Ex Parte Tsai et al

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 4, 2019

13995573 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 4, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/995,573 03/11/2014
88032 7590 04/08/2019
Jordan IP Law, LLC
12501 Prosperity Drive, Suite 401
Silver Spring, MD 20904
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Arthur Tsai
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
P35995US 1048
EXAMINER
ANDERSON, SCOTT C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3694
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/08/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
info@jordaniplaw.com
admin@jordaniplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte AR THUR TSAI and WILLIAM SU
Appeal2018-000694
Application 13/995,573
Technology Center 3600
Before JAMES R. HUGHES, ERIC S. FRAHM, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.
FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10, 12, 14--18, and 21-24. 1 We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 Claims 2, 4, 7, 11, 13, 19, 20, and 25 have been canceled.
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Disclosed Invention and Illustrative Claim
Appellants' disclosed invention concerns detecting whether
multimedia content is properly presented. See Spec. 1 :7-8. More
specifically, in the field of digital video advertisements, problems often
occur where frames are skipped or presented out of order. See Spec. 1: 10-
16. Accordingly, in one example, the disclosed invention implements a
player system that receives encoded multimedia content comprising an
advertisement, decodes the content to extract encoding information, and
compares the encoding information with stored information that indicates
how the frames of the encoded multimedia content should be presented. See
Spec. 9:6-16. "If the encoding information of multiple captured frames is
consistent with the stored information, then the encoded multimedia content
may be properly presented. Otherwise, alerts may be generated .... " Spec.
9:16-19. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A player system comprising:
a graphical user interface;
a display;
a presentation module to receive previously encoded
multimedia content and present the multimedia content on a
display;
a capture module to capture the multimedia content that
is presented on the display;
a decoding module to decode the captured multimedia
content and to retrieve encoding information from the captured
multimedia content, wherein the encoding information includes
frame identification;
a comparison module to compare the encoding
information with stored information; and
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an error handling module to generate an alert based on
the encoding information not being played with all frames
presented in a correct sequence as compared to the stored
information.
The Examiner's Rejections
Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10, 12, 14--18, and 21-24 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Hurst (US 2008/0297603 Al; Dec. 4,
2008), Helm (US 5,485,462; Jan. 16, 1996), and Greenberg (US
2009/0327100 Al; Dec. 31, 2009).
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Hurst, Helm, Greenberg, and Mayer (US 2007/0128899
Al; June 7, 2007).
Claims 15, 16, and 22-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
being unpatentable over Hurst, Helm, Greenberg, and Margulis (US
2007/0124474 Al; May 31, 2007).
Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Hurst, Helm, Greenberg, Margulis, and Mayer.
Claims 18 and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being
unpatentable over Hurst and Helm.
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
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Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There are, however, three judicially-created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: "[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int'!, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217-18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is "directed to." See id. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are
drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party
to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk .... ").
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 );
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as "molding rubber products" (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981 )); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267---68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 ("We
view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment."
Id. ( citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.").
If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive
concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 ( quotation marks omitted). "A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to
ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [ abstract idea]."' Id. ( alternations in original) ( quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention." Id.
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The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO's January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (hereinafter, "Revised
Guidance"). Under that guidance, after determining that a claim falls within
one of the statutory categories under § 101 (hereinafter, "USPTO Step 1 "),
we determine whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or
certain methods of organizing human activities) (hereinafter,
"USPTO Step 2A, Prong 1"); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h))
(hereinafter, "USPTO Step 2A, Prong 2").
Revised Guidance, at 51-52, 54--55. Only if a claim: (1) recites a
judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a
practical application, do we then evaluate whether the claim provides
an inventive concept. Revised Guidance, at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at
217-18. For example, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (hereinafter,
"USPTO Step 2B").
Revised Guidance, at 56.
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USPTO Step 1
We first note that Appellants argue the claims as a single group with
respect to the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection. See App. Br. 11.
Under our Rules,
[ w ]hen multiple claims subject to the same ground of rejection
are argued as a group or subgroup by appellant, the Board may
select a single claim from the group or subgroup and may
decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to
the group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone.
37 C.F.R. 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We select claim 1 as representative in our
analysis. Claim 1 is drawn to "[a] player system" and thus falls within at
least one of the enumerated categories (e.g., machine and/or manufacture) of
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 1
We have reviewed the Examiner's patent-ineligible subject matter
rejection of claim 1 (Final Act. 3--4) in light of Appellants' contentions that
the Examiner has erred (App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 5-10). Further, we have
reviewed the Examiner's response to Appellants' arguments (Ans. 3-5). We
disagree with Appellants' contentions that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. More specifically, we disagree with
Appellants' contentions that claim 1 does not recite an abstract idea.
The Examiner concludes the claims are directed to the abstract idea of
"verifying whether something has been delivered correctly (the steps of
capturing and comparing)." Final Act. 3. In particular, the Examiner
concludes the claimed encoding and decoding features are akin to the
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abstract idea found by the Federal Circuit in RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo
Co., 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Ans. 3.
Appellants contend the Examiner's statement of the abstract idea is
described at such a high level of abstraction that it is untethered from the
language of the claims. Reply Br. 5-6. Appellants also contend the claim 1
limitation "to decode the captured multimedia content and to retrieve
encoding information from the captured multimedia content" is different
than the standard encoding and decoding found patent ineligible in
RecogniCorp. Reply Br. 6-7.
Claim 1 recites "receiv[ing] previously encoded multimedia content
and present[ing] the multimedia content," "captur[ing] the multimedia
content," "decod[ing] the captured multimedia content and [] retriev[ing]
encoding information from the captured multimedia content," "compar[ing]
the encoding information with stored information," and "generat[ing] an
alert based on the encoding information ... as compared to the stored
information." These limitations, under their broadest reasonable
interpretation, recite decoding certain received and presented data,
comparing the decoded data to stored data, and generating an alert based on
the comparison.
The Federal Circuit has found that "standard encoding and decoding"
has been "long utilized to transmit information." RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at
1326. To wit, "Morse code, ordering food at a fast food restaurant via a
numbering system, and Paul Revere's 'one ifby land, two ifby sea'
signaling system all exemplify encoding at one end and decoding at the
other end." Id. Claim 1 does not specify a particular method of encoding
and decoding data, and therefore the claimed decoding of encoded data is
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not distinguishable from the standard encoding and decoding in
RecogniCorp. Although claim 1 recites the decoded data is "encoding
information" that "includes frame identification," this recitation merely
specifies the content of the data, and not a particular encoding/decoding
method. Thus, the decoding of encoded data in claim 1 encompasses an
evaluation that can be practically performed in the human mind, akin to the
examples in RecogniCorp.
Further, the claimed "receiv[ing]," "present[ing]," "captur[ing],"
"compar[ing]," and "generat[ing]" functions can also be practically
performed in the human mind. That is, receiving, presenting, and capturing
are all part of selecting certain data, which is a mental observation.
Comparing the ( decoded) selected data to stored data is a mental evaluation.
Generating an alert based on the comparison is a mental observation of the
comparison result. Accordingly, claim 1 recites a combination of mental
observations and evaluations that fall within the mental processes category
of abstract ideas listed in the Revised Guidance.
Appellants' argument that the abstract idea identified by the Examiner
is described at too high a level of abstraction (see Reply Br. 5---6) is not
persuasive of Examiner error. The Examiner identified abstract idea-
"verifying whether something has been delivered correctly (the steps of
capturing and comparing)" (Final Act. 3}-is at once stated more broadly
and more narrowly than our interpretation of the abstract idea recited in
claim 1. That is, we conclude the abstract idea in claim 1 includes the
mental processes of capturing and comparing as part of a verification
(generating an alert upon a condition), as does the Examiner, but we
conclude the abstract idea also includes other mental processes, as noted
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above. On the other hand, the Examiner concludes the abstract idea includes
verifying correct delivery, whereas we address this claim 1 feature,
specifically, generating an alert "based on the encoding information not
being played with all frames presented in a correct sequence," under USPTO
Step 2A, Prong 2, as discussed below. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit in
Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., noted that "[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction," and found that "[t]he Board's
slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability
analysis." 842 F.3d 1229, 1240-41 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, despite the fact
that claim 1 can be described at different levels of abstraction, the Examiner
has, at the least, identified claim 1 features----capturing and comparing-that
are part of the combination of mental processes we discuss above.
Accordingly, the Examiner did not err in concluding claim 1 recites an
abstract idea.
USPTO Step 2A, Prong 2
If a claim recites a judicial exception, in USPTO Step 2A, Prong Two,
we determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application of that exception by identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application.
Revised Guidance, at 54--55. We conclude that none of the additional
limitations identified and discussed below integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application.
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Claim 1 recites "[a] player system comprising: a graphical user
interface; a display." The Specification broadly describes a "computer
system 81 O" with associated peripherals for implementing the claimed
invention, where the peripherals include a "monitor 891 or other type of
display device." Spec. 10: 11-15; 12:2-3. The Specification also broadly
describes "a graphical user interface 305 configured to enable a user to
interact with one or more modules included in the player system 106." Spec.
5: 15-17. We see no description in the Specification that defines the "player
system," "graphical user interface," and "display" as anything other than
generic computer-based components. Accordingly, these features do not
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they amount to
mere instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(±).
Claim 1 also recites several modules, namely, "a presentation
module," "a capture module," "a decoding module," "a comparison
module," and "an error handling module." The Examiner concludes the
modules recited in claim 1 should be treated as means-plus-function
limitations under 35 U.S.C. § 112(±). 2 Final Act. 2-3. Appellants do not
argue the Examiner improperly interpreted the claimed modules as means-
plus-function language. We agree with the Examiner's conclusion (see Final
Act. 2) that the term "module" in claim 1 is a nonce word that does not
denote any particular structure, and thus should be treated as means-plus-
function language under§ 112(±). See Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC,
2 This application claims priority to PCT Application No. US2011/064577,
filed December 13, 2011, prior to the effective date of the AIA. We see no
error, however, in the Examiner's citation to§ 112(±), the text of which is
the same as pre-AIA § 112, sixth paragraph.
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792 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Here, the word 'module' does not
provide any indication of structure because it sets forth the same black box
recitation of structure for providing the same specified function as if the
term 'means' had been used."). In particular, we note that none of the prefix
terms to the claimed modules, for example, "presentation" or "capture,"
imparts sufficiently definite structure to the claimed modules. Accordingly,
as means-plus-function limitations, we must interpret the claimed modules
"to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the
specification and equivalents thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 112(±). See also In re
Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Per our holding, the
'broadest reasonable interpretation' that an examiner may give means-plus-
function language is that statutorily mandated .... ").
The Specification describes the "computer system 81 O" as including
"a processing unit ( or CPU) 820 having one or more processing cores, a
system memory 830, and a system bus 821 that couples various system
components including the system memory 830 to the processing unit 820."
Spec. 10:16-19. The system memory 830 may include "RAM 832 [that]
may contain data and/or program modules that are immediately accessible to
and/or presently being operated on by processing unit 820." Spec. 11: 1-6.
Accordingly, we construe the claimed modules as program code for
performing the respectively claimed functions that is stored in system
memory such as RAM and executed by a processor. 3 Such use of a generic
3 Upon further prosecution, the Examiner may wish to consider whether the
Specification sufficiently describes algorithms for each of the claimed
modules so as to pass muster under the definiteness requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph (pre-AIA). See Aristocrat Techs. v. Int 'l
Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[I]n a means-plus-
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processor for executing stored program code, however, merely amounts to
instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer, and therefore does
not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(±).
Claim 1 further specifies that the encoding information retrieved by
the decoding module "includes frame identification," and that the alert
generated by the error handling module is "based on encoding information
not being played with all frames presented in a correct sequence as
compared to the stored information." In other words, claim 1 limits the
decoded data that is compared with the stored data to a particular type of
data, i.e., data that is useful for determining whether frames of multimedia
content are played in the correct sequence. But such limitation of the
abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use fails to
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(h).
Claim 1 does not, as Appellants argue, recite an improvement in the
functioning of a computer. See App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 8-10. Claim 1 does
not specify any details of how the functions performed by the claimed
modules, for example, decoding data, are carried out. Absent details of how
the modules perform the recited functions, there can be no improvement in
computer technology that integrates the abstract idea into a practical
application. See MPEP §2106.05(a) ("To show that the involvement of a
computer assists in improving the technology, the claims must recite the
function claim 'in which the disclosed structure is a computer, or
microprocessor, programmed to carry out an algorithm, the disclosed
structure is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose
computer programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.").
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details regarding how a computer aids the method, the extent to which the
computer aids the method, or the significance of a computer to the
performance of the method.").
Moreover, in considering claim 1 as a whole, we see nothing that
applies the abstract idea "in a meaningful way, such that it is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception." MPEP §2106.05(e).
Even considering that generating an alert when multimedia frames are not
played in the correct sequence could be an important part of a process to
correct the sequence of frames, claim 1 does not actually apply the alert to
perform any corrective action. In other words, the alert is potentially useful
information, but claim 1 does not integrate that information into a practical
application. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, 659 F.3d
1057, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[T]he '139 and '739 patent claims ... include
the subsequent step of immunization on an optimum schedule. Claim 1 of
the '283 patent claims the idea of comparing known immunization results
that are, according to the patent, found in the scientific literature, but does
not require using this information for immunization purposes.").
Appellants also contend the "claims recite how features are
implemented in a functional and palpable way and are not so broad as to be
directed to an abstract idea itself that preempts every possible way of
performing the abstract idea." Reply Br. 10. However, while preemption is
the concern that drives the exclusionary principle of judicial exceptions to
patent-eligible subject matter (Alice, 573 U.S. at 216), preemption is not a
separate test of patent-eligibility, but is inherently addressed within the Alice
framework. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
13 79 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("While preemption may signal patent ineligible
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subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility.").
Accordingly, claim 1 does not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application.
USPTO Step 2B
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea that is not
integrated into a practical application, we now evaluate whether the
additional elements add a specific limitation that is not well-understood,
routine, or conventional activity in the field, or simply append well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea. Revised
Guidance, at 56.
Appellants contend claim 1 "allows for more than merely 'making
sure that images are in a correct sequence' using 'common, routine computer
functions."' Reply Br. 9. That is, "Appellant's claims address technical
problems that, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of
multimedia rendering by a computer would allow for ineffective multimedia
usage between a time when the problems actually occur and a time when the
problems are corrected." Reply Br. 9-10.
Claim 1, however, does not require implementing the abstract idea
with something more than well-understood, routine, and conventional
computer functions. As discussed above, the Specification describes using
generic computer components for the claimed "graphical user interface,"
"display," and respective modules. See Spec. 5: 15-17; 10: 11-19; 12:2-3;
11: 1---6. Further, the Specification does not describe any alteration to the
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conventional functioning of generic computer components in performing the
functions recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept. We are,
therefore, not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting as patent-ineligible
claim 1, and claims 3, 5, 6, 8-10, 12, 14--18, and 21-24 grouped together
therewith.
Obviousness
The Examiner finds the combination of Hurst, Helm, and Greenberg
discloses all the limitations of claim 1, including that Hurst teaches "an error
handling module to generate an alert." Final Act. 5-7. Appellants contend,
among other things, that Hurst fails to teach this feature. App. Br. 12-13;
Reply Br. 15. We are persuaded of Examiner error.
Hurst relates to "a test pattern generation system for detecting and
quantifying losses in at least one of video and audio equipment." Hurst,
,r 34. The Examiner relies on paragraph 48 of Hurst for teaching the claim 1
feature of generating an alert. Final Act. 6; Ans. 6. Hurst describes the
following:
For displaying a test pattern that indicates distortions
produced by a color transformation mismatch, according to
another embodiment, a signal with two or more distinct color
values is chosen such that, when a color transformation
mismatch occurs, the resulting pattern would show that one or
more of the two or more distinct color values would exceed the
normal 0% to 100% range of that color. ... This loss of
distinction would be an indication to a viewer that a color
transformation mismatch has occurred.
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Hurst, ,r 48. Here, Hurst discloses that a viewer perceives a color
transformation mismatch by viewing a test pattern. Hurst does not disclose
that the test pattern generation system detects the mismatch and then
generates an alert, for example, by using "an error handling module" as in
claim 1.
We are, therefore, constrained to find the Examiner erred in rejecting
independent claim 1, independent claims 10, 18, and 21, which recite
commensurate limitations, and dependent claims 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14--17, and
22-24 for the same reasons.
CONCLUSIONS
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1,
3, 5, 6, 8-10, 12, 14--18, and 21-24 as being directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1,
3, 5, 6, 8-10, 12, 14--18, and 21-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 3,
5, 6, 8-10, 12, 14--18, and 21-24 for obviousness. Therefore, we do not
sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejections of claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10, 12,
14--18, and 21-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 8-10,
12, 14--18, and 21-24. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(a)(l) ("The affirmance of the
rejection of a claim on any of the grounds specified constitutes a general
affirmance of the decision of the examiner on that claim, except as to any
ground specifically reversed.").
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. §
41.50(±).
AFFIRMED
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