Ex Parte Vass

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 15, 2016

12563973 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 15, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/563,973
108982 7590
Wolfe-SBMC
601 W. Main Avenue
Suite 1300
Spokane, WA 99201
09/21/2009
03/17/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Jozsef Vass
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
P942 7433
EXAMINER
HUANG, MIRANDA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2157
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/17/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket@sbmc-law.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOZSEF VASS
Appeal2013-002388
Application 12/563,973 1
Technology Center 2100
Before JASON J. CHUNG, KIMBERLY McGRAW, and
MELISSA A. RAAP ALA, Administrative Patent Judges.
CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part.
INVENTION
The invention is directed to monitoring behavior with respect to a
software program such as a media player application. Spec. i-f 3. Claims 1,
7, and 13 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention and is
reproduced below:
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Adobe Systems
Incorporated. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2013-002388
Application 12/563,973
1. A method performed by data processing apparatus, the
method comprising:
playing media content using a first program that is
limited to a first security context corresponding to a first
domain of the first program, the first program having an object
in the first security context corresponding to the media content;
receiving an event comprising information indicating a
monitoring program;
instantiating the monitoring program in a second security
context that is applicable to multiple domains, including the
first domain, the instantiated monitoring program having access
from the second security context to the object of the first
program in the first security context; and
receiving from the monitoring program information
regarding playing of the media content.
Kullick
Koved
Plastina
Monteiro
Mears
REFERENCES
us 5,732,275
US 2002/0161996 Al
US 2003/0182100 Al
US 7,228,359 Bl
US 2008/0263579 Al
REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
Mar. 24, 1998
Oct. 31, 2002
Sept 25; 2003
June 5, 2007
Oct. 23, 2008
Claims 1, 2, 6---8, 12-14, and 18-20 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Plastina
and Mears. Ans. 2-8; Final Act. 2-11.
Claims 3, 9, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Plastina, Mears, and Monteiro. Final
Act. 12-13.
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Application 12/563,973
Claims 4, 10, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Plastina, Mears, and Kullick. Final
Act. 13-15.
Claims 5, 11, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the combination of Plastina, Mears, and Koved. Final
Act. 15-17.
ANALYSIS
The Appellant's contentions, with respect to independent claims 1, 7,
and 13, focus on three issues. We address these issues in tum.
1. Claims 1, 7, and 13 limitation:
playing media content using a first program that is limited
to a first security context corresponding to a first domain of
the first program, the first program having an object in the
first security context corresponding to the media content.
Appellant contends Plastina does not teach or suggest this limitation
because the Examiner failed to provide articulated reasoning or sufficient
evidence to support such conclusions and Plastina's disclosure does not
support the Examiner's contention that the user identification process
teaches or suggests the disputed limitation. App. Br. 4--6, 9.
We disagree with Appellant. The Examiner found Plastina teaches or
suggests playing media content using media-playing application (e.g. the
first program) (Ans. 2; Plastina i-f 61) on a particular device (e.g. first
domain) (Ans. 2-3; Plastina i-f 56) that requires user logon (e.g. limited to a
first security context) (Ans. 2; Plastina i-fi-1140-141) and a generated user
identifier associated with the media content metadata (e.g. an object in the
first security context corresponding to the media content) (Ans. 3; Plastina
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Application 12/563,973
ilil 61, 140-141 ), which teaches or suggests "playing media content using a
first program that is limited to a first security context corresponding to a first
domain of the first program, the first program having an object in the first
security context corresponding to the media content" as recited in claims 1,
7, and 13.
Appellant does not provide persuasive evidence or arguments as to
why the Examiner's findings are in error. While the Examiner bears the
initial burden of establishing an initial case of unpatentability, once that
burden has been met the burden of coming forward with evidence or
arguments demonstrating error in the Examiner's rejection shifts to
Appellant. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Mere
lawyer's arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by
factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F .3d
1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred
finding Plastina teaches the disputed limitation.
2. Claims 1, 7, and 13 limitation "receiving an event comprising
information indicating a monitoring program"
Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in finding that Mears'
discussion of "downloading of a metering program according to user
consent" teaches "receiving an event comprising information indicating a
monitoring program" as required by claims 1, 7, and 13. App. Br. 7.
However, the Examiner also found that Mears teaches the display of an on-
screen prompt that asks the consumer whether the consumer would like to
participate in an audience metering. Ans. 4 (citing Mears i-f 152, Figs 1, 5,
28). The Examiner explains the on-screen prompt regarding participating in
an audience metering program corresponds to the event comprising
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Application 12/563,973
information indicating a monitoring program. Id. Appellant's Reply Brief
does not rebut the Examiner's findings and reasoning, which we find to be
reasonable. As such, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred finding
Mears teaches the disputed limitation.
3. Claims 1, 7, and 13 limitation:
"instantiating the monitoring program in a second security
context that is applicable to multiple domains, including the
first domain, the instantiated monitoring program having
access from the second security context to the object of the
first program in the first security context"
Appellant contends "domain" and "security context" cannot be
interpreted as "device" and "user log on," respectively. Reply Br. 2.
Appellant contends that the experience monitoring module of Plastina is
limited to a first security context and therefore, could not be instantiated in a
second security context. App. Br. 7-8. Further, Appellant contends that
Plastina fails to teach or suggest that the monitoring program is applicable to
multiple domains, including the first domain. App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 3.
We disagree with Appellant.
At the outset, the Examiner finds that Plastina's device corresponds to
the claimed "first domain" and user log on information corresponds to the
claimed "security context." Ans. at 3. Appellant's contentions that the
Examiner's interpretation of "domain" and "security context" is inconsistent
with the Specification is not persuasive. Limitations appearing in the
Specification but not recited in the claim should not be read into the claim.
See E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Claims must be interpreted "in view of the specification" without
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Application 12/563,973
importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily);
In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404---05 (CCPA 1969); see also In re Zietz,
893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("During patent examination the
pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably
allow .... The reason is simply that during patent prosecution when claims
can be amended, ambiguities should be recognized, scope and breadth of
language explored, and clarification imposed. . . . An essential purpose of
patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and
unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be
removed, as much as possible, during the administrative process."). We find
the Examiner's findings and explanations to be reasonable.
The cited portions of Plastina relied upon by the Examiner teach
monitoring each user's content (e.g., instantiating the monitoring program)
(Ans. 5; Plastina i-f 122, Figs. 6-7) using an experience monitoring module
running on a user's computer (e.g., in a second security context) (Ans. 2-3;
Plastina i-f 56) that monitors multiple users/devices (e.g., multiple domains,
including the first domain) (Ans. 5; Plastina i-f 122, Figs. 6-7) in which each
user has a user logon (e.g., each user has a security context) (Ans. 2-3;
Plastina i-fi-1122, 140-141, Fig. 9), which teaches the limitation "instantiating
the monitoring program in a second security context that is applicable to
multiple domains, including the first domain" as recited in claims 1, 7, and
13.
In addition, the cited portions of Plastina relied upon by the Examiner
teach the experience monitoring module (e.g., the instantiated monitoring
program) (Ans. 5; Plastina i-f 122, Figs. 6-7) running on a user's computer
(e.g., second security context) (Ans. 2; Plastina i-f 56) that monitors multiple
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Application 12/563,973
users/devices (e.g., having access from the second security context to the
object of the first program) (Ans. 5; Plastina i-f 122, Figs. 6-7), where each
user has a logon (e.g., each user has a security context) (Ans. 2-3; Plastina
i-fi-1122, 140-141, Fig. 9), which teaches the limitation "the instantiated
monitoring program having access from the second security context to the
object of the first program in the first security context" as recited in claims 1,
7, and 13.
We decline to address Appellant's arguments pertaining to Mears
(App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 1-3) because Plastina teaches this disputed limitation
for the reasons described supra.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated supra, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claim 1, 7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also sustain the
Examiner's rejections of claims 3-5, 9-11, 15-17, 19, and 20, which
Appellant argues are patentable for the same reasons as set forth above
(App. Br. 12).
4. Rejection of Claims 2, 8, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant contends that Plastina fails to teach the limitations because
Plastina teaches monitoring of multiple users' media playing experience,
such as what content is experienced by users and when it is experienced, and
that user metadata can be reconciled with one or more devices on which the
various users experience content by transferring media content files,
including the associated metadata, between devices, which is different than
the limitations recited in these claims. App. Br. 10. Appellant further
contends Plastina fails to teach "access to a display list of the first program"
and the Examiner failed to address this limitation. Id. We disagree with
Appellant.
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Application 12/563,973
The cited portions of Plastina relied upon by the Examiner teach
monitoring each user's content (e.g., providing the instantiated monitoring
program) (Ans. 6; Plastina i-f 122, Figs. 6-7) using an experience monitoring
module running on a user's computer (e.g., in the second security context)
(Ans. 6; Plastina i-f 56) that monitors multiple users/devices as a user selects
various pieces of content (e.g., access to a display list of the first program)
(Ans. 6-7; Plastina i-fi-159, 122), wherein each user has a user logon (e.g., in
the first security context) (Ans. 2-3; Plastina i-fi-1140-141, Fig. 9), which
teaches the limitation "providing the instantiated monitoring program in the
second security context with access to a display list of the first program in
the first security context" as recited in claims 2, 8, and 14.
In addition, the Examiner cited Fig. 7 and i-f 123 of Plastina to teach
the limitation "allowing the instantiated monitoring program in the second
security context to send information to domains other than the first domain"
as recited in claims 2, 8, and 14. Final Act. 5. In particular, the Examiner
found Plastina reconciling user metadata with one or more devices on which
the various users experience content (instantiated monitoring program in
second security context sends information to domain other than the first
domain). Id. Appellant fails to persuasively rebut these findings. We also
note that Plastina teaches peer-to-peer content sharing. Plastina i-fi-1134, 137,
144, 145.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated supra, we sustain the Examiner's
rejection of claims 2, 8, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
5. Rejection of Claims 6, 12, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
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Appellant contends the Examiner has not shown where Mears teaches
"receiving in a multi-media stream the information indicating a monitoring
program" as required by claims 6, 12, and 18. We agree with Appellant.
The Examiner points to three teachings in Mears. First, the Examiner
cites to Fig. 32 and i-f 152 of Mears, which relate to an on-screen prompt and
the download of metering software (block 3004). Ans. 7-8. However, the
Examiner has not explained how this disclosure teaches a multi-media
stream as required by the claims. The Examiner next cites to i-f 157 of Mears
as teaching that when a media file is selected for presentation, the metering
program is launched. Ans. 8. However, i-f 157 of Mears states that it is
"[t]he personal computer 29 [that] determines whether it should monitor
media content," whereas the claim requires the multi-media stream includes
"the information indicating the monitoring program." Finally, the Examiner
cites to i-f 45 and i-f 47 as teaching a multi-media stream comprising media
content that includes "media presentation information" such as video, audio,
or graphics information, and/ or metadata associated with the media content.
Ans. 8 (citing Plastina i-f 45); Final Act. 5---6 (citing Plastina i-f 47). However,
the Examiner has not explained how either the media presentation
information or the metadata associated with the media content constitutes
information indicating the monitoring program as required by the claims.
Nor has the Examiner explained how one skilled in the art would have
combined the disparate embodiments to arrive at the claimed invention.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated supra, we do not sustain the
Examiner's rejection of claims 6, 12, and 18.
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DECISION
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-5, 7-11, 13-17, 19, and
20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 6, 12, and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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