Ex Parte Schuh

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 24, 2017

13958896 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/958,896 08/05/2013 Eric J. Schuh SUB-02607-U S-NP 2016
173 7590 10/26/2017
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION - MD 3601
2000 NORTH M63
BENTON HARBOR, MI 49022
EXAMINER
MORALES FERNANDE, BENJAMIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/26/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
whirlpool_patents_co@whirlpool.com
mike_lafrenz @ whirlpool .com
deborah_tomaszewski@whirlpool.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ERIC J. SCHUH1
Appeal 2017-002574
Application 13/958,896
Technology Center 2600
Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—13, which constitute all the claims pending in
the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 Appellant identifies Whirlpool Corporation as the real party in interest.
App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-002574
Application 13/958,896
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s described and claimed invention is generally directed to
locking out a portion of a touch screen interface. Spec 12.2
Claim 1 is illustrative and reads as follows (with the disputed
limitation emphasized)'.
1. A method for locking out at least a portion of a touch
screen interface in response to an inadvertent touch, the method
comprises:
detect multiple touches on the portion of the touch screen
interface;
determine that the multiple touches are incompatible
touches, wherein the incompatible touches include touches that
are not indicative of a user-selectable combination;
initiate a lockout time period in response to the
determination; and
reinitiate the lockout time period in response to a
subsequent touch during the lockout time period.
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1—3, 6, 8, and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger et al. (US 2013/0069903 Al; published Mar. 21,
2013) (“Geiger”) and Williams et al. (US 2009/0021401 Al; published Jan.
22, 2009) (“Williams”).
2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed Nov. 5, 2015 (“Final
Act.”), Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed Mar. 3, 2016 (“App. Br.”) and Reply
Brief filed Nov. 30, 2016 (“Reply Br.”), the Examiner’s Answer mailed Oct.
7, 2016 (“Ans.”), and the original Specification filed Aug. 5, 2013 (“Spec.”).
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Appeal 2017-002574
Application 13/958,896
Claims 4 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Williams, and Cho (US 2015/0009160 Al;
published Jan. 8, 2015).
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Williams, and Yum et al. (US 2012/0110747 Al;
published May 10, 2012) (“Yum”).
Claims 10-13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Geiger, Williams, and Sugimoto (US 2014/0009418 Al;
published Jan. 9, 2014).
ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue raised by the Briefs3 is whether Geiger teaches
or suggests the limitation “determine that the multiple touches are
incompatible touches,” as recited in claim 1.
The Examiner finds that Geiger teaches the disputed limitation
because Geiger discloses “detecting inadvertent touches and disabling the
capacitive touch input interfaces based on a detection of an inadvertent
touch.” Ans. 1; see also Final Act. 3 (citing Geiger || 17, 18, 27). The
Examiner also finds that, even though paragraphs 17 and 18 of Geiger
disclose “the inadvertent input as pause, reset or others,” a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have recognized “that the system can be
configured to perform the lockout process for any inadvertent touch and it
will merely require a simple condition for determining that condition to be
inadvertent.” Ans. 1.
3 Although Appellant makes other arguments in the Briefs, we do not
address them because the resolution of this issue is dispositive.
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Appeal 2017-002574
Application 13/958,896
We are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred.
Appellant argues, and we agree, the Examiner’s characterization of Geiger is
incorrect because the touches are “compatible touches having an intended
and valid use,” such as “to pause or reset a video game or application that is
in use” (see Geiger 117), even though the touches are presumed or
determined to be accidental or unintentional. App. Br. 12. We note
Appellant’s Specification states that “incompatible touches” are
combinations of touch keys that, “when touched simultaneously, may not
activate a predetermined response of the electronic device.” Spec. 118.
Accordingly, we agree with Appellant’s argument that the claimed
“incompatible touches” cannot be met by expanding Geiger, as the Examiner
suggests, “to include any touches that do not meet a ‘simple condition’ to be
inadvertent.” See Reply Br. 2; see also, Ans. 1. Thus, because the touches
in Geiger activate a predetermined response of the electronic device, even
though they may be inadvertent, we agree with Appellant’s argument that
Geiger does not teach or suggest “determining that the multiple touches are
incompatible touches.” App. Br. 12.
Accordingly, on this record, we are constrained to find the Examiner
erred because the Examiner has not shown that Geiger teaches or suggests
the disputed limitation by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re
Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Examiner’s burden of proving
non-patentability is by a preponderance of the evidence). Thus, we do not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and dependent claims 2—13, for
obviousness under § 103(a).
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Appeal 2017-002574
Application 13/958,896
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—13 for obviousness
under § 103(a).
REVERSED
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