Ex Parte Sundaresh et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 17, 2017

12485167 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 17, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/485,167 06/16/2009 Nagaraja Sundaresh H0018596-1161.1455101 2755
90545 7590
HONEY WET ,T ,/STW
Patent Services
115 Tabor Road
P.O. Box 377
MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950
04/19/2017 EXAMINER
PEREZ BERMUDEZ, YARITZA H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2864
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/19/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentservices-us @ honey well, com
Honeywell.USPTO@STWiplaw.com
sherry, vallabh @honeywell.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte NAGARAJA SUNDARESH, PRADEEP SHETTY,
RAJESH RAMESH, CHANDRASHEKAR PADUBIDRI,
RANGESA ARAKERE, and ANANDA HUCHAPPA SHASTRY
Appeal 2015-003092
Application 12/485,167
Technology Center 2800
Before: JAMES C. HOUSEL, AVELYN M. ROSS, and
BRIAN D. RANGE, Administrative Patent Judges.
ROSS, Administrative Patent Judge
DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of
claims 1—18. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 In our Decision below we refer to the Specification (as amended) (“Spec.”)
filed June 16, 2009, the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) dated November
13, 2013, the Appeal Brief filed May 19, 2014 (Appeal Br.), the Examiner’s
Answer (“Ans.”) dated November 12, 2014, and the Reply Brief (“Reply
Br.”) filed January 12, 2015.
2 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Honeywell International
Inc., the assignee of the instant application. Appeal Br. 4.
Appeal 2015-003092
Application 12/485,167
STATEMENT OF CASE
The claims are directed to a system and methods to make consumers
aware of electricity usage. Spec. 1. Claims 1 and 8, reproduced below, are
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. An energy usage awareness system comprising:
an energy meter that measures energy usage of a building
and stores the measured energy usage as a measured power
magnitude that is sampled over a specified duration of time;
a memory that stores information about one or more
energy using appliances within the building, the appliance
information comprising:
a type of each of the energy using appliances;
a number of appliances of each type within the building;
ratings information for the one or more appliances; and
a listing of typical hours of usage during a typical day for
each type of energy using appliances; and
wherein the appliance information and the listing of
typical hours of usage during a typical day are entered by a user;
and
a processor coupled to the energy meter and to the
memory, wherein the processor infers an energy usage pattern
for one or more of the energy using appliances using the
measured power magnitude of the building and the appliance
information.
8. An energy usage awareness method comprising:
measuring combined energy usage of a plurality of
appliances within a building using a single meter;
retrieving appliance information from a memory, the
appliance information comprising information about the types of
appliances installed within the building, the number of
appliances of each type installed within the building, ratings
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Application 12/485,167
information of each of the appliances, and a listing of typical
usage hours of each appliance;
inferring a pattern of energy usage for each appliance
using the measured energy usage, the appliance information, and
the listing of typical usage hours of each appliance type; and,
providing the pattern of energy usage to a user of the
appliances.
Claims Appendix at Appeal Br. 20 and 21.
REJECTIONS3
The Examiner maintains the following rejections:
A. Claims 8, 11, 14, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by Durling. Final Act. 4.
B. Claims 1, 4, and 6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Durling. Id. at 7.
C. Claims 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, and 13 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Durling in view
of Rodenberg. Id. at 11.
D. Claims 7 and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Durling in view of Golden. Id. at
16.
E. Claims 17 and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a)
as being unpatentable over Durling in view of Rodenberg
and in further view of Ehlers. Id. at 17.
Appellants appeal the rejections of claims 1—18. Appellants argue
independent claims 1,8, and 17 (as well as dependent claim 18 together with
3 The Examiner rejects claims 1—18 as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112,12
but acknowledges withdrawal of the rejection. Ans. 2.
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claim 17) but do not separately argue claims 2—7 and 9—16. Appeal Br. 3—
19. We therefore focus our discussion below on claims 1, 8, and 17
(Rejections A, B and E) to resolve the issues on appeal. But, because we
reverse the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 8, we also discuss
Rejections C and D below.
OPINION
Rejection A—Anticipation (claims 8, 11, 14 and 15)
The Examiner rejects claim 8 (among others) as being anticipated by
Durling. Final Act. 4. The Examiner finds that Durling “teaches an energy
usage awareness method” having each of the steps of claim 8. Id. at 4—5.
Appellants present several arguments in support of their position that
Durling cannot anticipate claim 8. See e.g., Appeal Br. 9—15. Because we
find Appellants’ argument that Durling fails to teach “the number of
appliances of each type installed within the building” persuasive of error, we
need not address Appellants’ remaining arguments.
Appellants urge that the “method of independent claim 8 . . . store[s]
multiple recited information types which [are], by virtue of the recited
information types, specific to the installation [site] and only available
locally.” Appeal Br. 11. Appellants acknowledge that claim 8 does not
require user input of this stored information, but urges that claim 8 “recites
input information to which the user of the appliances would have access and
to which persons other than the user of the appliance would not generally
have access.” Id. at 12. In contrast, Appellants argue that Durling does not
utilize information specific to the installed location or the categories of
information recited in the claims. Id. Rather, Durling is a smart meter that
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uses preprogrammed information that is “generic transition pattern data
which is externally obtained and preprogrammed into the unit prior to
installation and does not reflect the appliances actually present in the
building except by incidental overlap.” Id.
We find Appellants’ argument persuasive of reversible error by the
Examiner. Anticipation, a factual inquiry, is established where an Examiner
shows that a single prior art reference describes all features of the claimed
invention arranged as specified in claim, either expressly or inherently, in a
manner enabling one skilled in the art to practice the embodiment without
undue experimentation. See, e.g., ClearValue, Inc. v. Pearl River Polymers,
Inc., 668 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (To be anticipatory, “the reference must disclose each
and every element of the claimed invention, whether it does so explicitly or
inherently.”).
Here, in relevant part, claim 8 requires the step of retrieving appliance
information from memory where the appliance information includes, inter
alia, “the number of appliances of each type installed within the building.”
Claims Appendix at Appeal Br. 21 (emphasis added). The system of
Durling instead, “provides an estimate for each of the electric loads typically
found in people’s homes” as opposed to information about the appliances
(and numbers of each type of appliances) actually installed within a
building. Durling 127 (emphasis added). Therefore, and as Appellants
explain, “Durling does not appear to ‘know’ which types of appliances are
present within a building and can only assert a probability that a given
building includes an appliance of a given type selected from a limited set of
pre-programmed appliance types.” Reply Br. 3. By way of example, “one
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user building may have a pottery kiln while another may have a wood
turning lathe. Yet another may not have a hot tub or dehumidifier.
Accordingly, the recited appliance information detailed in the claim would
be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to be building specific and
thus to be locally provided.” Id. The Examiner’s position (Ans. 7—8.) that
“the claimed language does not specify the amount of items of appliances
[but rather] only requires a number of appliances” together with the Figures
depicting a listing of exemplary appliances, fails to establish that Durling
teaches “the number of appliances of each type installed within the
building.” Accordingly, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s rejection based
on anticipation.
Rejection B — Obviousness (claims 1, 4, and 6)
The Examiner rejects claim 1, including claims depending therefrom,
as obvious over Durling. Final Act. 7. The Examiner finds that Durling
teaches an energy usage awareness system having an energy meter, a
memory that stores appliance information, and a processor as claimed. Id. at
7—9. And, while Durling does not expressly teach that the appliance
information is entered by a user, the Examiner finds that “[i]n order to pre­
program this information [into memory,] this information [would] have to be
pre-programmed by an [sic] user.” Id. at 10. Thus, the Examiner reasons
that it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention “that a user enter or pre-program appliance information
and a listing of typical hours of usage for the benefit of having a profile data
available for the analysis of energy consumption based on data from
previous experiments.” Id.
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Appellants first argue that Durling does not teach measuring energy
usage but rather teaches measuring power which “are not equivalent terms.”
Appeal Br. 9. “Current and voltage, as measured by Durling, suffice to
measure power but not energy or energy usage” which are measured in
joules per second or watts. Id. Appellants contend that “substituting] a
computation based upon the rate of energy usage (i.e., power) instead of
energy usage, per se,” would change the principle of operation of Durling.
Reply Br. 5.
Appellants’ argument does not convince us of reversible error in the
Examiner’s rejection. As the Examiner aptly explains that
[p]ower is defined as the time rate at which energy is emitted,
transferred or received. Power is measured in Watts, 1 Watt = 1
Joule/sec. Energy is defined as power derived from the
utilization of physical or chemical resources; and as the capacity
of a physical system to perform work. Energy is measured in
Joules, 1 Joule = 1 Watt-second; Power is the rate of doing work
and is equivalent to energy consumed per unit time. In
conclusion, by measuring power, we are measuring energy,
whether it is called measuring energy or measuring power.
Ans. 3 (emphasis added). Durling teaches measuring energy consumption
over time, i.e., power in kilowatt-hours (kWh), as depicted in Figures 2 and
3. See Durling Figs. 2 and 3. Durling explains that this measured electric
power signal may then be decomposed into individual constituent loads. Id.
5, 7—13. Thus, Durling teaches a meter that meets the claim language,
that is, “an energy meter that measures energy usage . . . and stores the
measured energy usage as a measured power magnitude that is sampled over
a specified duration of time.” Claims Appendix at Appeal Br. 20; see also
id. at 22 (“wherein the measured energy is stored as discrete samples of the
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total power consumed within the building at specified intervals over a
specified duration of time”).
Next Appellants argue that claim 1 recites “a meter (singular) that
measures energy usage of a (singular) building[,]” as opposed to a plurality
of buildings. Appeal Br. 11 and 17. Therefore Appellants contend that the
“claims preclude the combination of meter readings from multiple types of
meters/sensors ... to derive that information in a manner not disclosed by
Durling.” Id.
Appellants’ argument is not persuasive of reversible error. As the
Examiner appropriately finds (Ans. 5), Durling teaches a single meter 10
that measures the energy consumption of a house or building and therefore,
reads on the claims. See e.g., Durling || 7, 14, 23—24, 27—28, and Fig. 3.
Moreover, we note that the article “a” or “an”—absent evidence to the
contrary—means “one or more.” See, e.g., Baldwin Graphics Systems, Inc.
v. Siebert, 512 F.3d. 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (In patent parlance, an
indefinite article “a” or “an” means “one or more”). Here, neither the claims
nor the specification indicate Appellants desire to depart from this general
rule. Abtoxv. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Indeed,
a comparison of the claims indicates quite the opposite; where Appellants
intended for “a” to denote a single element, Appellants specifically claimed
a single meter. Compare Claims Appendix at Appeal Br. 21, claim 8
(reciting “a single meter”) with id. at 20, claim 1 (reciting “an energy
meter”).
Third, Appellants assert that “Durling does not disclose the recited
items of stored information of the independent claims having been input by
the user of the appliances [occupant(s)] within the building.” Appeal Br. 13.
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Rather, Appellants contend that Durling relies upon generic, preprogrammed
information that are exemplified by the appliances of Figure 1. Id. Thus,
Appellants urge that “[t]he Examiner errs by relying upon substantially
different information obtained from substantially different sources’ '' than
claimed. Id. at 14. Appellants also argue that “Durling disparages incurring
home field installation costs at paragraph [0007] and so disparages even
entry of the number of types of appliances, the types of appliances, or the
number of appliances of each appliance type at the time of installation.”
Reply Br. 9.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. The specified
“appliance information,” relating to “one or more energy using appliances”
stored in memory represents data that does not patentably differentiate the
structure or function of the energy meter of claim 1 from Durling. The
energy meter and its function of claim 1 and Durling are the same; only the
quality, i.e., relative specificity or accuracy of the input data differs between
Durling and the instant claims. We need not give patentable weight to
descriptive material absent a new and unobvious functional relationship
between the descriptive material and the device. See Ex parte Nehls, 88
USPQ2d 1883, 1887—90 (BPAI 2008) (precedential); see also In re Ngai,
367 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272,
1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“Nonfunctional descriptive material
cannot render nonobvious an invention that would have otherwise been
obvious.”), affd, No. 06-1003 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rule 36). Thus,
nonfunctional descriptive material—namely the appliance information of the
claims—does not confer patentability to inventions that are otherwise
obvious over the prior art.
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Fourth, Appellants assert that “[t]he systems of the independent
claims employ a processor coupled to an energy meter in conjunction with
the user supplied information.” Appeal Br. 14—16. Appellants criticize
Durling as it does not disclose the “recited items of stored information of the
independent claims having been input by the user of the appliances
[occupant(s)] within the building.” Id. at 12—13.
Appellants fail to identify error in the Examiner’s rejection.
Appellants’ Specification does not assign any particular meaning to the term
“user,” much less the narrow definition Appellants’ suggest—i.e., “user of
the appliance” or “occupant of the building.” Therefore, and as explained by
the Examiner, “the user can be any user including [a] user pre-programing
[sic] the meter.” Ans. 14. Durling teaches that appliance information,
including information from “offline experiments” that relates to the
probability of appliances turning on and off, can be preprogrammed into the
energy meter. Durling 146. Therefore, the Examiner reasons that “it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention
was made that a user enter or pre-program appliance information ... for the
benefit of having a profile data available for the analysis of energy
consumption based on data from previous experiments.” Ans. 16. We find
no error in the Examiner’s reasoning.
Lastly, Appellants contend that because “Durling matches observed
transient patterns with previously determined representative transient pattern
and based on the best fit assigns the power consumption observed to a
category . . . Durling does not infer a pattern of energy usage for each
appliance using the measured energy usage, the appliance information and
listing of typical usage hours . . . .” Appeal Br. 15. This is due to the fact
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that Durling does not use appliance information related to the “number of
appliances of each type installed within the building,” as claimed. Id.
Appellants also argue that using the predetermined appliance profiles of
Durling to infer what appliance types would be present, similarly changes
the principle of operation of Durling as different input information would be
used. Reply Br. 5. Therefore, Appellants reason that the proposed
modifications cannot be made.
For the reasons discussed above, Appellants do not persuade us of
reversible error because their argument objects to the nature of the appliance
information used and the data input, and, as descriptive information it cannot
render nonobvious that which would have otherwise been obvious over the
prior art. Nehls, 88 USPQ2d at 1887-90; Curry, 84 USPQ2d at 1274.
Rejections C and D — Obviousness
(dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12 and 13 and dependent claims 7 and 16)
Claims 2, 3, 5, and 7:
The Examiner rejects claims 2, 3, 5 (Rejection C), and 7 (Rejection D)
as obvious over Durling in view of Rodenberg and additionally in view of
Golden as applied to claim 7. Final Act. 11 and 16. These claims depend
from independent claim 1. Claims Appendix at Appeal Br. 20. Appellants
do not present any arguments for claims 2, 3, 5 and 7 separate from what is
argued for claim 1. See Appeal Br. 17—18. Therefore, for the reasons
discussed above (see supra p. 7—11), we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 2, 3, 5 and 7.
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Claims 9, 10, 12, 13 and 16:
The Examiner rejects claims 9, 10, 12, 13 (Rejection C), and 16
(Rejection D) as obvious over Durling in view of Rodenberg and
additionally in view of Golden as applied to claim 16. Final Act. 11 and 16.
These claims depend from independent claim 8. Claims Appendix at Appeal
Br. 21—22. Because we reversed the rejection with respect to claim 8, and
the Examiner does not rely upon Rodenberg or Golden to cure the
deficiencies identified above with regard to Durling (see supra p. 5—6), we
do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9, 10, 12, 13, and 16.
Rejection E— Obviousness (claims 17 and 18)
The Examiner rejects claim 17 as obvious over Durling, Rodenberg
and in view of Ehlers. Final Act. 17. Claim 17 is similar to claim 1 but
additionally requires “an input device for inputting information about the
one or more energy consuming devices within the building by the user” and
“a display for displaying the energy usage pattern to the user.” Claims
Appendix at Appeal Br. 22—23. The Examiner again reasons that “[i]n order
to pre-program this information this information [would] have to be pre­
programmed by an [sic] user. Therefore to enter/pre-program this
information by a user would have been obvious.” Final Act. 20. The
Examiner also notes that Durling does not teach a display; but, “Rodenberg
teaches a system and method for monitoring energy usage and displaying
electrical power consumption and cost at the consumer’s residence or
business (see page 1, paragraph [0002]) using a Receiving Display Unit (see
page 1, paragraph [0006]).” Id. at 21. According to the Examiner, it would
have been obvious to modify Durling to include a display “for the benefit of
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enhancing the system [by] providing the user with a means for watching
their energy consumption.” Id.
Appellants maintain similar positions addressed above for
independent claim 1. Appeal Br. 18—19; Reply Br. 8—11. Moreover,
Appellants contend that the additionally cited references, Rodenberg and
Ehlers, do not overcome the deficiencies of primary reference Durling
discussed above. Appeal Br. 18—19.
For the reasons discussed above for claim 1, we are unpersuaded by
Appellants’ arguments.
Appellants, for the first time in reply, additionally argue (1) that a user
data input of Rodenberg “serves no purpose in Durling and thus there is no
motivation for the proposed combination” and (2) “[t]he building user inputs
[of Ehlers] identified by the Examiner appear to be a thermostat setting and
possibly a preferred humidity, neither of which is information recited in
claim 17.” Reply Br. 10. Appellants have not explained, nor is it apparent,
that these arguments were necessitated by the Examiner’s Answer or could
not have been presented in the principal brief. Therefore, these arguments
are untimely and we will not reach arguments presented for the first time in
a reply brief in the absence of good cause. 37 C.F.R. §41.41(b)(2).
Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner reversibly erred in rejecting claims 8, 11, 14, and 15
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Durling.
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The Examiner reversibly erred in rejecting claims 9, 10, 12, 13 and 16
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Durling in view of
Rodenberg and Golden (as applied to claim 16).
The Examiner did not reversibly err in rejecting claims 1, 4, and 6
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Durling.
The Examiner did not reversibly err in rejecting claims 2, 3, and 5
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Durling in view of
Rodenberg.
The Examiner did not reversibly err in rejecting claim 7 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Durling in view of Golden.
The Examiner did not reversibly err in rejecting claims 17 and 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Durling in view of
Rodenberg and in further view of Ehlers.
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8—16 is
reversed and the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—7, 17, and 18 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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