Ex Parte Warren

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 13, 2018

13600299 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/600,299 08/31/2012 Eli Cole Warren PA0022759U;67097-1982PUS1 2447
54549 7590 02/15/2018
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS/PRATT & WHITNEY
400 West Maple Road
Suite 350
Birmingham, MI 48009
EXAMINER
GETACHEW, JULIAN B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3745
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/15/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ELI COLE WARREN
Appeal 2017-002850
Application 13/600,2991
Technology Center 3700
Before LINDA E. HORNER, LISA M. GUIJT, and BRENT M. DOUGAL,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HORNER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-9 and 14-21. Final Office Action
(February 25, 2016) (hereinafter “Final Act.”).2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
The claimed subject matter relates to tip clearance probes for turbine
engines. Gas turbine engines used in commercial aircraft include rotors and
1 Appellant identifies United Technologies Corporation as the real party in
interest. Appeal Brief 1 (July 18, 2016) (hereinafter “Appeal Br.”).
2 Claims 10-13 are in condition for allowance. Advisory Action 1-2 (May
17, 2016) (hereinafter “Adv. Act.”).
Appeal 2017-002850
Application 13/600,299
stators. To achieve desired performance, an optimal clearance between the
tips of the rotors and an outside diameter of a gas path must be maintained.
The gas turbine performance is validated by measuring the blade tip
clearance using one or more tip clearance probes.
The claims on appeal recite a sensor face located “on a first axial end”
of a tip clearance probe housing. The rejections of the claims are based on
finding that the prior art discloses a sensor face in the claimed location on
the probe housing. The Examiner based this finding on an unreasonably
broad interpretation of the claim term “axial end.” As such, we REVERSE.
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1 and 14 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter and is reproduced below.
1. A tip clearance probe comprising:
a housing defining an axis;
a sensor component retained within said housing;
a sensor face on a first axial end of said housing, wherein
said sensor face is angled relative to said axis; and
an anti-rotation feature within said housing, wherein said
anti-rotation feature is operable to prevent said sensor component
from rotating about said axis.
Appeal Br. 8 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTIONS3
The Final Office Action includes the following rejections:
1. Claims 1-7, 9, and 14-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as anticipated by Libertini (US 4,329,644, issued May 11, 1982).
3 The Final Office Action also included rejections of claims 10-13 under
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Application 13/600,299
2. Claims 1 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated based on an alternative interpretation of Libert ini.
3. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Libertini and Grzybowski (US 5,818,242, issued October 6,
1998).
ANALYSIS
The Examiner found that Libertini discloses a housing 2, a sensor
component 4, 5 within the housing, and a sensor face on a first axial end of
the housing. Final Act. 6, 12. In one interpretation of Libertini, the
Examiner found that the sensor face is the angled surface defined by channel
31 in electrode pins 6, 7. Id. at 3—4, 6-7. The Examiner provided the
following annotated drawing to accompany this finding.
US 4,329,644
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Libertini and of claim 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Final Act. 6. The Examiner
subsequently withdrew these rejections. Adv. Act. 1-2.
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Appeal 2017-002850
Application 13/600,299
Id. at 4. The drawing shown above is a copy of a portion of Figure 4 of
Libertini with an Examiner annotation added to identify the location of the
claimed “axial end.”
In another interpretation of Libertini, the Examiner found that the
sensor face is the bottom surface of electrode pins 6, 7, as viewed from
Figure 5. Id. at 12-13.
sensor face
Id. at 13. The drawing shown above is a copy of Figure 5 of Libertini with
an Examiner annotation added to identify the location of the claimed “sensor
face.”
