Ex Parte SambharDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 21, 201612611655 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 21, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/611,655 11103/2009 48500 7590 06/23/2016 SHERIDAN ROSS P,C 1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200 DENVER, CO 80202 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Ankur Sambhar UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 4366YDT-269 2920 EXAMINER CHOI, DAVIDE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2174 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/23/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): cjacquet@sheridanross.com pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com edocket@sheridanross.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ANKUR SAMBHAR Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 Technology Center 2100 Before ERIC S. FRAHM, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and CARLL. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. ENGELS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1--4, 6-16, 18, 19, and 21-23. Claims 5, 17, and 20 are canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM Claim 1, reproduced below with reference letters added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: [A J 1. A method for enhancing a conference comprising: [BJ designating a virtual meeting attendant (VMA) to act on behalf of a previously invited conference attendee; [CJ recognizing one or more of a triggering event in the conference and a tagged agenda item; [DJ taking an action item on behalf of the conference attendee based on at least one of the one or more triggering events in the conference, wherein the VMA has access to information that allows patching on demand, based on the at least one of the one or more triggering events in the conference, via an initiation of an outbound communication, of the conference attendee into the conference to allow the conference attendee to contribute to the conference and interact with one or more other conference attendees attending the conference in real-time; [EJ determining, based on preferences and presence information, how to contact the conference attendee; and [FJ in response to detecting the triggering event in the conference, initiating a contact to the conference attendee. APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) claims 1, 3--4, 6, 7, 9-13, 15-16, 18, and 19 as being unpatentable over the combination of Gudipaty (US 2009/0319916 Al; Dec. 24, 2009), Rapaport (US 2010/0205541 Al; Aug. 21, 2010), and Karlsson (US 2005/0221808 Al; Oct. 6, 2005); claims 2, 8, and 14 as being unpatentable in view of Gudipaty, Rapaport, Karlsson, and Vijayakumar (US 2011/0022967 Al; Jan. 27, 2011); and claims 21-23 as being unpatentable in view of Gudipaty, Rapaport, Karlsson, and Myers (US 7,065,186 B 1; June 20, 2006). 2 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 ANALYSIS Claims 1--4, 6, 7, 9-16, 18, and 19 The Examiner finds Gudipaty describes a multimedia-conference system with an "auto-attend" feature that allows conference invitees who cannot attend a conference to record the conference and to collaborate with actual attendees, among other functionality. See Final Act. 3-9; Ans. 3--4; Gudipaty i-fi-f 19-22, 58, 69-70. In combination with the teachings of Gudipaty, the Examiner cites Rapaport for its disclosures of "patching on demand" based on a triggering event and Karlsson as an additional disclosure of initiating communications with a contact in response to a triggering event. Final Act. 7-9 (citing Rapaport i124 and Karlsson i-f 11 ); see also Final Act. 24; Ans. 4. Appellant argues the combination of references fails to teach or suggest element H, as labeled above in claim 1. See App. Br. 8. Specifically, contrasting Rapaport, Appellant argues claim 1 requires "the initiation of the outbound communication to be to the conference attendee (an attendee that was previously invited) to join the conference attendee to a conference currently in progress," but Rapaport teaches away from that requirement with its disclosures of a system that invites "individuals to join a new online chat room or session that has not yet commenced." App. Br. 8. Further, Appellant asserts the Examiner's combination of Gudipaty and Rapaport would not work as claimed because: Using the Examiner's logic, the user is invited to the original conference (as disclosed in Gudipaty). Based on events in the original conference, the user would then be invited to join the new conference of Rapaport so that the conference attendee can contribute and interact, in real-time, with one or more conference attendees attending the original conference. The 3 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 Examiner's logic fails to answer one question: how can the user interact with the attendees of the original conference in real- time when the user is in a new (different) conference with different users (users defined by the clustering results)? The Examiner is trying to combine the two references in a way that not only contradicts the conflicting teachings of the references but also would not work as claimed claim 1. App. Br. 9. Appellant's Reply brief additionally argues "the Examiner has not established that Gudipaty discloses an outbound communication that allows the conference attendee to interact with the other conference attendees in real time as required by claim 1" because Gudipaty only describes communication by a single meeting participant with an auto-attendee via e-mail or IM. Reply Br. 5-7 (citing Gudipaty i-f 69-70). We find Appellant's arguments unpersuasive. Contrary to Appellant's arguments regarding the form of communication described in Gudipaty (see Reply Br. 6-7), the plain language of claim 1 requires "initiating a contact to the conference attendee," and Appellant's Specification broadly describes such contact to include a "patch" by instant message (Spec. 5), "via text, via a messaging service, via a multimedia service, or the like" (Spec. 14). Gudipaty similarly lists "email, IM, chat, voice, device, etc." as exemplary communication channels with which meeting participants can "establish a communication channel using the appropriate communications modality, and engage in interactive communications with the auto-attendee." Gudipaty i-f 70 (emphasis added). That Gudipaty describes an example of one meeting participant asking a question of an auto-attendee does not limit or detract from Gudipaty' s clear teaching of "interactive communications with the auto-attendee." Gudipaty 4 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 if 70; accord id. if 69 ("This published presence state information informs others that desire to contact the presentity of his/her availability and willingness to communicate."). We are also unpersuaded by Appellant's arguments that the Rapaport teaches away from Gudipaty or that the combination of references would result in users invited to an original conference, as disclosed in Gudipaty, communicating in real time with users in a new, different conference, as disclosed in Rapaport. See App. Br. 8-9; Reply Br. 5---6. "The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference." See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). The test for obviousness "is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art." Id. (citations omitted); accord KSR Int 'l Co. v. TeleFlex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (S. Ct. 2007) (obviousness analysis does not require precise teachings of the claimed subject; the analysis should account for the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ). Here, the Examiner provided detailed findings with reasonable explanations for the combinations of references supported by rational underpinnings to reach the conclusion of obviousness, and Appellant has not persuasively rebutted the Examiner's findings and conclusions. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 1, as well as independent claim 13 and dependent claims 2--4, 6, 7, 9-12, 14--16, 18, and 19, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments as claim 1. 5 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 Claim 8 Claim 8 recites "[t]he method of claim 1, wherein VMA's are ranked based on one or more of a title and an order received." In addition to the Examiner's findings regarding claim 1, the Examiner cites Vijayakumar's disclosures of an online-meeting system that displays a ranked list of meeting participants based on meeting participants' work experience and other variables. See Final Act. 16-7; Vijayakumar i-fi-f 15-18, 21, and 28. Appellant argues the Examiner erred in citing Vijayakumar's disclosures regarding rankings of meeting participants (i.e., people) based on work experience, while "claim 8 requires that VMA's be ranked based on a title or order received." App. Br. 10; accord Reply Br. 8. Appellant clarified in the Reply Brief that "Appellant is not arguing that Gudipaty does not disclose a VMA. The Appellant is arguing that neither Gudipaty, Rapaport, nor Vijayakumar disclose the ranking of a VMA." Reply Br. 8; accord App. Br. 10 ("Vijayakumar does not even discuss a Virtual Meeting Assistant (VMA), let alone ranking a VMA as required by claim 8. How can Vijayakumar disclose ranking a VMA when it does not disclose any type of VMA ?"). We find Appellant's arguments unpersuasive as Appellant again attacks the references individually without addressing the substance of combined teaches of the prior art. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425. Further, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 4--5) that a reasonable interpretation of "title" in claim 8 includes a conference attendee's title (see Spec. 13(listing "attendee title")) and that claim 8 would have been obvious in view of Gudipaty' s disclosures addressed above in further of view of Vijayakumar' s suggestions of ranking the online representations of meeting participants 6 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 based on variables such as work experience, which, as Appellant acknowledges may equate to, or at least suggest, a title (App. Br. 10 ("A person's work experience may or may not have anything to do with the person's title."); Reply Br. 8 ("a person's title does not necessarily equate to a person's expertise")). See also Gudipaty i-fi-141 ("organizational information (e.g., a title)"), 58. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 8. Claims 21-23 Claim 21 depends from claim 1 and recites the following disputed limitation, with emphasis added by Appellant (App. Br. 11 ): "wherein the triggering event in the conference comprises detection of the conference attendee's name spoken in the conference and detection of a question to the conference attendee spoken in the conference." Appellant argues Gudipaty does not teach this limitation because, similar to the arguments addressed above regarding claim 1, "it is clear that the communication channel used to ask the question [in Gudipaty] is a separate communication channel from the multi-media conference." App. Br. 11-12 (citing Gudipaty ,-r,-r 67, 69-70). We find Appellant's argument unpersuasive for the reasons addressed above. In addition, claim 21 expressly includes within its scope both "converting the question to text and sending the text over an Instant Message (IM) to the conference attendee" and "calling the conference attendee and playing the question to the conference attendee" (App. Br. 18 (Claims App'x)), both of which are consistent with the modalities disclosed in 7 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 Gudipaty (see Gudipaty if 70 (reciting questions sent to an auto-attendee by IM and voice, among other means)). We are also unpersuaded by Appellant's argument that Gudipaty does not disclose "detection of a question asked in the conference." App. Br. 12. As the Examiner finds (Final Act. 4, 17-20, 25-26), Gudipaty teaches using triggers such as agenda items, the presence or availability of a certain meeting participant, and questions or requests from meeting participants to determine when to present auto-attendee files to actual attendees, to allow an auto-attendee to ask a questions, or to indicate when an auto-attendee becomes available to answer a question. See Gudipaty iii! 21 ("An auto- attendee may desire to ... ask a question on an agenda topic .... "), 58 ("presentation parameters may specify certain logical event segments suitable for the auto-attend file 208 (e.g., agenda iteml), context indicators suitable to trigger presentation of the auto-attend file 208 (e.g., presence of a certain meeting participant 154-1-p ), ... [explicit or] implicit requests from a meeting participant 154-1-p and so forth."); 69-70 (describing a presence detection module to monitor and retrieve presence information of auto- attendees to "inform[] others that desire to contact the [auto-attendee's] presentity of his/her availability and willingness to communicate"); see also Gudipaty Fig. 3 (identifying "John" as an auto-attendee; stating "Present John's Slide Deck for Agenda Item]" and "John ... Available"). In addition, for each of claims 21, 22, and 23, Appellant argues that when a name is detected in Myers, the user is not in a conference, but the Examiner does not rely on Myers for conference-related limitations. Instead, the Examiner cites Myers as evidence that methods for recognizing 8 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 a spoken name were known in the art at the time of Appellant's invention, a fact Appellant acknowledges. See App. Br. 12-13. We agree with the Examiner that the combination of such teachings in Myers's with the teachings of Gudipaty, Rapaport, and Karlsson would have taught or suggests the limitations of claim 21, as well as claims 22 and 23 which recite related limitations and for which Appellant relies on the same arguments. Appellant's arguments do not substantively address the references' combined teachings as cited by the Examiner, and Appellant cannot establish nonobviousness by attacking Myers individually without addressing the references' combined teachings. See Keller, 642 F.2d at 425; KSR Int'!, 550 U.S. at 418 (obviousness analysis does not require precise teachings of the claimed subject; the analysis should account for the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ). Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejections of claims 21- 23. CONCLUSION Having considered each of Appellant's arguments regarding claims 1- 4, 6-16, 18, 19, and 21-23 in view of the Examiner's rejections and the evidence of record, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error and adopt as our own the Examiner's findings, conclusions, and reasoning consistent with the above. DECISION The Examiner's rejections of claims 1--4, 6-16, 18, 19, and 21-23 are affirmed. 9 Appeal2014-009247 Application 12/611,655 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended. 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation