Ex Parte Vander Mey et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 24, 2016

13484128 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 24, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/484, 128 05/30/2012
98449 7590 06/28/2016
Shumaker & Sieffert, P,A,
1625 Radio Drive, Suite 100
Woodbury, MN 55125
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Christopher David Vander Mey
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
1133-196US01 4605
EXAMINER
BLAIR, KILE 0
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2651
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/28/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
pairdocketing@ssiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CHRISTOPHER DAVID V ANDER MEY,
KARL MARTIN OHMAN, SERGE LACHAPELLE,
and WSTIN RUSSEL UBERTI
Appeal2014-006243
Application 13/484, 128
Technology Center 2600
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, MELISSA A. HAAPALA, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
SAADAT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-21, which are all the claims pending in this application. We have
jurisdiction over the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We reverse.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Google Inc. (App. Br.
3).
Appeal2014-006243
Application 13/484, 128
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants' invention relates to muting participants in a
communication session. (Abstract). Claim 1 is illustrative of the invention
and reads as follows.
1. A method comprising:
joining, by a first device, a communication session that includes
second and third devices, wherein:
the first device is configured to generate first audio data for the
communication session and to output a first sound,
the second device is configured to generate second audio data
for the communication session and to output a second sound, and
the third device is configured to generate third audio data for
the communication session and to output a third sound;
receiving, by the first device, the second audio data generated
by the second device;
receiving, by the first device and from one of the second and
third devices, a mute command, wherein the mute command identifies
the second device, and each of the first, second, and third devices are
configured to generate and receive mute commands; and
upon receipt of the mute command, causing, by the first device,
the muting of the second audio data generated by the second device,
such that the first and third devices output the first sound and the third
sound, respectively, that does not include the second audio data
generated by the second device.
The Examiner's Rejections
Claims 1, 2, 4--7, 16-18, 20, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as being anticipated by Scopia (Radvision, Ltd., SCOPIA Desktop
datasheet, Apr. 2007). (Final Act. 2-5; Ans. 2-5.)
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Application 13/484, 128
Claims 3, 8, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Scopia and Cutler (US 2010/0322387 Al, Dec. 23,
2010). (Final Act 5-7; Ans. 6-7).
Claims 9 and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Scopia. (Final Act 7-8; Ans. 8).
Claims 10 and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Scopia and Jachner (US 2007 /0117508 Al, May 24,
2007). (Final Act 8-9; Ans. 8-9).
Claims 14 and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Scopia and Eran (US 7,269,252 B2, Sep. 11, 2007).
(Final Act 9-10; Ans. 9-10).
ANALYSIS
With respect to claim 1, the Examiner finds Scopia' s disclosure meets
all the recited limitations and therefore anticipates claim 1. The Examiner
specifically finds Scopia' s list of video network moderator controls, which
includes mute controls, combined with Scopia's statement that anyone can
control a meeting, discloses "receiving, by the first device and from one of
the second and third devices, a mute command, wherein the mute command
identifies the second device, and each of the first, second, and third devices
are configured to generate and receive mute commands." (Final Act. 2-3;
Ans. 11-14). Each of Appellants' independent claims include this
limitation.
Appellants argue "Scopia's disclosure specifying that 'Anyone can
control the meeting' does not necessarily mean everyone can control the
meeting, or even that more than one person can control the meeting at a
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Application 13/484, 128
given time." (App. Br. 10). Appellants additionally argue Scopia's
statement that anyone can control the meeting does not necessarily include
control of the mute command (App. Br. 8-10). It is possible the control of a
meeting includes merely a sub-set of the listed controls and does not include
mute controls (id.). We are persuaded by Appellants' arguments.
The Examiner has not established a prima facie case of anticipation.
The Examiner finds Scopia discloses ( 1) a list of moderator controls
including a mute control and (2) two types of meetings: a moderated
meeting which requires a PIN, and an unmoderated meeting in which
anyone can control a meeting (Final Act. 2-3; Ans. 13-14 ). Based on these
findings, the Examiner asserts that Scopia anticipates claim 1 because "[i]t
would be clear to one of ordinary skill in the art reasonably construing the
teachings of Scopia that an 'un-moderated meeting' is essentially a meeting
where anyone can moderate or execute a 'moderator control"' and this
disclosure in Scopia "explicitly teaches that 'moderator controls' include
muting and un-muting of any participant." (Ans. 13-14). The Examiner's
conclusion is based on speculation and lacks the supportive evidence needed
to establish a primafacie case of anticipation (see Ans. 13-14). The
Examiner has not identified, nor do we find, any teaching in Scopia that
every participant in a communication session can control a meeting, or that
control of a communication session necessarily includes the mute command.
CONCLUSIONS
On the record before us, Appellants arguments have persuaded us that
the Examiner erred in finding Scopia discloses "receiving, by the first device
and from one of the second and third devices, a mute command, wherein the
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Application 13/484, 128
mute command identifies the second device, and each of the first, second,
and third devices are configured to generate and receive mute commands,"
as recited in independent claim 1 and similarly recited in independent claims
4, 20, and 21. We therefore do not sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) rejection
of claims 1, 4, 20, and 21, as well as claims 2, 5-7, and 16-18, dependent
therefrom. We also do not sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of the
remaining claims because the Examiner has not identified any teachings in
the other applied prior art to overcome the above-noted deficiency of Scopia.
DECISION
We reverse the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-21.
REVERSED
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