Ex Parte Taylor et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 23, 2017

12796425 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 23, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/796,425 06/08/2010 Ronald Taylor 061134-9131-US01 2780
23409 7590 10/25/2017
MICHAEL BEST & FRIEDRICH LLP (Mke)
100 E WISCONSIN AVENUE
Suite 3300
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202
EXAMINER
LAU, KEVIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/25/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mkeipdocket@michaelbest.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RONALD TAYLOR, JANE LIU,
and GUSTAVO SUMCAD
Appeal 2017-002945
Application 12/796,4251
Technology Center 2600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
MICHAEL J. ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1—21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Technology
The application relates to electronic door locks that can be controlled
remotely. Spec. Tflf 2—\.
Illustrative Claim
Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at
issue emphasized:
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Harrow Products LLC.
App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-002945
Application 12/796,425
1. A lock system comprising:
a plurality of access points, each including a portion
movable between an open position and a closed position;
a remote portion operable to broadcast a beacon and a data
update signal that includes data updates;
a plurality of lock mechanisms, each one coupled to one
of the plurality of access points and movable between a locked
position in which the access point is maintained in the closed
position and an unlocked position in which the access point is
freely movable between the open position and the closed
position;
a smart warning unit separate from the remote portion and
including a transceiver operable to transmit an alert signal; and
a plurality of wireless modules, each one coupled to one
of the plurality of lock mechanisms and operable to move the
lock mechanism between the locked position and the unlocked
position, each wireless module including a receiver operable in a
first mode to periodically and non-continuously listen for the
beacon and operable in a second mode in response to receipt of
the beacon to receive the data updates, the first mode consuming
a first amount of power that is less than a second amount of
power consumed during operation in the second mode, each
receiver operable in response to receipt of the alert signal to
move the receiver’s lock mechanism to one of the locked position
and the unlocked position in a coordinated fashion.
Rejections
Claims 1—6, 10-16, 20, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Carrieri (US 2006/0214767 Al;
Sept. 28, 2006), Unger (US 2002/0152473 Al; Oct. 17, 2002), Sivard (US
2006/0229053 Al; Oct. 12, 2006), and Syron-Townson et al. (US 5,070,442;
Dec. 3, 1991). Final Act. 2.
Claims 7—9 and 17—19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
obvious over the combination of Carrieri, Unger, Sivard, Syron-Townson,
and Varma (US 5,850,753; Dec. 22, 1998). Final Act. 16.
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Appeal 2017-002945
Application 12/796,425
ISSUES
Did the Examiner err in finding Syron-Townson teaches or suggests
“a smart warning unit separate from the remote portion and including a
transceiver operable to transmit an alert signal” and “each receiver operable
in response to receipt of the alert signal to move the receiver’s lock
mechanism to one of the locked position and the unlocked position in a
coordinated fashion,” as recited in independent claim 1?
ANALYSIS
A) “a smart warning unit. . . including a transceiver”
Independent claims 1 and 13 recite “a smart warning unit separate
from the remote portion and including a transceiver operable to transmit an
alert signal.”
The Examiner relies on Syron-Townson’s disclosure of a fire alarm
system for teaching these limitations. Final Act. 6 (citing Syron-Townson
3:8—15). Appellants argue “a transceiver must include both a transmitter and
a receiver” and Syron-Townson’s fire alarm panel includes only a
transmitter, not a receiver. App. Br. 7.
The Examiner first finds Syron-Townson’s “transmitter for the fire
alarm includes a current relay (Fig. 4) for triggering the transmission” and
the current relay “receives a signal... to begin transmitting information.”
Ans. 2. We agree with Appellants, however, that “[t]he Examiner’s
interpretation of the term ‘transceiver’ is unreasonably broad” because “[a]t
some level, every transmitter receives some type of control signal which
regulates the content. . . the transmitter will transmit.” Reply Br. 3.
Alternatively, the Examiner finds “the fire alarm system can be seen
as including the powerline carrier interface unit D,” which “is a transceiver.”
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Appeal 2017-002945
Application 12/796,425
Ans. 2 (citing Syron-Townson 3:34-47, Fig. 1). Appellants do not dispute
that Syron-Townson’s powerline carrier interface unit D is a transceiver.
See Syron-Townson 3:34—35. Instead, Appellants argue “the powerline
carrier interface unit in Syron-Townson’s system is separate from the fire
alarm panel.” Reply Br. 3.
Although we agree with Appellants that the fire alarm panel alone
includes only a transmitter, not a transceiver (see Syron-Townson 5:8—19),
Appellants have not sufficiently explained why the claimed “smart warning
unit” would be limited to just Syron-Townson’s fire alarm panel (as shown
in Figure 4) rather than also including powerline carrier interface unit D (as
shown in Figure 1). The Examiner is correct that “the powerline carrier
interface unit D is the unit that communicates with the door locks.” Ans. 3
(citing Syron-Townson 3:34-47). Moreover, Syron-Townson’s fire alarm
panel and powerline carrier interface unit D are “separate from” the system
that the Examiner relies on for teaching the claimed “remote portion” (i.e.,
Carrieri’s wireless central access control system). Ans. 2—3.
Therefore, Appellants have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in
finding Syron-Townson teaches or suggests the claimed smart warning unit.
B) “in response to receipt of the alert signal ”
Claim 1 recites “each receiver operable in response to receipt of the
alert signal to move the receiver’s lock mechanism to one of the locked
position and the unlocked position in a coordinated fashion.”
Appellants argue Syron-Townson’s door locks “do not receive the fire
alarm” because the fire alarm panel sends the fire alarm to the central
monitoring station, and the central monitoring station sends a different signal
to the locks instructing them to unlock. App. Br. 9.
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Appeal 2017-002945
Application 12/796,425
The Examiner, however, finds that “the powerline carrier interface
unit D is the unit that communicates with the door locks” and therefore “the
unlock signals can be[] seen as the alert signal as they can be triggered by
the fire alarm.” Ans. 3.
As discussed above, Appellants have not sufficiently explained why
Syron-Townson’s powerline carrier interface unit D is not part of the
claimed “smart warning unit.” Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that
signals sent from the powerline carrier interface unit D to the door locks in
the event of a fire teach or suggest the claimed alert signal.
C) “one of the locked position and the unlocked position ”
Independent claim 13 recites “the lock mechanism moving to one of
the locked position and the unlocked position in response to the alert signal.”
Claim 1 recites a commensurate limitation.
Appellants argue Syron-Townson only teaches unlocking all doors in
response to a fire alarm, not locking all doors in response to a different alert.
App. Br. 9. The Examiner finds this sufficient because “the language is in
the alternative” and “does not need both.” Ans. 4. Appellants, however,
argue that the claims recite “and,” not “or.” Reply Br. 4.
There may be instances where “one of A and B” means “one of A and
one ofB.” See, e.g., SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d
870, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing “at least one of A and B” to mean “at
least one A and at least one B” because A and B were separate categories).
Here, however, the “locked position” and “unlocked position” are specific
positions that are mutually exclusive. The lock cannot simultaneously move
to both the locked position and the unlocked position. Moreover, the claims
only require one alert signal so we are not persuaded the claims as presently
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Application 12/796,425
written require both a locking alert and an unlocking alert. Instead, the
claims here are more closely analogous to a Markush group, which typically
separates a series of alternatives using the word “and.” E.g., Gillette Co. v.
Energizer Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A
Markush group lists specified alternatives in a patent claim, typically in the
form: a member selected from the group consisting of A, B, and C.”). To
the extent Appellants intended a different meaning, “the patent drafter is in
the best position to resolve the ambiguity in the patent claims, and it is
highly desirable that patent examiners demand that applicants do so in
appropriate circumstances so that the patent can be amended during
prosecution rather than attempting to resolve the ambiguity in litigation.”
Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. M-ILLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir.
2008). Here, the Examiner has shown Syron-Townson teaches moving the
lock mechanism to one of the specified alternative positions.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of independent
claims 1 and 13, and their dependent claims 2—12 and 14—21, which
Appellants argue are patentable for similar reasons. See App. Br. 10; 37
C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
For the reasons above, we reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting
claims 1—21.
No time for taking subsequent action in connection with this appeal
maybe extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED
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