Ex Parte VanBlon et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 28, 2018

14683753 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/683,753 04/10/2015
58127 7590 08/29/2018
FERENCE & ASSOCIATES LLC
409 BROAD STREET
PITTSBURGH, PA 15143
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Russell Speight V anBlon
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
RPS920150006USNP(710.433) 1903
EXAMINER
MEROUAN,ABDERRAHIM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2619
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/29/2018 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RUSSELL SPEIGHT V ANBLON, ARNOLD S. WEKSLER,
NATHAN J. PETERSON, RODD. WALTERMANN,
and
JOHN CARL MESE
Appeal2018-002582
Application 14/683,753 1
Technology Center 2600
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOV AN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-21, which are all the claims pending
in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM. 2
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Lenovo (Singapore)
PTE. LTD. Appeal Br. 3.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.") filed July
24, 2017; the Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed January 15, 2018; Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.") mailed November 15, 2017; Final Office Action ("Final
Act.") mailed February 22, 2017; and original Specification ("Spec.") filed
April 10, 2015.
Appeal2018-002582
Application 14/683,753
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants' invention relates to a method and device for "electronic
display content fitting" by "identify[ing] a shortened representation for
display of one or more of the text characters" in a received communication,
"shorten[ing] the one or more of the text characters using the shortened
representation," and outputting "the shortened representation to the display
device." Title ( capitalization altered); Abstract.
Claims 1, 12, and 21 are independent. Representative claim 1 is
reproduced below with disputed limitations in italics:
1. A device, comprising:
a display device;
a processor operatively coupled to the receiver; and
a memory comprising instructions that are executed by
the processor to:
analyze a received communication comprising one or
more words to identify text characters;
identify a shortened representation for display of one or
more of the text characters, wherein the shortened
representation is identified based upon a shortening technique
provided by a user;
shorten the one or more of the text characters using the
shortened representation; and
output display data including the shortened
representation to the display device.
Appeal Br. 23-26 (Claims App'x).
Evidence Considered
Rogers US 2010/0145676 Al
Greenfield US 2010/0042916 Al
Hebert US 2016/0048500 Al
2
June 10, 2010
Feb. 18,2010
Feb. 18,2016
Appeal2018-002582
Application 14/683,753
Examiner's Rejections
(1) Claims 1-5, 7, 8, 10-16, 18, 19, and 21 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Rogers and Greenfield. Final
Act. 2-7.
(2) Claims 6, 9, 17, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Rogers, Greenfield, and Hebert. Final Act. 7-9.
ANALYSIS
Claims 1-5, 7, 8, 10-16, 18, 19, and 21
With respect to independent claim 1, the Examiner finds Rogers'
mobile handset device, shown in Figures 1 and 12, teaches a device
including a display, a processor, and a memory with instructions (software
of Rogers' "string transformation engine") for analyzing a received
communication ( e.g., an SMS message) to identify text characters, and
identifying a shortened representation for display of one or more of the text
characters, as claimed. Final Act. 3 (citing Rogers ,r,r 29, 36, 43, 62---63,
Figs. 1 and 12). The Examiner further finds Rogers' string transformation
engine shortens the one or more text characters using the identified
shortened representation, and displays the shortened representation as
claimed. Final Act. 3--4 (citing Rogers ,r,r 30, 37).
To support the conclusion of obviousness, the Examiner relies on
Greenfield for teaching the claimed "shortened representation [being]
identified based upon a shortening technique provided by a user." Final Act.
4. Particularly, the Examiner finds Greenfield shortens words based on user-
selected shortening techniques, such as user-selected synonyms from a
thesaurus of words. Final Act. 4 ( citing Greenfield ,r 27); Ans. 11 ( citing
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Greenfield ,r 26). The Examiner further finds Greenfield allows a user to
shorten names (e.g., the name "Stephen") to a version with fewer letters
( e.g., to "Steve"). Ans. 10-11 ( citing Greenfield ,r 19).
Appellants dispute the Examiner's factual findings regarding Rogers
and Greenfield. Particularly, Appellants argue "Rogers makes no mention
of the user being able to select a shortening technique, rather the shortening
techniques are determined per the rules programmed at the string
transformation engine." Appeal Br. 17; Reply Br. 19. Appellants further
argue Greenfield does not teach the claimed "shortened representation is
identified based upon a shortening technique provided by a user" because
"Greenfield does not shorten words." Appeal Br. 18; Reply Br. 20. "Rather,
Greenfield adds, deletes, or changes words to words having more or less
characters." Appeal Br. 18 (citing Greenfield ,r,r 27, 41); Reply Br. 20.
Appellants further argue Rogers and Greenfield are non-analogous, and the
Examiner's combination of references lacks articulated reasoning. Appeal
Br. 15-17; Reply Br. 17-19.
We do not find Appellants' arguments persuasive. Instead, we find
the Examiner has provided a comprehensive response to Appellants'
arguments supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 9-12. As such,
we adopt the Examiner's findings and explanations provided therein. Id. At
the outset, we note claim terms are given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the Specification. In re Am. A cad. of Sci. Tech
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable
interpretation, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning,
as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of
the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257
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Application 14/683,753
(Fed. Cir. 2007). Appellants' Specification does not provide an explicit and
exclusive definition of the claimed term "shortened representation." Rather,
Appellants' Specification provides a list of non-exhaustive examples of
"shortened representations," as follows:
an embodiment shortens an incoming message or piece of
content so that it fits on a given piece of screen real estate ....
Methods of shortening content may include removal of certain
types of characters such as vowels from a text string. Removal
of larger pieces of content, e.g., removal of certain words from a
sentence of phrase, may also be performed ....
An embodiment may also convert text based content ( e.g.,
characters forming a word or phrase) to known or commonly used
abbreviations or acronyms. For example, an embodiment may
convert a text based character string of "you" to "u, "as another
example "Gotta go," may be changed to "GG, "likewise "I don't
know" may be resized to "!DK, " the sound of the full and
abbreviated version may be used, e.g., "great" replaced with
"gr8, " etc. Such abbreviations or slang representations are
commonly used at the time of inputting a message; however, an
embodiment may convert the full form of the text string input
into such abbreviated representations automatically, e.g., at
display time ....
[A] user . . . may choose a content type such as text
messages, calendar events, emails, web pages, transcribed
voicemails, etc., that are to be or are not to be abbreviated or
shortened. Moreover, a user may clarify explicitly or implicitly
which sub-portions of content are to be shortened, e.g., clarify a
list of acceptable abbreviations for text or acceptable graphics or
icons that are to be used ....
[T]he shortened representation may take a variety of forms
and may be influenced by the underlying content. For example,
if text characters are included in the communication that are
amenable to shortening based on abbreviation, colloquial forms,
or shortened forms (e.g., "phone" for "telephone," "Gr8 "for
"great, " etc.), an embodiment may identify these substitutes as
a shortened representation .... Various rules and data sources
(e.g., grammar rules, linguistic rules, word form hierarchies,
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abbreviations, graphical representations or icons, etc.) may be
utilized ....
[A] shortened representation may include a text character
string having one or more characters removed therejrom, e.g.,
at least one vowel and/or an icon, and/or a shortened
representation may include a reduced size of the one or more of
the text characters or a reduced size of a previously shorted text
string or previously selected icon.
Spec. ,r,r 14, 17, 19, 32, 36 (emphases added). Thus, Appellants'
Specification broadly describes shortened representations ( of text strings)
include abbreviations, abbreviated versions, and acronyms, informal,
colloquial, and slang equivalents, and text strings from which some letters
have been removed.
Based on Appellants' Specification, the Examiner has broadly
interpreted the claim term "shortened representation" as encompassing
Greenfield's shorter synonyms and shorter naming alternatives. Ans. 10-11.
Therefore, we find the Examiner's interpretation reasonable and consistent
with Appellants' Specification. Greenfield's use of shorter synonyms and
shorter name alternatives is commensurate with the broad description of
"shortened representations" in Appellants' Specification. For example, the
Examiner finds Greenfield's using "Steve" as a shortened version of
"Stephen" is analogous to the shortening "technique used in the instant
application such as [ the use of] 'phone' for 'telephone."' Ans. 10-11 ( citing
Spec. ,r 32).
Additionally, Rogers teaches "shortened representations" of text
strings to fit a small display size. Final Act. 3--4 (citing Rogers ,r,r 29--30,
36, 43, Fig. 1). For example, Rogers shortens "average" to "avg,"
"building" to "bldg," and the phrase "the quick brown fox jumped over the
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lazy dog" to "quik brwn fox jmps ovr lzy dog" or "fox jmps ovr dog." See
Rogers ,r,r 30, 36; Final Act. 3--4.
We also disagree with Appellants' argument that "Greenfield[' s
teachings] do not include a shortened representation, but, rather, a
completely different word." Appeal Br. 18 (emphasis added). Greenfield's
short form "Steve" is not "a completely different word" from the long form
"Stephen." See Appeal Br. 18; Greenfield ,r 19. Additionally, the claimed
"shortened representation" includes acronyms, as well as informal,
colloquial, and slang equivalents. See Spec. ,r,r 17, 19, 32, 36. Thus, the
claimed "shortened representation" does not preclude "a completely
different word," as Appellants advocate. Appeal Br. 18.
We therefore agree with the Examiner that Greenfield teaches a
"shortened representation is identified based upon a shortening technique
provided by a user," as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 4. Additionally, we
agree with the Examiner that Rogers identifies text characters in words and
identifies a shortened representation for display of one or more of the text
characters, as claimed. Final Act. 3--4.
We are also not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner
"has not articulated a reason why a person skilled in the art would combine
the prior art references." Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 17. The Examiner has
articulated sufficient reasoning for adding Greenfield's user-selectable
shortening techniques to Rogers' string transformation engine for shortening
and displaying text strings, for improving Rogers' text adjustments of
screens with different sizes. Final Act. 4. Providing user-selectable
shortening techniques (as taught by Greenfield's paragraphs 26 and 27)
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enables better content adjustment to screens of different sizes. Final Act. 4
( citing Greenfield ,r 27); Ans. 11 ( citing Greenfield ,r 26).
We are also not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that (i)
Greenfield is not analogous to the claimed invention, and (ii) "Rogers and
Greenfield are not directed to solving the same problem" and are not "from
the same field of endeavor." Appeal Br. 15-18; Reply Br. 17, 19. "Whether
a reference in the prior art is 'analogous' is a fact question." In re Clay, 966
F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,
810 F.2d 1561, 1568 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Two criteria have evolved for
determining whether prior art is analogous:
( 1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor,
regardless of the problem addressed, and
(2) if the reference is not within the field of the
inventor's endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved.
Id. at 658-59 (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436,442 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In
re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979)). "A reference is reasonably
pertinent if ... it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals,
logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in
considering his problem." Id. at 659.
As correctly recognized by the Examiner, Rogers and Greenfield are
directed to fitting textual content to prescribed sizes. Ans. 9-10.
Specifically, Rogers describes a "method and apparatus for adjusting the
length of text strings to fit display sizes," and Greenfield describes a method
and system for "identifying critical textual passages that influence the
pagination of electronic documents such that the addition or removal of text
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Application 14/683,753
to these critical passages will have the effect of shortening or lengthening
the document" to "fit [the] document[] into a prescribed length." See Rogers
Title ( capitalization altered); Greenfield Abstract, ,r,r 3--4, 8, 15, 73; Ans. 9--
10. Both Rogers and Greenfield disclose that text can be fit to a prescribed
size by shortening words in the text. See Rogers (Abstract ("software [is]
configured to analyze and modify text strings to shorten their length by ...
abbreviating some words, [and] deleting letters (e.g., vowels) from some
words")); Greenfield ,r,r 14--15 ("any desired textual format of any length
may be submitted for analysis" to "a computer-based system for identifying
critical textual passages that influence the pagination of electronic
documents" such that "removal of text to these critical passages will have
the effect of shortening" the document), 19, 27, Abstract; Ans. 10. Fitting
textual content to prescribed sizes is also Appellants' field of endeavor, as
evidenced by Appellants' Specification being directed to "electronic display
content fitting" so that "[content] fits on a given piece of screen real estate."
See Spec. ,r 14; Title ( capitalization altered). Similar to Rogers and
Greenfield, Appellants' Specification discloses that text can be fit to a
prescribed size by shortening words in the text. Spec. ,r,r 2--4, 14 ("an
embodiment shortens an incoming message or piece of content so that it fits
on a given piece of screen real estate. That is, an embodiment may modify
the content such that it is appropriately re-sized," for example by "removal
of certain types of characters such as vowels from a text string"), 1 7
("convert text based content ( e.g., characters forming a word or phrase) to
known or commonly used abbreviations or acronyms" or "slang
representations").
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As such, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that Rogers
and Greenfield are non-analogous art. Appeal Br. 15-16. We agree with the
Examiner that Rogers and Greenfield would have logically lent themselves
to the problem of fitting textual content by shortening words. Ans. 9-10; see
Spec. ,r,r 2--4, 14, 17, Title; Rogers Title, Abstract; Greenfield ,r,r 14--15, 19,
27, Abstract.
Accordingly, Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner's rejection of claim 1. As such, we sustain the Examiner's
obviousness rejection of claim 1, and similarly, independent claims 12 and
21 for which Appellants provide the same arguments, and dependent claims
2-5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13-16, 18, and 19 argued for their dependency therefrom.
Appeal Br. 14.
Claims 6, 9, 17, and 2 0
With respect to claims 6, 9, 1 7, and 20, Appellants argue Hebert is
non-analogous to Rogers and Greenfield and outside the scope of
Appellants' endeavor and, as such, cannot be relied upon to support the
obviousness rejection of these claims. Appeal Br. 20-21; Reply Br. 21-23.
Appellants' argument is not persuasive. Instead, we agree with the
Examiner that Hebert, like Rogers and Greenfield, would have logically lent
itself to the problem of shortening textual content. Ans. 11-12.
Particularly, Hebert displays "suggestions 512a-e in the suggestion box 510"
for replacing a previously identified textual concept (e.g., an artist's name,
such as "Jennifer Lopez") "with a small icon and/or an abbreviated version
of the concept." See Hebert ,r 46; see also Hebert ,r 68 ("the selected
concept/suggestion may be input into the text field .... In an[] example, if
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the application relates to making flight reservations on a web site ( e.g.,
which may use a little calendar icon for aiding in the input), then the
canonical form of a date concept may be used"). Hebert's shortening
suggestions are displayed to the user of a mobile device "whenever the soft
keyboard 514 is displayed (e.g., such as in response to a text cursor or focus
in a text box or field capable of receiving text)" on the mobile device. See
Hebert ,r 46. We therefore agree with the Examiner that Hebert would have
logically lent itself to the problem of shortening words/text addressed in the
claimed invention, as Hebert is concerned with shortening communications
for output to a display. Ans. 12; see Spec. ,r,r 2--4, 14, 17; Hebert ,r,r 44, 46.
Appellants further argue the combination of Rogers, Greenfield, and
Hebert fail to teach or suggest "wherein the shortened representation is an
icon" as recited in claim 6, because "Herbert[ sic] makes no mention of how
text characters could be shortened." Appeal Br. 21; Reply Br. 23. However,
as discussed supra, Hebert shortens a concept ( a word composed of text
characters) by replacing the concept with an icon. See Hebert ,r 46. Thus,
Hebert discloses a shortened representation is an icon, as recited in claims 6
and 17. Ans. 12.
Appellants additionally argue the Examiner's combination of Hebert
with Rogers and Greenfield lacks articulated reasoning. Appeal Br. 19--20;
Reply Br. 21-22. We remain unpersuaded, as the Examiner has articulated
sufficient reasoning for adding Hebert's icon-based shortening technique, to
Rogers' string transformation engine for shortening text, thereby providing
additional options for shortening text. Ans. 12; Final Act. 8-9. Particularly,
Hebert's "icon represent[s] ... another form of shortening a word." Ans.
12.
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As Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred
in rejecting claims 6, 9, 17, and 20, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of
these claims.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have not
demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-21 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-21.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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