Ex Parte Wang et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 1, 2017

13109989 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 1, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/109,989 05/17/2011 Xiaohuan C. Wang 337722-333601/P10871US1 2561
133036 7590 11/03/2017
DLA Piper LLP (US)
2000 University Avenue
East Palo Alto, CA 94303-2215
EXAMINER
KEATON, SHERROD L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2142
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/03/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ApplePros Admin @ dlapiper.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte XIAOHUAN C. WANG, GIOVANNI AGNOLI,
DAVID N. CHEN, VIJAY SUNDARAM, BRIAN MEANEY,
MIKE STERN, PAUL T. SCHNEIDER, ERIC J. GRAVES,
and RANDY UBILLOS
Appeal 2017-005825
Application 13/109,9891
Technology Center 2100
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
GALLIGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1—29, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.2
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Apple Inc. App. Br. 2.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed August 5, 2016
(“App. Br.”); Appellants’ Reply Brief filed February 22, 2017 (“Reply Br.”);
Examiner’s Answer mailed December 22, 2016 (“Ans.”); and Final Office
Action mailed January 5, 2016 (“Final Act.”).
Appeal 2017-005825
Application 13/109,989
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims on Appeal
Claims 1, 12, and 21 are independent claims. Claim 1 is reproduced
below:
1. A method of defining a media editing application for
creating multimedia presentations, the method comprising:
defining a composite display area for displaying a
graphical representation for each media clip in a set of media
clips that are parts of a composite presentation;
defining a range selector for selecting a portion of a
graphical representation of a media clip that is displayed in the
composite display area;
defining a user interface item for presenting at least three
selectable predefined retiming operations, wherein each
predefined retiming operation performs a different playback
speed modification to the media clip; and
defining a retiming engine for applying a selected
predefined retiming operation to a range of the media clip that
corresponds to the portion of the graphical representation
selected by the range selector in order to change a playback
timing of the range of the media clip according to the playback
speed modification of the selected predefined retiming operation,
wherein a size of the graphical representation of the media
clip is changed after applying the selected predefined retiming
operation to provide visual feedback of the selected predefined
retiming operation.
References
Fay an
Ubillos
Kuspa
Landy
Johnson
US 2003/0164845 A1 Sept. 4, 2003
US 2008/0152297 A1 June 26, 2008
US 2008/0253735 A1 Oct. 16, 2008
US 2010/0040349 A1 Feb. 18, 2010
US 2010/0275121 A1 Oct. 28,2010
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Application 13/109,989
Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1—11 and 21—29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Fayan, Landy, Ubillos, and Kuspa. Final Act. 2—6,
10-12.
Claims 12 and 16—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fayan, Landy, and Ubillos. Id. at 6—9.
Claims 13—15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Fayan, Landy, Ubillos, and Johnson. Id. at 9-10.
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
the issues raised by Appellants. Arguments not made are waived. See 37
C.F.R. §§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) and 41.39(a)(1).
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. 103(a): Independent Claims 1, 12, and21
“three selectable predefined retiming operations'1'’
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Landy teaches “a
user interface item for presenting at least three selectable predefined
retiming operations,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 12
and 21. App. Br. 10-14, 16—17; Reply Br. 3^4. Specifically, Appellants
argue “Landy does not present a [user interface (UI)] control that presents
three selectable predefined retiming operations, but rather provides a UI
control that can be successively adjusted to define successive retiming
operations.” App. Br. 11—12. Appellants further argue Landy’s UI control
does not “inherent[ly] . . . hav[e] three selectable predefined retiming
operations.” Reply Br. 3. Additionally, Appellants argue Landy’s “speed
adjustment box is a UI control that the user has to adjust to define the
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Application 13/109,989
retiming operation for the entire clip (as opposed to a portion of the clip[)].”
App. Br. 11 (emphasis omitted).
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Landy
teaches a speed adjustment box interface element that allows “user input of
additional options” (Final Act. 3) for “adjusting the video speed” of video
playback (Landy 146, Fig. 4). Based on that teaching, the Examiner
concludes “[i]t would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention to provide an enhanced interface with
graphical options for playback speed.” Final Act. 3.
Appellants’ argument that Landy’s interface does not explicitly or
inherently present “three selectable predefined retiming operations” (App.
Br. 11—12; Reply Br. 3—4), does not address the Examiner’s conclusion that
“[i]t would have been obvious” to present at least three selectable predefined
retiming operations in view of Landy (Final Act. 3). Landy’s speed
adjustment box is an interface element a user interacts with to set playback
speed (Landy 146, Fig. 4; see Landy 115). Further, the speed adjustment
box up/down arrow interface element (Landy Fig. 4) at least suggests that
the user can select from multiple playback options, i.e., up for faster
playback, down for slower playback (Final Act. 3). Even further, Landy
teaches more than three playback speeds can be set by a user. Landy 5 (a
“sliding bar control can be set by the user to set the speed at which
successive screen images are displayed.”), 57—64. Moreover, Landy teaches
at least three user selectable interface elements for adjusting video playback
properties (Landy Fig. 9,1 69 “the user may select magnifier ratios for the
screen size from a drop-down list”). Because Landy teaches a user interface
for adjusting playback speed, multiple playback speeds, and presenting
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Application 13/109,989
multiple video adjustment options for selection, we are not persuaded it
would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill
in the art” or would have “represented an unobvious step over the prior art”
to provide a speed adjustment box with three selectable speed adjustments.
Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citations omitted).
Additionally, we disagree with Appellants’ argument that Landy
“define[s] [its] retiming operation for the entire clip (as opposed to a portion
of the clip as recited” in the claims (App. Br. 11). Landy teaches its video is
played at a first speed for a first portion of a video clip and then adjusts its
speed to a second speed for a second portion of a video clip (Landy 146,
Fig. 3).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding
that the subject matter of “a user interface item for presenting at least three
selectable predefined retiming operations” would have been obvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art based on the teachings of Landy.
“applying a selected predefined retiming operation to a range'1'’
Initially, we note Appellants contend the Examiner “improperly
combines Fayan and Ubillos” (App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 4), but Appellants do
not present any arguments addressing how or why the Examiner improperly
combines the references, e.g., why the references are not combinable or why
the skilled artisan would not have made the combination. Instead,
Appellants argue the combination of Fayan and Ubillos does not “disclose or
suggest a retiming engine that retimes such a selected portion of a media
clip” (App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 4), which we address infra.
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Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Fayan and Ubillos teaches “a range selector for selecting a portion of a
graphical representation of a media clip” and “a retiming engine for applying
a selected predefined retiming operation to a range of the media clip that
corresponds to the portion of the graphical representation selected by the
range selector in order to change a playback timing of the range of the media
clip,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 12 and 21. App.
Br. 12—13, 15—17; Reply Br. 4. Specifically, Appellants argue “Ubillos
describes selecting segments from media clips in the media pane to add a
selected segment to the project” but the “selection tool of Ubillos does not
describe using the selection tool to perform edits on the selected segments.”
App. Br. 12; Reply Br. 4. Appellants further argue “Fayan describes
performing retiming operations on a video, but does not describe performing
retiming operations for a selected portion of a media clip.” App. Br. 13;
Reply Br. 4.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Final Act. 2—3), and we
agree, Fayan teaches “a retiming effect may be applied to [a] specified range
of a media file” (Fayan 120). The Examiner further finds (Final Act. 3—4),
and we agree, Ubillos teaches “a user can select segments of video and
transfer the selected segments to the project pane 110” (Ubillos 148, Fig. 5).
The Examiner combines Fayan and Ubillos by applying the “editing
capabilities of clips . . . previously addressed in Fayan” to Ubillos’s “ability
to select content” (Ans. 4), i.e., the “select[ed] ranges/sections of the media
clip” (Final Act. 4, 12).
Appellants’ argument that Ubillos does not teach retiming and Fayan
does not teach selecting portions of clips (App. Br. 12—13; Reply Br. 4)
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improperly attacks Ubillos and Fayan individually when the rejection is
based on a combination of Ubillos and Fayan. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
426 (CCPA 1981). Fayan teaches retiming a portion of a media file. Fayan
H 18 (“A clip on the timeline may be defined using ... a range within the
media data stored in [a media] file”), 20 (“a retiming effect may be applied
to the specified range of a media file”). Appellants do not persuasively
address the Examiner’s incorporation of Ubillos’s “selection] [of]
ranges/section of [a] media clip” with Fayan’s media clip retiming, in order
to retime a selected portion of a media clip. Final Act. 3—4, 12; Ans. 4. We
note that Landy also teaches retiming a portion of a media clip, as discussed
supra. Landy Fig. 3.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Fayan and Ubillos teaches “a range selector for selecting a
portion of a graphical representation of a media clip” and “a retiming engine
for applying a selected predefined retiming operation to a range of the media
clip that corresponds to the portion of the graphical representation selected
by the range selector in order to change a playback timing of the range of the
media clip,” as recited in claim 1. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fayan, Landy,
Ubillos, and Kuspa. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21,
which Appellants argue is patentable for similar reasons. See App. Br. 16—
17.
Claim 12 similarly recites “a range selector for selecting a portion of a
graphical representation of a media clip,” “a user interface item for
presenting at least three selectable predefined retiming operations,” and “a
retiming engine for applying a selected predefined retiming operation to a
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range of the media clip that corresponds to the portion of the graphical
representation selected by the range selector in order to change a playback
timing of the range of the media clip.” Appellants argue claim 12 is
patentable for reasons similar to those argued for claim 1. See App. Br. 13—
16. Thus, for the reasons set forth with respect to claim 1, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 12 as being unpatentable over Fayan, Landy
and Ubillos.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Dependent Claims 5, 6, 25, and26
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Fayan teaches “each
keyframe associated with a position in the media clip that is determined by a
previously performed retiming operation,” as recited in claim 5 and similarly
recited in claim 25. App. Br. 18—19, 21—22; Reply Br. 5—6. Specifically,
Appellants argue that Fayan’s “keyframes are inserted by an editor of the
video” but that the keyframes are not “associated with a position that is
determined by a previously performed editing operation.” App. Br. 18—19.
We are persuaded. The Examiner finds Fayan teaches “interpolation
is performed as a resampling operation on the playback samples which
would have utilized a previous timing operation.” Ans. 5 (citing Fayan H 5,
47). The Examiner also cites (Final Act. 5) Fayan’s disclosure of
“keyframes ... to associate an output time with a perceived plavback speed.
A keyframe signifies that, at the output time indicated by the keyframe, the
associated perceived playback speed will be applied” (Fayan 131).
Although Fayan teaches keyframes and retiming operations, the Examiner
has not shown where or explained how Fayan’s keyframes are based on
previous retiming operations. Moreover, the Examiner has not explained
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how it would have been obvious, nor is it readily apparent, that Fayan’s
keyframes are positioned based on a previously performed retiming
operation.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
of claims 5 and 25, as well as claims 6 and 26, which depend from claims 5
and 25, respectively.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Dependent Claim 9
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Fayan teaches “a
frame interpolator for creating an interpolated video frame based on a source
of the media clip and the playback curve,” as recited in claim 9. App. Br.
19—20; Reply Br. 6—7. Specifically, Appellants argue Fayan “fails to
describe creating an interpolated video frame based on a source of the media
clip and the playback curve. The cited portion of Fayan does not describe
creating video frames at all.” App. Br. 19.
We disagree with Appellants’ argument that Fayan’s interpolation
does not create video frames. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Fayan teaches “interpolation is performed on video samples,” creating “an
interpolated video frame” (Ans. 5 (citing Fayan || 5, 31, 47)). Specifically,
Fayan teaches a retimed video clip having output times associated with a
speed function curve (Fayan 131, Fig. 5). The corresponding “output video
samples may be computed using . . . motion-based interpolation,” which
creates an interpolated video frame. Fayan 147 (citing US 09/657,699,
which issued as Patent 6,665,450 and which discloses that “motion
parameters are then used to warp the first and second images to obtain an
interpolated image between the first and second images.” (1:22—27)).
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Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
Fayan teaches or suggests the limitations as recited in claim 9. Therefore,
we sustain the rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Dependent Claim 17
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Fayan and Ubillos teaches “the graphical representation of the media clip
further comprises a plurality of thumbnail images that are sampled from the
media clip at regular intervals of playback time,” as recited in claim 17.
App. Br. 20-21; Reply Br. 7—8. Specifically, Appellants argue Fayan does
not teach “a graphical representation of a media clip that includes (1) several
sections that represents different portions of the media clip that play back at
different speeds and (2) several thumbnail images that are sampled from the
media clip at regular intervals of playback time.” Reply Br. 7. Further,
Appellants argue Fayan teaches “a tool for modifying playback speeds of a
video track, not for individual media clips.” App. Br. 20; Reply Br. 7—8.
Appellants further argue “the thumbnail groups of Ubillos do not include
any sort of tool for editing the clips.” App. Br. 20-21. Additionally,
Appellants argue “no motivation is provided to combine” Fayan and Ubillos.
Id. at 21.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Final Act. 3—4, 8), and
we agree, Ubillos teaches “a user interface 100 displaying a video clip 200
as a thumbnail group 203” for each video clip in a collection of video clips
(Ubillos 137).
Appellants’ argument that Fayan does not teach thumbnails of retimed
clips (Reply Br. 7—8) improperly attacks Fayan individually while the
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Examiner relies on a combination of the teachings of Ubillos and Fayan. In
re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). In particular, Appellants do not
address the Examiner’s combination, which applies Ubillos’s thumbnail
groups to the collections of clips that have been retimed by Fayan’s retiming
feature. See Ans. 6
Further, we disagree with Appellants’ argument that Fayan does not
modify playback speeds of “individual media clips” (App. Br. 20), i.e.,
portions of a media file. As discussed supra, we agree with the Examiner’s
finding (Final Act. 2—3) that Fayan teaches “a retiming effect may be applied
to [a] specified range of a media file” (Fayan 120), i.e., a media clip.
Furthermore, Appellants’ argument that “Ubillos do[es] not include any sort
of tool for editing the clips” (App. Br. 20—21) does not address the
Examiner’s finding that Fayan teaches a retiming tool (Final Act. 2—3 (citing
Fayan 120). Additionally, Appellants’ argument that “no motivation is
provided to combine” Fayan and Ubillos (App. Br. 21) is not persuasive
because the Examiner articulates reasoning with some rational underpinning
as to why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have combined the teachings of
Fayan and Ubillos — “us[ing] a known technique to improve a similar
device” (Ans. 6) — which Appellants have not addressed.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Fayan and Ubillos teaches or suggests the limitations as
recited in claim 17. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
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Remaining Claims 2—4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13—16, 18—20, 22—24, and 27—29
Appellants do not argue separate patentability for dependent claims 2—
4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13—16, 18—20, 22—24, and 27—29, which depend directly or
indirectly from claims 1, 12, and 21. See App. Br. 10-22. Accordingly, for
the reasons set forth above, we sustain the Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 2^1, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13-14, 18-20, 22-24, and 27-29.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—4, 7—24, and
27-29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 5, 6, 25, and 26
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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