Ex Parte SalibaDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardFeb 1, 201914722809 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 1, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/722,809 05/27/2015 76444 7590 Setter Roche LLP 14694 Orchard Parkway Building A, Suite 200 Westminster, CO 80023 02/05/2019 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR George Saliba UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. Ql5-1004-US1 4363 EXAMINER RIZK, SAMIR W ADIE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2112 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/05/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@setterroche.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte GEORGE SALIBA 1 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 Technology Center 2100 Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JON M. JURGOV AN, and NABEEL U. KHAN, Administrative Patent Judges. JURGOV AN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-25. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We affirm-in-part. 2 1 The Appeal Brief indicates the real party in interest is Quantum Corporation. Appeal Brief 2. 2 Our Decision refers to the Specification ("Spec.") filed May 27, 2015, the Final Office Action ("Final Act.") mailed April 21, 2017, the Appeal Brief ("App. Br.") filed October 13, 2017, and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.") mailed December 15, 2017. Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 CLAIMED INVENTION The claimed invention relates to hybrid error correction codes (HECC) that combine the speed and flexibility of rateless code approaches ( e.g., fountain codes) with the efficiency of rated Reed-Solomon codes. Spec. ,r 45. The codes are dynamically variable, and the number of codes provided to a set of receivers may be less than a complete set of codes to save computing and transmission resources. Id. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed invention: 1. A method, comprising: accessing first electronic data that describes a data storage device to which a message has been provided, where the first electronic data is not provided by the data storage device, where the message was provided from a hybrid Reed Solomon data structure stored in an electronic data storage, where the hybrid Reed Solomon data structure includes plaintext data arranged in two or more dimensions and a set of error detection codes associated with a first dimension of the plaintext data; selecting a number of error correcting codes to produce for the message based, at least in part, on the first electronic data; producing the number of error correcting codes for the message from data stored in the hybrid Reed Solomon data structure, storing the number of error correcting codes in the hybrid Reed Solomon data structure as part of a set of error correcting codes associated with a second, different dimension of the plaintext data, and selectively providing one or more of the number of error correcting codes to one or more error correcting code receivers. App. Br. (Claims App. 1) ( emphasis added). 2 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 REJECTIONS Claims 23-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non- statutory subject matter. Final Act. 2. Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. Final Act. 2-3. Claims 1-25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) based on Watson (US 2007/0300127 Al, December 27, 2007) and Oren (US 2013/0077719 Al, March 28, 2013). Final Act. 4--10. ANALYSIS § 101 Rejection Patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de nova. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, we review the Examiner's§ 101 determinations concerning patent eligibility under this standard. Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101, as follows: [w Jhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. In interpreting this statute, the Supreme Court emphasizes that patent protection should not preempt "the basic tools of scientific and technological work." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Benson"); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) ("Mayo"); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) ("Alice"). The rationale is that patents directed to basic building blocks of technology would not "promote the [p ]rogress of [ s ]cience" under 3 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, but instead would impede it. Accordingly, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas, are not patent-eligible subject matter. Thales Visionix Inc. v. US., 850 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354). The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for subject matter eligibility in Alice (134 S. Ct. at 2355). The first step is to determine whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept. Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76-77). If so, then the eligibility analysis proceeds to the second step of the Alice/ Mayo test in which we "examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72, 79). There is no need to proceed to the second step, however, if the first step of the Alice/Mayo test yields a determination that the claim is directed to patent eligible subject matter. The Patent Office has recently revised its guidance for how to apply the Alice/Mayo test in the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 FR 50-57 (January 7, 2019) ("the Revised Guidance"). Applying Step 1 of the Revised Guidance (which is unchanged from the prior guidance) to the present case, we determine that claims 23 to 25 recite a "computerized method" which is a form of "process" falling within one of the categories enumerated under § 101, thus satisfying Step 1 of the Revised Guidance. We proceed to apply Step 2A of the Revised Guidance to determine if the claims are "directed to" a judicial exception. Step 2A of the Revised Guidance corresponds to the first step of the Alice/Mayo test but is in part 4 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 changed from the 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 FR 74618-74633 (Dec. 16, 2014). The first prong of Step 2A under the Revised Guidance is to determine whether the claims recite a judicial exception including (a) mathematical concepts; (b) certain methods of organizing human activity; and ( c) mental processes. Reviewing claim 23, shown below, we note that the claim involves mathematical concepts, namely, mathematical algorithms for producing Reed Solomon error correcting codes and a Reed Solomon generator matrix. 23. A computerized method, comprising: storing a message, by a computer, in an electronic data store; controlling how many hybrid rateless Reed Solomon error correcting codes for the message are produced by the computer that stores the message in a modified Reed Solomon generator matrix, where the hybrid rateless Reed Solomon error correcting codes are produced using the modified Reed Solomon generator matrix, and controlling the time at which the computer produces the hybrid rateless Reed Solomon error correcting codes. App. Br. 15 (Claims App.). Accordingly, we proceed to the second prong of Step 2A, where we inquire whether an additional element of the claim integrates the mathematical concept into a practical application. Revised Guidance at 54-- 55. Such an additional element may reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to another technology or technical field. Id. at 55. By controlling how many hybrid rateless Reed Solomon error correcting codes are produced by a computer for a message, the claimed invention avoids generation of extraneous error codes. Spec. 5 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 3 8-39. Controlling the time at which a computer produces the codes allows for their availability when needed, and prevents their generation when not needed. Id. Consequently, claim 23 recites improvements to the functioning of the computer, thus integrating the mathematical concept into a practical application. Claims 24 and 25 incorporate the additional element by virtue of their dependency from claim 23. Thus, we determine claims 23 to 25 are directed to patent eligible subject matter. Accordingly, we do not address Step 2B of the Revised Guidance ( corresponding to step two of the Alice/Mayo test). § l l 2(b) Rejection "[W]hen the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of§ 112(b )." In re Zietz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The USPTO construes claims under their broadest reasonable interpretation during prosecution "to facilitate sharpening and clarifying the claims at the application stage." In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Zietz at 322. See also MPEP § 2173. The Examiner concludes claim 1 is "indefinite and ambiguous and foggy" and thus rejected the claim under§ 112(b ). Final Act. 2-3. In particular, the Examiner notes claim 1 recites "accessing first electronic data that describes a data storage device to which a message has been provided, where the first electronic data is not provided by the storage device." Id. 6 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 The Examiner then asks "How [sic] an electronic data describes a data storage?" Id. We interpret the Examiner's statement as meaning the claim does not explain how the electronic data describes the data storage device, and consequently is ambiguous. Appellant responds that "electronic data can describe numerous different types of information, such as software instructions, text documents, audio/visual media, etc.," and that "it would not be outside the realm of someone having ordinary skill in the art to make electronic data describe a data storage device rather than, for example, a Word document." App. Br. 7-8. Appellant also argues modem operating systems display information about storage components, such as hard disk drives, solid state drives, etc., in the computer. Id. at 8. Appellant's argument is unclear and inconsistent with what the Specification describes as the "first electronic data that describes a data storage device." A decision on whether a claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) requires a determination of whether those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification. Power-On, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Specification seems to state that the first electronic data relates to reliability of a data storage device or whether a message provided to the data storage device was stored error free. Spec. ,r,r 43, 45. Appellant's argument does not agree with what is described in the Specification for the claimed limitation, and is thus unpersuasive to show Examiner error. 7 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 § 103 Rejection "Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."' KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) ("KSR"). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). A. Independent Claims 1, 19, and 2 3 Regarding claim 1, the Examiner finds that paragraph 45 of Oren discloses the claimed "accessing first electronic data that describes a data storage device to which a message has been provided." Final Act. 5. Oren discloses that their invention can be used not only in Mobile Digital Television (MDTV) receivers, but also in other applications that involve 2-D encoding, such as other kinds of wireless receivers, Digital Video Disks (DVDs), Hard Disk Drives (HDD), memories and backplanes. Oren ,r,r 11, 45. The Examiner concludes that Oren discloses "[a]ll kids [sic] of electronic data that describes storage device." Ans. 9. Title 35 U.S.C. § 132 provides in part: (a) Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected, or any objection or requirement made, the Director shall notify the applicant thereof, together with such information and references as 8 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his application. The Examiner's rejection does not meet this standard, because it does not provide the information necessary to judge the propriety of continuing prosecution. In particular, the Examiner does not indicate what specifically he is relying upon in Oren's paragraph 45 to disclose the claimed "first electronic data that describes a data storage device." An explanation from the Examiner was needed under the circumstances to support the rejection. Accordingly, we do not sustain the § 103 rejection against claim 1. The Examiner rejects claims 19 and 23 for the same reasons as claim 1. Final Act. 10. Appellant notes that claims 19 and 23 include limitations not recited in claim 1, such as claim 19' s row-centric error detection codes and column-centric error correcting codes. We agree with Appellant that the Final Office Action should have explained where, specifically, Watson and Oren disclose the elements of claims 19 and 23, which are significantly different from claim 1. For example, the Examiner does not identify where Watson or Oren discloses the row-centric error detection codes and column- centric detection codes of claim 19, or the controlling of how many codes are produced and their timing, as recited in claim 23. Appellant was not given enough information useful in judging the propriety of continuing prosecution of claims 19 and 23, as required under § 13 2. B. Remaining Claims The remaining claims depend from the independent claims discussed above and necessarily incorporate all of their limitations. Accordingly, for 9 Appeal2018-003989 Application 14/722,809 the same reasons, we do not sustain the§ 103 rejections of the dependent claims. DECISION We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 23-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation