent
parameters which are derived from user input speech.” Id.
Subsequent to the Examiner setting forth the above rationales and
reasoning in the Response to Arguments section of the Examiner’s Answer,
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Appellants concede “Kanevsky discloses that acoustic features in a speaker’s
voice are identified.” Reply Br. 2. Appellants maintain, though, that
“Kanevsky does not further disclose that at least one parameter value of
those acoustic features is used to determine an experience level of a user.”
Id.
Analysis
Appellants do not dispute that Kanevsky discloses a speech
recognition method that receives speech from a user and then processes said
input speech to obtain at least one parameter value. See App. Br. 6-9; Reply
Br. 1-3. The only issue before us, then, is whether Kanevsky discloses the
final claim step of determining an experience level of the user using the at
least one parameter value. We therefore start our analysis by inquiring into
the meaning of the claim language, “determining an experience level of the
user using at least one parameter value.” “Before considering the rejections
. . ., we must first [determine the scope of] the claims . . . .” In re Geerdes,
491 F.2d 1260, 1262 (CCPA 1974).
Appellants seem to consider the claim term “experience level” to be
limited to corresponding to a user’s experience with using automatic speech
recognition software or applications:
For example, by way of background for the benefit of the
Board, Appellants have explained that an automatic speech
recognition system may provide user assistance to guide a user
when using the system. Automatic speech recognition
assistance can include user guidance to instruct users how to
use the system or provide prompts to remind users how to
complete commands. The assistance can range from simple
instructions for using a command to more sophisticated
interaction with the user. The user prompts can guide the user
on how to format commands (e.g. “say the complete phone
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number”) or provide the user with command options. Very
detailed user guidance can slow the user’s interaction with the
ASR while minimal user guidance may not provide sufficient
assistance to novice users. (See Appellants’ Specification,
¶ 0003) Also, Appellants have disclosed that the amount of
prompting required to guide a user can depend upon the user’s
experience with automatic speech recognition. (See
Appellants’ Specification, ¶ 0047) Moreover, Appellants have
disclosed that a user experience level may include novice,
normal, expert, and the like. (See Appellants’ Specification,
¶ 0054)
Therefore, although any given user may have a high level
of education generally, that same user may have a low or
nonexistent level of experience with automatic speech
recognition. In other words, an experience level of a user is
independent of the educational level of the user.
App. Br. 8. We find, though, that claim 1 does not limit the determining
step to determining the user’s level of experience using automated speech
recognition software. Rather, claim 1 merely recites, more broadly,
“determining an experience level.”
We further find that no objective standard is established for defining
what constitutes the act of “determining an experience level.” As noted
above, Appellants only assert that “a user experience level may include
novice, normal, expert, and the like.” App. Br. 8 (citing Spec. ¶ 54).
Paragraph 54 of Appellants’ Specification further indicates that “a number
of thresholds can be defined to classify the user’s experience level,” and that
the recited levels of novice, normal, and expert are merely non-limiting
examples of experience levels that may be designated. Spec. ¶ 54.
As such, the claim term “experience level” merely constitutes non-
functional descriptive material – the term is nothing more than a subjective
label or conclusion. That is, this descriptive term is given little patentable
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weight. “User experience level,” could be based on a classification scheme
for classifying any potential characteristic. The claimed “level” would read
on any chosen threshold within such a potential classification scheme. In
short, a broad, but reasonable, construction of the claim term “experience
level of the user” is not restricted to the examples in the disclosure and, so
long as the potential classification scheme for ascertaining the “experience
level of the user” incorporates at least one parameter value that was obtained
from processing input speech.
At least under this interpretation, the prior art reasonably maps to this
claim limitation. Kanevsky discloses that various acoustic features are
identified in the speaker’s voice. Kanevsky, col. 8, ll. 30-37. These acoustic
features include accent, vocal tract characteristics, voice source
characteristics, fundamental frequency, running average pitch, running pitch
variance, pitch jitter, running energy variance, speech rate, shimmer,
fundamental frequency, variation in fundamental frequency, and MEL
cepstra. Id.
Kanevsky also discloses that acoustic features collected from various
users are compared and common features are identified to identify similar
users (users having one or more common acoustic features). Kanevsky,
col. 8, ll. 37-44. “[U]ser clusters are identified to cluster users with one or
several common features, with several similar acoustic components or with
similar profile characteristics, thereby classifying such users in the same
classes. Additionally, thereafter, user characteristics are recorded, collected
and used for further use classification.” Kanevsky, col. 8, ll. 44-49.
For the reasons set forth above, we see no reason that would prevent
the recited “experience level” of claim 1 from reading on the users’ resultant
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cluster or classification designations, as recited in Kanevsky. Regardless of
whether the designations are experiences potentially associated with the
users’ interactions with Kanevsky’s speech recognition software or whether
they are experiences associated with some sort of the users’ life experiences
or characteristics, these cluster and classification designations reasonably
can be interpreted as constituting “experience levels.” Moreover, the cluster
and classification designations are based upon commonalities in the users’
measured vocal features – parameter values obtained from processing input
speech.
Accordingly, Appellants have not demonstrated that Kanevsky fails to
disclose the claim limitation of “determining an experience level of the user
using the at least one parameter value.” We therefore sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 1, as well as of claims 2-9, which were not
separately argued.

CLAIMS 10-20
Independent claim 10, which is narrower than claim 1 due to the
additional, final limitation of prompting the user, is illustrative of claims 10-
20:
10. A speech recognition method for a speech recognition
system comprising the steps of:
(a) receiving input speech from a user;
(b) processing said input speech to obtain at least one
parameter value;
(c) determining an experience level of the user using the at
least one parameter value; and
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(d) prompting the user based upon said determined
experience level to assist the user in delivering speech
commands to the system.
The only other remaining independent claim is system claim 20, which is
similar in scope to method claim 10.
Contentions
The Examiner concludes that Kanevsky discloses all of the limitations
of independent claims 10 and 20. Ans. 5, 7 (citing, without further
clarification, Kanevsky, col. 3, l. 62 – col. 4, l. 60; col. 7, l. 18 – col. 8, l.
64). In response, Appellants assert
the essence of [Kanevsky’s] subject matter relates to acoustic
models that are stored locally in local databases on user
computers and that are modified and passed across a network to
a global database on a speech recognition server, which in turn
distributes the modifications across the network to computers of
other clustered similar users. But Kanevsky does not disclose
anything about prompting one of those users based upon that
user’s experience level to assist that user in delivering speech
commands to a speech recognition system. Therefore, it is
unclear what, if anything, the cited portions of Kanevsky have
to do with the additional subject matter of claims 10 and 20.
App. Br. 9.
The Examiner then fails to respond to Appellants’ arguments. The
Response to Arguments section of the Examiner’s Answer makes no
mention of independent claims 10 and 20, whatsoever, much less include
any response to the above arguments or provide any further clarification or
insight into how the Examiner may be interpreting either the claim language
or Kanevsky’s disclosure. Ans. 8.
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Analysis
Kanevsky states in the Background of Invention section of the
Specification that “[t]he present invention is related to speech recognition”
and explains that “[a]utomatic speech recognition (ASR) systems for voice
dictation and the like use any of several well[-]known approaches to for [sic]
word recognition.” Kanevsky, col. 1, ll. 25-33 (emphasis added). Kanevsky
further states
as users issue commands, dictate letters, etc., a corresponding
local acoustic model on each corresponding user’s system, e.g.,
PDA 104, recognizes the particular user’s speech. If the user
corrects the results of the recognition, the corrections are stored
locally in a local database and used to adjust and refine the local
acoustic model.
Kanevsky, col. 6, ll. 16-23 (emphasis added).
Kanevsky’s references to voice dictation and the dictation of letters
indicates that the ASR’s resultant output may be in a printed or displayed
format (e.g., on a computer monitor or the like). Kanevsky’s disclosure that
the user is capable of reviewing and correcting these output results further
indicates that the resultant output reasonably can be interpreted as
constituting prompts for correction. That is, we find no reason that would
preclude the “prompting . . . to assist the user in delivering speech
commands to the system” of claim 10 from reading on such computer
displays or other outputs of draft text that a user can observe. Furthermore,
we have already explained in the preceding analysis of the claim 1 rejection
why the text displayed on the screen can be deemed to be a result of the
user’s determined experience level.
As such, Appellants have failed to demonstrate that Kanevsky does
not disclose all of the limitations of independent claim 10. Accordingly, we
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will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as claims 11-20
which were not separately argued.

CONCLUSIONS
Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1-20 under 35 U.S.C. §102.
Because the Examiner failed to adequately explain how Kanevsky
was being applied in the claim rejections, we conclude Appellants did not
have reasonable notice of the thrust of the rejection’s bases, as set forth in
the present Opinion. We therefore designate the rejection of claims 1-20 as
new grounds of rejection pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b).

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-20 is affirmed.
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). This regulation states that “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant
to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Furthermore, 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN
TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new grounds of
rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding
will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
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(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . .
In further regard to the affirmed rejection, 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1)
provides that “Appellant may file a single request for rehearing within two
months of the date of the original decision of the Board.”
Should Appellants elect to prosecute further before the Examiner
pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)(1), in order to preserve the right to seek
review under 35 U.S.C. §§ 141 or 145 with respect to the affirmed rejection,
the effective date of the affirmance is deferred until conclusion of the
prosecution before the Examiner unless, as a mere incident to the limited
prosecution, the affirmed rejection is overcome.
If Appellants elect prosecution before the Examiner and this does not
result in allowance of the application, abandonment, or a second appeal, this
case should be returned to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board for final action
on the affirmed rejection, including any timely request for rehearing thereof.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010).

AFFIRMED
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

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