Ex Parte SHOWALTER

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 12, 2018

14286039 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 12, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/286,039 05/23/2014 Thomas SHOW ALTER
113027 7590 10/16/2018
Muncy, Geissler, Olds & Lowe, P.C. CoreLogicl 13027
4000 Legato Road
Suite 310
Fairfax, VA 22202
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
CORLOG.020CON 8902
EXAMINER
HOLLY, JOHN H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/16/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
meo.docket@mg-ip.com
meo@mg-ip.com
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte THOMAS SHOW ALTER
Appeal2017-004753
Application 14/286,039
Technology Center 3600
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges.
SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal2017-004753
Application 14/286,039
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's invention is directed to a data analytics model for loan
treatment. Spec. ,r 5. Claim 15, reproduced below, is representative of the
claimed subject matter:
15. A computer-implemented method for analytics in loan
treatment comprising:
accessing, by a computer system from at least one data
repository through a first communication channel, credit report
information for a person associated with a loan, property
information for a specific property associated with the loan,
loan information for the loan, and real estate market
information for a region including the specific property,
wherein the real estate market information includes a time on
market for the region including with the specific property, and
wherein the property information includes a property value,
equity, or open lien amount;
applying, by a data processor, a cluster model, the cluster
model comprising an unsupervised machine-learned classifier
configured to classify a borrower of the loan and the specific
property into one of a plurality of borrower-property clusters,
each of the plurality of borrower-property clusters being a
function of both the credit report information and the property
information;
applying, by the data processor, a net present value
model as a function of the plurality of borrower-property
clusters, the property information, the loan information, the
loan treatment information, and the real estate market
information, the net present value model comprising a machine
trained model configured to calculate the net present value; and
outputting through a second communication channel the
net present value.
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e. a law of nature, a
natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as being obvious
over the combination of Goldblatt et al. (US 2006/0218079 Al; published
Sept. 28, 2006) ("Goldblatt") and Shao et al. (US 7,191,150 Bl; issued Mar.
13, 2007) ("Shao").
ANALYSIS
35 USC§ 101 Rejections
To determine whether a claim is eligible under § 101, "[ w ]e must first
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible
concept." Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014).
"[I]n applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that
claim the 'buildin[g] block[s]' of human ingenuity and those that integrate
the building blocks into something more." Id., 134 S. Ct. at 2354--55. One
must keep in mind that "all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect,
rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,"
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71
(2012), and "describing the claims at ... a high level of abstraction and
untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the
exceptions to§ 101 swallow the rule." Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822
F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Instead, "the claims are considered in
their entirety to ascertain whether their character as a whole is directed to
excluded subject matter." Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.,
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790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). "If the claims are not directed to an
abstract idea [or other patent-ineligible concept], the inquiry ends. If the
claims are 'directed to' an abstract idea, then the inquiry proceeds to the
second step of the Alice framework." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The Examiner determines:
In this case, a series of steps for performing data analytics in
loan treatment, claims 1-20 recite a series of steps of applying,
by a data processor, a cluster model, the cluster model
comprising an unsupervised machine-learned classifier
configured to classify a borrower of the loan and the specific
property into one of a plurality of borrower-property clusters,
each of the plurality of borrower-property clusters being a
function of both the credit report information and the property
information; applying, by the data processor, a net present value
model as a function of the plurality of borrower property
clusters, the property information, the loan information, the
loan treatment information, and the real estate market
information, the net present value model comprising a machine-
trained model configured to calculate the net present value; and
outputting through a second communication channel the net
present value, which is a fundamental economic principle.
Final Act. 4. The Examiner further determines the functionality recited in
the claims "has long been used in the industry in which people purchase
goods, services, or other reasons, thus concluding a fundamental economic
practice." Ans. 19. The Examiner determines the claims are "similar to
other concepts that have been identified as abstract ... such as comparing
new and stored information and using rules to identify options." Final Act.
4. In addition, the Examiner determines the claims "can be performed with a
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Application 14/286,039
pencil and paper or in a computer and is similar to the 'information
processing technology' at issue in Content Extraction . .. " Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues the Examiner "misidentified any abstract idea that
may be present in claims 1-20" because the language "comparing new and
stored information and using rules to identify options" is not recited in any
of independent claims 1, 9, and 15. App. Br. 6. Appellant further argues
that by merely quoting the claim language, the Examiner has not sufficiently
explained why the subject matter of the claims is directed to a judicial
exception. App. Br. 6-7. In addition, Appellant argues the detailed features
in the claims "are in contrast to the very high-level abstract ideas in the
relevant case law on this topic." App. Br. 8.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. In analyzing whether a
claims is directed to an abstract idea, we look to other decisions where
similar concepts were previously found abstract by the courts. See Amdocs
(Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The Examiner determined the claims were similar to those in SmartGene,
Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 Fed. Appx. 950, 955 (Fed. Cir.
2014) ("comparing new and stored information and using rules to identify
medical options" is an abstract idea), not that the claim language itself
recites "comparing new and stored information and using rule", as Appellant
argues. See Final Act. 4. The Examiner also determined the claims were
similar to those in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat. Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Final Act. 5; Ans.
19.
We agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to performing
data analytics in loan treatment, which is a fundamental economic practice,
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and thus, an abstract idea. See Final Act. 3--4; Ans. 6. Moreover, the claims
are directed to collecting information ( e.g., "accessing ... [data]"),
analyzing the information ( e.g., "applying ... a cluster model," "applying ..
. a net present value model"), and displaying the information ("outputting ..
. the net present value"). The claims are thus, comparable to other claims
found to be directed to abstract ideas. See, e.g., Electric Power Group, LLC
v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("collecting
information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and
analysis" are "abstract-idea processes"); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674
F.3d 1315, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (determining a loan clearinghouse process
is abstract); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs.for Imaging, Inc., 758
F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("organizing information through
mathematical correlations"); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 ("1)
collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and
3) storing that recognized data in a memory" are directed to an abstract
idea); LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. Appx. 991, 996 (Fed. Cir.
2016) ( claims directed to "a loan-application clearinghouse, or more simply,
coordinating loans" are abstract).
In the second step of the Alice framework, we then "consider the
elements of each claim both individually and 'as an ordered combination' to
determine whether the additional elements 'transform the nature of the
claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). The Supreme Court describes this as "a search
for an inventive concept-- i.e., an element or combination of elements that is
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sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the ineligible concept itself." Id. (quotation omitted).
The Examiner determines the claims "can be performed with a pencil
and paper or in a computer and [are] similar to the 'information processing
methodology' at issue in Content Extraction." Final Act. 5; see also Ans.
19. Further, the Examiner determines the claims "require[] no more than a
generic computing device (server), a client (generic computer) interface, and
a network ( connected generic computers) to perform generic functions that
are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known
in the industry." Final Act. 6; see also Ans. 6-9.
Appellant argues the claims do not "'tie up' the use of the alleged
abstract idea of 'comparing new and stored information and using rules to
identify options."' App. Br. 9. Appellant further argues the Examiner has
not provided sufficient factual findings that the features of the claims are
"well-understood, routine and conventional," nor that they have been "long
used in the industry in which people purchase goods, services, or other
reasons, thus concluding a fundamental economic practice." App. Br. 10.
According to Appellant, "neither Goldblatt nor Shao, either alone or in
combination, discloses" the limitations in claim 15, "so these features are
clearly not 'well-understood, routine and conventional."' App. Br. 11-12.
Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. The c1airns generically
recite a "computer system" and '"data processor." Appellant does not direct
our attention to anything in the Specification that shows any specialized
computer hardware or other "inventive" computer components are required.
Nor has Appellant persuasively argued why the functions performed in the
c 1ai ms - accessing data, analyzing data, and outputting data - are not
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routine, conventional, and well-known functions of a generic computer. See
buySAFE', Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[t]hat
a computer receives and sends information over a network--------with no further
specification-is not even arguably inventive''); In re TL! Communications
LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F .3d 607, 614 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (server that
receives data, extracts classification information from the received data, and
stores the digital images insufficient to add an inventive concept); Lending
Tree, 656 Fed. Appx. at 996 ("automating conventional activities using
generic technology does not amount to an inventive concept"). Rather, the
Specification describes generic computer components performing generic
computer functions that are routine and conventional, and are performing the
normal, basic functions of a computer. See, e.g., Spec. ,r 8 ("[a] computer
generates a user interface . .. [a] user input of the computer receives . ..
[ t ]he computer calculates ... [ t ]he receiving and calculating are repeated ...
[a] display displays ... "); see also Spec. ,r,r 49, 12, 13, 71; see also Electric
Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 ("Nothing in the claims, understood in light of the
specification, requires anything other than off-the-shelf, conventional
computer, network, and display technology for gathering, sending, and
presenting the desired information."). "In order for the addition of a
machine to impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a
significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather
than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be
achieved more quickly, i.e., through the utilization of a computer for
performing calculations." SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'! Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d
1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assur. Co. of Canada, 687 F.3d 1266, 1277-78 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Accordingly, Appellant has not adequately explained how the claims
are performed such that they are not routine, conventional functions of a
generic computer. The claims at issue do not require any nonconventional
computer or display components, or even a "non-conventional and non-
generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces," but merely call for
performance of the claimed data collection, analysis, and display "on a set of
generic computer components." Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349--52 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus,
considering the features of the claims, individually and as an ordered
combination, we find there are no additional elements that transform the
nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2355.
With regard to Appellant's argument that the pending claims are
patent eligible because Golblatt and Shao do not teach the limitations, (see
App. Br. 11-12), Appellant improperly conflates the requirements for
eligible subject matter(§ 101) with the independent requirements of novelty
(§ 102) and non-obviousness(§ 103). "The 'novelty' of any element or
steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101
categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981); see also Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818
F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (stating that, "under the Mayo/Alice
framework, a claim directed to a newly discovered law of nature ( or natural
phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery
for the inventive concept necessary for patent eligibility").
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Appellant's preemption argument is likewise unpersuasive of
Examiner error. Although preemption "might tend to impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it, 'thereby thwarting the primary object
of the patent laws"' (Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. 70)),
"the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent
eligibility." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
13 59, 13 62---63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price
optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce
setting do not make them any less abstract.").
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we, therefore, sustain the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1-20.
35 USC§ 103(a) Rejections
Dispositive Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of
Goldblatt and Shao teaches or suggests
applying, by a data processor, a cluster model, the cluster model
comprising an unsupervised machine-learned classifier
configured to classify a borrower of the loan and the specific
property into one of a plurality of borrower-property clusters,
each of the plurality of borrower-property clusters being a
function of both the credit report information and the property
information,
as recited in independent claim 15 and commensurately recited in
independent claims 1 and 9?
The Examiner relies on Shao to teach or suggest the disputed
limitation. Final Act. 8, 22-23 (citing Shao 7: 19-33, 10:39-52); Ans. 15-17
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(citing Shao 7: 19--33, 10:39-52). Appellant argues "there is no disclosure or
suggestion in the cited sections of Shao of 'classify[ing] a borrower of the
loan and the specific property into one of a plurality of borrower-property
clusters,' much less where 'each of the plurality of borrower-property
clusters [is] a function of both the credit report information and the property
information."' App. Br. 16. According to Appellant:
While Shao discloses that 'document vectors Vi are then
clustered,' there is no disclosure or suggestion in Shao that this
clustering is performed 'to classify a borrower of the loan and
the specific property into one of a plurality ofborrower-
property clusters,' much less where 'each of the plurality of
borrower-property clusters [is] a function of both the credit
report information and the property information.' Rather, it is
the document vectors Vi that are clustered. There is simply no
disclosure or suggestion that 'a borrower of the loan and the
specific property' are classified 'into one of a plurality of
borrower-property clusters.'
App. Br. 17.
We are persuaded by Appellant's arguments. Although Shao teaches
clustering document vectors Vi in order to determine subject matter
similarities pertaining to debt collectors' notes (Shao 10:39--52, 11: 15-24),
Shao does not describe classifying a borrower of the loan and the specific
property into one of a plurality of borrower-property clusters, each of the
plurality of borrower-property clusters being a function of both the credit
report information and the property information. Rather, Shao describes
clustering based on similar contextual information in the collectors' notes,
such as, for example, clusters based on illness, criminal and legal issues,
payment plans and settlements, or foreclosure and job issues. Shao 14:5--48.
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The Examiner has not sufficiently explained how Shao, even in combination
with Goldblatt, teaches or suggests the disputed limitation.
Because we agree with at least one of the arguments advanced by
Appellant, we need not reach the merits of Appellant's other arguments.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of
independent claims 1, 9, and 15. For the same reasons, we do not sustain the
Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections of dependent claims 2-8, 10-14, and
16-20.
DECISION
The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection of claims 1-20 is affirmed.
The Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claims 1-20 is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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