In making these findings, the Examiner interpreted “axial end” to
mean “any end surface of the housing along an axis.” Ans. 10; see also
Final Act. 3. The Examiner explained that this interpretation is the plain
meaning of the term “axial end” under a broadest reasonable interpretation
in light of the Specification because “the term ‘axial end’ does not
necessarily describe a particular location,” the term is not limited to the
outermost ends of the housing in the claim, and “the term is not given a
special definition in the [Specification.” Examiner’s Answer 10 (November
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Appeal 2017-002850
Application 13/600,299
17, 2016) (hereinafter “Ans.”); see also Adv. Act. 2. Appellant argues that
“the angled surface of the channel 31 is not positioned at an ‘axial end of
said housing,’ as is claimed.” Appeal Br. 4; see also id. at 4-5; Reply Br. 1-
2. We agree with Appellant.
The Examiner’s interpretation is problematic for three reasons. First,
the Examiner interprets “axial end” without defining the word end,
referencing the very word “end” itself in the definition. In this case, using
one of the words in the claim term to define that very same word in the
claim term (i.e., defining an end by use of the word “end” itself) abdicates
the Examiner’s responsibility of providing a complete meaning to the claim
term. Second, despite the Examiner’s statement that the term is interpreted
according to its plain meaning, the meaning attributed to the word “end” by
the Examiner is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of that word. Third,
the Examiner’s interpretation does not correspond to how one having
ordinary skill in the art would understand the term in light of the
Specification.
As to the plain meaning of “end,” ordinary definitions of this word
include: (1) “the part of an area that lies at the boundary,” (2) “a point that
marks the extent of something,” (3) “the point where something ceases to
exist,” and (4) “the extreme or last part lengthwise : TIP.” Merriam-
Webster.com, available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
end, last accessed on February 6, 2018 (definitions 1(a), 1(b)(1), 1(b)(2), and
1(c)). These definitions demonstrate that an “end” of a housing is located at
an extreme extent of the housing. In the case of the claim term, an “axial
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Application 13/600,299
end” is located at the extreme extent of the housing located along an axis
defined by the housing.
This interpretation comports with the Specification’s usage of the
term. The Specification uses the term “axial end” consistently to refer to a
location on one of the outermost ends of the housing. For example, the
Specification describes a sensor face on a first axial end of the housing (]fl| 4,
17), a tip clearance probe cap on a second axial end of the housing (]fl| 12,
39), and a lip feature on one axial end of the housing (]f 34). The
Specification contrasts the location of these components on the outermost, or
axial ends, of the housing with other components located within the housing.
For example, the Specification describes that the anti-rotation feature is
disposed within the housing. Spec. 4, 17.
The Examiner justifies the interpretation because “the term is not
given a special definition in the [Specification.” Ans. 10. This is not the
correct inquiry.
The correct inquiry in giving a claim term its broadest
reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is not
whether the specification proscribes or precludes some broad
reading of the claim term adopted by the examiner. And it is
not simply an interpretation that is not inconsistent with the
specification. It is an interpretation that corresponds with what
and how the inventor describes his invention in the
specification, i.e., an interpretation that is “consistent with the
specification.”
In re Smith Int’l, Inc., 871 F.3d 1375, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting In
re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In this case, the
Examiner’s interpretation is not consistent with how the inventor describes
the invention in the Specification. Thus, we agree with Appellant that the
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Appeal 2017-002850
Application 13/600,299
Examiner’s interpretation of “axial end” to encompass a surface near the
midpoint of the housing along an axis is unreasonably broad when reading
that term in light of Appellant’s Specification. Appeal Br. 4.
The portion of Libertini’s probe identified by the Examiner in the
rejection as corresponding to the claimed “sensor face” is not located at an
axial end of the housing. As noted by Appellant, the identified sensor face is
located within the housing about midway between the axial ends of the
housing. See Libertini, Fig. 4; Appeal Br. 5.
For these reasons, we do not sustain the rejection of independent
claims 1 and 14 as anticipated by Libertini under either of the Examiner’s
interpretations of that reference. Likewise, the rejections of dependent
claims 2-9 and 15-21, which are based on this same interpretation of the
claim language, suffer the same deficiency and are not sustained.
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1-9 and 14-21 is
reversed.
REVERSED
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