Ex Parte Schwarz et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 5, 2014

11349523 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte STANLEY G. SCHWARZ,
CHRISTOPHER M. MACHECA,
and MICHAEL GLANCY
____________

Appeal 2012-002984
Application 11/349,523
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, CARLA M. KRIVAK, and
JEFFREY S. SMITH, Administrative Patent Judges.

SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2012-002984
Application 11/349,523

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 2–10, 15–17, 22–25, 35, and 68–82, which are all the
claims remaining in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.

Representative Claim
17. A method for remotely disabling a product in response to
an event, comprising:
receiving a payment schedule regarding the product;
detecting a first trigger event associated with the payment
schedule; and
transmitting a message to a device coupled to the product
in order to disable the product, the transmitting responsive to
detection of the first trigger event, and wherein the message
instructs the device to disable the product at a specified time in
the event no additional messages are received by the device.

Prior Art
Palmer US 4,700,296 Oct. 13, 1987
Joao US 5,917,405 June 29, 1999
Abrams US 6,587,739 B1 July 1, 2003
Bishop US 6,611,201 B1 Aug. 26, 2003
Simon US 2006/0108417 A1 May 25, 2006

Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 2–5, 8, 10, 15–17, 22, 23, 35, 68, 69, and 71 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Bishop.
Appeal 2012-002984
Application 11/349,523

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Claims 6 and 72 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bishop and Joao.
Claims 7 and 73 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bishop and Abrams.
Claims 9 and 70 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Bishop and Simon.
Claims 24, 25, 74–77, 80, and 82 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Bishop and Palmer.
Claim 78 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Bishop, Palmer, and Joao.
Claim 79 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Bishop, Palmer, and Abrams.
Claim 81 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Bishop, Palmer, and Simon.

ANALYSIS
We adopt the findings of fact made by the Examiner in the Final
Rejection and Examiner’s Answer as our own. We agree with the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 2–10, 15–17, 22–25, 35, and 68–82 for
the reasons given in the Examiner’s Answer. We highlight the following for
emphasis.

Section 102 rejection of claims 2-5, 8, 10, 15-17, 22, and 23
Claim 17 recites “transmitting a message [that] instructs the device to
disable the product at a specified time in the event no additional messages
are received by the device.” The Examiner finds Bishop describes
Appeal 2012-002984
Application 11/349,523

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transmitting a message that instructs the device to disable a vehicle, or
“product,” at a specified time suing relay based systems such as slave relay
unit 308. Ans. 12-13. Appellants contend Bishop describes immediately
disabling the vehicle, but does not teach delaying the disablement. Reply
Br. 2–3. In particular, Appellants contend column 11, lines 1–27 of Bishop
refers to a warning system giving a warning at a predetermined time, but
does not refer to slave relay unit 308 performing an action at a
predetermined time. Reply Br. 4.
Appellants’ contentions are inconsistent with Bishop, which
describes, “slave relay unit 307 or the warning system 7 performs an
accessing, monitoring, controlling, and/or warning function on its own, such
as when it is programmed to do so at a predetermined time of day or after a
predetermined time period . . . .” Col. 11, ll. 2–6 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Bishop describes “transmitting a message [that] instructs the
device to disable the product at a specified time in the event no additional
messages are received by the device” within the scope of claim 17.
We therefore sustain the rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
Appellants do not present arguments for separate patentability of claims 2–5,
8, 10, 15, 16, 22, and 23, which fall with claim 17.

Section 103 rejections of claims 6, 7, and 9
Appellants do not present arguments for separate patentability of
claims 6, 7, and 9, but rely on those presented for claim 17 (App. Br. 21),
which we find unpersuasive. We therefore sustain the rejections of claims 6,
7, and 9 under 35 U.S.C. §103.

Appeal 2012-002984
Application 11/349,523

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Section 102 rejection of claims 35, 68, 69, and 71
Appellants contend Bishop does not disclose a second message
responsive to the trigger event associated with the payment schedule. App.
Br. 20. In particular, Appellants contend the advertisements disclosed by
Bishop are not tied to the trigger event. Reply Br. 6. However, Bishop
discloses the messages “may include warnings prior to or concurrently with
the enabling or disabling a particular function in the vehicle; notifications or
instructions to the owner/operator; or even advertisements.” Col. 5, ll. 49–
52. Appellants have not provided persuasive argument or evidence to show
the warnings, notifications, and instruction messages of Bishop are not
responsive to the trigger event.
Further, the Examiner finds the acknowledge signal of Bishop
describes the second message within the meaning of claim 35. Ans. 17–18.
Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence or argument to rebut the
Examiner’s finding.
We therefore sustain the rejection of claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
Appellants do not present arguments for separate patentability of claims 68,
69, and 71, which fall with claim 35.

Section 103 rejections of claims 70, 72, and 73
Appellants do not present arguments for separate patentability of
claims 70, 72, and 73, but rely on those presented for claim 35 (App. Br. 21),
which we find unpersuasive. We therefore sustain the rejections of claims
70, 72, and 73 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

Appeal 2012-002984
Application 11/349,523

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Section 103 rejections of claims 24, 25, and 74-82
Appellants contend the access control card of Palmer does not teach a
credit card within the meaning of claim 25. App. Br. 23–24; Reply Br. 6.
The Examiner finds the access control card of Palmer represents a rental
payment, or “credit,” which teaches a credit card. Ans. 19–20. Appellants
have not provided a definition of “credit card” that excludes a card having a
credit of a rental payment as taught by Palmer.
We therefore sustain the rejection of claim 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appellants do not present arguments for separate patentability of claims 24
and 74–82, which fall with claim 25.

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2–10, 15–17, 22–25,
35, and 68–82.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

msc