Ex Parte Vadakkumpadan et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 2, 201913694120 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 13/694, 120 10/30/2012 101887 7590 04/04/2019 The Johns Hopkins University C/0 Venable LLP P. 0. Box 34385 Washington, DC 20043-9998 UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Fijoy Vadakkumpadan UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 02240-339872 5093 EXAMINER BORIN, MICHAEL L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1631 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/04/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): hjdaley@venable.com PTOMAIL@VENABLE.COM khauser@VENABLE.COM PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED ST ATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte FIJOY V ADAKKUMP ADAN, HERMENEGILD AREY ALO, NATALIA TRAYANOVA, andKATHERINEWU (APPLICANT: THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY) Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 1 Technology Center 1600 Before DONALD E. ADAMS, JOHN G. NEW, and DAVID COTT A, Administrative Patent Judges. ADAMS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL ThisAppeaF under35 U.S.C. § 134(a)involves claims 1--4, 6, 8, 10- 13, 15, 17, 19-22,24,26,and28-39(Fina1Act. 3 2). Examinerentered rejectionsunder35U.S.C. § 101 and35U.S.C. § 103(a). Wehave jurisdiction under35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellants identify "The Johns Hopkins University" as the real party in interest (Appellants' August 2, 2017 Appeal Brief (Br.) 3 ). 2 This Appeal is related to Appeal 2018-003128 (Application 13/984,741). 3 Examiner's October 26, 2016 Final Office Action. Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants' disclosure "relates to systems and methods for personalized cardiac arrhythmia risk assessment, and more particularly personalized cardiac arrhythmia risk assessment by simulating arrhythmia inducibility" (Spec. 4 ,r 2). Claim 1 is representative and reproduced below: 1. A computer-implemented method of determining a likelihood of an occurrence of a cardiac arrhythmia in a living patient, comprising: receiving contrast-enhanced three-dimensional MRI or CT data that includes said living patient's heart; segmenting said contrast-enhanced three-dimensional MRI or CT data of said living patient's heart to obtain three- dimensional heart image data; segmenting said three-dimensional heart image data into a plurality of different tissue types of said heart based on said contrast-enhanced three-dimensional MRI or CT data, said plurality of different tissue types including a normal tissue region, a scar tissue region and a transition zone region, said transition zone region including an infarct border zone tissue region; constructing a whole-heart model of said living patient's heart, said constructing said model comprising: creating a fmite element mesh using the segmented three-dimensional MRI or CT data to provide a geometrical representation of said patient's heart, the fmite element mesh comprising a plurality of volume elements; determining a fz ber orientation in each of the volume elements based on calculations executed on a patient- specific geometry of the patient's heart; and assigning electrophysiological parameters to each of the volume elements taking into account the fl ber 4 Appellants' October 30, 2012 Specification. 2 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 orientations and the type of tissue where the corresponding volume element is located; simulating a response of said patient's heart to each of a plurality of stimulations to a corresponding plurality of locations within said living patient's heart using said whole- heart model; classifying each simulation outcome for each stimulation as one resulting in a cardiac arrhythmia or not resulting in a cardiac arrhythmia; calculating a likelihood index based on results of said classifying; and providing at least one of said likelihood index or a parameter based thereon to a user. (Supp. Br. 5 7-8 ( emphasis added).) 5 Appellants' September 27, 2017 Response to Notice of Non-Compliant Appeal Brief. 3 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 Grounds of rejection before this Panel for review: I. Claims 1--4, 6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17, 19-22, 24, 26, and 28-39 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Trayanova, 6 Kroll, 7 Lohman, 8 Constantinides, 9 Korn, 10 Nathan, 11 and Frangi, 12 in combination with Revishvili, 13 Chen, 14 or Linenbank. 15 II. Claims 1--4,6,8, 10-13, 15, 17, 19-22,24,26,and28-39stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101. REJECTION]: ISSUE Does the preponderance of evidence relied upon by Examiner support a conclusion of obviousness? FACTUAL FINDINGS (FF) We adopt Examiner's fmdings concerning the scope and content of the prior art (Final Act. 9-12), and provide the following for emphasis: 6 Natalia A Trayanova,PhD,FHA, FHRS, Whole Heart Modeling: Applications to Cardiac Electrophysiology and Electromechanics, I 08 CIRC REs. 113-128 (2011) (citation is made to the NIH-Public Access CIRRES. Author Manuscript 1-30; available in PMC 2012 January 7). 7 Kroll, US 7,421,292 Bl, issued Sept. 2, 2008. 8 Lohman et al., US 2004/0215091 Al, published Oct. 28, 2004. 9 Constantinides, US 2003/0120151 Al, published June 26, 2003. 1° Korn et al., US 2011/0087088 Al, published Apr. 14, 2011. 11 Nathan et al., US 2011/0087110 Al, published Apr. 14, 2011. 12 Alejandro F. Frangi et al., Three-Dimensional Modeling/or Functional Analysis of Cardiac Images: A Review, 20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MEDICAL IMAGING 2-25 (2001 ). 13 Revishvili et al., US 2010/0191131 Al, published July 29, 2010. 14 Chen et al., US 2005/0018885 Al, published Jan. 27, 2005. 15 Linnenbank et al., US 2012/0002840 Al, published Jan. 5, 2012. 4 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 FF 1. Examiner fmds that Trayanova discloses, inter alia, determining fiber orientation of a patient's heart (see Final Act. 9 ( citing Trayanova §§ 2.2 and 3.2); see also Ans. 5 (Examiner fmds that Trayanova is relied upon to disclose "determining fiber orientation in [a] whole-heart geometric model of [a] particular patient's heart"); Ans. 5---6 ( citing Trayanova § 2.2) (Examiner fmds that "Trayanova acknowledges that if [histological or diffusion tensor (DT) MRI] data [is] not available 'rule-based approaches' are used to assign fiber orientation"); Ans. 6 (Examiner fmds that "Trayanova is viewed as teaching determining fiber orientation in each volume element based on patient-specific geometry")). FF 2. Examiner fmds that Trayanova discloses Appellants' claimed invention, but for calculating a cardiac arrhythmia "likelihood index, based on ... simulated responses of [a] heart model," the use of a cardiac arrhythmia likelihood index to determine the "likelihood of [an] occurrence of cardiac arrhythmia in [a] patient," "obtaining three-dimensional imaging data of [a] patient's heart in vivo[] from contrast-enhanced MRI imaging," and "defming volume elements of ... 3D heart models" (Final Act. 9-12; see also id. at 9 (Trayanova discloses, inter ali a, "constructing a whole-heart geometric model for simulating at least one of electrophysiological activity or electromethcnical activity of [a] patient's heart)). FF 3. Examiner fmds that the use of a "metric ( such as index, likelihood, etc.) to qualify [a] heart condition measured by various parameters as arrhythmia is known in the art" (Final Act. 10-11 (citing Kroll 18:29-50 and 19:34--43 and Lohman 9: left column, 11. 20-38)). FF 4. Examiner fmds that "obtaining three-dimensional imaging data of [a] patient's heart in vivo, from contrast-enhanced MRI imaging in particular, 5 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 are known in the art" (Final Act. 11 ( citing Constantinides ,r,r 62, 63, and 66; Korn ,r,r 7, 24, 26, 39, and 70; and Nathan ,r,r 24, 26, 39, 69, and 70); see also Ans. 5 ("obtaining three-dimensional imaging data of [a] patient's heart in vivo are known in the art")). FF 5. Examiner fmds "with regard to defming volume elements of the model, it is known that volume mesh elements in 3D heart models may take the form of any closed polyhedron, and typically contain tetrahedral-shaped volume elements" (Final Act. 12 ( citing Revishvili ,r,r 75-80; Chen ,r 180; or Linenbank,r,r 5, 8, and 82). ANALYSIS Based on the combination of Trayanova, Kroll, Lohman, Constantinides, Korn, Nathan, and Frangi, in combination with Revishvili, Chen, or Linenbank, Examiner concludes that, at the time Appellants' invention was made, a person of ordinary skill in this art would have realized that the more simulated outcomes in a modeled heart that result in the classification of a cardiac arrhythmia, the more likely an arrhythmia is to happen in the heart that is being modeled (Final Act. 10). Thus, Examiner reasons, it would have been prima facie obvious to a person of ordinary skill in this art "to use metrics such as index or likelihood to characterize data obtained from simulated electrophysiological or electromechanical activity in heart models" (Final Act. 11 ). In addition, Examiner fmds that a person of ordinary skill in this art would have found it prima facie obvious "to use data of three-dimensional imaging of a living patient's heart that are acquired in vivo, as it simplifies and facilitates the imaging data acquisition and does not require invasive procedures" (id.). 6 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 Appellants contend that "Examiner's reliance on Trayanova ... is misplaced because the reference applies to ex vivo hearts and does not consider the modeling of a living patient's heart" (Ans. 22; see also id. at 23). We are not persuaded. On this record, Examiner fmds that Constantinides, Korn, and Nathan disclose three-dimensional imaging of a living patient's heart (see FF 4). Thus, we fmd no error in Examiner's conclusion that, at the time Appellants' invention was made, a person of ordinary skill in this art would have found it prima facie obvious "to use data of three-dimensional imaging of a living patient's heart that are acquired in vivo, [in Trayanova's method,] as it simplifies and facilitates the imaging data acquisition and does not require invasive procedures" (Final Act. 11 ). Appellants contend that "Trayanova ... rather than disclosing determining the claimed patient-specific fiber orientations, it actually taught that acquiring patient-specific fiber orientation for a living patient was an impossibility" (Br. 23; see id. at 24 ( Appellants contend that the prior art relied upon by Examiner does not "disclose[] determining fiber orientations as claimed and constructing a patient-specific whole heart model of a living patient's heart"). We are not persuaded. As Examiner explains, Trayanova discloses the use of "rule-based approaches' ... to assign fiber orientation" (FF 1 ). There is no evidence on this record to support a conclusion that Trayanova' s rule-based approaches are not applicable to a living patient's heart (cf Br. 22-23). Because the method of Appellants' claim 1 does not require a plurality of electrical stimulations, we are not persuaded by Appellants' contention that "Trayanova ... fails to disclose simulating a response of [a] patient's heart to a plurality of electrical stimulations using the whole heart 7 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 model" (see Supp. Br. 7-8; cf id. at 8 (Appellants' claim 4 limits the scope of the method set forth in Appellants' claim 1 to require that the plurality of stimulations are electrical stimulations); Br. 23). Appellants' claim 1 requires, inter ali a, that simulation outcomes are classified as "one resulting in a cardiac arrhythmia or not resulting in a cardiac arrhythmia," therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants' contention that "Trayanovafails to disclose classifying each simulation outcome for each stimulation as one of a normal heart rhythm or a cardiac arrhythmia" (Br. 23 ( emphasis added)). In this regard, we do not fmd and Appellants' have not identified a disclosure on this record to support a fmding that a person of ordinary skill in this art would have understood that all simulation outcomes that do not result in a cardiac arrhythmia are normal heart rhythms. Nevertheless, as Examiner explains Trayanova discloses the classification of simulation outcomes as one of a normal heart rhythm or a cardiac arrhythmia(Final Act. 10 (citing Trayanova §§ 3.2-3.3 and Fig. 3)). Thus, Appellants' contentions are not persuasive. Appellants fail to provide an evidentiary basis on this record to support their contention that "Kroll, Lohman, Constantinides, Korn, Nathan, Frangi, Revishvili, Chen, and Linenbank do not make up for the deficiencies of Trayanova" (Br. 23 ). Therefore, we are not persuaded by Appellants' unsupported contention. In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) ("Attorney's argument in a brief cannot take the place of evidence."). For the same reason, we are not persuaded by Appellants' contentions that at the time of their claimed invention, a person of ordinary skill in this art would not have understood Trayanova to suggest "a virtual heart methodology could be constructed so as to determine [a] patient's risk of sudden cardiac 8 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 death" and "Applicant[ s] in fact believe[] that the consensus in the field at the time this invention was made was that it was not possible to construct a realistic personalized heart model to perform realistic simulations of the functioning of an individual's heart" (Br. 24). For the foregoing reasons, we are not persuaded by Appellants' contention that Examiner's rejection is based in "impermissible hindsight reasoning" (Br. 24). CONCLUSION The preponderance of evidence relied upon by Examiner supports a conclusion of obviousness. The rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S. C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Trayanova, Kroll, Lohman, Constantinides, Korn, Nathan, and Frangi, in combination with Revishvili, Chen, or Linenbank is affirmed. Claims 2--4, 6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17, 19-22, 24, 26, and 28-39 are not separately argued and fall with claim 1. REJECTION]]: ISSUE Does the preponderance of evidence of record support Examiner's fmding that Appellants' claimed invention is directed to patent ineligible subject matter? PRINCIPLES OF LAW An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 3 5 U.S. C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: '" [l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 9 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 ideas'" are not patentable. E.g.,AliceCorp. v. CLSBankint'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at217-18 (citing Mayo CollaborativeServs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012)). Inaccordancewiththat framework, we frrst determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593,611 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk."). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 ); mathematical formulas (Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding rubberproducts"(Diamondv. Diehr,450U.S. 175,191 (1981)); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n. 7 (quoting Corningv. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267---68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochranev. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Di ehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that"[ a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a 10 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 mathematical formula." Diehr,450U.S. at 176;see also id. at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." Id. ( citing Gottschalk and Parker); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."). If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( quotation marks omitted). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ abstract idea]."' Id. ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPT0,2019 RevisedPatentSubjectMatter Eligibility Guidance, 11 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (January 7, 2019) ("Revised Guidance"). Under that guidance, we frrst look to whether the claim recites: ( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). See 84 Fed. Reg. 54--5 5. Only if a claim ( 1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP §2106.05(d)); or ( 4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 84 Fed. Reg. 51. ANALYSIS Applying the Revised Guidance to the facts on this record, we find that Appellants' claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The Revised Guidance instructs us first to determine whether any judicial exception to patent eligibility is recited in the claim. The Revised Guidance identifies three judicially-excepted groupings identified by the courts as abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain methods of organizing human behavior such as fundamental economic practices, and (3) mental processes. Examiner fmds that Appellants' "process is a computational method of modeling heart condition of patient's heart to determine a numeric value of likelihood of occurrence of a cardiac arrhythmia in the patient" (Final 12 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 Act. 3 ). In this regard, Examiner fmds that Appellants' "method includes the steps of receiving imaging information, constructing a heart model, performing mathematical calculations to simulate activity of heart, classifying the results, and calculating an index value," which Examiner fmds "are directed to processing information and converting one form of numerical representation into another by organizing information through mathematical concepts such as mathematical algorithms, mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas, and calculations" (id.). We agree with Examiner that claim 1 recites patent ineligible subject matter. More specifically, Appellants' claim 1, reproduced above, recites the following limitations: (1) "segmenting ... [the] data ... to obtain three-dimensional heart image data," (2) "segmenting [the] three-dimensional heart image data into ... [ additional] data," and (3) determining a fiber orientation in each of the volume elements based on calculations executed on a patient-specific geometry of the patient's heart (Supp. Br. 7-8). These limitations simply require mathematic calculations, which, without more, is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I, 850 F.3d at 1340; see also Digitech Image Techs., LLC. v. Elecs. For Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Without additional limitations, a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing information to generate additional information is not patent eligible"). For the reasons discussed above, Appellants' claimed invention is directed to mathematical calculations, which are among the groupings identified in the revised Guidance, and thus an abstract idea (see Final Act. 4 (Examiner fmds that Appellants' claims are "directed to an abstract idea which is a judicial exception")). 13 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 Having determined that Appellants' claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception, the Revised Guidance directs us to next consider whether the claims integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. On this record, Appellants' claim 1 comprises the steps of: (a) "[a] computer- implemented method of determining a likelihood of an occurrence of a cardiac arrhythmia in a living patient," (b) "receiving ... data that includes [ data regarding a] living patient's heart," and "calculating a likelihood index based on results of said classifying," (c) "constructinga whole-heartmodel of [a] living patient's heart ... , " ( d) "simulating a response of said patient's heart to each of a plurality of stimulations to a corresponding plurality of locations within said living patient's heart using said whole-heart model," ( e) "classifying each simulation outcome for each stimulation as one resulting in a cardiac arrhythmia or not resulting in a cardiac arrhythmia," and ( f) "providing at least one of said likelihood index or parameter based thereon to a user" (Supp. Br. 7-8). We fmd, however, that analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, and outputting the results of such an analysis or calculation to a user, i.e. by a display, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea because they are insignificant post-solution activities. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353-54. Similarly, the receiving, or data collection, step of Appellants' claim, does not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea because it is an insignificant pre-solution activity. See Mayo 566 U.S. at 79 ( quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590) ("Purely 'conventional or obvious' '[pre ]-solution activity' is non11a1ly not sufficient to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law"). In addition, the use of a generic computer to perform generic computer 14 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 functions that are "well-understood, routine, conventional activities" previously known in the industry is not enough to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225-26. In sum, Appellants' claimed method directs a person of ordinary skill in this art to create and manipulate data as part of a model of a living patient's heart in order to simulate the induction of an arrhythmia in the model to determine a patient-specific ablation target that eliminates the arrhythmia with a minimal ablation lesion size as distinguished from a technical improvement for achieving or applying that result, i.e., the elimination of an arrhythmia with a minimal ablation lesion size in a living patient's heart. Cf Diehr, 450 U.S. at 179 n.5 (the claims in Diehrrecited a method for operating a rubber- molding press including the step of "opening the press automatically when a said comparison [ of calculated cure time vs. elapsed time] indicates equivalence." Thus, the recited mathematical equation had the practical application of automatically operating a press). Therefore, on this record, we conclude that the ineligible subject matter in Appellants' claim 1 is not integrated into a practical application. Having determined that the judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application, the Revised Guidance requires us to evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they provide an inventive concept, such as a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, conventional in the field, or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 84 Fed. Reg. 51. In this regard, we note that Appellants' method comprises the steps of: (i) "constructing a whole-heart 15 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 modelof[a] living patient's heart"and(ii) "simulating a response of said patient's heart to each of a plurality of stimulations to a corresponding plurality of locations within said living patient's heart using said whole-heart model" (Supp. Br. 7-8). We recognize that the model construction step of Appellants' claimed invention comprising the additional steps of creating a fmite element mesh using the segmented three- dimensional MRI or CT data to provide a geometrical representation of said patient's heart, the fmite element mesh comprising a plurality of volume elements; determining a fiber orientation in each of the volume elements based on calculations executed on a patient-specific geometry of the patient's heart; and assigning electrophysiological parameters to each of the volume elements taking into account the fiber orientations and the type of tissue where the corresponding volume element is located. (Supp. Br. 7-8.) As discussed above, with respectto the obviousness rejection, however, these method steps were known, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry (see e.g., FF 1-5; Final Act. 8- 12; Ans. 4--5; cf Br. 18-20). Therefore, we conclude that Appellants' claim 1 does not include an inventive concept. Although Appellants contends that their "invention provides a tool to determine a likelihood that a particular person will suffer SCD[ 16l" and that "[ t ]here currently is no such tool available to provide such important personalized life or death information," their claimed invention is not commensurate in scope with their contentions (see Br. 14; cf Br. 7-8). CONCLUSION OF LAW 16 Appellants defme the acronym "SCD" as "sudden cardiac death" (Br. 14). 16 Appeal 2018-002939 Application 13/694, 120 The preponderance of evidence of record supports Examiner's fmding that Appellants' claimed invention is directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Therejectionofclaim 1 under35U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. Claims 2--4, 6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17, 19-22, 24, 26, and 28-39 are not separately argued and fall with claim 1. TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 17 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation