Ex Parte van Wageningen et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 30, 2018

13383914 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/383,914 01/24/2012 Andries van Wageningen
24737 7590 08/01/2018
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus A venue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2009P01312WOUS 7010
EXAMINER
BARNETT, JOEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2836
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/01/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patti. demichele@Philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ANDRIES VAN WAGENINGEN, BART MICHIEL DE BOER,
CHRISTOPH LOLF, LENNART YSEBOODT, MENNO ANNE
TREFFERS, WILLEM FRANKE P ASVEER, and EBERHARD
WAFFENSCHMIDT
Appeal2017-010192
Application 13/383,914
Technology Center 2800
Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, A VEL YN M. ROSS, and
SHELDON M. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judges.
DELMENDO, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
The Applicants (hereinafter "Appellants") 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) from the Primary Examiner's final decision to reject claims 1---6,
12, and 15-18. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 The Appellants identify the real party in interest as "Koninklijke Philips
N.V." (Appeal Brief filed March 6, 2017 (hereinafter "Appeal Br.") 3).
2 Appeal Br. 8-14; Reply Brief filed July 28, 2017 (hereinafter "Reply Br.")
2-9; Final Office Action entered August 23, 2016 (hereinafter "Final Act.")
2-12; Examiner's Answer entered May 18, 2017, which appears to have
been superseded by a substantially identical Substitute Examiner's Answer
entered May 30, 2017 (hereinafter "Ans.") 2-8.
Appeal2017-010192
Application 13/383,914
I. BACKGROUND
The subject matter on appeal relates to components for an inductive
power transfer system (e.g., a transmitter) and to the system itself
(Specification filed January 13, 2012, hereinafter "Spec.," 1, 1. 2; Appeal Br.
15-18 (Claims Appendix)). According to the Appellants, "[i]t is an object
of the invention to propose a method and a system for activating, by means
of a receiver, a transmitter which is in standby mode to activated mode" (id.
at 2, 11. 20-21 ).
Representative claim 1 is reproduced from the Claims Appendix to the
Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.), with key limitations emphasized, as follows:
1. A transmitter for transmitting electric power to a
receiver inductively, the transmitter comprising:
a primary coil configured for inductive coupling with a
secondary coil located in the receiver; and
a detection circuit connected to the primary coil and
configured to detect an activation signal, such that when the
receiver requests electric power from the transmitter the
activation signal is generated by the receiver and provided to the
secondary coil to be transmitted, via inductive coupling, to the
primary coil, wherein the transmitter is changed from a standby
mode to an activated mode when the activation signal 1s
detected; and
wherein the transmitter is configured to reverse a
function of the primary coil when the transmitter is in the
activated mode, such that the primary coil inductively transmits
the electric power to the secondary coil of the receiver.
II. REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, the Examiner maintains three rejections:
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Application 13/383,914
A. Claims 1, 3, 6, 12, and 15-183 under 35 U.S.C.§ I02(a) or
I02(e) (i.e., I02(e)(l)) (pre-AIA) as anticipated by Bennett; 4
B. Claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) (pre-AIA) as unpatentable
over Bennett and Fukui et al. 5 (hereinafter "Fukui"); and
C. Claims 4 and 5 under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) (pre-AIA) as
unpatentable over Bennett and Joseph A. Paradiso & Mark
Feldmeier, "A Compact, Wireless, Self-Powered Pushbutton
Controller" (hereinafter "Paradiso"; other publication details
not indicated on the document). 6
(Ans. 2-8; Final Act. 2-12.)
III. DISCUSSION
With respect to Rejection A, the Appellants do not argue any claim
separately pursuant to the requirements set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(iv)
(Appeal Br. 8-14). Therefore, we confine our discussion of Rejection A to
claim 1, which we select as representative. All other claims subject to this
3 The statement of the rejection in the Final Action indicated claim 4 was
also rejected on this ground but both Answers no longer include this claim as
rejected on this ground (Ans. 2). In addition, although discussed in the body
of the rejection (Final Act. 10), claim 18 was not included in the statement
of the rejection (id. at 5). Both Answers now include claim 18 as rejected
(Ans. 2).
4 US 2010/0036773 Al, published February 11, 2010.
5 US 2007/0159235 Al, published July 12, 2007.
6 The Examiner states that the document is admitted prior art (Ans. 2; Final
Act. 11 ). The Appellants do not address this rejection separately, much less
dispute the Examiner's finding that Paradiso' s teachings are admitted prior
art (Appeal Br. 8-14). Therefore, we presume that the Appellants'
arguments against this rejection are the same as that provided for the
rejection entered against the base claim in Rejection A.
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Application 13/383,914
rejection stand or fall with claim 1. In addition, the Appellants do not
submit any additional argument against Rejection B other than to state that
"Fukui fails to cure the above identified deficiencies of Bennett" (id. at 14).
As the Appellants do not address Rejection C, all claims stand or fall with
claim 1. 7
The Examiner finds that Bennett describes a transmitter that includes
every limitation recited in claim 1 (Final Act. 5---6). Critical to this finding,
the Examiner finds that although Bennett teaches an authentication process
prior to initiating power transmission, the "activation signal" detection
recited in claim 1 broadly encompasses the exchange of signals involved in
Bennett's authentication process (Ans. 3). Additionally, the Examiner gives
the terms "standby mode" and "active mode" broad interpretations,
explaining that "[i]n the basic meaning, standby mode is a state where
something is ready and available to perform a function, but not yet
performing that function" (id. at 4) and pointing out that the Specification
fails to define these terms more narrowly (id. at 6).
The Appellants contend that, in contrast to claim 1, "Bennet[ t] does
not mention anything about a transmitter changing from standby to active
upon detection of an activation signal generated in the target device"
(Appeal Br. 9; emphases omitted). According to the Appellants, Bennett's
authentication "is clearly different from claim 1 where the receiver generates
the activation signal and, when detected, the transmitter changes to activated
mode" (id.; emphasis omitted). In the Appellants' view, "the Examiner
7 Absent special circumstances, arguments not made in the Appeal Brief are
waived. 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv); 37 C.F.R. § 4I.41(b)(2). See, e.g., In
re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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Application 13/383,914
essentially ignores the claim language requiring the transmitter to have two
modes, a standby mode and an activated mode" (id. at 1 O; emphasis
omitted). The Appellants urge that "Bennett's delivery of power or not
delivering power to the receiver is not the same as a transmitter with a
standby mode or active mode" (id. at 12; emphasis omitted). Furthermore,
the Appellants argue that Bennett does not describe the function reversal
limitations highlighted in reproduced claim 1 above (id. at 13).
We have fully considered the Appellants' arguments but find them
insufficient to reveal any reversible error in the Examiner's rejection. In re
Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
"During ... original examination, the PTO must give claims their
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification." In re
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus,
"we look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for claim terms,
but otherwise apply a broad interpretation." Id. "As [ our reviewing] court
has discussed, this methodology produces claims with only justifiable
breadth." Id. In explaining why the PTO uses the broadest reasonable
interpretation standard rather than the "ordinary meaning" standard used
during district court litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States
observed:
[C]onstruing a patent claim according to its broadest reasonable
construction helps to protect the public. A reasonable, yet
unlawfully broad claim might discourage the use of the
invention by a member of the public. Because an examiner's
(or reexaminer's) use of the broadest reasonable construction
standard increases the possibility that the examiner will find
the claim too broad (and deny it), use of that standard
encourages the applicant to draft narrowly. This helps ensure
precision while avoiding overly broad claims, and thereby
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Application 13/383,914
helps prevent a patent from tying up too much knowledge,
while helping members of the public draw useful information
from the disclosed invention and better understand the lawful
limits of the claim.
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143, 2144--2145
(2016) (emphasis added).
Faithfully applying these principles, we discern no reversible error in
the Examiner's broad interpretation of the disputed claim terms "standby
mode," "active mode," and "signal." As the Examiner aptly points out (Ans.
6), the Appellants state in their Specification that "when the transmitter does
not transmit power to any receiver, the transmitter will be set to standby
mode which can also be referred to as 'sleeping mode' or 'inactive mode"'
(Spec. 1, 11. 18-20). The Appellants do not direct us to any other description
in the Specification that compels narrower definitions for these terms.
Under these circumstances, "standby mode" and "active mode" may
reasonably be interpreted to read on Bennett's transmitter state prior to
power transmission and during power transmission, respectively (Bennett
Figs. 1-3; ,r 3 7 ("If the [authentication] match is determined, then resonant
power delivery is initiated.")). Similarly, the Appellants fail to direct us to
any scope-limiting definition in the Specification for "activation signal" that
would exclude the sort of information or signal exchanged and detected
during the authentication process described in Bennett (id. Fig. 3; ,r,r 28, 37).
With respect to the function reversal limitations highlighted in the last
clause of reproduced claim 1 above, we agree with the Examiner's analysis
(Ans. 6-7). Therefore, we adopt it as our own.
For these reasons, and those well-stated by the Examiner, we uphold
the Examiner's rejection as maintained against claim 1.
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IV. SUMMARY
Rejections A through Care sustained. Therefore, the Examiner's final
decision to reject claims 1---6, 12, and 15-18 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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