Ex Parte Taylor et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 1, 201914478473 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/478,473 09/05/2014 28395 7590 07/03/2019 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L 1000 TOWN CENTER 22NDFLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Kendrick J. Taylor UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 83456081 3938 EXAMINER FANTU, YALKEW ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2859 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/03/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KENDRICK J. TAYLOR and MARK J. FERREL Appeal2018-008804 Application 14/478,473 Technology Center 2800 Before KAREN M. HASTINGS, MERRELL C. CASHION, JR., and JANEE. INGLESE, Administrative Patent Judges. HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's rejections of claims 1--4, 8, 11-16, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(l) as being anticipated by Nitzberg et al. (US 8,768,563 B2 issued Jul. 1, 2014), or in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Nitzberg in view of Bertness et al. (US 2009/0024266 Al, pub. Jan. 22, 2009). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellant is the applicant, Ford Motor Technologies, LLC which is also stated to be the real party in interest (Appeal Br. 2). Appeal2018-008804 Application 14/478,473 Claim 1 illustrates the invention. 1. A test device comprising: a charge coupler pluggable to a vehicle; a processor configured to communicate electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) handshaking communications with the vehicle via the charge coupler; the test device permanently lacking ability to provide electrical power for charging the vehicle; and the EVSE handshaking communications include communications which EVSE would communicate with the vehicle for the EVSE to initiate charging of the vehicle. Appellant relies on the arguments presented for claim 1 for independent method claim 12 (Appeal Br. 10). Appellant presents arguments for independent test device claim 16 that merely recite the limitations of the claim (Appeal Br. 10). Appellant does not separately argue any of the dependent claims. Accordingly, all the claims stand or fall together. Therefore, we limit our discussion to claim 1 and claims 2--4, 8, 11-16, and 18 stand or fall with this claim. OPINION We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced thereon. Cf Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential) (cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[I]t has long been the Board's practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner's rejections")). Having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant's contentions, we are not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error, and we 2 Appeal2018-008804 Application 14/478,473 affirm the Examiner's§§ 102 and 103 rejections for the reasons expressed in the Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following for emphasis. We refer to the Examiner's Final Action for a statement of the rejections. Final Act. 3---6. With respect to the anticipation rejection, Appellant primarily argues that the claim limitations "configured to communicate electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE) handshaking communications with the vehicle via the charge coupler" and "the EVSE handshaking communications include communications which EVSE would communicate with the vehicle for the EVSE to initiate charging of the vehicle" do not encompass Nitzberg' s test device (Appeal Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 4--5). Appellant contends that claim 1 requires "the test device communicating with the vehicle to test the vehicle" (Appeal Br. 8). Appellant further argues that claim 1 requires "the test device communicating EVSE handshaking communications with the vehicle in which the EVSE handshaking communications include communications which EVSE would communicate with the vehicle for the EVSE to initiate charging of the vehicle" (Appeal Br. 9). Appellant's arguments do not point to reversible error in the Examiner's determination of anticipation. Claim 1 does not expressly recite that the test device communicates with the vehicle to test the vehicle or "the test device communicating EVSE handshaking communications with the vehicle." Nor does claim 1 exclude the test device from being connected to an EVSE. Limitations not appearing 3 Appeal2018-008804 Application 14/478,473 in the claims cannot be relied upon for patentability. In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). In construing claims, "the PTO must give claims their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification .... Therefore, we look to the specification to see if it provides a definition for claim terms, but otherwise apply a broad interpretation." In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). "[A]s applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or patentee." Id. A preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's finding that the claimed subject matter of independent claim 1--4, 8, 11-16, and 18 are anticipated within the meaning of§ 102 in view ofNitzberg. As the Examiner points out, Nitzberg teaches that the testing device may be located in different places including the electric vehicle (EV) (Ans. 9). 2 The Examiner explains that the mobile test unit in Nitzberg is communicating with the vehicle through the EV connector3 (Final Act. 7). A preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's position that one of ordinary skill would have reasonably inferred from Nitzberg that the testing unit may be located on the EV itself, and thus communicating with the vehicle. In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (In determining whether a reference anticipates the subject matter recited in a claim, "it is proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be expected to draw therefrom."); see also In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264--65 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 2 Column 2, lines 35-37, Nitzberg et al. 3 Figure 5, 200 and 17 6, Nitzberg et al. 4 Appeal2018-008804 Application 14/478,473 ( a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the inferences one of ordinary skill in the art would have reasonably been expected to draw therefrom). On this record, Appellant has not offered persuasive argument or technical reasoning to establish that the Examiner reversibly erred in relying upon Nitzberg as anticipating the claimed subject matter. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 12 and 16 ( as well as all their dependent claims) as anticipated by Nitzberg. With respect to the alternative§ 103 rejection, it has been established that "the [obviousness] analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007). The Examiner further relies upon Bertness to exemplify that it was known to provide a portable battery testing device for an EV (that is not connected to an EVSE) ( e.g., Bertness abstract; Ans. 4, 5, 9). One of ordinary skill would have readily appreciated, using no more than ordinary creativity, that the testing device in Nitzberg may have been modified or configured such that there is no connection to the charge source as exemplified in Bertness. Appellant presents no arguments in the Appeal Brief regarding this rejection, and accordingly has not shown reversible error therein. 4 4 Appellant addresses Bertness for the first time in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 5). Appellant has not shown good cause why these arguments could not 5 Appeal2018-008804 Application 14/478,473 Accordingly, the Examiner's§§ 102 and 103 rejections of claims 1--4, 8, 11-16, and 18 are affirmed. ORDER It is ordered that the Examiner's decision is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) AFFIRMED have been presented in the Appeal Brief. Therefore, we need not consider the arguments newly raised in the Reply Brief. 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation