Ex Parte Wang et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 28, 2016

11416945 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
111416,945 0510312006
43859 7590 11/01/2016
SLATER MATSIL, LLP
17950 PRESTON ROAD, SUITE 1000
DALLAS, TX 75252
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Yu-Sheng Wang
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
TSM05-0578 8285
EXAMINER
HSIEH, HSIN YI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2816
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/01/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docketing@slatermatsil.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YU-SHENG WANG, JUNG-CHIH TSAO, KEI-WEI CHEN,
SHIH-CHIEN CHANG, and YING-LANG WANG
Appeal2015-001634
Application 11/416,945
Technology Center 2800
Before JEFFREY T. SMITH, N. WHITNEY WILSON, and
MONTE T. SQUIRE, Administrative Patent Judges.
SQUIRE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL 1
Appellants2 appeal the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-9, 11-
15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33, and 34. 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 In this decision, we refer to the Final Office Action appealed from, mailed
November 29, 2013 ("Final Act."), the Appeal Brief dated April 28, 2014
("App. Br."), the Examiner's Answer to the Appeal Brief dated September
24, 2014 ("Ans."), and the Reply Brief dated November 24, 2014 ("Reply
Br.").
2 Appellants identify Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, LTD.
as the Real Party in Interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal2015-001634
Application 11/416,945
We AFFIRM.
The Claimed Invention
Appellants' disclosure relates generally to the fabrication of
semiconductor devices, and more particularly to a method for fabricating a
barrier layer structure for a semiconductor-device electrical interconnect.
Spec. i-f 1. The method claims to produce "an improved barrier layer
between the interconnect conductor and the dielectric material in which the
interconnect recess is formed." Abstract. Claim 1 is illustrative of the
claims on appeal and is reproduced below from the Claims Appendix to the
Appeal Brief (App. Br. 22):
1. A method for fabricating a semiconductor device, the
method comprising the steps of:
providing a substrate having a contact region;
depositing a dielectric layer over the substrate;
forming an interconnect recess in the dielectric layer;
depositing a first tantalum nitride (TaN) film within the
interconnect recess;
halting the depositing the first TaN film;
re-sputtering the first TaN film after the halting the
depositing the first TaN film;
depositing a second tantalum nitride (TaN) film over the
first TaN film;
re-sputtering the second TaN film after the second TaN
film has been completely deposited;
depositing a first tantalum (Ta) film over and in contact
with the second TaN film;
halting the depositing the first Ta film;
re-sputtering the first Ta film after the halting the
depositing the first Ta film;
depositing a second tantalum (Ta) film after the re-
sputtering the first Ta film, the depositing the second Ta film
being over and in contact with the first Ta film;
halting the depositing the second Ta film; and
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Application 11/416,945
re-sputtering the second Ta film after the halting the
depositing the second Ta film.
The References
The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence in
rejecting the claims on appeal:
Lard on et al.,
(hereinafter "Lardon")
Ding et al.,
(hereinafter "Ding")
us 4,915,806 Apr. 10, 1990
US 2003/0116427 Al Jun. 26, 2003
The Rejections
On appeal, the Examiner maintains the following rejections:
1. Claims 1-9, 11-15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33, and 34 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written
description requirement. Final Act. 2; Ans. 2.
2. Claims 1-9, 11-15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33, and 34 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ding in view ofLardon
Final Act. 3; Ans. 2.
OPINION
Rejection 1
Appellants argue claims 1-9, 11-15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33, and 34 as a
group. We select claim 1 as representative of this group, and the remaining
claims stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Claims 1 stands rejected for lack of written description under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Final Act. 2. In particular, the Examiner
finds that adequate written descriptive support is not provided in the
Specification for the "halting the depositing the first TaN film"; "halting the
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Application 11/416,945
depositing the first Ta film"; and "halting the depositing the second Ta film"
limitations recited in the claim. Id. (quoting claim 1) (emphasis added to
identify key disputed claim term).
Appellants argue that the Examiner's rejection should be reversed
because the claims fully comply with the written description requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. App. Br. 9. In particular, relying on
paragraphs 37, 40, and 41 and Figure 5 of the Specification, Appellants
argue that the Specification fully describes each of the claimed halting the
deposition limitations because the Specification "explicitly (or, at the very
least, implicitly) states that the deposition steps are performed and that the
re-sputter is performed after the deposition." Id. at 13. We disagree.
The test for an adequate written description "requires an objective
inquiry into the four comers of the specification from the perspective of a
person of ordinary skill in the art ... [and] [b]ased on that inquiry, the
specification must describe an invention understandable to that skilled
artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed."
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en bane). Moreover, the "prior application itself must describe
an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can
clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the
filing date sought." Lockwood v. American Airlines Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
We are not persuaded that claim 1 's "halting" limitations are
adequately supported by the Specification. As the Examiner correctly points
out (Ans. 3), the term "halting" is never mentioned in the Specification and
none of the claimed halting steps are explicitly or implicitly described in the
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Application 11/416,945
Specification. The portions of the Specification Appellants identify in the
Appeal Brief do not provide sufficient written descriptive support for the
halting limitations. As found by the Examiner (Ans. 3), although
paragraphs 34, 37, 40, 41 and Figure 5 of the Specification indicate that re-
sputtering occurs after the deposition, these portions do not require or even
suggest that the deposition is halted before the re-sputtering process begins
or specifically halted between these steps. 3 Nor do these portions preclude
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language, i.e., that the
depositing and re-sputtering steps occur simultaneously, which, as noted by
the Examiner (Ans. 3) was well known in the prior art, see Ding i-fi-1 85, 86,
93.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-9, 11-
15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph for
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
"'-Rejection 2
Appellants argue claims 1-9, 11-15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33, and 34 as a
group. We select claim 1 as representative of this group, and the remaining
claims stand or fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The Examiner determines that the combination of Ding and Lardon
suggests all of the steps of claim 1 and would have rendered claim 1
obvious. Final Act. 3-5. The Examiner finds that Ding teaches the majority
3 The portions of the Specification relied upon by Appellants as written
descriptive support also do not make clear the nature and intended scope of
the term "halting," particularly from a temporal standpoint. For example,
there is no description regarding what, if any, amount of time or delay
between steps would constitute "halting" for purposes of the claim.
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Application 11/416,945
of claim 1 's limitations, but that it does not teach repeating the steps of
"depositing and re-sputtering of the TaN film and the Ta film," as recited in
the claim. Id. at 3, 4 (citing Ding i-fi-12, 4, 8, 82, 83, 85, 86, 92, and 93; Figs.
8A, 8B, 8C, 8D, and 9). The Examiner, however, relies on Lardon for
disclosure of these limitations. Id. at 5. In particular, the Examiner finds
that Lardon teaches "repetition of depositing (coating) and re-sputtering
(resputtering) of the metal films in a microcavity." Id. (citing Lardon, col. 4,
11. 20-29).
Based on the above findings, the Examiner concludes that it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention
to combine the teachings of Ding and Lardon to arrive at Appellants'
claimed method because Ding teaches "the two steps of depositing and re-
sputtering of the TaN film and the Ta film in the trench" and Lardon teaches
that "repeating the[ se] two steps can achieve a more uniform and thick
coating on the side walls of the microcavity, i.e. the trench." Final Act. 5
(citing Lardon, col. 4, 11. 20-29).
Appellants argue that that it would not have been obvious to combine
Ding' s and Lardon' s teachings as proposed by the Examiner because the
proposed modification would "render the prior art unsatisfactory for its
intended purpose." App. Br. 16. In particular, Appellants argue that Ding's
and Lardon's processes each have different purposes, and that because the
purpose of Ding' s process is "to protect the sidewalls and the material
around the opening during ... re-sputtering" and the purpose of Lardon's
process is "to remove the material around hole openings," such a
modification would render Ding's process unsatisfactory for its intended
purpose of "providing a degree of protection." Id. at 17, 18. Appellants also
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contends that the Examiner has failed to establish a prima facie case of
obviousness because certain portions of Ding that the Examiner relies on as
support are "irrelevant to the current rejection of claims 1, 11 and 27" and do
not "provide additional support for the Examiner's rejections." Id. at 19.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Based on the record
before us, we find that the Examiner's findings regarding Ding' s and
Lardon' s teachings and reasoning for why one of ordinary skill in the art
would have combined these teachings to arrive at the claimed invention
(Final Act. 5) are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and based
on sound technical reasoning. Ding i-fi-12, 4, 8, 82, 83, 85, 86-88, 92, and 93;
Figs. 8A, 8B, 8C, 8D, and 9; Lardon, col. 2, 11. 31-34, col. 4, 11. 6-12, 20-
29. Appellants do not persuasively refute the Examiner's factual findings in
this regard or explain why the Examiner's articulated reasoning for
combining Ding' s and Lardon' s teachings lacks a rational underpinning or is
otherwise reversible.
Appellants' argument that that Ding and Lardon teach different
purposes and that the Examiner's proposed combination would render the
prior art unsatisfactory for its intended purpose is unpersuasive because
Appellants do not provide an adequate technical explanation or identify
sufficient evidence in the record to support it. In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d
699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Moreover, we concur with Examiner's finding (Ans. 7) that Ding and
Lardon teach the same purpose for using the re-sputtering process. As the
Examiner found (Ans. 5, 7), in Ding's process the purpose of using re-
sputtering is to redistribute the material of the barrier layer 3 51 from the
bottom of the via to the sidewalls of the via 349. Ding i-fi-1 86-88, Figs. 2,
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Application 11/416,945
8B. As the Examiner further found (Ans. 6), Lardon also teaches this same
purpose for using re-sputtering in its process. Lardon, col. 2, 11. 31-34
(disclosing that "the coating substance being deposited at first mainly on the
bottom of the cavities and reaching the side walls of the cavities [occurs]
only through redistribution by sputtering"); col. 4, 11. 6-12 ("By means of
this so-called sputtering, the aluminum on the substrate was redistributed in
a known manner, that is, a portion of the coating material, which had been
sputtered from the substrate, was deposited on the side walls of the
cavity[.]").
Appellants' contention that certain portions of Ding are irrelevant to
and do not provide additional support for the Examiner's rejections (App.
Br. 19), without more, is conclusory and insufficient to establish reversible
error in the Examiner's analysis and findings in this regard. De Blauwe, 736
F.2d at 705.
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-9, 11-
15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
the combination of Ding and Lardon.
DECISION/ORDER
The Examiner's rejections of claims 1-9, 11-15, 17, 27, 29-31, 33,
and 34 are affirmed.
It is ordered that the Examiner's decision is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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