Ex Parte Stahl et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 15, 201913699310 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 13/699,310 01/30/2013 Thomas Anthony Stahl 24498 7590 02/20/2019 Vincent E. Duffy THOMSON Licensing 19868 Collins Road CANYON COUNTRY, CA 91351 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. PU100128 3445 EXAMINER CASTRO, ALFONSO ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2421 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/20/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): mike.pugel@eurekovation.com vincent.duffy@technicolor.com Patricia. Verlangieri@InterDigital.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte THOMAS ANTHONY STAHL, DARREL WAYNE RANDALL, and AARON MICHAEL SMITH 1 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 Technology Center 2400 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, ERIC S. FRAHM, and JAMES DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges. COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-25. Claims 26-37 are cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm. 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Thomas Licensing, France. See Appeal Br. 3. Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 Invention Embodiments of Appellants' claimed invention on appeal relate to: [A] system and method for providing wireless broadcast and/ or locally stored entertainment services on a people transporter, such as an airplane, a bus, or a train, and more particularly to a system and method for providing program guide according to whether the people transporter is within or without an area authorized to receive wireless broadcast and whether the user desires display of channels from the wireless broadcast in the program guide. Spec. 1. Representative Claim 1. A method for use in a mobile content distribution system, said system having content stored locally and capable of receiving content wirelessly from a wireless service provider, compnsmg: determining if said system is within an area authorized to receive content from a first wireless service provider; if said system is not within said authorized area, enabling display of a program guide including channels from said locally stored content but no channel from said first wireless service provider, wherein the locally stored content is stored on a people transporter, and selectable to be watched using the program guide; and if said mobile system is within an area authorized to receive content from said first wireless service provider, the method further comprising: [L 1] determining if a user signal has been received for receiving live wireless program guide information from said first wireless service provider; and [L2] if said user signal has been received, acquiring said live wireless program guide information and enabling display of said program guide including channels from said locally stored 2 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 content and channels from said first wireless service provider included in said live wireless program guide information. (Emphasis added regarding the contested limitations LI and L2). Rejection Claims 1-25 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being obvious over the combined teachings and suggestions of Sklar et al. (US 5,801,751, issued Sept. 1, 1998, hereinafter referred to as "Sklar"), in view of Hammond (US 2002/ 0152470 Al, published Oct. 17, 2002). ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellants' arguments and any evidence presented. We have reviewed Appellants' arguments in the Briefs, the Examiner's obviousness rejections, and the Examiner's responses to Appellants' arguments. Appellants do not proffer sufficient argument or evidence to persuade us of error regarding the Examiner's underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). For at least the reasons discussed below, we agree with and adopt the Examiner's underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, as set forth in the Final Action and Answer. In our analysis below, we highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis. GROUPING OF CLAIMS Based upon Appellants' arguments (App. Br. 7-9), and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv), we decide the appeal of the single obviousness rejection of claims 1-25 on the basis of representative claim 1. 3 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 Contested Limitations LI and L2 of Independent Claim 1 Appellants contest the Examiner's findings regarding the following limitations L 1 and L2 of independent claim 1: [L 1] determining if a user signal has been received for receiving live wireless program guide information from said first wireless service provider; and [L2] if said user signal has been received, acquiring said live wireless program guide information and enabling display of said program guide including channels from said locally stored content and channels from said first wireless service provider included in said live wireless program guide information. Claim 1 (emphasis added). See Appeal Br. 7-9. At the outset, we note the above contested steps or acts are recited in similar form having commensurate scope in remaining independent system claim 14. Appellants understand the Examiner does not rely on Sklar to disclose contested limitations L 1 and L2 of claim 1. See Appeal Br. 7-9. Thus, Appellants generally focus their arguments on the Examiner's findings (Final Act. 6-7), regarding Hammond, paragraphs 44--48, 62, and 63, as allegedly disclosing the contested limitations. See Appeal Br. 7-9; Reply Br. 2-7. Appellants also contend Hammond "teaches away" from the claimed invention "by disclosing a program guide which only provides the display and selection of recorded (i.e., locally stored) programs, and does not provide the display and selection of any live programs, contrary to the present claimed invention." Appeal Br. 7. Appellants urge that "Hammond teaches a system which records all of the programs that the system has received." Id. (emphasis added). 4 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 In support, Appellants contend: The system in Hammond merely makes a program selection from two locally recorded sources, a "RECORD PROGRAM" storage medium 77 or the other "RECORD PROGRM" storage medium 83, as shown in Fig. 6A and Fig. 6B, and clearly described in [0062] and [0063] of Hammond. First, Hammond clearly states in [0063] that "recorded programs 83 may also be selected at the mixer for display on the screen 82", as shown in Fig. 6B. Also as shown in Fig. 6B, the mixer 81 of Hammond also selects programs from "D" which are in fact from another "RECORD PROGRAM" storage medium 77 shown in FIG. 6A. Accordingly, again, Hammond's system and therefore its EPG are related only to programs which are all already locally recorded or stored, contrary to the present claimed invention. Appeal Br. 7-8. Appellants thus submit the proposed combination of Sklar and Hammond does not disclose or suggest at least limitations L 1 and L2 of claim 1. App. Br. 8. Appellants further contend the Examiner has not established any probability or expectation of success in combining the cited references to arrive at the claimed invention. App. Br. 9. In response, the Examiner further explains the basis for the rejection: [T]he Appellants appear to stipulate that Hammond discloses a program guide which provides the display and selection of recorded (i.e., locally stored) programs. By the same token, the Appellants argue that Hammond does not provide the display and selection of any live programs. The Examiner agrees with the Appellant that Hammond does teach a program guide which provides for display and selection of recorded (i.e., locally stored) programs but the Examiner disagrees that Hammond does not provide the display and selection of any live programs. Ans. 5 (emphasis added). 5 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 Claim Construction 2 As an initial matter of claim construction, we conclude there is no language in claim 1 that precludes the wireless service provider electronic 2 We give the contested claim limitations the broadest reasonable interpretation ("BRI") consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Spec. 7, 11. 4--10: "all statements herein reciting principles, aspects, and implementations of the present principles, as well as specific examples thereof, are intended to encompass both structural and functional equivalents thereof. Additionally, it is intended that such equivalents include both currently known equivalents as well as equivalents developed in the future (i.e., any elements developed that perform the same function, regardless of structure)." (Emphasis added). We direct the Examiner's attention in the event of further prosecution of this application to In re Fuetterer (319 F.2d 259, 263 (CCPA 1963)), wherein the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained: In the Fullam case [In re Fullam, 161 F.2d 247, 73 USPQ 399 (CCPA 1947)], this court stated that some claims were properly rejected as "functional in claiming merely the desired result well known to and sought after by workers skilled in the art." Claims directed merely to a "desired result" have long been considered objectionable primarily because they cover any means which anyone may ever discover of producing the result. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62; Heidbrink v. McKesson, 290 F. 665. (Emphasis in original.) See also 3 7 C.F .R. § 1. 79 - Reservation clauses not permitted ("A reservation for a future application of subject matter disclosed but not claimed in a pending application will not be permitted in the pending application, but an application disclosing unclaimed subject matter may contain a reference to a later filed application of the same applicant or owned by a common assignee disclosing and claiming that subject matter."). See also MPEP § 608.0l(e) ("Reservation Clauses Not Permitted [R- 08.2012]"). 6 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 program guide (EPG) and associated program content information from being stored along with previously stored local content for later delayed use. Rather, claim 1 merely conditionally restricts a channel of "said first wireless service provider" from being displayed in the program guide with the included channels of "said locally stored content" when "said system is not within said authorized area." (Emphasis added). Moreover, claim 1 is silent regarding any details of an extrinsic authorized area agreement with a wireless service provider, or other regulatory restriction, that would preclude time-shifted display of program content ( as opposed to merely restricting EPG content when the system "is not within said authorized area," as claimed). Claim 1. 3 Turning to the evidence cited by the Examiner, we find at least Hammond teaches or suggests the contested "determining" limitation L 1, which occurs subsequent to the step of acquiring an in-service satellite (block 71 ) (para. 61 ), whereupon "the satellite EPG (Electronic Program Guide) is downloaded from the satellite (block 73 ). " Hammond ,r 62. Regarding Appellants' "teaching away" argument, our reviewing court guides: "A reference may be said to teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent from 3 Cf Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding that time shifting of TV program content falls under the fair use doctrine - "One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible."). 7 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 the path that was taken by the applicant." Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ( citations omitted). However, a "finding that the prior art as a whole suggests the desirability of a particular combination need not be supported by a finding that the prior art suggests that the combination claimed by the patent applicant is the preferred, or most desirable, combination." In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Teaching an alternative or equivalent method, however, does not teach away from the use of a claimed method. In re Dunn, 349 F.2d 433,438 (CCPA 1965). See DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("A reference does not teach away [ ... ] if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not 'criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage' investigation into the invention claimed."). Here, because both Hammond and Sklar pertain to in-flight satellite TV reception, we find they are in the same field of endeavor and therefore are analogous art to the claimed invention. See In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Specifically, we find Appellants' "teaching away" argument unavailing, because we find nothing in Hammond or Sklar that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the invention claimed. In response to Appellants' contention that "Hammond is addressing a different problem than the present claimed invention" (Reply Br. 4), our reviewing court guides it is irrelevant that the prior art and the present invention may have different purposes. See Nat 'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("A finding that two inventions were designed to resolve different problems ... is insufficient to demonstrate that one invention teaches away from another."). 8 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 It is sufficient that references suggest doing what Appellants did, although the Appellants' particular purpose was different from that of the references. In re Heck, 699 F.2d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 539 (CCPA 1967)). For a prima facie case of obviousness to be established, the reference need not recognize the same problem solved by the Appellants. See In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court provides further guidance: "[N]either the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the [Appellants] controls" when performing an obviousness analysis. KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). In reviewing the record, we find Appellants are arguing the references separately. Appellants essentially attack Hammond in isolation, and do not substantively traverse the Examiner's underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness, which is based upon Sklar in combination with Hammond. 4 Turning to the evidence cited by the Examiner (Ans. 9, footnote 14), Sklar expressly describes both real time TV satellite reception on an aircraft, and also delayed reception that has been stored for use when the aircraft is out of range of any satellite provider: An example of the operation of the present invention is a flight leaving the West coast of the United States, heading 4 Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). 9 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 East and flying over the Atlantic Ocean to Europe. The aircraft would be within the coverage area of the DBS satellites for five or more hours, during which time the digitized television data would be received and stored on board the aircraft. This data includes programming for each of the approximately 150 channels transmitted by the satellites 18. During this phase of the flight, the passengers have real- time access to these programs. After leaving the East coast, the stored television data would be presented to the passengers. Thus, for the remainder of the flight, when the aircraft is out of range of the satellites 18, the passengers still have access to television programming, although it is a time delayed version. Sklar col. 5, 11. 53-67 ( emphasis added). Moreover, to the extent that Hammond stores or buffers EPG or TV content received when the aircraft (i.e., "people transporter") is within a particular content provider's satellite coverage area (see Fig. 6A, record storage 77; ,r 62), we find extending Hammond's capabilities to include real time TV reception on an aircraft, as expressly taught by Sklar ( column 5, lines 53---67), would have merely been the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions-an obvious improvement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417; see also id. ("[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill."). Thus, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1, limitation L2, would have been a predictable result that also would have been obvious to try. See Ans. 5. Even without experimentation, simple logic suggests there are only three possibilities: (1) enabling the EPG display of local channels from locally stored content, or (2) enabling the EPG display of the received live (real time satellite) programming guide, or (3) enabling both, as recited in 10 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 limitation L2. We find it self-evident that the live wireless programming guide (and associated live satellite TV content) will not be available for viewing, unless: (1) the system is within the authorized wireless coverage area, or, (2), the wireless EPG and associated TV content have been previously locally stored. Thus, there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions to suggest that Appellants' claimed method and system would have been obvious. Appellants have not proffered any evidence properly entered into the record proving that skilled artisans would not have reasonably expected success if the teachings of the Sklar and Hammond references were so combined. Our reviewing court guides: "[ o ]bviousness does not require absolute predictability of success ... all that is required is a reasonable expectation of success." In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903---04 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Nor is there any evidence of record indicating that a person of ordinary skill would have needed to "vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices," or "explore a new technology or general approach ... where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it," which would counsel against an invention being obvious to try. Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1359 (quoting In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894,903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). We therefore find the Examiner's reason to combine the teachings of Sklar and Hammond is supported by articulated reasoning with sufficient rational underpinning to justify the Examiner's legal conclusion of obviousness. 11 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 We again emphasize that the Examiner's ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness is based upon the combined teachings of the cited references. Moreover, "'the question under 35 USC 103 is not merely what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made."' Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)). (Emphasis added); see also MPEP § 2123. This reasoning is applicable here. However, in the event that our reviewing court would disagree, we further emphasize the conditional language recited in claim 1: (in bold) if said user signal has been received, acquiring said live wireless program guide information and enabling display of said program guide including channels from said locally stored content and channels from said first wireless service provider included in said live wireless program guide information. Claim 1 ( emphasis added). See Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal No. 2013-007847, at *9 (PTAB, April 28, 2016) (precedential) (holding The Examiner did not need to present evidence of the obviousness of the remaining method steps of claim 1 that are not required to be performed under a broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim (e.g., instances in which the electrocardiac signal data is not within the threshold electrocardiac criteria such that the condition precedent for the determining step and the remaining steps of claim 1 has not been met.); see also Ex parte Katz, Appeal No. 2010-006083, 2011 WL 514314, at *4--5 (BPAI Jan. 27, 2011). 12 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 Here, we apply the controlling guidance of Schulhauser, and additionally find the Examiner need not present evidence of the obviousness of the conditional method step ("if said user signal has been received"), as recited in claim 1, because this conditional step is not positively recited as being actually performed under a broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. 5 Even assuming, arguendo, that the recited condition precedent is actually reached, in considering representative independent claim 1 as a whole, we further conclude that Appellants' claimed "program guide" (and any associated program content) is non-functional descriptive material (NFDM) intended for human viewing. Although an interactive program guide graphical user interface might generally be otherwise construed as functional, such functional interactivity with the program guide is not recited in claim 1. The rvfanual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) provides applicable guidance: "where the claim as a whole is directed to conveying a message or meaning to a human reader independent of the intended computer system, and/or the computer-readable medium merely serves as a support for information or data, no functional relationship exists." MPEP 5 See, also e.g., Applera Corp. v. Illumina, Inc., 375 F. App'x 12, 21 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (affirming a district court's interpretation of a method claim as including a step that need not be practiced if the condition for practicing the step is not met); Cybersettle, Inc. v. Nat 'l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 243 F. App'x 603, 607 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (unpublished) ("It is of course true that method steps may be contingent. If the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied, the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed."). 13 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 § 2111.05 (III.) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, Last Revised Jan. 2018). See also Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BP AI 2008) (precedential) ("[T]he nature of the information being manipulated does not lend patentability to an otherwise unpatentable computer-implemented product or process."). Therefore, in applying the procedural guidance of the MPEP, and the controlling guidance of Nehls, we broadly but reasonably construe the recited displayed "program guide" (and any associated program content) as non-functional descriptive material merely intended for human perception. For at least the aforementioned reasons, and on this record, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner's factual findings for contested limitations L 1 and L2 of representative independent claim 1. On this record, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's underlying factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness for representative independent claim 1. Claims 2-25 (not argued separately) fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 1-25. Reply Brief To the extent Appellants may advance new arguments in the Reply Brief not in response to a shift in the Examiner's position in the Answer, we note arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner's Answer will not be considered except for good cause. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). In particular, Appellants' have not shown good cause why we should consider Appellants' new arguments (Reply Br. 6) and untimely new evidence (i.e., two Comcast screen shots), which were introduced into the 14 Appeal2017-003328 Application 13/699,310 record for the first time in the Reply Brief (7). See 3 7 C.F .R. § 41.41 (b )( 1) ("A reply brief shall not include any new or non-admitted amendment, or any new or non-admitted affidavit or other Evidence."). CONCLUSION The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-25 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.50(f). AFFIRMED 15 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation