Ex Parte Thompson et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJul 28, 201713953310 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 28, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/953,310 07/29/2013 Whit Thompson 8053-5-1 6091 30448 7590 08/01/2017 AKERMAN LLP P.O. BOX 3188 WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33402-3188 EXAMINER VIG, NARESH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3622 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/01/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ip @ akerman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte WHIT THOMPSON, HENRIQUE MEYER, LLOYD E. McCLENDON III, and DOUGLAS McCLENDON Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 Technology Center 3600 Before JAMES R. HUGHES, LARRY J. HUME, and ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges. HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1—13, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. Final Act. 1—2; Br. I.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 We refer to Appellants’ Specification (“Spec.”) filed July 29, 2013 and Appeal Brief (“Br.”) filed Oct. 15, 2015. We also refer to the Examiner’ Answer (“Ans.”) mailed Mar. 11, 2016, and Final Office Action (Final Rejection) (“Final Act.”) mailed May 15, 2015. Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 Appellants ’ Invention The invention generally relates to processing tax deed applications for a real estate tracts, in particular, systems and methods for managing the processing of tax deed applications. The system includes a user interface, a memory storing instructions, and a processor executing instructions to perform operations. The operations performed include receiving tax deed application data for a tract of real, accessing tax certificate data associated with the tract, determining the fees associated with the tax deed application based on the amount of taxes and interest due for the associated tax certificate(s), and receiving and accepting electronic payment of the fees. Spec. H11—20; Abstract. Representative Claim Independent claim 1, reproduced below, further illustrates the invention: 1. A system for processing a tax deed application for a tract of real estate, the system comprising: a user interface; a memory that stores instructions; a processor that executes the instructions from memory to perform operations, the operations comprising: receiving application data representative of the tax deed application for the tract of real estate in connection with a tax certificate associated with the tract of real estate; accessing data representing every outstanding tax certificate associated with the tract of real estate; determining an amount of fees associated with the tax deed application, wherein the amount of fees is based at least in part on (a) the amount of taxes due in connection with said tax certificate; (b) the amount of interest due in connection with said 2 Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 tax certificate; (c) the amount of taxes due in connection with other outstanding tax certificates associated with the tract of real estate, if any; and (d) the amount of interest due in connection said other outstanding tax certificates, if any; accepting electronic payment of the amount of the fees associated with the tax deed application for the tract of real estate; determining that tax deed data associated with the tract of real estate has been changed; and displaying, in the user interface, at least a portion of the tax deed data, the display providing an indication of the determined changes to the tax deed data in the at least a portion of the tax deed data. Rejection on Appeal The Examiner rejects claims 1—13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as not being directed to patent-eligible subject matter. ISSUE Based upon our review of the record, Appellants’ contentions, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the issue before us follows: Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1—13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as not being directed to patent-eligible subject matter? ANALYSIS Appellants argue independent claims 1 and 3 together as a group and do not separately argue dependent claims 2 and 4—13. See Br. 16—19. We select independent claim 1 as representative of Appellants’ arguments with respect to claims 1—13. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The Examiner rejects the claims and, in particular, claim 1 as not being directed to patent-eligible matter in that: The claim as a whole, does not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. This is because the claim does 3 Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 not effect an improvement to another technology or technical field; the claim does not amount to an improvement to the functioning of a computer itself; and the claim does not move beyond a general link of the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. The claim merely amounts to the application or instructions to apply the abstract idea (i.e. processing of tax deed applications for certificates bought by investors/owners) on a computer, and is considered to amount to nothing more than requiring a generic computer system (e.g. a computer system comprising a generic database; a generic element for providing communication capability; a generic element for receiving user input; a generic display to present user requests; and a generic element to process payments) to merely carry out the abstract idea itself. As such, the claim, when considered as a whole, is nothing more than the instruction to implement the abstract idea (i.e. processing of tax deed applications for certificates bought by investors/owners) in a particular, albeit well-understood, routine and conventional technological environment. Final Act. 6; see Final Act. 4—6; Ans. 2—3. Appellants contend “Claim 1 provide [s] significant advantages over previous techniques of processing of tax deed applications [and] . . . also amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea of processing of tax deed applications, alleged by the Office Action.” Br. 17 (internal quotation omitted); see Br. 16—18. Appellants further contend “Claim 1 does not pre-empt the abstract idea of processing of tax deed applications.” Br. 18 (internal quotation omitted). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “Tong held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Assn for 4 Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77—80 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts” {id.), e.g., to an abstract idea. If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo 566 U.S. at 78, 79). The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Turning to the first step of the eligibility analysis, the Examiner finds claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of processing tax deed applications. See Final Act. 4—6; Ans. 2—3. Appellants do not contest that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, but instead focus on the second step of the Alice 5 Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 analysis—whether the claim adds significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. See By. 16—18. We agree with the Examiner that Appellants’ claim 1 (and the other pending claims) are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. See Final Act. 4—6; Ans. 2—3. Claim 1 utilizes a processor to receive tax deed application data associated with the tract of real estate, which is associated with one or more tax certificates. The recited process finds (accesses) outstanding tax certificates associated with the tract and determines fees for the tax deed application based on the taxes due for the tax certificate(s) and the interest due for the tax certificate(s). The process then accepts electronic payment of fees. The process also determines that tax deed data has been changed and utilizes a user interface to display the tax deed data as well as an indication of the changes to the tax deed data. Spec. ^fl[ 11—20. The instant claims are akin to the claims for analyzing information found to be abstract in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353—54 (Fed. Cir. 2016), or the claims directed to image data processing discussed in Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding “a process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate [data or information] to generate additional information is [abstract and] not patent eligible”). Having found Appellants’ claims are directed to an abstract concept under Alice’s step 1 analysis, we next address whether the claims add significantly more to the alleged abstract idea. See Final Act. 5—6; Ans. 2—3. As directed by our reviewing Court, we search for an ‘“inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible 6 Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 application.’” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355). Appellants contend claim 1 “amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself’ (Br. 16) and “provide[s] significant advantages over previous techniques of processing of tax deed applications” (Br. 17). We disagree with Appellants’ unsupported and conclusory arguments. Appellants’ claim 1 does not recite any of the purported advantages. See Br. 16—18. Indeed, the claim merely recites processes for manipulating data, e.g., utilizing database operations. Such steps — receiving tax deed application data, finding and accessing outstanding tax certificates associated with the tax deed application, determining fees, accepting payment, and displaying data — are all routine and conventional computer functions (i.e., mathematical operations) of a general processor. The Specification supports this view in discussing the processes implemented in software which operates on generic computers to perform the recited data manipulation steps. See Spec. 42—84; Figs. 1—11. Moreover, we find this type of activity, i.e., receiving and processing data and determining fees includes longstanding conduct that existed well before the advent of computers and the Internet, and could be carried out by a human with pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalkv. Benson").2 2 Cybersource further guides that “a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.” Cybersource, 654 F.3d at 1373. 7 Appeal 2016-005829 Application 13/953,310 Appellants also contend claim 1 “does not pre-empt the abstract idea of processing of tax deed applications,” in that it “would be very easy to perform the abstract idea of processing of tax deed applications without performing each and every limitation.” Br. 18 (internal quotation omitted). We note, however, that lack of complete preemption does not make an abstract concept patent-eligible. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility”). For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under § 101 of independent claims 1 and 3, and also dependent claims 2 and 4—13, which fall with claims 1 and 3, respectively. CONCLUSION On this record, Appellants have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1—13 under 35 U.S.C. §101. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—13. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation