Ex Parte Sneddon

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 26, 2013

12290819 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/290,819 11/04/2008 Kirk Sneddon PA0011744U.67397-117PUS1 5185
54549 7590 02/27/2013
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS/PRATT & WHITNEY
c/o CPA Global
P.O. Box 52050
Minneapolis, MN 55402
EXAMINER
KASHNIKOW, ERIK
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1782
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte KIRK SNEDDON
____________

Appeal 2011-012683
Application 12/290,819
Technology Center 1700
____________

Before ROMULO H. DELMENDO, GEORGE C. BEST, and
GRACE KARAFFA OBERMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.

OBERMANN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks relief under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the following
rejections of claims 1 and 18-26 directed to a pressure vessel: Claims 1
and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by, or in the alternative,
under § 103(a) as unpatentable over, both Seal (US 5,822,838) and,
separately, Phillips (US 4,421,827); claims 19-26 as unpatentable under
§ 103(a) over Seal and, separately, Phillips, both in view of Pocius
(Adhesion, Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, Wiley
Online Library: Book Article, 1-11 (2002)). We have jurisdiction under 35
U.S.C. § 6.
We REVERSE.
Appeal 2011-012683
Application 12/290,819

2
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is set
forth below:
1. A pressure vessel for containing materials under elevated
pressures, said pressure vessel comprising:

a liner;

an adhesive layer, applied directly to an outer surface of said liner,
said adhesive layer having a texture formed by a peel ply applied to said
adhesive layer prior to cure then removed post cure to transfer said texture
from said peel ply to said adhesive layer; and

an overwrap layer applied onto said adhesive layer post cure, said
overwrap layer formed by winding an impregnated filamentary material
around said adhesive layer such that said impregnated filamentary material
binds with said adhesive layer.

The independent claims are 1 and 24. Claim 1 specifies an “adhesive
layer having a texture formed by a peel ply” in a process that “transfer[s]
said texture from said peel ply to said adhesive layer[.]” Claim 24 specifies
an “adhesive layer having a texture formed thereon,” wherein the “texture
forms an open surface porosity at a micromechanical level[.]”
The Examiner identifies no process in either primary reference (Seal
or Phillips) whereby a texture is transferred to, or formed on, the surface of
an adhesive layer as specified in claims 1 or 24. Ans. 4-6. Instead, the
Examiner concludes that these are product-by-process claims, and that as
such, the specified “texture” is met by any adhesive layer, because “all
layers intrinsically have a textured surface.” Ans. 5 (applying Seal to
claim 1); Ans. 6 (applying Phillips to claim 1); Ans. 9 (finding that “all
limitations as to” claim 24 “have been disclosed above”).
Appeal 2011-012683
Application 12/290,819

3
Specifically, the Examiner reasons that the “broadly used [] term
texture” is met by “the surfaces in Seal [] and Phillips” because they “must
inherently have a texture, whether it be smooth, bumpy or [having] open
surface porosity on a micromechanical level[.]” Ans. 10. But that is not
how Appellant uses the term “texture” in the Specification. According to the
Specification, a “texture” is imparted to the adhesive layer, for example, by
placing a peel ply in “100% surface contact” with that layer to give
“volatiles a low resistance path for evacuation.” Spec. 11:16-17 and 12:1-4.
The Specification consistently supports the plain language of claims 1
and 24, which specify that a particular “texture” is imparted to the surface of
the adhesive layer by the surface of the peel ply. The plain terms of claim 1
require an “adhesive layer having a texture formed by a peel ply” wherein
the texture transfers “from said peel ply to said adhesive layer.” The plain
terms of claim 24 require an “adhesive layer having a texture formed
thereon, said texture form[ing] an open surface porosity at a
micromechanical level.”
We thus agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s view that “every
surface has a texture, inherently, and thus any surface can meet the claims”
is based on an overly broad interpretation of the term “texture.” Reply Br. 1
(emphasis omitted). As Appellant points out, the Examiner makes no
showing that the inherent texture of the adhesive layer disclosed in Seal or
Phillips “would be equivalent to a texture formed by a peel ply.” Id. at 2
(emphasis omitted). Moreover, transferring the texture of a peel ply to the
surface of an adhesive layer (claim 1), or forming on an adhesive layer a
texture having “open surface porosity at a micromechanical level” (claim
24), necessarily results in a “final texture” that is different from the intrinsic
Appeal 2011-012683
Application 12/290,819

4
“initial texture” that characterizes the adhesive layer prior to application of a
peel ply. Id. Stated in a slightly different way, the Examiner fails to show
that a peel ply does not alter the surface of an adhesive layer.
Critically lacking here is any evidence establishing that the intrinsic
surface texture of the adhesive layer disclosed in Seal or Phillips is
structurally identical to “a texture formed by a peel ply” (claim 1), or “a
texture formed” to leave “an open surface porosity at a micromechanical
level” (claim 24). The secondary reference (Pocius) generally explains the
interplay between surface roughness and adhesion, but the Examiner does
not explain with specificity how the Seal or Phillips disclosure is to be
modified in view of Pocius in the manner claimed.
We thus reverse the rejections of claims 1 and 18-26.

REVERSED

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